Case Number: VC064270 Hearing Date: August 04, 2015 Dept: SEC
DAVILA v. VILLARRUEL
CASE NO.: VC064270
HEARING: 08/04/15

#1
TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendants ALBERT VILLARRUEL, ANTHONY VILLARRUEL and GINA GARCIA’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the 4th (trespass) cause of action; otherwise OVERRULED. C.C.P. § 430.10(e).

This matter is consolidated with Villarruel v. Davila, Inc. (BC562522) and Davila v. Villarruel (14F10850). All three cases involve title and/or possession of certain real property located in Pico Rivera, CA.

The subject demurrer is directed at plaintiff MANUEL DAVILA’s First Amended Complaint filed in the lead case. Therein, he asserts causes of action for (1) cancellation of written instrument, (2) quiet title, (3) fraud, (4) trespass, (5) conspiracy and (6) punitive damages.

In the FAC, plaintiff alleges that he purchased the property in October 2002. FAC, ¶8; Exh. A (Grant Deed). He allowed defendant SUSAN GARCIA (now deceased) and her adult son, defendant Albert Villaruel to live at the property rent free. ¶9.

In June 2010, in response to concerns expressed by Susan, plaintiff executed a Grant Deed naming Susan as a testamentary trustee for the property. That Deed was to be recorded only upon plaintiff’s death. ¶11. It is designated as “Exhibit B,” but not attached to the FAC.

Plaintiff contends that Susan’s other children—co-defendants Anthony Villaruel and Gina Garcia—moved into the property. Thereafter, the demurring defendants obtained a copy of the 2010 Deed, and allegedly altered to designate them as grantees. ¶13. On April 16, 2014, defendants allegedly recorded the fraudulent deed. ¶3, Exh. C.

Plaintiff then recorded a Grant Deed on May 30, 2014 transferring the property from a “John LaPointe” back to plaintiff Davila. ¶14, Exh. D.

Defendants argue that plaintiff was, at some point, decedent Susan’s boyfriend but that decedent always intended to leave the subject property to her children. They further argue that the 2014 Grant Deed from LaPointe is a legal nullity, as he had no interest in the property. As noted above, defendants filed a separate action for quiet title to the property (BC562522).

1st—cancellation of instrument
Defendants contend that there is no basis to cancel the deed they recorded in 2014. Plaintiff alleges the Deed was fraudulently altered, and seeks cancellation on that basis. C.C. §3412. He need not “make a showing” of its invalidity at the pleading state. The demurrer is overruled.

2nd—quiet title
Although defendants demur to the “entire pleading,” their demurrer does not separately address the quiet title cause of action. It is overruled.

3rd—fraud
5th—conspiracy
Defendants argue that the fraud cause of action lacks the requisite specificity. The Court disagrees. The basis of plaintiff’s fraud cause of action is that the addition of the three defendants to the 2010 deed was the result of a forgery. The degree of particularity required depends on the extent to which the defendant needs detailed information to be placed on notice of the charges; less particularity is required where the defendant may be assumed to have knowledge of the facts equal to that possessed by the plaintiff. Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 1076, 1099. Here, defendants are alleged to have forged and recorded the deed at issue. They presumably possess knowledge of the factual circumstances surrounding that act. The allegations are sufficient and the demurrer overruled.

The demurrer to the conspiracy cause of action is overruled for the same reason. Plaintiff has alleged the wrongful act and resulting harm. He cannot reasonably be expected to plead facts with respect to the formation and operation of a conspiracy. See Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1224 (elements). The fact that the three defendants stood to jointly gain from the transfer is sufficient to support the cause of action against each.

4th—trespass/ejectment
Plaintiff alleges that he has a superior right to possession and that defendants are “wrongfully withholding” the subject property. FAC, ¶¶31, 32. Defendants demur on the ground that the elements of a trespass are not alleged and, in particular, plaintiff failed to allege lack of consent. See Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463. No dates are alleged, nor are the salient facts regarding each of the defendants’ residency there. The demurrer is sustained.

The cause of action appears to be duplicative of the issues raised in the consolidated unlawful detainer matter, particularly if plaintiff is only seeking possession. If that is the case, the claim should be dismissed. Otherwise, the Court will allow plaintiff the chance to amend to properly allege facts supportive of an actionable trespass.

6th—punitive damages
A claim for punitive damages should not be alleged as a cause of action. See, e.g. Millard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374. The form of the pleading is less important than its substance. Plaintiff has alleged a fraud claim, so he may also assert a claim for punitive damages. The demurrer thereto is overruled. (However, should plaintiff amend the pleading, the defect should be fixed).