Mario Alvarez and Ruth Alvarez v. Daniel Silverstein CASE NO. 113CV251489
DATE: 18 April 2014 TIME: 9:00 LINE NUMBER: 16
This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 17 April 2014. Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 18 April 2014, the motion of plaintiff Mario Alvarez to quash deposition subpoenas and for monetary sanctions was argued and submitted. Defendant Daniel Silverstein filed a formal opposition to the motion.

Statement of Facts

This action arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 4 September 2011, in which plaintiffs Mario Alvarez (“Mr. Alvarez”) and Ruth Alvarez (“Mrs. Alvarez”) were rear-ended by defendant Daniel Silverstein (“Defendant”). Mr. Alvarez alleges causes of action for general negligence and motor vehicle, and claims that he suffered injuries to his head and neck, wage loss, and loss of earning capacity as a result of the accident. Mrs. Alvarez alleges that Mr. Alvarez can no longer help her care for her grandchildren or perform certain chores around the home as a result of the accident and, therefore, asserts a claim for loss of consortium.

Discovery Dispute

On 13 February 2014, Defendant’s counsel served deposition subpoenas for the production of business records on American Automobile Association of Northern California, Nevada & Utah (“AAA”), Kaiser Hospital/PMG – Fremont, Hayward & Union City (“Kaiser Hospital”), Kaiser Hospital/PMG – Hayward & Union City Radiology (“Kaiser Radiology”), and Healthcare Recoveries, Inc. (“Healthcare Recoveries”), with production dates of 10 March 2014, and 13 March 2014. (See Cook Dec., Exs. A (1), (2), (3), and (4).)

The subpoena issued to AAA seeks documents relating to Mr. Alvarez’s claims and/or insurance file. (See Cook Dec., Exs. A (1).) The subpoenas issued to Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries seek Mr. Alvarez’s medical records and billing records from 2004 to the present. (See Cook Dec., Exs. A (2), (3), and (4).)

The subpoena issued to Kaiser Radiology also requests a “breakdown of films and or studies” reflecting the contents of the films and studies and the “associated cost for approval prior to production.” (See Cook Dec., Ex. A (4).)

Mr. Alvarez’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter to Defendant’s counsel on 18 February 2014, objecting to the subpoenas as “overly broad and thus invasive of Mr. Alvarez’s privacy.” (See Cook Dec., Ex. B., p. 1.) Mr. Alvarez’s counsel requested that the subpoenas be withdrawn, otherwise Mr. Alvarez would proceed with filing a motion to quash. (Id.)

On 20 February 2014, Mr. Alvarez’s counsel met with Defendant’s counsel following a court appearance in this matter and raised the issue of the subpoenas. (See Cook Dec., p. 2:13-18.) While Defendant’s counsel indicated that he had received the 18 February 2014 letter, there were no further discussions on the matter. (Id.)

Mr. Alvarez’s counsel wrote to Defendant’s counsel on 25 February 2014, reiterating Mr. Alvarez’s objections to the subpoenas and requesting a response to the 18 February 2014 letter. (See Cook Dec., Ex. C., p. 1.) Mr. Alvarez’s counsel did not receive a response to his letter and, therefore, called Defendant’s counsel on 3 March 2014, and left a message seeking to coordinate a hearing date for the motion to quash. (See Cook Dec., p. 2:27-28.) On the afternoon of 3 March 2014, Mr. Alvarez’s counsel received a telephone call from Defendant’s counsel’s office and agreement was reached to set the hearing for 18 April 2014. (See Cook Dec., p. 3:1-6.)

On 6 March 2014, Mr. Alvarez filed the instant motion to quash the subpoenas issued to AAA, Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries and for an award of monetary sanctions.

On 7 April 2014, Defendant filed papers in opposition to the motion. Therein, Defendant asserts that his counsel contacted Mr. Alvarez’s counsel by telephone on 12 March 2014, to discuss possible informal resolution of the disputed issues with regard to the subpoenas. (See Opp’n., Ex. B.) Mr. Alvarez’s counsel declined the meet and confer offer and indicated that he wanted to proceed with the motion to quash.

I. Mr. Alvarez’s Motion to Quash Subpoenas

Mr. Alvarez moves to quash the subpoenas issued to AAA, Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries, arguing that they are vague, ambiguous, overbroad, seek irrelevant information, violate his right to privacy, and/or violate the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.

In the moving papers, Plaintiff writes: “This court has no idea of what medical information may be contained in plaintiff’s various requested records. Neither does requesting party.” (page 4, lines 14-16.)

And that is exactly the dilemma presented to this Court. The moving papers do not represent that Plaintiff’s counsel knows what is in the records, other than the bare statement that “Relevant medical information was provided. Copies of records were provided.” (Separate Statements page 3, lines 21-22.)

Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that all of the treatment Mr. Alvarez received involved complaints of his head and neck only. However, there is also a loss of consortium claim and an absence of anything to indicate whether or not there were other complaints which might affect his ability to provide services to/on behalf of his wife.

Should this matter proceed to a hearing, this Court will ask counsel for Plaintiff what he meant by the following:

“Not by the wildest stretch of the imagination does such an event and such an injury opened the door to the wholesale discovery of all aspects of this (at the time of the accident) 67-year-old man’s health history. [¶] occasionally, even in a system in which the patients at the insane asylum are allowed to draft their own business records subpenas, sanity must be restored.” (Separate Statement page 4, lines 6-12.)

A. Legal Standard

Any consumer who is a party to the action and whose personal records are sought by a subpoena may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 to quash the subpoena. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subds. (a)(1), (2) and (g).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 authorizes a party to bring a motion to quash, modify, or direct compliance with a subpoena “upon such terms and conditions as the court shall declare.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.) A court may make any order to protect the parties, witness, or consumer from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of privacy rights. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a).)

B. Analysis

1. Subpoenas for Records from Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries

Mr. Alvarez argues that the subpoenas issued to Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries should be quashed in their entirety on the grounds that they are overbroad, seek irrelevant information, and violate his right to privacy.

a. Overbroad and Irrelevant Objections

Mr. Alvarez argues that the subpoenas issued to Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries are overbroad and seek irrelevant information because they request 10 years of medical information and are not limited by body part.

A party may discover any non-privileged matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the case and might reasonably lead to other admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof. (See Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Any doubt as to whether the information sought is relevant to the subject matter and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is generally resolved in favor of discovery. (See Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)

Mr. Alvarez argues that the subpoenas as drafted are overbroad because they are not limited by body part and therefore seek his entire medical history from 2004 to the present. Mr. Alvarez asserts that he complained of pain in the back of his head after the accident and was treated at Kaiser for neck complaints. (See Mr. Alvarez Sep. Stmt., p. 3:22-27.) He further explains that all of the subsequent treatment has been solely for his neck and no other body part. (See Mr. Alvarez Sep. Stmt., p. 4:1-3.) Thus, Mr. Alvarez contends that his claim of injury does not open the door to the wholesale discovery of all aspects of his medical history for the past 10 years without limitation.

Defendant argues that all of Mr. Alvarez’s medical and billing records from 2004 to the present are relevant because Mr. Alvarez has alleged injury to his neck and head and Mrs. Alvarez is claiming loss of consortium due to Mr. Alvarez’s inability to help her with daily chores and caring for their grandchildren. Defendant asserts that evidence of Mr. Alvarez’s general medical condition and any other ailments he may have suffered during the past 10 years may bear on whether there are any other reasons for Mr. Alvarez’s inability to help Mrs. Alvarez with daily chores and caring for their grandchildren. Defendant further asserts that Mr. Alvarez’s overall health and issues such as weight, temperature, blood pressure, and mental health may affect his neck condition.

It is readily apparent that medical and billing records for the past 10 years which pertain only to Mr. Alvarez’s neck and/or head are relevant to show causation for his injuries and whether he had any pre-existing conditions with regard to those body parts.

Defendant’s argument that he is entitled to 10 years of information regarding any other type of medical condition because it “may” have affected Mr. Alvarez’s neck condition or his ability to perform chores around the house is a closer call. The Court is mindful that in the discovery context, relevance is to be construed liberally in favor of disclosure (see Emerson Electric Co. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1107), and “the standard is relevancy to the subject matter, which is determined by potential, not actual, issues in the case.” (National Steel Products Co. v. Super. Ct. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 476, 492.)

Further, courts have held that under the Discovery Act, fishing expeditions (within reason) are permissible. (See Irvington-Moore, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 739, fn. 4.) In light of the foregoing, Mr. Alvarez’s medical and billing records which pertain to his general medical condition are relevant to Mrs. Alvarez’s claim for loss of consortium because they may contain evidence of other medical conditions, such as arthritis or high blood pressure, which may impact his ability to help with chores around the house.

However, from the state of this record, this Court is unable to state that records from 10 years ago would have little bearing on Mr. Alvarez’s physical ability to perform chores at the time of the accident and thereafter. Accordingly, Mr. Alvarez’s overbroad and irrelevant objections are OVERRULED him insofar as the subpoenas request Mr. Alvarez’s medical and billing records which pertain to his neck and head from 2004 to the present and his general medical condition from 4 September 2010 to the present.

b. Privacy Objection

Mr. Alvarez argues that the subpoenas issued to Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries invade his right to privacy in his medical information because they are overbroad and seek information unrelated to the instant case.

The burden is on Mr. Alvarez to justify his privacy objection. (See San Diego Professional Ass’n v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 194, 199; Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221; Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter Group 2012) at 8:814.) The right to privacy established by the California Constitution protects an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (See Pioneer Electronics, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 40.)

In evaluating Mr. Alvarez’s privacy claim, the court applies the framework set forth in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 40. Mr. Alvarez must first demonstrate that he possesses a “legally protected privacy interest” in the information sought. (See id. at p. 35.) Second, he must have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the particular circumstances. (See id. at p. 36–37.) Third, the invasion of privacy must be serious, as trivial invasions do not require the court to balance the interest of the parties. (See id. at p. 37.) However, if the invasion of privacy is serious and there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, then the court must balance the privacy interest at stake against other competing or countervailing interests. (See Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Super. Ct., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 370–371; John B. v. Super. Ct. (2006) 38 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1199; Palay v. Super. Ct. (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 919, 934; Save Open Space Santa Monica Mountains v. Super. Ct. (2001) 84 Cal. App.4th 235, 252-255.)

Mr. Alvarez argues that he has a legally protected privacy interest in his medical and billing records. Numerous decisions have recognized a privacy interest in medical records pertaining to the individual’s physical or mental condition. (See Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, supra, 93 Cal. App. 3d at p. 678; Jones v. Super. Ct. (1981) 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 549.) A person’s medical profile is an area of privacy more intimate and personal than many other areas that are judicially recognized and protected. (See Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 678; Britt v. Super. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844.)

The subpoenas issued to Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries seek medical records, reports, x-rays, diagnostic studies, and billing records regarding Mr. Alvarez’s medical condition in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy. (See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 36-37.) Inquiry into Mr. Alvarez’s medical condition is a serious invasion of privacy and has the potential to elicit irrelevant evidence of a highly personal nature.

Thus, Defendant must show that the information sought is directly relevant to a claim or defense in the instant case. The subpoenas seek Mr. Alvarez’s medical and billing records from 2004 to the present. Defendant argues that medical information for the past 10 years regarding Mr. Alvarez’s head and neck is directly relevant to this case because he is alleging injury to those body parts. Mr. Alvarez complained of pain in the back of his head after the accident and, subsequently, was treated at Kaiser for neck complaints. (See Mr. Alvarez Sep. Stmt., p. 3:22-27; 4:1-3.) Medical information regarding treatment Mr. Alvarez received for his head and neck for the past 10 years is also relevant to the instant case to establish whether he had any pre-existing conditions or complaints pertaining to those body parts. Accordingly, the medical and billing records from 2004 to the present which relate to the neck and head are directly relevant to the instant case.

In addition, Defendant asserts that evidence of Mr. Alvarez’s general medical condition and any other ailments he may have suffered during the past 10 years are relevant to the instant case because Mrs. Alvarez is making a loss of consortium claim and other medical conditions may have had an impact on Mr. Alvarez’s neck condition. Defendant argues that evidence of other medical conditions may bear on whether there are any other reasons for Mr. Alvarez’s inability to help Mrs. Alvarez with daily chores and caring for their grandchildren. Defendant further asserts that Mr. Alvarez’s overall health and issues such as weight, temperature, blood pressure, and mental health may have had an affect his neck condition.

Defendant’s argument that he is entitled to 10 years of information regarding any type of medical condition because it “may” have affected Mr. Alvarez’s neck condition or his ability to perform chores around the house is insufficient to support a finding of direct relevance because it is wholly speculative to conclude that some unknown medical condition contributed to his injuries. (See Opp’n., p. 3:23-24.) Essentially, it is Defendant’s position that he should be allowed to discover all of Mr. Alvarez’s medical records for the last 10 years in order to search for facts to support his speculation that Mr. Alvarez’s neck condition and/or inability to help with chores around the home could be attributable to another source.

Therefore, the Court OVERRULES Mr. Alvarez’s privacy objection insofar as it finds that the medical and billing records from 2004 to the present which relate to the neck and head are directly relevant to the instant case and outweigh Mr. Alvarez’s privacy interest. The objection is OVERRULED insofar as Mr. Alvarez’s medical and billing records from 2004 to the present which relate only to his general medical condition are not directly relevant to the instant case and are outweighed by Mr. Alvarez’s privacy interest.

2. Subpoena for Records from AAA

Mr. Alvarez argues that the subpoena issued to AAA for his insurance and/or claim file should be quashed on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, irrelevant, and seeks documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.

a. Vague and Ambiguous Objection

Mr. Alvarez asserts that the subpoena is improper because it is vague and ambiguous as to the scope of the records sought. Mr. Alvarez argues that the scope of the records sought is unclear because the subpoena requests any and all documents pertaining to the insurance and/or claims file, but then includes a specific claim number at the end of the request. Mr. Alvarez contends that it is not clear whether the subpoena is limited just to that claim number or if it pertains to all insurance and claim files about him. Mr. Alvarez also contends that the specified time frame of 2004 to the present, as indicated in the subpoena, somehow renders the subpoenas vague.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2020.410(a) provides that a subpoena for business records “shall designate the business records to be produced [. . .] by reasonably particularizing each category of item.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.410, subd. (a); Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2007) at ¶ 8:544.) The categories of documents to be produced must be reasonably particularized from the standpoint of the party on whom the demand is made. (See Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Super. Ct., (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 222; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2007) at ¶ 8:544.1.) “A description of document categories is unreasonable where it bears no relationship to the manner in which the records are kept, and imposes on the subpoenaed party the burden of searching extensive files at many locations to see what it can find to fit the categories in the demand.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Super. Ct., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at 222.)

The subpoena, as drafted, requests “any and all documents and records pertaining to the insurance and claim file of Mario Alvarez, including, but not limited to, all payments, policy information, listing of providers, correspondence, all log notes, declaration of coverage, medical records, color photographs [. . . ], 2004 to present, Claim No. 20-09-1728-6.” (See Cook Dec., Ex. A (1).) The subpoena issued to AAA is not vague or ambiguous but asks for documents relating to Mr. Alvarez’s claims file from 2004 to the present. The documents requested include several categories of documents and a specific claims file number, but are not limited to same. The requested insurance file for Mr. Alvarez consists of a finite set of documents that are regularly maintained in the course of AAA’s business. AAA should be able to understand, identify, and find what is requested. Thus, the subpoena is reasonably particularized, and Mr. Alvarez’s objection to the subpoena as vague or ambiguous is without merit and therefore OVERRULED.

b. Overbroad and Irrelevant Objections

Mr. Alvarez objects to the subpoena as overbroad and consequently seeks irrelevant information.

A party may discover any non-privileged matter that is relevant to the subject matter of the case and might reasonably lead to other admissible evidence. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) For discovery purposes, information is relevant to the subject matter if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof. (See Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.) Any doubt as to whether the information sought is relevant to the subject matter and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is generally resolved in favor of discovery. (See Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790.)

Mr. Alvarez argues that the subpoena is overbroad and seeks irrelevant information because it requests all documents pertaining to his claims and/or insurance file from 2004 to the present. He asserts that the accident did not occur until 4 September 2011, and therefore the documents within the claims file such as correspondence, log notes, or other policy information prior to that time are unrelated to the subject matter of this case. Similarly, Defendant contends that the subpoena is overbroad because it requests all medical records within the claim file without limitation as to body part. Defendant argues that information from the claims file would be relevant to establish the nature and extent of the injuries claimed by Mr. Alvarez and any information regarding his prior driving habits, which would be relevant to the claim of negligence.

The subpoena issued to AAA is not limited by date of loss or to claims stemming from the 4 September 2011 incident. The subpoena as drafted requests any and all documents pertaining to Mr. Alvarez’s claims or insurance file. (See Cook Dec., Ex. A (1).) This includes documents pertaining to a particular claim number, which is probably limited to a specific date of loss, but the subpoena is not limited to the same. Moreover, it is not clear from the parties’ papers that the specific claim number listed on the subpoena pertains to the 4 September 2011 incident. Thus, the subpoena as drafted may result in the production of documents unrelated to the 4 September 2011 accident. Moreover, the subpoena requests medical records and as drafted is not limited to medical records addressing the body parts of the neck and/or head. As noted above, the production of any of Mr. Alvarez’s medical and/or billing records should be limited to records from 2004 to the present which relate to the neck and head. Thus, the subpoena issued to AAA it is overbroad and seeks irrelevant information.

Accordingly, Defendant’s objections based on over breath and irrelevance are sustained insofar as the subpoena requests all documents relating to Mr. Alvarez’s insurance and/or claims file which are unrelated to the 4 September 2011 accident. The objections are OVERRULED insofar as the subpoena requests insurance documents relating to the 4 September 2011 accident and, to the extent it requests medical and/or billing records, to the body parts of head and neck.

c. Attorney-Client Privilege and/or Attorney Work Product Protection

Mr. Alvarez objects to the subpoenas on the grounds that they seek documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.

The party asserting any privilege has the burden of showing sufficient preliminary facts to assert the privilege. (See Venture Law Group v. Super. Ct. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.) “After this burden is met, or where there is no dispute concerning the preliminary facts, the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to show either the claimed privilege does not apply, an exception exists, or there has been an express or implied waiver.” (Id., citing Evid. Code § 917 and Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 123-124.)

The general rule concerning the attorney-client privilege is that communications between client and counsel are presumed to have been made in confidence and are broadly privileged against discovery. (See Evid. Code § 954; Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 8:146, 8:215.) The party asserting the privilege must show the existence of an attorney-client relationship at the time the confidential communications were made. (See Venture Law Group v. Super. Ct., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 102.)

The work product doctrine protects the work product of attorneys acting on a client’s behalf. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.010 et seq.; Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 8:146, 8:215.) Reports or communications between an insured and his insurer may come within the attorney-client privilege where: (1) the communication concerns a claim that is, or may become, the subject of litigation against the insured; (2) the claim would be covered under the insurance policy; and (3) the policy between the insurer and insured requires the insurer to defend the insured. (See Traveler’s Insurance Companies v. Super.Ct. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 436, 452; Soltani-Rastegar v. Super. Ct. (1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 424 [holding that the statements, given to the insurer for the sole purpose of defending against claims, were protected by the attorney-client privilege from discovery even though litigation had not yet commenced].)

Mr. Alvarez asserts that the claims file may contain recorded statements taken from him concerning this accident as well as log notes from adjusters regarding the same. Mr. Alvarez contends that these documents are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine because the statements were communicated to the insurance carrier in contemplation of possible litigation. Conversely, Defendant argues that the documents sought are not protected under the work product doctrine because they are not mental impressions of an attorney. Defendant asserts that, at best, the log notes might be qualified work product, but the production of the same is necessary since it is the only source of information regarding Mr. Alvarez’s past driving history and injuries claimed.

Mr. Alvarez’s objection that the information sought is protected by the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine is without merit because he does not provide a factual basis in support of this contention but instead asserts that the subpoena potentially calls for the production of privileged correspondence and/or log notes. Mr. Alvarez does not provide a declaration or otherwise establish that he made statements to his insurer for the sole purpose of defending against the claim which is the subject of the present litigation. He further fails to establish any facts that demonstrate that AAA is in possession of any other information or documents protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. In addition, Defendant does not seek documents from AAA that are clearly attorney-client communications and there is no evidence that AAA is in possession of documents prepared by or containing the mental impressions of Mr. Alvarez’s counsel such that the applicability of the work-product doctrine is immediately obvious. Thus, Mr. Alvarez fails to meet his initial burden of showing sufficient preliminary facts to assert the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. Accordingly, Mr. Alvarez’s objections on the basis of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are overruled.

D. Conclusion

Although the Court has sustained some of Mr. Alvarez’s objections, the Court exercises its discretion to modify the subpoenas rather than quash the same in their entirety given the nature of the objections made and the type of information sought.

Accordingly, the motion to quash the subpoenas issued to AAA, Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries is DENIED, but the Court limits the subpoenas issued to Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries to medical and billing records from 2004 to the present and the subpoena issued to AAA to claims and/or insurance records concerning the 4 September 2011 accident and, to the extent it requests medical and/or billing records, from 2004 to the present.

III. Mr. Alvarez’s Request for Monetary Sanctions

Mr. Alvarez requests monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,850.00 against Defendant and Defendant’s counsel under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1348 and Code of Civil Procedure sections 1985.3, subdivision (g), 1987, subdivisions (a) and (b), 2023.010, 2023.020, 2023.030, and 2023. 040.

First, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1328 does not apply because it allows for an award of sanctions even when no opposition to the motion is filed or the opposition is withdrawn and Defendant did file an opposition to the instant motion that was never withdrawn. Second, Code of Civil Procedure sections 1985.3, subdivision (g) and 1987, subdivisions (a) and (b) do not set forth any independent basis for the issuance of a monetary sanction. Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g) states that a consumer who is also a party to the action may move to quash a subpoena for their personal records under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1. Code of Civil Procedure section 1987, subdivisions (a) and (b) address the method for service of a deposition subpoena and the effect thereof. Third, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 defines acts that constitute misuses of the discovery process, and does not itself set forth any provisions regarding the issuance of a monetary sanction. Fourth, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 provides that sanctions may be imposed for misuses of the discovery process “[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title.” As such, section 2023.030 does not provide an independent basis for an award of sanctions. Fifth, Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.040 does not provide a basis for an award of monetary sanctions but states that every request for sanctions shall “identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought” in the notice of motion.

Finally, while Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.020 authorizes an award of sanctions against a party or attorney for failure to satisfy a meet and confer obligation, Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 under which the instant motion is brought does not impose such a requirement. Moreover, when such a requirement is imposed, the moving party has the obligation to meet and confer. (See e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.040, 2025.480, subd. (b), 2030.300, subd. (b).) Here, however, Defendant is the opposing party. Accordingly, Mr. Alvarez’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the motion to quash the subpoenas issued to AAA, Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries is DENIED, but the Court limits the subpoenas issued to Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries to medical and billing records to documents pertaining to the neck and head from 2004 to the present and the subpoena issued to AAA to claims and/or insurance records concerning the 4 September 2011 accident and, to the extent it requests medical and/or billing records, from 2004 to the present..

Accordingly, within 30 days of the date of the filing of this Order, AAA, Kaiser Hospital, Kaiser Radiology, and Healthcare Recoveries shall produce documents responsive to the subpoenas as modified herein.

These records are for the purpose of this litigation only. This Court designates them as “Plaintiffs, Attorneys and Experts Eyes Only.”

Alvarez’s request for sanctions is DENIED.