Filed 5/28/20 Beuchel v. Flanagan CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

MARIA V. BEUCHEL,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CAMERON M. FLANAGAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

B296548

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC682422)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elizabeth R. Feffer, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Dan Hogue and Dan Hogue for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Holmes, Taylor, Cowan & Jones, Andrew B. Holmes, and Patrick v. Chesney for Defendant and Respondent.

* * * * * *

Maria V. Beuchel (Beuchel) and Cameron M. Flanagan (Flanagan) have been neighbors for nearly 20 years and adverse litigants for nearly 15 of those years. This time around, Beuchel sued Flanagan over an alleged boundary dispute. The trial court sanctioned Beuchel $6,075 under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 after finding that she filed her complaint “for an improper purpose.” Beuchel now appeals this sanction. The sanction was proper, so we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. The boundary line

Beuchel and Flanagan have been next door neighbors in a residential neighborhood of Los Angeles since 2000. When Flanagan moved in, the boundary between their adjoining properties was delineated by the wall of Beuchel’s garage as well as a “series of old wall and wood fences.” Abutting that garage wall is a planter.

B. The parties’ prior disputes

Beuchel and Flanagan have been suing each other since 2006.

1. The 2006 lawsuit, settlement and release

In 2006, Flanagan sued Beuchel for civil harassment, and the parties ultimately settled the lawsuit. The settlement had two components: a Stipulation Re Settlement (the 2006 Settlement) and a Full and Final Mutual Release (the 2006 Release).

The 2006 Settlement contained 15 specific promises, including that (1) the parties “each agree to not interfere with the normal use of the other’s property, or the quiet use [and] enjoyment of the property,” and (2) “neither party shall destroy or deface the property of the other party.” The Stipulation also specified that the “[p]arties shall execute [a] mutual release of all claims, [including] related to the fence at the southwest corner of the Flanagan property.”

The 2006 Release specified that Beuchel and Flanagan:

“hereby release and forever discharge one another . . . from all actions, causes of action, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, which they had, now have or which they . . . can, shall or may have against one another for any reason whatsoever, including but not limited to all actions, causes of action, damages, claims and demands arising out of [the 2006 Settlement].”

The 2006 Release also set forth the language of Civil Code section 1542 and specified that “[t]he parties . . . waive[d] [its] provisions.”

Both parties were represented by counsel when they executed the 2006 Settlement and 2006 Release.

2. The 2012 civil harassment lawsuit

In November 2012, Beuchel sued Flanagan for harassment for various slights dating back to 2006. The trial court dismissed this lawsuit as “frivolous” and sanctioned Beuchel $1,500.

3. The December 2012 omnibus lawsuit

Just weeks after her November 2012 lawsuit was dismissed as frivolous, Beuchel sued Flanagan for battery, trespass, invasion of privacy and malicious prosecution tied to various incidents dating back to 2006, including several rejected in Beuchel’s November 2012 lawsuit. Flanagan counter-claimed for trespass and destruction of property, harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, intrusion into private affairs and nuisance. The trial court dismissed all of Beuchel’s claims on summary judgment, finding the majority barred by res judicata, and Beuchel settled Flanagan’s counter-claims for $37,000 and the execution of another release that contained a “1542 waiver.” Despite signing a short-form settlement agreement containing these settlement terms, Beuchel thereafter refused to sign the long-form agreement with identical terms, which necessitated a motion by Flanagan to enforce the short-form settlement that Beuchel fought in the trial court and on appeal. The trial court granted Flanagan’s motion to enforce and imposed $3,940 in sanctions after finding that Beuchel’s refusal to sign the long-form settlement was undertaken in “bad faith.” We affirmed that ruling.

II. Procedural Background

A. The Complaint

Just five months after the remittitur issued on our opinion affirming the trial court’s motion to enforce, Beuchel filed the instant lawsuit against Flanagan. She seeks two forms of relief. First, Beuchel seeks judicial declarations that the boundary line marked by her garage is not the true boundary line and that she may “remove the soil” in the planter. Second, Beuchel seeks to quiet title to her property. At no point in the complaint does Beuchel acknowledge the potential effect—or even the existence—of the 2006 Release.

B. Motion for sanctions

Flanagan filed a motion for monetary sanctions and dismissal under section 128.7 on the grounds that Beuchel’s lawsuit was filed for the improper purpose of harassing her, and was legally and factually frivolous because it is barred by the 2006 Release. After a full round of briefing and a hearing, the trial court ruled that Beuchel’s lawsuit was “filed for an improper purpose” and awarded $6,075 in sanctions against Beuchel (but not her attorney); the court did not dismiss the complaint. In a subsequent written order, the court added that “the claims in [Beuchel’s] complaint [were] subsumed by the previous settlement agreements.”

C. Appeal

Beuchel filed this timely appeal of the sanctions order.

DISCUSSION

Beuchel argues that the trial court erred in sanctioning her under section 128.7. We generally review an award of sanctions under this provision for an abuse of discretion (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 441 (Peake)), although we review subsidiary legal questions de novo (Optimal Markets, Inc. v. Salant (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 912, 921) and subsidiary factual questions for substantial evidence (In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478-1479).

As pertinent here, section 128.7 authorizes a trial court to issue monetary sanctions against a “party” for filing a complaint if (1) the party did so “for an improper purpose” or (2) the complaint is frivolous, either legally or factually. (§ 128.7, subds. (b) & (c); Ponce v. Wells Fargo Bank (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 253, 264 (Ponce).) However, because “a nonfrivolous complaint cannot be presented for an improper purpose” (Ponce, at p. 265), a showing of frivolity is also required for a monetary sanction based on a complaint filed for an improper purpose. A filing is made for an improper purpose if made “to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” (§ 128.7, subd. (b)(1).) A complaint is legally frivolous if a “‘reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit’” because it is “‘not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.’” (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 440, quoting In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650 and Guillemin v. Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 168 (Guillemin).) A complaint is factually frivolous if a reasonable attorney would agree that it is “‘not well grounded in fact’” because it lacks “evidentiary support” and is “[un]likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” (§ 128.7, subd. (b)(3); Peake, at p. 440, quoting Guillemin, at p. 168.)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err in concluding that Beuchel’s complaint was frivolous and that she acted with an improper purpose in filing it.

Beuchel’s complaint is objectively frivolous because any “reasonable attorney” would recognize that it is barred—legally and factually—by the 2006 Release. Courts will enforce a release of claims according to the release’s terms, which we independently review. (Skrbina v. Fleming Cos. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366; see Civ. Code, § 1541 [“An obligation is extinguished by a release therefrom . . . in writing, with or without new consideration”]; see also Salehi v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1159 (Salehi) [interpretation of a release is a “question of law”].) The 2006 Release “release[d] and forever discharge[d]” Beuchel and Flanagan “from all actions, causes of action, damages, claims and demands whatsoever, which they had, now have or which they . . . can, shall or may have against one another for any reason whatsoever.” (Italics added.) Suffice it to say, “all” means “all,” so the 2006 Release reaches any and all claims between these parties. (Rubin v. W. Mut. Ins. Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1547 [“all means all”]; Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166-1167 (Winet) [same].) The breadth of the 2006 Release is further confirmed by (1) the parties’ express waiver of the protections of Civil Code section 1542, which otherwise erects a default rule that releases do not reach claims that the “releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release” (Civ. Code, § 1542; see Jefferson v. Department of Youth Authority (2002) 28 Cal.4th 299, 306-307 [“express reference to section 1542” reinforces validity of broad release]; Iqbal v. Ziadeh (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 [same]; Belasco v. Wells (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 409, 417-418 [same]), and (2) the parties’ express recognition that the release extended to claims beyond those “arising out of” the 2006 lawsuit because the release “include[ed], but [was] not limited to” that action. Both parties also had counsel at the time the 2006 Release was executed, which further favors enforcing the release according to its plain language. (Winet, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168; Salehi, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1160-1161.) Because Beuchel’s complaint in this case is an “action, cause of action . . . claim [or] demand,” the 2006 Release bars the lawsuit and renders its filing factually and legally frivolous.

Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s factual finding that Beuchel’s complaint was filed for the improper purpose of harassing Flanagan. The complaint is yet another chapter in a book whose prior chapters almost uniformly involved Beuchel taking positions in litigation against Flanagan that were rejected on the merits and, in most cases, rejected as frivolous. The timing of Beuchel’s filing also supports a finding of harassment, as it confirms Beuchel’s practice of filing serial lawsuits—one after another as soon as the prior one was dismissed or otherwise resolved.

Beuchel resists this conclusion with what boils down to two categories of arguments.

First, she asserts that the trial court was wrong to impose sanctions at all because (1) the 2006 lawsuit giving rise to the 2006 Release did not involve a boundary dispute necessitating declaratory relief or a quiet title judgment, (2) the 2006 Release cannot and does not reach her quiet title claim because it is brought against any “unknown defendants” who claim any “right, title, estate, lien or interest . . . adverse to” her title rather than against Flanagan specifically, (3) her attorney’s pre-lawsuit analysis indicated that this lawsuit was not frivolous, and (4) she has a viable quiet title action (because Flanagan’s continued use of the planter constituted an implicit adverse use of Beuchel’s property, because the “agreed boundary doctrine” does not obviate the need for title to be quieted, because a section 664.6 motion to enforce the 2006 Settlement would not grant her full quiet title relief, and because the trial court erred in faulting her for not proving that her ability to obtain title insurance or sell her property was impaired by Flanagan’s continued use of the planter).

These arguments lack merit.

It does not matter whether the 2006 lawsuit involved the same dispute (or type of dispute) as the instant lawsuit because the 2006 Release, by its plain language, was not “limited” to the issues “arising out of” the 2006 lawsuit. Indeed, the 2006 Settlement expressly contemplated the 2006 Release would apply to unresolved boundary disputes, and it is undisputed that the boundary dispute at issue here pre-dated the 2006 Release by at least five years. In these circumstances, the 2006 Release’s plain language controls and sweeps beyond the claims at issue in the lawsuit that birthed it. (See Ignacio v. Caracciolo (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 81, 83 [referring to a release that reaches “claims outside the scope of the current . . . action”]; San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1050-1053 [same]; cf. Goodstein v. Bank of San Pedro (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 899, 907 [release limited to “full settlement of this action” limited just to claims underlying that action].) Beuchel cites language from our prior appellate decision where we noted that the applicability of the 2006 Release to a boundary dispute lawsuit Beuchel anticipated filing was “an issue for another day,” and treats that language as holding that the 2006 Release is not a bar. We fail to see how our failure to address an issue somehow definitively resolves it.

The 2006 Release also applies to this lawsuit notwithstanding Beuchel’s inclusion of a quiet title claim. As a threshold matter, Beuchel’s challenge to the inclusion of her quiet title claim does not apply to her declaratory relief claim. The 2006 Release bars Beuchel’s quiet title claim in any event. The parties to the 2006 Release certainly did not carve out quiet title actions expressly: It says “all . . . claims,” not “all . . . claims except quiet title claims.” Beuchel asserts that the exclusion of quiet title claims is implicit because the 2006 Release only bars claims that the parties “can, shall or may have against one another,” and goes on to assert that a quiet title claim is akin to a claim to remove a cloud on the title of property, which need not be adverse to anyone. We reject these assertions. By statute, a quiet title claim is now defined as a claim “to establish title against adverse claims to real . . . property.” (§ 760.020, subd. (a), italics added); quiet title claims are distinct from claims to remove a cloud on title (Reiner v. Danial (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 682, 689 [“Actions to remove a cloud on title . . . differ from actions to quiet title . . .”]; Castro v. Barry (1889) 79 Cal. 443, 446 [drawing this distinction].) More to the point, Beuchel has pled in her complaint that Flanagan has an adverse claim to her property. Beuchel’s quiet title claim incorporates by reference the facts underlying her alleged boundary dispute with Flanagan. That Beuchel has chosen not to name Flanagan specifically and to name additional “unknown defendants” does not somehow mean that her quiet title claim is not against Flanagan’s adverse claim and thus not a claim the two parties “have against one another” and that is accordingly barred by the 2006 Release.

Beuchel’s attorney’s analysis of the frivolity of her action is not dispositive, for it is the trial court’s evaluation of objective merit—not the sanctioned party’s attorney’s evaluation—that matters. More to the point, Beuchel’s counsel’s analysis at no point examines the effect of the 2006 Release. His failure to spot the dispositive issue surely does not establish the objective reasonableness of his position, and this remains true even if the trial court chose not to comment on the deficiency of counsel’s analysis.

And because the 2006 Release is dispositive, the viability of Beuchel’s quiet title and declaratory relief claims in the absence of that release is irrelevant and establishes no error in the trial court’s reliance on the 2006 Release.

Second, Beuchel argues that she cannot be sanctioned under section 128.7. She is wrong. Although a party cannot be sanctioned when sanctions are based upon the legal frivolity of her complaint (§ 128.7, subd. (d)(1)), the sanctions here are based upon her improper purpose. Sanctions against a party are allowed in this circumstance. (Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1419.) Although sanctions for filing a complaint for an improper purpose must also be accompanied by a showing of frivolity, Beuchel’s complaint was factually frivolous because it did not take a lawyer to recognize that the 2006 Release barring “all” claims and which Beuchel herself signed would bar her current claims. Further, and as noted above, sanctions are appropriate against Beuchel because she—rather than her current counsel—has been the driving force and common denominator through her history of litigation against Flanagan.

DISPOSITION

The sanctions order is affirmed. Flanagan is entitled to her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, Acting P.J.

ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.

CHAVEZ