Case Number: 19STCV04516 Hearing Date: August 21, 2019 Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

Mirna V. Arroyo Garcia,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Ashley Renee Price,

Defendant.

CASE NO: 19STCV04516

[TENTATIVE] ORDER

Re: Defendant’s motion to strike Punitive damages

Dept. 3

1:30 p.m.

August 21, 2019

1. Background Facts

This action for motor vehicle negligence arises from a collision between the parties on February 18, 2017.

2. Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Request for Punitive Damages

Defendant moves the court for an order striking Plaintiff’s requests for punitive and exemplary damages against Defendant Ashley Renee Price.

Legal Standard

The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. CCP § 436(a). The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. CCP § 436(b).

To succeed on a motion to strike punitive damages allegations, it must be said as a matter of law that the alleged behavior was not so vile, base, or contemptible that it would not be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228-1229. Civil Code section 3294 provides punitive damages are available in non-contract actions where defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud, defined as follows:

(c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

A demand for punitive damages for the commission of any tort requires more than the mere allegation of the “wrongfully and intentionally,” “oppression, fraud, and malice” sort of language found in Civil Code section 3294. Perkins v Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6-7. The allegations of fact must, in their totality, describe a state of mind and a motive that would sustain an award of punitive damages. Ibid. The mere allegation that an intentional tort is committed is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166. Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. Ibid.

Discussion

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant was driving under the influence are insufficient to show “despicable conduct” as required for a request of punitive damages under the “malice” prong of CCP § 3294(c)(1).

In discussing the availability of punitive damages in an automobile collision where a driver was intoxicated, the Court held that “[i]n order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, 895–96. “A conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code.” Id. at 895.

However, Taylor fell short, however, of holding that punitive damages are always appropriate in cases involving driving while intoxicated. The Court noted, “we have concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of ‘malice’ under §3294 if performed under circumstances which disclose a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.” Id. at 892.

Notably, a subsequent decision held that driving while intoxicated does not always give rise to a claim for punitive damages. “[W]e do not agree that the risk created generally by one who becomes intoxicated and decides nevertheless to drive a vehicle on the public streets is the same as the risk created by an intoxicated driver’s decision to zigzag in and out of traffic at 65 miles per hour in a crowded beach recreation area at 1:30 in the afternoon on a Sunday in June. The risk of injury to others from ordinary driving while intoxicated is certainly foreseeable, but it is not necessarily probable. The risk of injury to others from Mardian’s conduct under the circumstances alleged was probable.” Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82.

Defendant distinguishes Taylor from the facts at hand by arguing that the defendant in Taylor was not merely driving under the influence but had also previously caused a serious accident while driving under the influence, had numerous prior DUI convictions, and was facing an additional pending drink driving charge at the time of the accident. Id. At 893.

In the facts at hand, the Complaint alleges merely that “Plaintiff’s resulting injuries and damages were a direct and legal result or cause of Defendant being under the influence, or intoxicated, as a result of ingesting alcohol, at the time of subject incident, and as a result of operating a motor vehicle while in such an intoxicated state” (Compl. p.6). Plaintiff does not allege Defendant’s level of intoxication, and fails to allege any additional aggravating factors. It merely alleges that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The motion to strike is therefore granted.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend.