Case Number: 19NWCV00388 Hearing Date: December 17, 2019 Dept: SEC

BEDFORD v. MENNINGER

CASE NO.: 19NWCV00388

HEARING: 12/17/19

CALENDAR NO. 2

TENTATIVE ORDER

Defendant Judge Kimberly Menninger’s demurrer to Marcus Bedford Jr.’s Complaint is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendant to give NOTICE.

BACKGROUND

On May 7, 2019, Marcus Bedford Jr. (“Plaintiff”) filed an action against Los Angeles Superior Court Judge, Kimberly Menninger (“Defendant”), for injuries arising from Defendant’s resentencing of Plaintiff in violation of his contractual and due process rights in the matter People v. Bedford, Case No. 95HF0077 (“Criminal Action”). The complaint asserts the following causes of action:

Breach of Contract

“Failure to Respond”

“Failure to Rebut Affidavit by Defendant”

“Impairing of Contractual Obligation”

“Violation of Due Process”

“Entered into Wilful Default”

“Agreement and Acceptance of Terms”

Defendant Judge Kimberly Menninger now demurs to the entire Complaint on the grounds that it is barred: (1) by absolute judicial immunity; (2) by Government Code sections 820.2 and 821.6; (3) by the privileges afforded to Judge Menninger pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b); (4) as to Bedford’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against Judge Menninger; and (5) by Bedford’s failure to timely comply with the written claims requirements of the California Government Claims Act prior to filing this action.[1]

On October 17, 2019, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion to oppose demurrer to complaint finding that Plaintiff’s arguments were more properly raised in an opposition to Defendant’s demurrer. The court reminded parties that any opposition must be filed in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (b).

Plaintiff failed to file an opposition to the demurrer as suggested by the court in its October 17, 2019 order.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests judicial notice of the case summary for People v. Bedford, Superior Court of California, County of Orange, Case No. 95HF0077. (RJN, Exh. A.) Judicial notice is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d))

Defendant Judge Kimberly Menninger’s Demurrer

Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack, or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994; SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905; Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered. (Ibid.)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)

A special demurrer for uncertainty under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (f) is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant or plaintiff cannot reasonably respond because it cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

JUDICIAL IMMUNITY – All Causes of Action

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims arise from findings and court orders made by her in her official capacity as the assigned judicial officer in the Criminal Action.

Judicial immunity provides judges with immunity from civil liability in the performance of their judicial duties. (Bradley v. Fisher (1871) 80 U.S. 335, 354 (Bradley).) Judicial immunity may only be overcome if the underlying conduct was not performed in a judicial capacity or performed in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 356–357 [finding that no matter how invalid the act, if performed within the judicial officer’s jurisdiction, it will not render the judicial officer liable to answer in damages for it at the suit of the aggrieved party]; See also Mireles v. Waco (1991) 502 U.S. 9, 11–12.) An act is considered judicial if the function is normally performed by a judge. (Id. at p. 12.)

Moreover, the Court of Appeal has held that “[i]t is well established judges are granted immunity from civil suit in the exercise of their judicial functions. [Citations.] This rule applies even where the judge’s acts are alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly. [Citations.] The rule is based on ‘ “a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequence to himself.” ’ [Citations.] Judicial immunity is a principle of common law which is necessary for the welfare of the state and the peace and happiness of society.” (Frost v. Geernaert (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1104, 1107–1108 (Frost).)

Here, the allegations of the Complaint indicate that the complained of conduct is the “resentencing action” on November 2, 2018. (Compl., Commercial Affidavit, ¶¶ 14, 16.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was “forced into slavery and false imprisonment” by “Kimberly Menninger, Judge for Superior Court Of Orange County.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that “by impairing and trespassing on valid contracts” he had entered with the prior judge assigned to the Criminal Action, Judge Richard M. Aronson, he has suffered damages. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19, ¶ 43.)

Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s demurrer to argue that the resentencing was not a judicial act. From the face of the Complaint, there are no cognizable factual allegations that Defendant acted outside of her jurisdiction in resentencing Plaintiff. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that she “willfully exercised color of law without fundamental or subject matter jurisdiction impaired, trespassed, and breached valid contracts between parties” (id. at ¶ 16) and acted “without fundamental jurisdiction.” (Id. at ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff’s allegations admit that Defendant, a Superior Court Judge, resentenced him in a criminal action. His conclusory allegations that Defendant lacked the jurisdiction to do so do not withstand a general demurrer. (Bradley, supra, 80 U.S. at p. 349, fn. 16.) Accordingly, the court SUSTAINS Defendant’s demurrer on grounds of judicial immunity.

LEAVE TO AMEND

A demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend “ ‘where the facts are not in dispute, and the nature of the plaintiff’s claim is clear, but, under the substantive law, no liability exists. Obviously no amendment would change the result.’ ” (Frost, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1107.)

It is not in dispute that Plaintiff’s allegations arise from Defendant’s exercise of her judicial duties in resentencing Plaintiff in a criminal matter. Under the substantive law of judicial immunity, no liability exists for actions taken by Defendant while she was acting within her jurisdiction as a Superior Court Judge. Accordingly, leave to amend is denied. (Frost, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 1107; Bradley, supra, 80 U.S. at p. 336; Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.)

Demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Defendant’s demurrer on judicial immunity grounds is sufficient to dispose of the entire Complaint; therefore, the Court need not discuss Defendant’s remaining bases for demurring to the Complaint.

Conclusion and Order

Defendant Judge Kimberly Menninger’s demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Prevailing party to give NOTICE.