Filed 12/6/19 Garand v. County of Nevada CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(El Dorado)

—-

NORMAN GARAND,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF NEVADA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

C086243

(Super. Ct. No. SC20170095)

Plaintiff Norman Garand filed this action against several superior court judges (judicial defendants), Nevada County and several county employees (county defendants), and Michael Netherby, a process server (Netherby). The trial court sustained the judicial and county defendants’ demurrers and granted Netherby’s special motion to dismiss.

Garand now contends (1) he was denied due process because a judge was never appointed to this case, (2) it was an abuse of process for the trial court to traffic in breached deeds of trust, (3) he was not given notice of proposed orders, (4) an appeal stays proceedings to take land, (5) Nevada County unlawfully transferred this action to El Dorado County, and (6) a complaint to quiet title is not demurrable.

Because Garand’s third contention is forfeited and the remainder of his claims fail on the merits, we will affirm the judgments.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Garand makes many factual and procedural assertions, but most of them are not supported by references to the record on appeal. To the extent Garand makes statements of fact or procedure not supported by citations to the record on appeal, we must disregard those statements. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Miller v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 728, 743 (Miller).)

Garand’s request for judicial notice filed November 16, 2018 is denied in its entirety because it contains filings from other cases not relevant to this appeal and documents that were not before the trial court in this case. (See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6 [judicial notice denied because “the requests present no issue for which judicial notice of these items is necessary, helpful, or relevant”]; Appel v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 329, 342, fn. 6 [judicial notice denied where materials are not “relevant or necessary” to the court’s analysis].) We also strike the exhibits attached to Garand’s reply brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(d) [limiting materials that may be attached to brief as exhibits].)

We review the rulings and judgments of the trial court in this case and do not entertain new issues on appeal. (In re Marriage of Eben-King & King (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 92, 117.) Likewise, we do not address arguments that may be buried in the statement of the case or statement of facts in the opening brief or that are set forth in the argument section of the opening brief but are not stated “under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); see Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830, fn. 4.)

In addition, we do not address issues or contentions raised for the first time in Garand’s reply brief. Considerations of fairness require that an appellant raise all issues and contentions in the opening brief. (Neighbours v. Buzz Oates Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8.)

Moreover, we are constrained to review only the rulings and judgments in the present case and cannot consider the validity of rulings and judgments in other proceedings. The remedy for asserted error in those cases was to seek appellate review, not to assert those errors in a new action. (Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, 818.)

It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an appellant must affirmatively show error by an adequate record, and that error is never presumed. (IIG Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 639 (IIG Wireless).) An appellant has the burden “to support claims of error with meaningful argument and citation to authority.” (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 (Allen).) “We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.” (Ibid.) Pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) A self-represented litigant is “treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.)

BACKGROUND

We recount the background relevant to the five contentions Garand asserts in this appeal.

Garand filed a complaint against the judicial defendants, the county defendants and Netherby asserting numerous causes of action, such as quiet title, wrongful foreclosure, securities fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The complaint named other defendants, including attorneys and banks, but those defendants are not parties to this appeal because the judgments from which Garand appeals did not resolve his claims against them.

The judicial and county defendants demurred to the complaint, and Netherby filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court sustained the demurrers and entered judgment in favor of the judicial and county defendants. The trial court also granted Netherby’s motion to strike and entered judgment in Netherby’s favor.

DISCUSSION

A

Garand contends his due process rights were violated because a judge was never “appointed” to this case. Based on the authorities he cites, it appears his concern is that a judge was not assigned to handle all aspects of the matter.

Although Garand notes the rationale for an all-purpose assignment, he does not establish that the failure to make an all-purpose assignment violates due process. Accordingly, his contention fails.

B

Garand next argues the trial court committed an abuse of process by trafficking in “breached deeds of trust to steal land from the stock market and give it to the banking industry and destroy the country.” Garand cites authority pertaining to the tort of abuse of process, but he failed to assert an abuse of process cause of action in his complaint. Although the first page of his complaint identifies abuse of process in a list of the causes of action purportedly included in that pleading, the body of the complaint does not contain such a cause of action. Accordingly, his contention on appeal lacks merit.

C

Garand further claims the trial court violated his due process rights by not giving him notice of proposed orders. However, Garand does not support this claim with citations to the record or to authority. The contention is therefore forfeited. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Miller, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 743; Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52.)

In addition, Garand asserts that the county defendants and Netherby “gave themselves” dismissal orders that no judge issued. The assertion fails because each order was signed by a judge.

D

Garand argues a perfected appeal stays defendants from taking the land. He cites authority that an appeal stays trial court proceedings (see Code Civ. Proc., § 916), but he does not explain how the rule affects the judgments entered in this case, and he does not show trial court error in sustaining the demurrers and granting the motion to strike. Garand fails to carry his burden of demonstrating error on appeal. (IIG Wireless, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 639.)

E

Garand contends the Nevada County Superior Court unlawfully transferred this action to El Dorado County Superior Court. Specifically he argues the case should have been sent to the Chair of the Judicial Council and declares there is no evidence it did so. But the record belies his assertion. On May 31, 2017, the Nevada County Superior Court filed a notice that the Chief Justice assigned the matter to the El Dorado County Superior Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.511 [order of transfer], 10.1(a)(1) [chief justice as chair of Judicial Council] .) Garand does not show that the transfer was unlawful or deficient.

F

Finally, Garand claims a complaint to quiet title is not demurrable. He cites case law stating that a complaint is not demurrable if it alleges that plaintiff owns the property and that defendant asserts an adverse claim to the property. (Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195, 213.) Although the citation is accurate, the authority is not dispositive. Garand claims the subject property is owned by Kathryn Reynolds, his former attorney. And Garand does not point us to any allegation in his complaint that the judicial defendants, the county defendants, or Netherby assert an adverse claim to the property in question. Accordingly, Garand’s contention lacks merit.

DISPOSITION

The judgments are affirmed. Each respondent is awarded its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

/S/

MAURO, J.

We concur:

/S/

RAYE, P. J.

/S/

BLEASE, J.