2013-00153151-CU-CO

Michael Clark vs. State of Ca, Department of Corrections

Nature of Proceeding:  Motion to Quash Service of Summons

Filed By:  Johnson, Benjamin R.

Nevada Defendants’ Motion to Quash Plaintiff’s Service of Summons and Complaint is
GRANTED.

Specially appearing Defendants Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), Isidro
Baca, Debra Noel, Jennifer Nash, Dillyn Keith, Gregory Smith, Quentin Byrne, James
G. Cox, Jaime Rainone, Linda Adams, Amy Calderwood, David Fierro, Sheryl Foster,
Dwight Neven, and Brian Shields (collectively the “Nevada Defendants”) move to
quash service of process under CCP § 418.10  on the ground that this Court lacks
jurisdiction over the Nevada Defendants, because minimum contacts with the State of
California do not exist and it would be unreasonable for this Court to exercise
jurisdiction over the Nevada Defendants.

Pleadings

On Dec. 13, 2013, Plaintiff Michael Clark, an inmate currently in the custody of the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has filed his Verified
Complaint alleging causes of action for Fraud – Public Deceit (1 Count); Fraud –
Intentional Misrepresentation (2 Counts); Breach of Contract (23 Counts); Negligence
(5 Counts); and Deprivation of Civil Rights [CC § 52.1(b)] (1 Count) against the
Nevada Defendants and codefendants CDCR and named California corrections
employees.

Clark alleges that while he was incarcerated in Nevada through Interstate Corrections
Compact (“ICC”), he was not provided with conditions of confinement equal to those in
California, that he was removed from his housing and job assignment without notice
and transferred to another institution within Nevada, that inaccurate information in his
institutional file negatively affected his classification and housing, and that his safety
was jeopardized, among other claims.

Plaintiff served the Nevada Defendants by certified mail, return receipt requested
through the Sacramento County Sheriff.  None of the Nevada Defendants were
personally served with process.

A motion to quash service of summons is appropriately filed on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over defendant(s). Code Civ. Proc. § 418.10(a) (1).

When a defendant moves to quash service of process for lack of specific jurisdiction,
the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of
jurisdiction.  Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 1054, 1062

Personal Jurisdiction

California’s long-arm statute authorizes California courts to exercise jurisdiction on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of
California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) A state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant who has not been served with process within the state
comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal Constitution if
the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of
jurisdiction does not violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 434, 444, citing
International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution limits the power of a state court to assert personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant.  Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court  (1987) 480 U.S. 102,
113. As a general constitutional principle, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident that has sufficient “minimum contacts” with the state such that the
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”  International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310. 316.  It is essential
in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 475.

General or Specific

Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. A nonresident defendant may
be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum if his or her contacts in the forum
state are substantial, continuous and systematic.

This Court cannot conclude that it may exercise general jurisdiction over the Nevada
Defendants, as their contacts with California were not substantial, continuous, and
systematic, nor can this court conclude that they were so wide-ranging as to constitute
a physical presence in California.

The next relevant inquiry is whether this Court has specific jurisdiction under California
law.   Under the specific jurisdiction test, the Court must first look for “some act by
which the defendant purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
The purposeful availment requirement ensures that defendants will not be haled into a
jurisdiction through random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.”   Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 475.

A claim need not arise directly from the defendant’s forum contacts in order to be
sufficiently related to the contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Rather,
as long as the claim bears a substantial connection to the nonresident’s forum
contacts, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate. The due process clause is
concerned with protecting nonresident defendants from being brought unfairly into
court in the forum, on the basis of random contacts. That constitutional provision,
however, does not provide defendants with a shield against jurisdiction when the
defendant purposefully has availed himself or herself of benefits in the forum. The goal
of fairness is well served by a finding that there must be a substantial connection
between the forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim to warrant the exercise of specific
jurisdiction.  Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 434, 452.

The crucial inquiry concerns the character of defendant’s activity in the forum, whether
the cause of action arises out of or has a substantial connection with that activity, and
upon the balancing of the convenience of the parties and the interests of the state in
assuming jurisdiction. Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 143, 148.

Specific jurisdiction exists where there is a “demonstrable nexus between a plaintiff’s
claims and a defendant’s forum-based activities.” A court may exercise specific
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if: (1) the defendant has purposefully
availed himself or herself of forum benefits; (2) the controversy is related to or arises
out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum and (3) the assertion of personal
jurisdiction would comport with “fair play and substantial justice”  Pavlovich v. Superior
Court (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 262, 269.

Thus the inquiry: Have the Nevada Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the
privilege of conducting business in California?

Nevada Defendants assert that they have no connection with the State of California;
they do not reside in California and do not work in California. Each of the individuals
was employed at all times relevant to this litigation in the State of Nevada by the
Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”).

Here, the Nevada Defendants are all employees or former employees of the Nevada
Department of Corrections, who live and work in the State of Nevada. They do not
have any direct contact with the State of California.

All of the claims alleged by plaintiff Michael Clark in his complaint against the Nevada
Defendants occurred while plaintiff was incarcerated in Nevada, not California.  The
individual Nevada Defendants assert they did nothing that should subject them to the
jurisdiction of this Court.

Plaintiff has alleged that the Nevada defendants breached the ICC by denying him
physical access to the law library, placing restrictions on his legal copy work, denying
access to California courts, deducting room and board expenses from his inmate
account, removing him from his job assignment and transferring him to an institution in
Nevada other than one of his choosing, and failing to provide him with protective
housing, among other claims. All of his allegations against the Nevada Defendants
arise from activities solely within the State of Nevada. There is no allegation that the
Nevada Defendants violated his rights or caused harm against him while he was in
California.

Nevada Defendants assert that as this case has nothing to do with acts performed in  the State of California, and the Nevada Defendants are not domiciled in this State, and
it would be a substantial burden on them to defend themselves here, this Court should
decline to exercise jurisdiction.

In opposition, plaintiff Clark points to the Interstate Corrections Compact (“ICC”)
attached to the verified complaint.  The ICC was entered into between the State of
Nevada, Department of Prisons and Board of Prisons Commissioners (signed by the
Governor, Attorney General and Secretary of State of Nevada) and the State of
California Department of Corrections. The ICC has been enacted into statute in both
Nevada and California (Cal. Penal Code, sec. 11189, Nevada Revised States (“NRS”)
215A.020)

The ICC provides as “Governing Law” that: “Except where expressly otherwise
provided, the laws and administrative regulations the sending state shall govern in any
matter relation to an inmate confirmed pursuant to this contract and the Interstate
Corrections Compact.” (ICC, p.1, para. 2) The ICC further provides that “The fact of
confinement in a receiving state shall not deprive any inmate so confined of any legal
rights which said inmate would have had if confined in an appropriate institution of the
sending state.” Cal. Pen. Code § 11189(e)

Plaintiff further contends that the Nevada Defendants are agents of the CDCR by their
participation in the ICC, and therefore have availed themselves of the benefits of
California law, and may be sued on the same basis as their principal, CDCR.

However, the long-arm statute does not permit a court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the agents (Nevada Defendants) who lack sufficient contacts with California, even
if the principal (CDCR) is subject to jurisdiction through the actions of other California
agents. Our long-arm statute works only in the reverse, allowing a court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a principal when its agent has sufficient contacts with
California.

The ICC’s choice of law is distinguishable from personal jurisdiction.  The United
States and California Constitutions, as interpreted by appellate cases, determine the
length of this state’s long arm statute.

Defendants cite to unpublished US District Court cases, interpreting the ICC and other
states’ long arm statutes.  While not binding on this court, those cases persuasively
reason that transfer of a prisoner under the ICC is insufficient to establish minimum
contacts or the transaction of business in the forum state by out of state prison
officials.

Here, the Nevada Defendants did not reach out to have contact with California, but
received a prisoner transferred under the ICC, whom they housed in Nevada under
contract with California. Therefore, California has no personal jurisdiction over the
Nevada Defendants. There is no reason to conclude that the Nevada Defendants are
subject to suit in California.

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of showing minimum contacts of each of the
Nevada Defendants with the forum state. Clark may file a separate action in Nevada
courts, against the Nevada Defendants.

The motion to quash is granted.