Case Name: Mary Waldron v. The Leland Stanford Junior University, et al.

Case No.: 16CV294268

Defendant The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University (erroneously sued as The Leland Stanford Junior University; hereafter, “Stanford”) owned, occupied, operated, controlled, and maintained the Varsity Parking Lot L-97 (“Varsity Parking Lot”) at Stanford University. (Complaint, ¶2.)

On October 27, 2014, plaintiff Mary Waldron (“Waldron”) was walking at Stanford University approaching the Varsity Parking Lot. (Complaint, ¶7.) At said time and place, an upraised ledge/uneven walkway and other dangerous condition caused plaintiff Waldron to trip and fall and suffer serious permanent injury. (Id.)

Defendant Stanford owned, controlled, inspected, and maintained the path and walkway where plaintiff Waldron fell and was injured. (Complaint, ¶8.) Defendant Stanford had a duty to inspect, repair, and maintain the premises including the location where plaintiff Waldron was injured in a reasonably safe condition free of defects and unevenness of the type which caused plaintiff Waldron’s injuries. (Complaint, ¶9.)

On April 25, 2016, plaintiff Waldron filed a complaint against defendant Stanford asserting causes of action for:

(1) Negligence
(2) Premises Liability

On July 15, 2016, defendant Stanford filed an answer to plaintiff Waldron’s complaint.

On December 29, 2017, defendant Stanford filed the motion now before the court, a motion for summary judgment of plaintiff Waldron’s complaint.

I. Defendant Stanford’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.

“An action in negligence requires a showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, that the defendant breached the duty, and that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of injuries suffered by the plaintiff.” (Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 673.) “Premises liability is a form of negligence … and is described as follows: The owner of premises is under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the management of such premises in order to avoid exposing persons to an unreasonable risk of harm. A failure to fulfill this duty is negligence.” (Brooks v. Eugene Burger Management Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1611, 1619.) The essential factual elements to a claim for premises liability are stated in CACI, No. 1000:

[Plaintiff] claims that [he/she] was harmed because of the way [Defendant] managed [his/her/its] property. To establish this claim, [plaintiff] must prove all of the following:

1. That [defendant] [owned/leased/occupied/controlled] the property;
2. That [defendant] was negligent in the use or maintenance of the property;
3. That [plaintiff] was harmed; and
4. That [defendant]’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing [plaintiff]’s harm.

Defendant Stanford moves for summary judgment by relying upon the “trivial defect” defense. This defense is explained in Ursino v. Big Boy Restaurants of America (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 394, 398 (Ursino), where the court concluded, “persons who maintain walkways, whether public or private, are not required to maintain them in an absolutely perfect condition. The duty of care imposed on a property owner, even one with actual notice, does not require the repair of minor defects.” In Ursino, a 72-year old woman tripped on a raised edge of a section of defendant’s sidewalk and fell. The parties stipulated to a number of facts, one of which was that “the edge of the cement section in question was raised no higher than three-fourths of an inch.” (Ursino, supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 396.) The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant’s favor on the basis that the affirmative defense of “trivial defect” applied as a matter of law. The appellate court affirmed. The appellate court first determined that the “trivial defect” defense, which historically applied in actions against public entities, also applied to nongovernmental defendants. Next, the Ursino court explained what a trial court should consider in determining whether the defect is, in fact, “trivial.”

When a court determines whether a given defect is trivial, as a matter of law, the court should not rely merely upon the size of the depression. While size may be one of the most relevant factors to the decision, it is not always the sole criterion. Instead, the court should determine whether there existed any circumstances surrounding the accident which might have rendered the defect more dangerous than its mere abstract depth would indicate.

(Id. at p. 397; punctuation omitted.)

Some of those other circumstances would include, “lighting, debris, or a history of other similar injuries.” (Id.)

Aside from the size of the defect, the court should consider whether the walkway had any broken pieces or jagged edges and other conditions of the walkway surrounding the defect, such as whether there was debris, grease or water concealing the defect, as well as whether the accident occurred at night in an unlighted area or some other condition obstructed a pedestrian’s view of the defect.

(Caloroso v. Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927.)

In moving for summary judgment, defendant Stanford proffers the following facts: Plaintiff Waldron claims that she fell as a consequence of a height differential in walking conditions at the Stanford campus. The sidewalk height differential relevant in this matter was under 1 ½ inches in any event. The weather was clear and the pathway was not obstructed by any debris or shadows at any relevant time in this case. Plaintiff Waldron’s vision was not impeded at the time of the claimed trip and fall incident.

In opposition, plaintiff Waldron disputes defendant Stanford’s assertion that the pathway where plaintiff Waldron fell was not obscured by shadows. Plaintiff Waldron points to the photographs submitted by defendant Stanford and taken by the investigating officer within minutes of plaintiff’s fall which depict the area as partially shadowed.

Plaintiff Waldron’s evidence in opposition concerning the existence of shadows conflicts with her deposition testimony proffered by defendant Stanford where plaintiff Waldron testified as follows:

Q: Any shadows that existed there at the time of the incident?
A: No.

Plaintiff Waldron’s prior deposition testimony conflicts with the evidence she now proffers in opposing summary judgment. Thus, a triable issue of material fact exists with regard to whether shadows existed.

The legal analysis involves several steps. First, the court reviews evidence regarding the type and size of the defect. If that preliminary analysis reveals a trivial defect, the court considers evidence of any additional factors such as the weather, lighting and visibility conditions at the time of the accident, the existence of debris or obstructions, and plaintiff’s knowledge of the area. If these additional factors do not indicate the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonably careful person, the court should deem the defect trivial as a matter of law and grant judgment for the landowner. [Citation.]

(Stathoulis v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559, 567–568; emphasis added.)

Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her subjective non-observation of shadows addresses both a material preliminary fact (existence of shadows) and the ultimate issue of whether the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonable person. To the extent that it involves the existence of a preliminary fact, plaintiff’s testimony is in conflict with photographic evidence. Resolution of this factual conflict is not for the court to decide on a motion for summary judgment.

Accordingly, defendant Stanford’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.