2011-00114745-CU-PO

Mechelle Shereles vs. State Employess International Union

Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Tax Costs

Filed By: Rapaport, Joel

Plaintiff’s Motion to Tax Costs is GRANTED, in part, as set forth below.

Plaintiff named three defendants in this action: SEIU Local 1000, Rich Boyd and Maria
Patterson. All three were jointly represented by the same law firm.

On Nov. 12, 2013, the three defendants’ motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative for summary adjudication of issues was granted, in its entirety as to Local
1000 and Patterson, but granted in part and denied in part as to Boyd.

Prevailing parties Local 1000 and Patterson submitted a cost bill for $12,546.30.
Plaintiff challenges the award of all costs except the amount of $2,155.00, as the
remainder of the costs were incurred for expenses that will continue to be of use to
defendant Rich Boyd.

Plaintiff’s claim supporting her motion to tax costs is that where jointly represented
defendants present a unified defense and prevail in an action, the trial court has the
discretion to award or deny costs to that party. (Smith v. Circle P. Ranch Co. (1978) 87
Cal.App.3d 267, 272.)

The general rule is that “Unless otherwise provided by statute, a ‘prevailing party’ is
entitled to recover costs in any action or proceeding ‘as a matter of right.’ ([Code Civ.
Proc.,] §§ 1032, subd. (b); see § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A)-(C).) . . . ‘Prevailing party’ for
purposes of section 1032(a)(4) is defined as including: ‘[1] the party with a net
monetary recovery, . . . [4] a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover
any relief against that defendant.’ . . . [Citation.]” (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47
Cal.4th 1327, 1333.) The court has no discretion to deny costs to the prevailing party
absent statutory authority to do so. ( Vons Cos., Inc. v. Lyle Parks Jr,. Inc. (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 823, 832.) However, as noted, “where one of multiple, jointly represented
defendants presenting a unified defense prevails in an action, the trial court has
discretion to award or deny costs to that party. [Citations.]” ( Textron Financial Corp. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1061, 1075.)

Here, however it is apparent that the defendants although jointly represented did not
have a “unity of interest”. The allegations against Local 1000 was retaliation in the
conduct of its investigation into plaintiff’s allegations, the allegations against Patterson
were misconduct in the release of plaintiff’s address and Boyd was alleged to have
assaulted and battered plaintiff with a kiss and harassed her. Each defendant filed a
separate responsive pleading, each answered separate discovery requests, and in the
Court’s analysis of the issues on the motion for summary judgment, or in the
alternative for summary adjudication of issues, the court made clear that their interests
were not identical or necessarily unified. Regardless, the Court exercises its discretion
as follows:

Item 1. Filing and Motion Fees: $1,370.030

Plaintiffs appear to only object to $500.00 of the $1,370.00 in filing and motion fees
sought by Local 1000 and Patterson, which accounts for the filing fee for the motion for
summary judgment and/or summary adjudication brought by Local 1000, Patterson,
and Boyd. Although Boyd was not successful in adjudicating the assault and battery
causes of action alleged against him, the Court is not persuaded. The Christiansen
Declaration reflects that the prevailing party Local 1000 paid the $500 motion filing fee.
Therefore these costs are all allowed.

Item 4. Deposition Costs: $10,391.30

Plaintiffs do not allege that the costs incurred in taking Mechelle Sherles’ deposition
were unreasonable on their face. They object to the requested deposition costs is
based on their argument that because Boyd may use the deposition transcripts at trial,
the costs are not recoverable. However, transcripts and videotape of “necessary”
depositions are allowable costs. (C.C.P., sec. 1033.5(a)(3). The deposition testimony
was used in Local 1000 and Patterson’s successful motion for summary judgment and,
accordingly, recovery of such costs is a matter of right. (See C.C.P., sec. 1032(b).)
The Court concludes that Local 1000 is entitled to recover all of these costs.

Item 5. Service of Process: $635.00

These service of process fees were incurred in obtaining Searles’ medical records, cell
phone records and employment records. They are allowable costs to the prevailing
party. (C.C.P., sec. 1033.5(a)(3).)

Item 8. Witness Fees: $150.00

Finally, plaintiffs object to the $150.00 in witness fees incurred by Local 1000 and
Patterson while defending themselves against plaintiffs’ claims. Again, they are
allowable costs to the prevailing party. (C.C.P., sec. 1033.5(a)(3).)

In the exercise of its discretion, the Court will deduct $2,000 from the total fees
requested to represent the small portion of the allowable costs which may inure purely
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to the benefit of Rich Boyd’s defense of the remaining 3 and 4 causes of action for
assault and battery alleged against him.
The Costs remaining in the amount of $10,546.30 is approved.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule
3.1312 or further notice is required.