Case Name: Mid Century Insurance Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority
Case No.: 2012-1-CV-234064

Motion for Summary Adjudication by Cross-Complainants Great American Insurance Company and Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority

Factual and Procedural Background

On December 29, 2011, just after 4:00 a.m., Don Phuong Gedenberg (“Gedenberg”) pulled his tractor-trailer out of a driveway on South Seventh Street in San Jose, California and parked it on the shoulder facing oncoming traffic. The tractor-trailer was owned by Gedenberg’s employer, Valley Recycling. Gedenberg failed to sufficiently straighten his vehicle, and the front right portion of the trailer was jutting into the southbound lane.

Around the same time, a Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority (“SCVTA”) bus was headed southbound on South Seventh Street. The bus collided with Valley Recycling’s trailer, injuring its driver and causing severe damage to both the trailer and the bus.

On or about October 15, 2012, Mid Century Insurance Company (“Mid Century”), Valley Recycler’s insurer, filed a complaint to recover $44,166.47 for damage to the tractor-trailer. Shortly thereafter, Great American Insurance Company (“Great American”) and SCVTA (collectively, “Cross-Complainants”) filed a cross-complaint against cross-defendants Valley Recycling and Gedenberg (collectively, “Cross-Defendants”) seeking to recover damage to SCVTA’s bus.

On or about December 27, 2013, SCVTA filed a separate small claims action against Valley Recycling to recover $2,757.80 in medical costs incurred on behalf of its bus driver. The parties appeared for trial before the small claims commissioner. SCVTA presented two witnesses and introduced an unknown number of documents into evidence, while one witness testified on behalf of Valley Recycling. On June 13, 2014, the commissioner issued the following one sentence ruling, “Liability not found” and judgment was entered in favor of Valley Recycling.

Valley Recycling subsequently brought a motion in limine seeking dismissal of the cross-complaint, arguing that the action was barred by operation of either res judicata or collateral estoppel. In support of its motion Valley Recycling attached copies of the pleadings and minute orders from the small claims action. Following argument, the trial court determined that the cross-complaint for property damage was barred under the doctrine of res judicata since it was based on the same claim of negligence as SCVTA’s small claims action for personal injury.

The trial court conditioned dismissal of the cross-complaint on Mid Century dismissing its complaint against SCVTA, recognizing the inequity of allowing Mid Century to proceed to trial on its claims against SCVTA arising out of the accident issues arising from the accident while SCVTA was precluded from doing so. Thereafter, judgment was entered in favor of Valley Recycling.

Cross-Complainants appealed from the judgment arguing that the trial court erred in giving collateral estoppel to the small claims judgment. The Sixth District Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment. In doing so, the appellate court concluded that the small claims record was not sufficiently clear to justify applying collateral estoppel to SCVTA’s claims. Thus, the order dismissing the cross-complaint was vacated and the case remanded to the trial court to restore both the complaint and cross-complaint to the active civil calendar.

Currently before the Court is Cross-Complainants’ motion for summary adjudication of Cross-Defendants’ affirmative defense for collateral estoppel. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (f).) Cross-Complainants filed a request for judicial notice in conjunction with the motion. Cross-Defendants filed written opposition. Cross-Complainants filed reply papers and objections to evidence. Trial is set for April 10, 2017.

Motion for Summary Adjudication

Cross-Complainants move to summarily adjudicate the affirmative defense for collateral estoppel because no triable issues of fact exist.

Request for Judicial Notice

In support of the motion, Cross-Complainants request judicial notice of the following: (1) Cross-Defendant Valley Recycling’s trial brief (Exhibit 2); (2) Cross-Defendant Valley Recycling’s motion in limine to dismiss the cross-complaint on res judicata/collateral estoppel grounds (Exhibit 3); (3) the small claims court file of Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority v. Environmental Resource Recovery, Inc. (2013-1-SC-055253) (Exhibit 4); (4) the judgment of dismissal in the present action (Exhibit 5); and (5) the appellate opinion reflecting law of the case (Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority, et al. v. Valley Recycling 2016 WL 1367065) (Exhibit 6).

“Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action without requiring formal proof of the matter.” (Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1117.)

With respect to Exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5, these documents are subject to judicial notice as records of the superior court and small claims court under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). With respect to Exhibit 6, the appellate opinion is subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (a) as decisional law of the state of California. There is no opposition to the request for judicial notice which appears relevant to issues raised by the motion. (See Gbur v. Cohen (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 296, 301 [judicial notice is always confined to those matters which are relevant to the issues at hand].)

Accordingly, the request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Evidentiary Objection

The Court declines to rule on the objection to evidence as Cross-Complaints failed to meet their initial burden on the motion for summary adjudication.

Legal Standard

“The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not in dispute. A party may seek summary adjudication on whether a cause of action, affirmative defense, or punitive damages claim has merit or whether a defendant owed a duty to a plaintiff. A motion for summary adjudication…shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 625, 630 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

“Summary adjudication is proper if the papers submitted show there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to prevail on a cause of action as a matter of law. A defendant moving for summary adjudication bears the initial burden to show the cause of action has no merit, i.e., that one or more elements of the cause of action…cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff…to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists…” (Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1386-1387 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

“A triable issue of material fact exists if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. Thus, a party cannot avoid summary [adjudication] by asserting facts based on mere speculation and conjecture, but instead must produce admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact.” (California Bank & Trust v. Lawlor, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 631 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

Affirmative Defense: Collateral Estoppel

“Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. [Citation.] Traditionally, we have applied the doctrine only if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding. [Citations.] The party asserting collateral estoppel bears the burden of establishing these requirements. [Citation.]” (Lucido v. Super Ct. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)

However, as this is a motion for summary adjudication, Cross-Complainants bear the burden of disposing of this affirmative defense. (See Pieper v. Commercial Underwriters Ins. Co. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1015 [“The moving defendant bears the burden of proving the absence of any triable issue of material fact, even though the burden of proof as to a particular issue may be on the plaintiff at trial.”]; see also Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840 [“A responding plaintiff has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden.”].) For the reasons stated below, Cross-Complainants fail to meet this burden.

Law of the Case Doctrine

Cross-Complainants argue that the law of the case doctrine precludes Cross-Defendants from proving each element of their collateral estoppel defense.

“Under the law of the case doctrine, the decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case. [Citation.] The doctrine applies to decisions of intermediate appellate courts as well as courts of last resort. [Citation.] The doctrine promotes finality by preventing relitigation of issues previously decided. [Citations.] The doctrine does not apply to points of law that might have been determined, but were not decided in the prior appeal. [Citation.]” (Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 298, 309 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

Here, Cross-Complainants argue that the law of the case doctrine applies because the Sixth District Court of Appeal concluded that collateral estoppel could not be used to bar the cross-complaint. However, the appellate court’s finding is based in part on the fact that the small claims record was inadequate and did not support a finding of collateral estoppel. (See Declaration of Matthew Henderson at Exhibit 6 [Appellate Opinion at pp.8-9].) In addition, the appellate court reversed the judgment because a motion in limine was used to dispose of the action instead of allowing the case to proceed to trial. (Id. [Appellate Opinion at p. 8]; see Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1593 [“What in limine motions are not designed to do is to replace the dispositive motions prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.”].) The Court of Appeal’s decision does not preclude Cross-Defendants from raising the defense of collateral estoppel as a matter of law. In fact, if anything, the appellate court’s opinion leaves the door open allowing Cross-Defendants to raise collateral estoppel as a defense during trial supported by proper evidence.

Consequently, the law of the case doctrine is not applicable and does not dispose of the collateral estoppel defense on summary adjudication.

Lack of Evidence to Support Collateral Estoppel

Even if collateral estoppel could be asserted, Cross-Complainants argue that Cross-Defendants do not have any evidence to support the defense. In particular, Cross-Complainants contend that the small claims file is limited to the 19 pages of documents produced by Valley Recycling in support of the motion in limine. (See Cross-Complainants Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts at Nos. 9-10.) However, as the opposition points out, evidence other than the small claims file could be used to establish collateral estoppel. Such evidence, for example, may include testimony given by witnesses to support the defense. Thus, it will be up to the trier of fact to determine whether Cross-Defendants can support their affirmative defense for collateral estoppel.

Accordingly, the motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.