Filed 6/17/20 Omega Family Global, Inc. v. Doe CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

OMEGA FAMILY GLOBAL, INC. et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JANE DOE et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

D075358

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-00035697-CU-PT-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, David M. Rubin, Judge. Affirmed.

Sharif Faust Lawyers, Matthew J. Faust, and Khodadad D. Sharif for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Glenn Stern Law, Glenn E. Stern, and Matthew P. Malczynski for Defendants and Respondents.

Omega Family Global, Inc. (Omega) filed a petition to compel arbitration against Jane and John Doe, contending they were required to arbitrate a dispute arising under a surrogacy agreement Jane had entered into with third parties. The Does moved to transfer venue of the action to Riverside, where they lived, and as prescribed by the surrogacy agreement. The trial court granted the Does’ transfer motion and awarded attorney fees ($9,200) and costs ($50) incurred by the Does in filing the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 396b, subd. (b).) Omega and its attorneys Matthew Faust and Sharif/Faust Lawyers, Ltd. (Appellants) appeal from the order awarding fees. They raise three contentions on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it awarded fees and costs after making positive statements on the record regarding counsel’s arguments in opposition to the motion; (2) the trial court erred when it held Appellants knew or should have known Riverside was the appropriate venue to file their petition to compel arbitration; and (3) the trial court erred when it found the Does’ attorney’s market rate was reasonable because the declaration filed in support contained no information about the attorney’s experience, education, or age. We conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding fees and determining the amount of the award. We therefore affirm the order.

FACTS

Jane Doe agreed to act as a gestational surrogate for a couple (the intended parents) who lived in China and were unable to have children. The intended parents were clients of Omega, a commercial surrogacy company. Facilitated by Omega, Jane and the intended parents entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement in November 2015. Omega was not a party to the agreement.

Pursuant to the surrogacy agreement, embryos conceived with the intended parents’ genetic material were transferred to Jane. During the pregnancy, the parties learned Jane was carrying two children. The children were born in Riverside, California. After the children were born, the parties learned only one child was the genetic offspring of the intended parents, while the second child was the genetic offspring of Jane and John Doe.

The parties provide competing versions of events following the birth of the children. According to Jane, even after DNA tests confirmed that one child was Jane and John’s, Omega refused to return the child and threatened to place him for adoption unless she paid significant funds Omega claimed she owed them. According to Omega, however, Jane denied the child was hers and was uncooperative while Omega cared for the child and worked to transfer legal parentage of the child to Jane.

The intended parents, who had paid extra fees associated with a twin pregnancy, settled a dispute with Omega in February 2017. In connection with that settlement, the intended parents assigned to Omega their rights and claims against Jane, including their rights under the surrogacy agreement.

The surrogacy agreement contained provisions that required the surrogate to take ovulation-inhibiting drugs during the surrogacy, and prohibiting the surrogate from engaging in sexual activity during certain phases of the surrogacy. As such, Omega alleged that Jane and John’s child could only have been conceived through Jane’s breach of the surrogacy agreement. Omega filed a petition to compel arbitration against Jane and John, contending they were required to arbitrate their dispute pursuant to the surrogacy agreement. Omega filed the petition in San Diego County Superior Court.

Around the same time, Jane sued Omega in Riverside County Superior Court, asserting claims for child abduction, extortion, child abuse and endangerment, battery, intentional misrepresentation, conspiracy, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and unfair business practices.

The Does opposed Omega’s arbitration petition and moved to transfer Omega’s petition from San Diego to Riverside pursuant to section 397. The Does contended Riverside was the appropriate venue for the action pursuant to the surrogacy agreement. The Does also sought an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in moving to transfer venue pursuant to section 396b, subdivision (b).

Meanwhile, Omega moved to transfer the Riverside action to San Diego and requested the actions be coordinated, contending San Diego was the proper venue pursuant to the surrogacy agreement.

After a hearing on the cross-motions, the trial court granted the Does’ motion and transferred Omega’s action to Riverside County Superior Court. The trial court retained temporary jurisdiction only for the purpose of ruling on the Does’ request for attorney fees and costs, and subsequently ordered Omega to pay $9,200 in fees and $50 in costs.

DISCUSSION

I.
Award of Attorney Fees Under Section 396b

A. Additional Factual Background

1. The Surrogacy Agreement

The agreement stated that it “was executed by Surrogate in the State of California, County of Riverside, and shall be governed by, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of California.” The agreement provided that “issues pertaining to legal custody and determination of parentage of the [c]hild will be addressed in the Superior Court of the State of California County of Riverside.” The agreement also contained an agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate other disputes, including an agreement to arbitrate “any action to enforce or interpret this [a]greement or to resolve disputes,” “[e]xcept for parentage issues,” that could not be resolved through mediation. The arbitration was required to be conducted in Riverside County, California, “or another location agreed upon by the parties or, if not, by the arbitrators.” A paragraph of the surrogacy agreement entitled “Governing Law,” provided that “[a]ny action or mediation shall be initiated in California. If more than one venue is appropriate, subject to judicial approval, venue shall be in a county to be selected by the Intended Parents.” As discussed further post, Omega relies on this language of the agreement (section 34.01), in combination with the assignment of rights by the intended parents, to argue it had the authority to select San Diego as the venue for its petition.

2. Petition to Compel Arbitration and Motion to Change Venue

Omega filed a petition to compel arbitration in San Diego County Superior Court, contending Jane and John breached the surrogacy agreement and were required to arbitrate the ensuing dispute. The petition alleged the surrogacy agreement was made in San Diego and authorized Omega (as the assignee of the intended parents) to choose the venue for any court proceedings.

The Does moved to transfer venue from San Diego to Riverside. The Does argued Omega was not a party to the surrogacy agreement; the surrogacy agreement expressly required arbitration to be conducted in Riverside County; disputes pertaining to custody or parentage issues required litigation in Riverside County Superior Court; and the agreement was executed by Jane in Riverside County, performed in Riverside County (where the children were born), and Jane and John Doe reside in Riverside County.

Omega opposed the change of venue motion, reiterating its position it stood in the shoes of the intended parents as assignees under the surrogacy agreement, which, Omega maintained, allowed “the Intended Parents to select venue in the event of a dispute.”

3. Hearing on Venue Issues

At the outset of the hearing, the court provided a tentative decision stating that, based on the language of the contract, it would grant the Does’ motion to transfer Omega’s arbitration petition to Riverside. Omega’s counsel explained the settlement between his client and the intended parents, including the agreement to assign claims; argued the intended parents’ claims for money damages were properly assignable; and argued Omega should not have to litigate in Riverside because its key witnesses reside and do business in San Diego. The Does’ counsel acknowledged there were a number of issues for a court to decide at the outset of the case (regarding assignability, arbitrability, and more) but urged that Riverside was the appropriate venue for these arguments to be heard.

During the hearing, the trial court complimented the attorneys for both sides for their professional behavior and eloquence. The trial court reiterated that, based on the language of the contract, the appropriate venue was clearly Riverside, and pointed out that Omega counsel’s “eloquent” and “helpful” arguments should be heard by a judge in Riverside. The trial court stated he was “totally engaged” by counsel’s arguments, “but even so, being really amazed by his advocacy, . . . I feel like I should just be ruling on, I think this belongs in Riverside for two reasons. One, I think the agreement says so. . . . And two, just on the sheer venue piece, that I think my analysis is this is not a question of where is it best. It’s where is it least bad. Because it seems like it sort of cuts both ways.” When Omega’s counsel indicated he wanted to respond to the hypothetical question, ” ‘[w]here should the case have been started,’ ” the trial court interposed, “I think reasonable minds can differ. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . I’m not saying you did anything wrong.” After taking a brief recess, the trial court confirmed its tentative ruling to grant the Does’ motion to transfer venue to Riverside based on the language of the contract and indicated it would reserve jurisdiction only to rule on the Does’ fee request.

In a subsequent written order, the trial court granted the Does’ request for fees associated with the venue transfer motion. The trial court found that the surrogacy agreement was made in Riverside County and stated the arbitration will be conducted in Riverside County. Thus, the petition to compel arbitration should have been filed in Riverside County. The trial court found Omega knew or should have known at the time of filing its petition to compel arbitration that Riverside County was the appropriate venue for filing. The trial court found, under these circumstances, an award of attorney fees was appropriate, the hourly rate sought ($460) was reasonable, and the number of hours billed (20) was reasonable.

B. Applicable Law

“Venue, the county in which an action takes place, is statutorily governed by the type or form of the particular action.” (Lebastchi v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1465, 1469 (Lebastchi).) The general venue rule provides that venue is appropriate in the county where the defendant resides. (See § 395, subd. (a) [“Except as otherwise provided by law . . . , the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.”], italics added.) This general rule is subject to exceptions for certain types of actions, including breach of contract claims. (See § 395, subd. (a) [an action founded on a contract may be tried in the superior court in the county where the obligation will be performed, where the contract was entered into, or where the defendant resides at the commencement of the action, “unless there is a special contract in writing to the contrary”].)

For arbitration claims in particular, a petition to compel arbitration shall be filed in the “county where the agreement is to be performed or was made.” (§ 1292, subd. (a).) “If the agreement does not specify a county where the agreement is to be performed and the agreement was not made in any county in this state, the county where any party to the court proceeding resides or has a place of business” is the proper venue. (Id., subd. (b).) In all other cases, venue is appropriate “in any county in this state.” (Id., subd. (c).)

If an action is filed in an improper venue, the trial court has the discretion to order the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s “reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in making . . . the motion to transfer” venue pursuant to section 396b, subdivision (b). The statute provides: “In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action. In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known. As between the party and his or her attorney, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney not chargeable to the party. Sanctions shall not be imposed pursuant to this subdivision except on notice contained in a party’s papers, or on the court’s own noticed motion, and after opportunity to be heard.” (§ 396b, subd. (b).)

“The statute requires the court to assess whether the attorney acted in good faith after having first skillfully evaluated the facts and reviewed applicable statutes and case law. The phrase ‘good faith’ is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one’s duty or obligation. [Citation.] Thus, if, after reviewing the factual and legal presentation made by the losing party, the court finds that no reasonable attorney would have honestly chosen such a forum, and that the forum appears to have been selected to impair defendant’s right to defend, an award of attorney fees would be entirely proper.” (Metzger v. Silverman (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d Supp. 30, 38-39 (Metzger).) “The statute also requires the attorney . . . opposing a motion for a change of venue, to carefully investigate the facts with a view of determining which court is proper for the trial of the action. If, following a thorough investigation, the attorney has an honest and reasonable belief that his client has a tenable contention, and he believes that he can establish the existence of such facts supporting his choice of venue to the satisfaction of the court, this part of his task is complete.” (Id. at p. 39.) “An attorney who fails to review the applicable case law, and relevant statutes, before filing an action, or before making a motion to change venue, runs a substantial risk that attorney fees will be assessed against him. While the statute does not require a lawyer to be omniscient, it does require him to demonstrate professional competence.” (Id. at pp. 39-40.)

“Where, as here, the trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, its decision will be reversed only if there has been a prejudicial abuse of discretion. ‘ “To be entitled to relief on appeal . . . it must clearly appear that the injury resulting from such wrong is sufficiently grave to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ‘ ” (Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 921, 932 (Mission Imports) [finding no abuse of discretion where trial court awarded fees and costs to party resisting an unsuccessful motion to change venue].) Where a trial court’s order is challenged on the ground that its findings are not supported by the evidence, we review the record for substantial evidence in support of the court’s ruling, including any implied findings. (West Coast Development v. Reed (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 693, 697-698 (West Coast).) “Assuming some evidence exists in support of the factual findings, the trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason.” (Id. at p. 698.)

C. Analysis

The trial court found that, at the time of filing their petition, Appellants knew or should have known that Riverside County was the appropriate venue in which to file, and it granted the Does’ request for attorney fees on that basis. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Riverside County was the only appropriate venue given the express language of the surrogacy agreement and the nature of Appellants’ claims, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees under section 396b.

Appellants claim they are entitled to arbitrate their dispute with the Does—a dispute which arises from Jane Doe’s alleged breach of the surrogacy agreement. We therefore look to the surrogacy agreement to determine the appropriate venue. The surrogacy agreement provides that “any action to enforce or interpret this [a]greement or to resolve disputes,” except for parentage issues, is subject to arbitration. Of particular importance here, the surrogacy agreement expressly mandates that “[t]he arbitration will be conducted in Riverside County, California, or another location agreed upon by the parties or, if not, by the arbitrators.” If, as Appellants claim, they are entitled to arbitrate their dispute with the Does based on the surrogacy agreement, they are likewise required to comply with the agreement’s clear venue requirements.

Appellants contend that San Diego was nonetheless an appropriate venue based on the surrogacy agreement’s Governing Law provision (section 34.01), which states: “If more than one venue is appropriate, subject to judicial approval, venue shall be in a county to be selected by the Intended Parents.” (Italics added.) They contend the intended parents assigned their rights to Omega, so Omega has the right to select San Diego as the venue. We are not persuaded that this provision applies because Omega has failed to establish that venue is appropriate in any county other than Riverside. As the trial court concluded, venue in Riverside County is appropriate based on section 1292, subdivision (a). As relevant here, section 1292, subdivision (a) provides that a petition to compel arbitration should be filed in the county where the underlying agreement was made or is to be performed. Here, the evidence presented to the trial court established that the surrogacy agreement was accepted by Jane Doe when she executed it in Riverside County, and the children were born in Riverside. Even applying general venue provisions applicable to breach of contract claims, Appellants are unable to establish San Diego was a proper venue. Pursuant to section 395, subdivision (a), “if a defendant has contracted to perform an obligation in a particular county, the superior court in the county where the obligation is to be performed, where the contract in fact was entered into, or where the defendant or any defendant resides at the commencement of the action is a proper court for the trial of an action founded on that obligation . . . .” (See Metzger, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at pp. Supp. 40-41 [“Since the contractual obligation was accepted in this county, and the work was performed here, the suit would have properly been brought in this county . . . .”].) There was no evidence showing the surrogacy agreement was accepted or otherwise created, or performed, in San Diego County. Based on the clear language in the surrogacy agreement and the evidence before it, the trial court did not err by finding Omega knew or should have known that Riverside County was the proper venue. The trial court did not err when it rejected Appellants’ claim that it had the right to choose venue under section 34.01 of the surrogacy agreement; it was never triggered because there was never “more than one venue” which was appropriate.

The trial court properly exercised its discretion to award sanctions in this case. Appellants contend the trial court erred when it imposed sanctions “[f]or [f]ailing to [a]nticipate the [c]ourt’s [c]onstruction of the [d]ispute [r]esolution [p]rovisions.” “If the law on a particular subject is doubtful or debatable, an attorney will not be held responsible for failing to anticipate the manner in which the uncertainty will be resolved.” (Metzger, supra, 62 Cal.App.3d at p. Supp. 39.) Here, however, there was nothing “doubtful or debatable” about the governing legal principles and the trial court’s resolution of the dispute. Counsel was required “to carefully investigate the facts with a view of determining which court is proper for the trial of the action,” and to “review the applicable case law, and relevant statutes, before filing an action.” (Ibid.) The surrogacy agreement and applicable law clearly establish that venue in Riverside, not San Diego, was proper.

The trial court’s findings in support of the sanctions award were sufficient. Appellants disagree, claiming the trial court made no specific finding of bad faith. They argue the fee award cannot stand because the trial court complimented counsel’s arguments and stated that “reasonable minds can differ,” and Appellants did not do “anything wrong.” We note, however, the trial court complimented both sides’ arguments. Regardless of how the trial court characterized the situation during the hearing, it ultimately applied the correct legal standard in its subsequent written decision and exercised its discretion to award attorney fees under section 396b. Omega’s counsel’s arguments did not persuade the trial court to abandon its initial determination that transfer was warranted, based on the reasonable finding that Omega should have known Riverside was the appropriate venue according to the clear contract language and applicable law. We decline to find that gracious, polite comments made from the bench during the hearing undermine the court’s discretionary conclusion a fee award was warranted. (See Whitlow v. Board of Medical Examiners (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 478, 487 [“Fortunately for the stability of judgments the findings of the court are those expressed in writing. What the judge said may be useful to explain the findings but it cannot overcome them, and if contradictory, must be disregarded.”].)

We reject Appellants’ contention that the trial court was required to make an express finding of bad faith. ” ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent . . . .’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We construe the trial court’s order imposing sanctions as an implied finding that Appellants, in selecting San Diego as the place to file their petition, were acting in bad faith. (See, e.g., Summers v. City of Cathedral City (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1069, fn. 17; Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Maxim Integrated Products, Inc. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 243, 265-266; cf. In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 124, 143 [even where statute at issue included a directive that the trial court ” ‘recite in detail the action or tactic or circumstances justifying the order’ ” (§ 128.5, subd. (c)), the appellate court rejected the argument that the trial court also was required to make an express finding that the sanctioned party acted in bad faith].) Contrary to Appellants’ assertion, there is substantial evidence to support this implied finding of bad faith. “In reviewing the facts which led the trial court to impose sanctions, we must accept the version thereof which supports the trial court’s determination, and must indulge in the inferences which favor its findings.” (West Coast, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 698.) As discussed ante, the surrogacy agreement underlying Omega’s petition to compel arbitration stated Jane entered into it in Riverside, and clearly required the arbitration to occur in Riverside. Knowing that the Does intended to file their own action, Appellants preemptively filed their action in San Diego for their own convenience. The trial court could properly conclude there was no good faith basis for Appellants to file the petition in San Diego, instead of Riverside, County. (See § 1292, subd. (a).) The trial court did not abuse its discretion and its decision to award fees does not result in a miscarriage of justice. (Mission Imports, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 932.)

Finally, Appellants contend the trial court erred in analyzing one of the factors under section 396b—whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected. Appellants are correct that there was no evidence in the record establishing the Does asked Appellants to stipulate to change venue to Riverside. The trial court correctly recognized this, finding “no evidence of a stipulation to change venue was provided.” We reject Appellants’ claim that the trial court “erroneously required the parties to have entered into a stipulation prior to the filing of the underlying [p]etition.” Appellants misconstrue the trial court’s ruling, which also used the term “stipulation” when explaining there was no agreement (or stipulation) authorizing Appellants to depart from the specific venue requirements in the surrogacy agreement. The trial court never stated that it was awarding sanctions based on Appellants’ failure to accept a reasonable offer by the Does to transfer venue to Riverside. The trial court’s order is presumed correct, and we reject Appellants’ argument that the court misapplied the governing law. Even if it had, we review the trial court’s conclusions, not its reasoning, and affirm if the court’s determination is correct on any legal basis. (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 269.) Whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected is just one factor the trial court may consider in determining whether sanctions are warranted. For reasons we have already discussed, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions based on Appellants’ decision to file in San Diego county in contravention of the clear language in the surrogacy agreement.

II.
Calculation of Attorney Fees

A. Additional Factual Background

In its motion to transfer venue to Riverside, the Does’ counsel requested that the court exercise its discretion to award reasonable attorney fees and costs. Specifically, counsel requested $4,600 associated with preparing the motion for change of venue (10 hours at counsel’s hourly charge of $460 per hour), $2,300 associated with preparing the reply brief (five hours at $460 per hour), $2,300 associated with traveling to and attending the hearing (five hours at $460 per hour), and $50 reimbursement for the motion filing fee—for a total of $9,250. An attorney declaration in support of the fee request stated the attorney was licensed to practice in California, worked for his law firm from an office in Glendora, California, and charged an hourly rate of $460.

Omega contended that the Does’ fee request was not supported by sufficient evidence to demonstrate it was reasonable because it failed to articulate counsel’s experience, the scope of work completed, or the market rates for legal services in San Diego. Without providing a citation or other support, Omega contended that rates in Los Angeles are generally higher than they are in San Diego.

The trial court found the circumstances warranted an award of expenses and fees. The trial court further found the hourly rate sought ($460) was reasonable, and the number of hours billed in relation to the motion to transfer venue (20) was reasonable.

B. Applicable law

The lodestar method for determining a reasonable attorney fee calculates the fee by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489.) “Any challenge based on the amount of the fee awarded is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] An appellate court will interfere with the trial court’s determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1004 (Heritage Pacific).) ” ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his [or her] court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong” ‘—meaning that it abused its discretion.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

C. Analysis

Omega contends the trial court erroneously applied the lodestar method because the $460 hourly rate approved by the trial court is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Appellants contend “the Does did not provide the court with any information [on which] to base a fair market rate.” We disagree. The attorney declaration in support of the fee request stated the attorney was licensed to practice in California, worked from his firm’s office in Glendora, California, and listed an hourly rate of $460. It is true, as Appellants urge, that counsel’s declaration did not contain information about the attorney’s “credentials”; however, the attorney appeared and argued the motion before the trial court, which afforded the trial court an opportunity to assess counsel’s ability. The trial court found that the requested hourly rate of $460 was “reasonable given market rates, counsel’s skill and experience, and the unique nature of the case.” “The court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate.” (Heritage Pacific, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1009.) The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, given its knowledge of the local legal market and its evaluation of counsel’s work, the hourly billing rate of $460 was reasonable. (See Cordero-Sacks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1286-1287 [trial court did not err when it relied on its own expertise to determine the value of the attorney’s professional services, and concluded that an hourly rate of $450 was reasonable].)

Omega also argues that the hours requested were not adequately supported because counsel provided only “block billing entries” containing insufficient information. Here, however, the declaration stated that counsel had spent 10 hours preparing the motion for change of venue, five hours preparing the reply brief, and five hours traveling to and attending the hearing. The trial court found the number of hours billed in connection with the motion (20 total hours) was reasonable. Detailed billing statements are not required to support a fee request. (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324 [“It is not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorney fees under the lodestar method. [Citations.] Declarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked and the tasks performed are sufficient.”].) And while “[t]rial courts retain discretion to penalize block billing when the practice prevents them from discerning which tasks are compensable and which are not” (Heritage Pacific, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1010), the trial court here was clearly able to discern from the information provided which tasks were compensable, and properly awarded fees only for the time associated with the successful venue transfer motion. The trial court’s award of fees and costs based on the evidence before it was not an abuse of discretion. (See Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698 [“It is well established that ‘California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.’ “]; Heritage Pacific, at p. 1004 [appellate court will interfere with trial court’s attorney fees determination only where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion].)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to costs on appeal.

GUERRERO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.