Case Name: Maria Stella Lujan v. Andres Lujan, Jr.
Case No.: 18-CV-326398

Currently before the Court is the motion by defendant Andres Lujan, Jr. (“Defendant”) for judgment on the pleadings.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a personal injury action. Plaintiff Maria Stella Lujan (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant have a son together and reside at 13765 Appoloosa Drive in San Martin, California. (Complaint, ¶¶ GN-1 & IT-1.) On May 16, 2017, without notice or warning, Defendant carelessly, negligently, recklessly, intentionally, and willfully fired a gun at his son, who was crouching in the hallway of the family home. (Ibid.) “Plaintiff ran to help her son” and Defendant “discharged the firearm … next to her ear,” which caused Plaintiff significant hearing loss. (Ibid.) “He then continued to attempt to get a clear shot at his son while Plaintiff was attempting to keep him from shooting their son.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges that “[Defendant’s] discharge of his service revolver inside the residence … in an attempt to kill or injure his son constituted a[n] ultrahazardous activity.” (Id. at ¶ GN-1.)

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging causes of action for: (1) negligence; (2) assault and battery; and (3) negligence.

Defendant filed a first amended answer (“FAA”) to the complaint on March 27, 2019.

On June 20, 2019, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion on September 25, 2019.

Discussion

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438, Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the complaint.

I. Legal Standard

A defendant can move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint and/or (2) the complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).)

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is akin to demurrer and governed by the same procedural rules. (County of Orange v. Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 21, 32; Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254 (Shea).) The court must accept as true all properly pleaded material factual allegations, giving them a liberal construction, but not conclusions of fact or law. (Shea, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1254.) “A court will not consider facts which have not been alleged in the complaint unless they may be reasonably inferred from the matters which have been pled or are proper subjects of judicial notice.” (Hall v. Great Western Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 713, 719, fn. 7 (Hall); Shea, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1254 [“The grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the complaint, and in any matters subject to judicial notice. [Citation.]”].)

II. Merits of the Motion

Defendant argues the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because Plaintiff “signed a Stipulation for Judgment of Dissolution in Santa Clara Superior Court Case 2015-5-FL-002811,” “[t]his Stipulation contained a paragraph expressly constituting a full release of all issues between the parties,” and Plaintiff thereby released Defendant from any and all liability for damages incurred as a result of the incident on May 16, 2017. (Mem. Ps. & As., pp. 1:21-24, 2:3-6, 3:9-12, & 3:20-4:5.)

Defendant’s argument is not well-taken because it goes beyond the scope of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which considers only the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint and proper subjects of judicial notice. (See Hall, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 719, fn. 7.) The fact that Plaintiff entered into a stipulation in another case, which purportedly contained a release of her claims against Defendant, is not alleged in the complaint. Furthermore, that fact cannot be reasonably inferred from matters alleged in the complaint. In addition, Defendant did not submit a request for judicial notice of that fact or the stipulation between the parties. Thus, the Court cannot consider the fact that forms the basis of Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Defendant asserts the Court can properly consider the stipulation, and its contents, in ruling on the instant motion because the stipulation is attached as an exhibit to the FAA, citing Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Vaughn (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 171, 178 (Lumbermens). Defendant’s assertion lacks merit. Lumbermens merely sets forth the well-established principle that the Court may examine a written instrument when it is attached to the challenged pleading as an exhibit and properly incorporated in the pleading by reference. (Ibid. [“ ‘When a motion for judgment on the pleadings has the purpose and effect of a general demurrer, the facts alleged in the pleading attacked must be accepted as true, and the [trial] court may also consider matters subject to judicial notice.’ [Citation.] Ordinarily such a motion is confined to the face of the challenged pleading; but when a written instrument is attached to the pleading and properly incorporated therein by reference, the court may examine the exhibit and treat the pleader’s allegations of its legal effect as surplusage. [Citation.]”].) The FAA is not the challenged pleading under review. Thus, the Court cannot consider the exhibits attached thereto in connection with the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings.

In any event, Defendant cites no legal authority, and the Court is aware of none, providing that a release of claims somehow deprives the Court of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [“When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”]; see also Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612, 619, fn. 2 [same].) Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by constitutional or statutory law and has been defined by the California Supreme Court as “the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” (Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 1028, 1035.) “By contrast, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.” (Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 493, 503; Miller-Leigh LLC v. Henson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1143, 1148-1149.) A classic example of a matter over which California courts lack subject matter jurisdiction is an action based on claims where federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. (See e.g., Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 238 [lack of subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under federal patent laws].) Here, Plaintiff’s claims are for negligence, assault, and battery. Defendant does not present any reasoned legal argument or legal authority demonstrating that the Court lacks the power to hear or determine such claims.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the complaint is DENIED.