Item 1 2013-00148271-CU-MC

Morton & Pitalo, Inc. vs. Vincent Doyle

Nature of Proceeding: Motion for Attorney Fees

Filed By: Krogh, Shawn M.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys Fees is unopposed and is granted.

This matter was continued from March 28 to allow plaintiff to file and serve the time records to support the summary of invoices. Counsel filed the documents April 2, 2018 and the Court has now reviewed them.

Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice is granted.

On December 18, 2017 the Court denied, without prejudice, plaintiff’s earlier motion for attorneys fees that sought fees from both defendants pursuant to Civil Code 1717 and Penal Code 496(c).

The initial Notice of Judgment was filed on this judgment on September 7, 2017. (Krogh Dec, ¶ 15.) On October 16, 2017, the judgment was amended to include costs pursuant to the Memorandum of Costs filed on September 20, 2017, for a total judgment of $3,378,608.00. On November 6, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney Fees based on California Civil Code section 1717 and California Penal Code section

496. The initial motion was heard and taken under submission on December 15, 2017. During the hearing, counsel for Plaintiff argued that California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.4 should apply. On December 18, 2017, the Court denied the motion without prejudice, since the new ground raised at the hearing was not addressed in the moving papers. (Krogh Dec, ¶ 17.).

After the hearing. Plaintiff filed and served the Notice of Amended Judgment on

January 3, 2018. (Krogh Dec, ¶ 16.) Now, by way of this Motion, Plaintiff seeks to have this court determine whether or not Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees from defendant Vincent Doyle under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.4.

CCP 1021.4 provides: In an action for damages against a defendant based upon the defendant’s commission of a felony offense for which he has been convicted, the court may, upon motion, award reasonable attorneys fees to a prevailing plaintiff against the defendant who has been convicted of a felony. CCP 1021.4.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleged six causes of action for conversion, violation of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, conspiracy, constructive trust, money had and received, and breach of fiduciary duty. These causes of action arose from Defendant’s embezzlement of funds belonging to Plaintiff. On April 29, 2015

Defendant Vincent Doyle (hereinafter “Defendant”) was convicted of mail fraud in connection with the embezzlement as set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Request for Judicial Notice No. 1. – Judgment in a Criminal Case; Krogh Dec, ¶ 7 and Exhibit A.)

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in the present action because a judgment was entered against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff. (Request for Judicial Notice No. 2 – Judgment in this Action.; Krogh Dec, ¶¶ 8-9 and Exhibit B.) As plaintiff is the prevailing party in the present action, and the action was filed for damages arising from the Defendant’s commission of a felony for which he was convicted, Plaintiff seeks reasonable attorney fees to plaintiff in the amount of $112,718.75.

Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates are $300 for the Mr. Krogh who has been practicing for 20 years. The other rates charged by associates run from $100 to $250 per hour. These rates are reasonable for the Sacramento area.

Moving counsel has appropriately defined the scope of his work to a sufficient degree of specificity “so as to meaningfully enlighten the court of those [entries] related to” the claims upon which the attorney’s client prevailed. Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist.
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 689.

This case involved complex issues and there were several causes of action that arose from the mail fraud. Counsel spent a total of 205 hours billed in prosecution of this action which included pretrial, discovery motions and a successful motion for summary judgment. (Krogh Decl. ¶ 11-13)

Plaintiff has filed no opposition questioning the reasonableness of the hourly rates or the number of hours spent.

Generally, statutory fees are determined by the “lodestar” method. Under that method, a “reasonable” hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by an attorney of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084,1095 (PCLM)). “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community…” [Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 [ Ketchum).) A trial court may adjust the lodestar amount based on various factors specific to the case to fix the attorney fees at fair market value for the services provided. (PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 1095-1096.) The factors include: (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature

of the fee award.” (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132; Holguin v. Dish Network LLC

(2009) Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332. In considering the lodestar factors, a trial court must “focus on providing an award of attorney fees reasonably designed to fully compensate [the prevailing party’s] attorneys for the services provided.” (Harsford v. Board of Trustees (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395.)

Fee award amounts are matters within the trial court’s discretion: the “trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, at p. 1132; accord PLCM Group, (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.)

The Court finds that the number hours spent on each task set forth in the invoices was reasonable and the hourly rates charged, as set forth above, are reasonable. Thus, the Court awards fees in the requested amount.

The Court will sign the proposed order.