Palacios Pacheco, et al. v. U.S.-Sino Investment, Inc., et al. CASE NO. 112CV236494
DATE: 27 June 2014 TIME: 9:00 LINE NUMBER: 10
This matter will be heard by the Honorable Judge Socrates Peter Manoukian in Department 19 in the Old Courthouse, 2nd Floor, 161 North First Street, San Jose. Any party opposing the tentative ruling must call Department 19 at 408.808.6856 and the opposing party no later than 4:00 PM Thursday 26 June 2014. Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel.

On 27 June 2014, the following motions were argued and submitted: (1) the motion of plaintiff Maria Leticia Palacios Pacheco to compel defendant U.S.-Sino Investment, Inc. to provide further responses to special interrogatories, set one, and requests for production of documents, set two, and for an award of monetary sanctions (the “U.S.-Sino motion”); and (2) the motion of plaintiff Maria Leticia Palacios Pacheco to compel defendant Dan Luo to attend his deposition and produce documents, and provide initial responses to form interrogatories, set two, special interrogatories, set one, requests for admission, set two, and requests for production of documents, set two, and for an award of monetary sanctions (the “Luo motion”).

Defendant U.S.-Sino Investment, Inc. filed a formal opposition to the U.S.-Sino motion. Stephen Heath, an attorney with the law firm of Fredrickson, Mazeika & Grant, LLP, specially appeared as counsel for defendant Dan Luo and filed a formal opposition to the Luo motion, solely with respect to plaintiff Maria Leticia Palacios Pacheco’s requests for an order compelling defendant Dan Luo’s attendance at deposition and an award of monetary sanctions.

On 24 June 2014, after this Tentative Ruling was written, this Court received and reviewed opposition papers filed by attorney Marlene Thomason (“Ms. Thomason”) on behalf of Mr. Luo with respect to the motion to compel initial responses to FI, SI, and RPD, and to deem the RFA admitted (the “Luo motion”). Mr. Luo did not previously file an opposition to the Luo motion to the extent that it requested an order compelling initial responses to FI, SI, and RPD, and deeming the RFA admitted.

The opposition filed by Ms. Thomason is untimely as opposition papers were due on 16 June 2014. In addition, Ms. Thomason is Mr. Luo’s former counsel. On 14 February 2014, Ms. Thomason substituted out of the case and since that time Mr. Luo has been self-represented. Since Ms. Thomason no longer represents Mr. Luo, she cannot properly file an opposition on his behalf. Accordingly, it appears that the untimely opposition should be disregarded.

The opposition indicates that Mr. Luo provided initial responses to the FI, SI, RPD, and RFA on 18 June 2014 and 19 June 2014. (Opp’n., p. 2:2-4.) However, the Court was not provided with the initial responses, their proofs of service, or declarations from Ms. Thomason or Mr. Luo declaring that the initial responses were served on Plaintiff. Thus, the Court cannot verify that initial responses have been served or whether the responses to the RFA were substantially code-compliant.

On the morning of 25 June 2014, this Court received and reviewed papers filed by U.S.-Sino on 24 June 2014, objecting to Ms. Pacheco’s reply that was filed in connection with her motion to compel U.S.-Sino to provide further responses to SI and RPD (the “U.S.-Sino motion”).

U.S.-Sino objects to Ms. Pacheco’s reply on the ground that it violates Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivision (c) because Ms. Pacheco served the reply by U.S.-mail, a method that it was not reasonably calculated to ensure delivery by the close of the following business day, 23 June 2014. U.S.-Sino’s counsel declares that she received the reply on 24 June 2014. U.S.-Sino also objects to the reply on the ground that it violates California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(d)-(e) because it is 12 pages and Ms. Pacheco did not apply to the Court for leave to file a memorandum longer than 10 pages.

U.S.-Sino has not been prejudiced by the purportedly deficient service as its counsel received and reviewed the reply 3 days prior to the hearing. In addition, while the reply was longer than 10 pages, the arguments therein were largely duplicative of those made in Ms. Pacheco’s moving papers and U.S.-Sino addressed the merits of the same in its opposition.

Accordingly, it appears that the Court should exercise its discretion to consider Ms. Pacheco’s reply.

Statement of Facts

This is action arises out of the death of Raul Zapata Mercado (“Mr. Mercado”) and was filed by various plaintiffs, including Mr. Mercado’s widow, his family members, and his coworkers, against defendants U.S.-Sino Investment, Inc. (“U.S.-Sino”), Richard Xin Liu (“Mr. Liu”), Dan Luo (“Mr. Luo”), Apolinar Polo Perez (“Mr. Perez”), Polo Perez Construction, Polo Perez Construction, Inc., and Wesley Wun Shyong Chen (“Mr. Chen”) (collectively “Defendants”).

Plaintiffs allege that in the fall of 2011, U.S.-Sino began excavation and foundation construction on a property that was owned by Mr. Chen and located at 814 Calaveras Ridge Drive in Milpitas, California. Plaintiffs allege that U.S.-Sino is owned and operated by Mr. Liu and that U.S.-Sino is Mr. Liu’s alter ego.

On 25 January 2012, a building inspector from the City of Milpitas, Gerardo Amador (“Mr. Amador”), visited the work site and found the excavation and foundation work to be unsafe. Mr. Amador promptly issued a stop work order for the entire project due to the dangerous conditions. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Amador handed the stop work order directly to Mr. Luo. Plaintiffs further allege that Mr. Luo ignored an oral demand from Mr. Amador on 26 January 2012, to stop work on the project. After receiving the stop work orders, Defendants did not notify the laborers at the Milpitas property that conditions were unsafe, and instructed the laborers—including Mr. Mercado—to continue working. On 28 January 2012, the excavation collapsed, fatally suffocating and crushing Mr. Mercado.

Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on 22 January 2013, alleging the following causes of action: (1) wrongful death (against all Defendants); (2) negligence (against all Defendants); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against U.S.-Sino and Mr. Luo); and (4) wage claims (against U.S.-Sino, Mr. Luo, and Mr. Chen).

Discovery Dispute

I. The U.S.-Sino Motion

On 30 December 2013, Ms. Pacheco served U.S.-Sino with special interrogatories (“SI”), set one, and requests for production of documents (“RPD”), set two via U.S. mail. (Millen Dec., p. 2:1-3, Exs. A, B.) On 11 February 2014, U.S.-Sino served Ms. Pacheco with its responses to the SI and RPD. (Millen Dec., p. 2:5-8 Exs. C, D.) U.S.-Sino provided a verification for its responses to the SI, but did not provide one for its responses to the RPD. (Id.)

On 11 March 2014, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter via email to U.S.-Sino’s former defense counsel, Keith White (“Mr. White”), regarding purported deficiencies in U.S.-Sino’s responses to the SI and RPD. (Millen Dec., p. 2:9-11.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel and Mr. White then engaged in a series of meet and confer efforts from 11 March 2014 to 18 March 2014. (Millen Dec., p. 2:9-26, Exs. E, F, G.)

Ms. Pacheco’s counsel declares that Mr. White then requested an extension of time until 28 March 2014, for U.S.-Sino to provide amended responses to the SI and RPD, and to produce additional documents responsive to the RPD. (Millen Dec., p. 3:1-3.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel further declares that Mr. White requested that Ms. Pacheco postpone filing a motion to compel further responses to the SI and RPD, and the parties agreed that Ms. Pacheco would have up to and including 30 April 2014, to file such a motion. (Millen Dec., p. 3:4-6., Ex. H.)

Ms. Pacheco’s counsel declares that he followed-up with Mr. White regarding U.S.-Sino’s further responses and the production of additional documents on 1 April 2014 and 21 April 2014, but U.S.-Sino never provided further responses or produced additional documents. (Millen Dec., p. 3:7-17.)

On 24 April 2014, Ms. Pacheco filed the instant motion to compel further responses to the SI and RPD, and for an award of monetary sanctions. The U.S.-Sino motion was set for hearing on 23 May 2014.

On 8 May 2014, Mr. Liu filed an ex parte application for an order continuing the U.S.-Sino motion on the grounds that U.S.-Sino was recently suspended by the Secretary of State and could not take any action on its behalf in defending this lawsuit. Mr. Liu further indicated that State National Insurance Company, the insurer defending him, recently retained new counsel and the new counsel required additional time to be brought up to speed on the case. The same day, the Court ordered the hearing on the U.S.-Sino motion continued to 27 June 2014.

On 16 June 2014, U.S.-Sino filed papers in opposition to the U.S.-Sino motion. Ms. Pacheco filed a reply on 20 June 2014.

II. The Luo Motion

Mr. Luo has been representing himself in this case since February 2014. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:1.) Mr. Luo’s deposition was originally scheduled for 27 March 2014, by Mr. Chen. (Mem. Ps & A., p. 3:12-13; Millen Dec., p. 2:3-4.) However, Mr. Chen cancelled the deposition a few days prior to its scheduled date. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:14-15; Millen Dec., p. 2:5-6.)

Ms. Pacheco’s counsel then contacted Mr. Luo and counsel for Defendants in order to clear a new date for Mr. Luo’s deposition. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:16-22.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel declares that he spoke with Mr. Luo via telephone regarding his deposition and Mr. Luo refused to provide him with any dates for the same. (Millen Dec., p. 2:11-12.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel further declares that every time he proposed a possible deposition date, Mr. Luo would inform him that “he ‘had something very important to do’ on each day” that was proposed and “refused to tell [him] what these important things were.” (Millen Dec., p. 2:12-14.)

On 7 April 2014, Ms. Pacheco then served Mr. Luo via U.S. mail with a deposition notice setting his deposition for 20 May 2014. (Millen Dec., p. 2:7-10, Ex. D.) In addition, Ms. Pacheco served Mr. Luo via U.S. mail with form interrogatories, set two (“FI”), SI, set one, requests for admission, set two (“RFA”), and RPD, set two. (Millen Dec., p. 3:14-17, Exs. O, P, Q, R.)

Ms. Pacheco’s counsel declares that, subsequent to the issuance of the deposition notice, attorney Gregory Rockwell (“Mr. Rockwell”) advised him during a telephone conversation that he would be representing Mr. Luo. (Millen Dec., p. 2:17-18; Mem. Ps & As, p. 3:25-26.) However, on 5 May 2014, Mr. Rockwell indicated that he would not be representing Mr. Luo as previously indicated and it was his “understanding that the insurer [intended] to provide a defense to Mr. Luo, and that separate counsel [would] be appointed shortly.” (Millen Dec., p. 2:15-17, Ex. E.) Mr. Rockwell stated that as soon as he was informed who would be representing Mr. Luo he would advise Ms. Pacheco’s counsel. (Id.)

Ms. Pacheco’s counsel declares that at a case management conference in this case on 13 May 2014, he asked Mr. Rockwell if he could confirm whether Mr. Luo would be appearing at his deposition on 20 May 2014. (Millen Dec., p. 2:18-20; Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:3-4.) Mr. Rockwell declined to provide Ms. Pacheco’s counsel with any information regarding Mr. Luo’s appearance at deposition or the identity of Mr. Luo’s new counsel. (Id.)

On 14 May 2014, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel sent an email to Mr. Luo, requesting that Mr. Luo confirm his attendance for the 20 May 2014 deposition. (Millen Dec., p. 23-24, Ex. G.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel requested that Mr. Luo inform him if he would be unable to attend the deposition as scheduled and provide him with alternative dates on which he could appear. Ms. Pacheco’s counsel requested that Mr. Luo respond by 16 May 2014. (Id.) The same day, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel called Mr. Luo at the phone number provided by Mr. Luo on his substitution of counsel form, filed with the court on 24 February 2014, and left him a voicemail regarding the deposition. (Id.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel declares that this was the same phone number at which he had successfully contacted Mr. Luo less than 60 days prior to discuss potential deposition dates. (Id.)

Ms. Pacheco’s counsel also emailed Mr. Luo’s former counsel, Marlene Thomason (“Ms. Thomason”), on 14 May 2014, indicating that it was his understanding that she might still be in contact with Mr. Luo. (Millen Dec., p. 2:21-22, Ex. H.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel requested that Ms. Thomason contact Mr. Luo and ask Mr. Luo to contact his office to confirm his attendance at the 20 May 2014 deposition. (Id.)

Ms. Pacheco’s counsel sent Mr. Luo a meet and confer letter regarding the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD on 15 May 2014. (Millen Dec., p. 3:18-19, Ex. S.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel advised Mr. Luo that his responses to the discovery requests were due on 12 May 2014, and as 15 May 2014, he had not received the same. (Id.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel requested that Mr. Luo provide responses to the requests and indicated that Ms. Pacheco would be filing a motion to compel initial responses. (Id.)

On 19 May 2014, Stephen Heath (“Mr. Heath”), an attorney with the law firm of Fredrickson, Mazeika & Grant, LLP, sent Ms. Pacheco’s counsel a letter advising that his “office was just retained by York Risk Services Group last Thursday to represent Mr. Dan Luo in this matter.” (Millen Dec., p. 3:3-4, Ex. H.) Mr. Heath advised that Mr. Luo had informed him that he was not available for his deposition on 20 May 2014, and would need to reset it for a future date. Mr. Heath therefore requested that the deposition be continued to a later date. (Id.)

The same day, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel exchanged a series of emails with Kerry Laiw (“Ms. Laiw”), an attorney with the law firm of Fredrickson, Mazeika & Grant, LLP, regarding Mr. Luo’s deposition. (Millen Dec., p. 3:5-7, Exs. I, J, K, L; Mem. Ps & As., p. 4:16-27.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel advised that he would proceed with the deposition as scheduled unless Mr. Luo’s counsel was able to obtain the written agreement, by that afternoon, from all of the parties regarding a new deposition date that was close in time to 20 May 2014. (Id.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel further stated that Mr. Luo and his counsel would need to agree to pay the non-refundable interpreter fees that had been incurred. (Id.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel indicated that the deposition had been set for nearly 2 months and he had made several efforts to confirm whether Mr. Luo would attend, but Mr. Luo ignored his inquiries until after non-refundable expenses were incurred. (Id.) He further indicated that, since Ms. Laiw’s law firm had been Mr. Luo’s counsel since the prior week, they should have been aware of the deposition prior to 19 May 2014, as well as his efforts to contact Mr. Luo regarding the deposition. (Id.)

Ms. Laiw advised that Mr. Luo would not appear for his deposition as scheduled as he was unavailable. (Id.) She did not provide Ms. Pacheco’s counsel with an explanation as to the reason why Mr. Luo was unavailable. (Id.) She requested a continuance of the deposition based on Mr. Luo’s unavailability and in light of the fact that her firm was recently retained as counsel. (Id.) Ms. Laiw indicated that her office was attempting to obtain alternative deposition dates from Mr. Luo and would notify Ms. Pacheco’s counsel of the same as soon as any dates were received. (Id.)

Given Ms. Laiw’s response, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel declined to continue the deposition. (Id.) The deposition proceeded on 20 May 2014, and Mr. Luo failed to appear. (Id.)

On 21 May 2014, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel emailed and called Mr. Luo’s counsel, requesting that they contact him to discuss Mr. Luo’s deposition and his discovery responses. (Millen Dec., p. 3:10-13; Mem. Ps & As., p. 5:18-29.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel did not receive a response. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 5:19-20.)

On 23 May 2014, Ms. Pacheco filed the instant motion to compel Mr. Luo’s attendance at deposition and production of documents, and initial responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD, and for an award of monetary sanctions.

On 16 June 2014, Mr. Heath filed a formal opposition to the Luo motion, advising that he was specially appearing as counsel for Mr. Luo solely for the purposes of opposing the motion to compel Mr. Luo’s attendance at deposition and Ms. Pacheco’s request for monetary sanctions. Mr. Luo did not file an opposition to the Luo motion with respect to Ms. Pacheco’s request for an order compelling initial responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD. Ms. Pacheco filed a reply on 19 June 2014.

Discussion

I. The U.S.-Sino Motion

Ms. Pacheco moves to compel U.S.-Sino to provide code-compliant verifications for its responses to the SI and RPD, and further responses to the SI and RPD, without objections. U.S.-Sino opposes the motion, arguing that its objections have merit and its substantive responses are complete.

A. Procedural Issue

As a preliminary matter, Ms. Pacheco requests that this Court strike and disregard the opposition filed by U.S.-Sino. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 5:1-10.) Ms. Pacheco asserts that U.S.-Sino is a suspended corporation and, thus, cannot participate in any litigation. (Id.) However, U.S.-Sino’s counsel declares that as of the date of the filing of the opposition, 16 June 2014, U.S.-Sino is an active corporation. (Pimentel Dec., p. 2:7-9.) Accordingly, the Court DENIES Ms. Pacheco’s request that it strike and/or disregard U.S.-Sino’s opposition.

B. Evidentiary Objections

In her reply papers, Ms. Pacheco objects to numerous statements in the declaration of Lauren Pimentel, submitted in support of U.S.-Sino’s opposition, on the grounds of lack of personal knowledge, hearsay, lack of foundation, improper expert opinion, irrelevant, and improper legal conclusion.

There is no authority holding that the Court must rule on evidentiary objections made in connection with a discovery motion. Therefore, the Court declines to rule on Ms. Pacheco’s evidentiary objections.

C. Requests for Judicial Notice

Ms. Pacheco makes two separate requests for judicial notice on pages 5 and 7 of her reply papers. First, Ms. Pacheco requests that this Court take judicial notice of a webpage from the California State Contractor’s License Board website that purportedly indicates U.S.-Sino’s license status. (Reply, p. 5:17-19.) Second, Ms. Pacheco requests that this Court take judicial notice of a lawsuit filed by U.S.-Sino’s liability insurer, State National Insurance Company, Inc., in federal court. (Reply, p. 7:20-23.)

Ms. Pacheco’s requests for judicial notice do not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1113(l), which states that any request for judicial notice must be made in a separate document listing the specific items for which notice is requested. Similarly, the requests do not comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1306(c), which provides that a party requesting judicial notice of material under Evidence Code sections 452 or 453 must provide the court and each party with a copy of the material because Ms. Pacheco did not provide the Court with a copy of the subject material.

Accordingly, Ms. Pacheco’s requests for judicial notice are DENIED.

D. Verifications

Ms. Pacheco argues that U.S.-Sino has failed to provide code-complaint verifications for its responses to the SI and RPD.

Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.250, subdivision (a) and 2031.250, subdivision (a) state that the party to whom the interrogatories or requests for production of documents are directed shall sign the response under oath, unless the response contains only objections. Where a hybrid response is served, a verification is required only for the substantive portion of the response. (See Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657-658.)

In practice, the responding party usually signs a verification form stating as follows: “I certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing answers are true and correct.” (Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter Group 2013) at 8:1103, p. 8F-53.)

Ms. Pacheco argues that U.S.-Sino failed to serve any verification at all for its substantive responses to the RPD. Additionally, Ms. Pacheco argues that U.S.-Sino’s verification for its substantive responses to the SI is improper because it “merely states that the person signed ‘knows the contents of the responses’ and is ‘authorized to make the verification’,” but does not indicate that the discovery responses are true and correct.

U.S.-Sino does not oppose Ms. Pacheco’s request that it provide a verification for its responses to the SI and an amended verification for its responses to the RPD. U.S.-Sino states only that Mr. Liu currently resides in Beijing, China, “obtaining signatures has been challenging,” and it “will provide executed verifications.” (Opp’n., p. 9:18-22.)

Accordingly, Ms. Pacheco’s request for verifications for U.S.-Sino’s responses to the SI and RPD is GRANTED. U.S.-Sino is ordered to provide Ms. Pacheco with a verification for its initial substantive responses to the SI and an amended verification for its initial responses to the RPD.

E. The SI

Ms. Pacheco moves to compel further responses to SI Nos. 1-15, arguing that U.S.-Sino’s objections are improper and its substantive responses are evasive.

1. Legal Standard

A party propounding form interrogatories may move for an order compelling further responses if that party deems an answer is evasive or incomplete and/or an objection is without merit or too general. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300; Coy v. Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.) The burden is on the responding party to justify any objections or failure to fully answer. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)

2. Objections

a. Undefended Objections

U.S.-Sino raised numerous boilerplate objections in its responses to the SI. Except as expressly indicated below, U.S.-Sino does not attempt to defend its objections, and therefore, the Court finds that the undefended objections are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)

b. SI Nos. 1-2

SI No. 1 asks U.S.-Sino to identify every communication in which it discussed the stop work order issued by the City of Milpitas for the construction project at the subject property between 7:00 AM on 25 January 2012 and 11:45 AM on 28 January 2012. (Sep. Stmt., p. 5:1-4.) SI No. 2 asks U.S.-Sino to state when it first learned about the stop work order issued by the City of Milpitas for the construction job at the subject property. (Sep. Stmt., p. 6:10-11.)

In its responses to SI Nos. 1-2, U.S.-Sino objected to the requests as vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome, and overbroad.

U.S.-Sino argues that SI Nos. 1-2 are vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome, and overbroad because the term “YOU” as used in the interrogatories encompasses its agents, employees, officers, and managers, such that the request “would require [it] to obtain information from represented defendants in this matter, such as defendant Dan Luo.” (Opp’n., p. 3:9-14.) U.S.-Sino contends that Mr. Luo is “no longer available” and its responses reflect the full extent of its knowledge due to the fact that it no longer has access to independent contractors, such as Mr. Luo. (Opp’n., p. 3:14-15.)

U.S.-Sino’s objections to SI Nos. 1-2 are without merit. U.S.-Sino does not provide an explanation as to how the SI are vague, ambiguous, or overbroad, but merely argues that it should not be required to obtain information from defendants such as Mr. Luo. In addition, U.S.-Sino does not make a particularized showing of facts demonstrating that the discovery is unduly burdensome e.g., specific facts as to how much work, time, and expense would be required to respond and/or produce responsive documents. (West Pico Furniture Co. v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 418; Contra, Mead Reinsurance Co. v. Super. Ct. (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 313, 318.)

Furthermore, U.S.-Sino is required to make an inquiry of other natural persons or organizations to respond to interrogatories, which includes its officers, managers, employees, and agents, such as Mr. Luo. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220, subd. (c).) Asserting that its agents, officers, managers, or employees are represented by separate counsel in their personal capacity is not a ground for objection. U.S.-Sino has an obligation to make an inquiry of its officers, agents, managers, and employees in their capacity as officers, agents, managers, and employees of U.S.-Sino, not in their personal capacity, for the information sought by these SI. Thus, the vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome, and overbroad objections with respect to SI Nos. 1-2 are overruled.

c. SI No. 14

SI No. 14 asks U.S.-Sino to identify any workers’ compensation insurance policy that it has ever had. (Sep. Stmt., p. 16:26-27.) In its response to SI No. 14, U.S.-Sino objected to the request as overbroad.

U.S.-Sino argues the request is overbroad because it asks for any workers’ compensation insurance policy in force at any point in time. U.S.-Sino convincingly asserts that any workers’ compensation policy that was in force prior to the subject project is not relevant to the subject action.

Accordingly, U.S.-Sino’s overbroad objection is sustained. The Court modifies SI No. 14 such that it requests only information about workers’ compensation policies that U.S.-Sino had in place from 2011, the year when construction on the subject property began, to the present.

d. SI No. 15

In its opposition, U.S.-Sino objects to SI No. 15 on the ground that the information sought by the request is equally available to Ms. Pacheco from Bill Harkopf. U.S.-Sino did not object to SI No. 15 in its original response on that ground, and cannot now assert that objection for the first time in opposition to a motion to compel. (See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 263, 273 [waiver occurs where the responding party fails to timely raise an objection in its initial response].) Thus, this objection has been waived.

3. Substantive Responses

Ms. Pacheco argues that U.S.-Sino’s substantive responses to SI Nos. 1-15 are evasive and incomplete.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220 states that each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits. (Code Civ. Proc., 2030.220, subd. (a).) If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible. (Code Civ. Proc., 2030.220, subd. (b).) If the responding party does not have personal knowledge

sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party. (Code Civ. Proc., 2030.220, subd. (c).)

SI No. 1 asks U.S.-Sino to identify every communication in which it discussed the stop work order issued by the City of Milpitas for the construction project at the subject property between 7:00 AM on 25 January 2012 and 11:45 AM on 28 January 2012. (Sep. Stmt., p. 5:1-4.) U.S.-Sino provided a substantive response to SI No. 1 generally identifying “Skype and telephone records previously produced.” (Sep. Stmt. p. 5:18-19.)

Ms. Pacheco asserts that U.S.-Sino’s substantive response is evasive because it does not identify “each and every communication in which the stop work order was discussed” during the subject 72-hour time period. (Sep. Stmt., p. 6:3-5.) Ms. Pacheco contends that generally identifying phone or Skype records that were previously produced is inadequate because such a response “does not indicate which calls involved the content asked about,” namely those communications that pertained to the stop work order. (Sep. Stmt., p. 6:5-6.)

The Court agrees that U.S.-Sino’s response is evasive because it refers to an undifferentiated group of documents and does not identify the specific communications within that group that are responsive to the SI. (See Hernandez v. Super. Ct. (Acheson Industries, Inc.) (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 294 [noting “[t]he court orally warned petitioners not to use a boilerplate response in order to identify documents, but to relate each document to the specific interrogatory requesting the identification”].) Thus, a further response is warranted to SI No. 1.

SI No. 2 asks U.S.-Sino to state when it first learned about the stop work order issued by the City of Milpitas for the construction job at the subject property. (Sep. Stmt., p. 6:10-11.) U.S.-Sino provided a substantive response to SI No. 2 stating that “[i]nformation responsive to this request is in the care, custody, and/or control of co-defendant Dan Luo.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 6:20-21.)

U.S.-Sino’s response to SI No. 2 is evasive and non-responsive because it does not state the date on which it first learned about the stop work order. As previously indicated, U.S.-Sino is obligated to make an inquiry of other natural persons or organizations to respond to interrogatories, which includes its officers, managers, employees, and agents, such as Mr. Luo. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.220, subd. (c).) Thus, a further response to SI No. 2 is warranted.

SI Nos. 3-9 ask U.S.-Sino to state the last date that Mr. Perez, Mr. Perez’s employees, anyone associated with Mr. Perez, Polo Perez Construction, Inc., Polo Perez Construction, Inc.’s employees, Polo Perez Construction, or Polo Perez Construction’s employees performed work at the subject property. U.S.-Sino provided identical substantive responses to SI Nos. 3-9, identifying “the deposition of Polo Perez and documents discussed therein, including [. . .] Perez’s daily calendar/log.” (See e.g., Sep. Stmt., p. 13:15-20.) U.S.-Sino also stated that it had “no recollection of any dates other than those identified by Mr. Perez and would defer to Mr. Perez’s records of such events.” (Id.) U.S.-Sino further stated that “[b]ased on those records and those records only it appears that the last day any work, as responding party uses that term, was performed was on Friday, January 6, 2012.” (Id.)

U.S.-Sino’s general reference to Mr. Perez’s deposition and Mr. Perez’s calendar/log is not straightforward or responsive to the requests as it does not provide the last date on which Mr. Perez, his employees, or his companies performed work at the subject property. Moreover, U.S.-Sino does not indicate where in Mr. Perez’s deposition testimony or his calendar/log the last date on which work was performed could be located. Furthermore, U.S.-Sino’s response is evasive because it qualifies its answer that “the last day any work [. . .] was performed was on Friday, January 7, 2012,” by stating that its answer is based “on [Mr. Perez’s] records and those records only.” U.S.-Sino is required to provide a complete response based upon all information that is reasonably available to it, not just Mr. Perez’s records. (Code Civ. Proc., 2030.220, subd. (a).) Thus, further responses to SI Nos. 3-9 are warranted.

SI Nos. 10-12 asks U.S.-Sino to identify persons that were its shareholders on 28 January 2012, and persons who have been its officers or directors at any time. (Sep. Stmt., p. 14:4-5, 21-22, 15:11-12.) U.S.-Sino provided identical substantive responses to SI Nos. 10-12, identifying “Richard Liu and Ping Tong each of whom may be reached through counsel for U.S.-Sino.” (See e.g., Sep. Stmt., p. 14:11-12.)

Ms. Pacheco argues that the substantive responses to SI Nos. 10-12 are incomplete because U.S.-Sino has refused to provide contact information for Ping Tong (“Mr. Tong”) as requested by the interrogatories. Ms. Pacheco is correct the that term “identify” as used in the SI means that the responding party shall provide the present work and home addresses, and known telephone numbers for any person responsive to the request. (Sep. Stmt., p. 3:20-23.) U.S.-Sino’s responses to SI Nos. 10-12 do not provide Mr. Tong’s work address, home address, or telephone number and are therefore incomplete.

With respect to SI No. 11, Ms. Pacheco also argues that U.S.-Sino “appears to be providing false discovery responses” because the “Contractor’s State License Board website shows that Jun Liu was and is an officer of [U.S.-Sino]” and Jun Liu is not listed in the response to SI No. 11. (Sep. Stmt., p. 14:25-27, 15:1-3.) In support of her position, Ms. Pacheco submits copies of web pages from the California Contractor’s State License Board’s website, which indicate that Jun Liu was an officer of U.S.-Sino in 2008. (Millen Dec., p. 3:20-25, Ex. K) In its opposition, U.S.-Sino indicates only that it “will provide an amended response to [SI No. 11].” (Opp’n., p. 4:2-3.) While Ms. Pacheco’s belief that U.S.-Sino’s response to SI No. 11 is false is not a proper basis to compel a further response, U.S.-Sino’s response does appear to be incomplete based on its failure to account for Jun Liu.

Thus, further responses to SI Nos. 10-12 are warranted.

SI No. 13 asks U.S.-Sino to identify all persons that have ever been its employees. (Sep. Stmt., p. 15:23-24.) U.S.-Sino provided a substantive response to SI No. 13, identifying “Richard Liu, who may be reached through his counsel of record” and “Bo Gao, 283 13th Street, Oakland, CA 94612.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 16:7-8.)

Ms. Pacheco argues that U.S.-Sino’s substantive response to SI No. 13 is incomplete because it “[fails] to supply proper phone and contact information for Bo Gao.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 16:23-24.) To the extent that U.S.-Sino’s response does not provide any telephone number for Bo Gao, it is incomplete. If U.S.-Sino does not have personal knowledge of Bo Gao’s phone number it should so state. Thus, a further response to SI No. 13 is warranted.

SI No. 14 asks U.S.-Sino to identify any workers’ compensation policies it has ever had. (Sep. Stmt., p. 16:26-27.) U.S.-Sino provided a substantive response to SI No. 14, stating that it was “currently unaware of ever having workers’ compensation insurance.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 17:6-7.)

U.S.-Sino’s substantive response to SI No. 14 is evasive because it is not possible to determine from the answer whether U.S.-Sino has ever owned a workers’ compensation insurance policy. U.S.-Sino indicates that it is unaware of ever having workers’ compensation insurance and, therefore, acknowledges that it has sufficient knowledge to respond to the SI in a straightforward manner by stating that it has never had workers’ compensation insurance. Thus, a further response to SI No. 14 is warranted.

SI No. 15 asks U.S.-Sino to identify persons with whom it has shared office space with at a location in Fremont, California. (Sep. Stmt., p. 17:14-16.) U.S.-Sino provided a substantive response to SI No. 15, stating that it shared office space at that location with real estate brokers and agents who were affiliated with RE Realty Experts. (Sep. Stmt., p. 17:24-27.) U.S.-Sino further stated that it “does not have information concerning the individual brokers or agents who also did business at this address,” but it “believes this information would be available from Bill Harkopf, a broker at RE Realty Experts.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 18:1-4.)

U.S.-Sino’s substantive response to SI No. 15 is code-complaint because it states that U.S.-Sino shared office space with real estate agents and brokers affiliated with RE Realty Experts and it does not have personal knowledge sufficient to provide the names and contact information of the individual real estate agents or brokers. (Code Civ. Proc., 2030.220, subd. (c).) Thus, no further response to SI No. 15 is warranted.

4. Conclusion

Accordingly, the U.S.-Sino motion is GRANTED as to SI Nos. 1-13 and 14 (as modified above) and DENIED as to SI No. 15.

F. The RPD

Ms. Pacheco moves to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 51-100, arguing that U.S.-Sino’s objections are without merit and its substantive responses are incomplete and evasive.

1. Legal Standard

A party propounding a request for production of documents may move for an order compelling a further response if it deems that: (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete; (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive; or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) The motion must set forth “specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Good cause is established simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance. (See Kirkland v. Super. Ct., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.) If good cause is shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections. (Id.)

2. Good Cause

Discovery is allowed for any matters that are not privileged, relevant to the action, and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) Information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement thereof. (See Gonzalez v. Super. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546.)

RPD Nos. 51-52 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all “IRS Form 1099’s” and “IRS Form W-2’s” issued by it to Mr. Luo. RPD Nos. 53-56 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all of its corporate filings, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and corporate records. RPD Nos. 57-62 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all of its corporate financial documents, capitalization records, banking records, and federal and state tax records. RPD Nos. 63-66 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all minutes from its shareholder meetings, board of directors meetings, and officer meetings, and corporate resolutions. RPD Nos. 67-70 and 72 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all records of its debt, assets, debt to equity ratio, profit and loss statements, and guarantees. RPD No. 71 asks U.S.-Sino to produce all documents that reflect any “revenue generating projects” that it worked on from 1 January 2008 to 28 January 2012. RPD Nos. 73-83 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all documents that: were signed by Mr. Liu on its behalf; reflect the relationship between U.S.-Sino and U.S.-Sino Investment, LLC; identify its shareholders, officers, and directors; reflect the issuance of stock to any person; and reflect the election of any corporate officers or directors. RPD No. 84 asks U.S.-Sino to produce documents that reflect the identity of persons with whom it has shared office space with at a location in Fremont, California. RPD Nos. 85-86 ask U.S.-Sino to produce documents that reflect any workers’ compensation insurance policies it had in place at the time of the incident or at any time. RPD Nos. 87-100 ask U.S.-Sino to produce documents that reflect financial transactions between Mr. Liu, his family, U.S.-Sino, and U.S.-Sino Investment, and the relationship between U.S.-Sino, RE Realty Experts, Inc., U.S.-Sino Investment, LLC, Rolling Plow, LLC, and Mr. Liu.

Ms. Pacheco argues that the documents sought by RPD Nos. 51-100 are relevant to the instant case because they will likely lead to admissible evidence that relates to her claim that U.S.-Sino is the alter ego of Mr. Liu. Ms. Pacheco persuasively argues that the RPD seek documents relevant to evaluating an alter ego claim, including corporate formation, corporate capitalization, the possible commingling of funds and assets, whether corporate formalities were observed, and the manipulation of assets between and amongst entities which is relevant to her alter ego claims. (See Flora Crane Serv., Inc. v. Super. Ct. (1965) 234 Cal. App. 2d 767, 778-79; see also Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal. App. 4th 799, 811.)

Accordingly, there is good cause for the discovery sought.

3. Objections

a. Undefended Objections

U.S.-Sino raised numerous objections in response to each and every one of the RPD. Except as expressly indicated below, U.S.-Sino does not attempt to defend its objections, and therefore, the Court finds that the undefended objections are without merit. (See Coy v. Super. Ct., supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 220-221.)

b. Code of Civil Procedure section 3295

In its opposition, U.S.-Sino objects to RPD Nos. 51-52, 57-62, 67-72, and 87-94 on the ground that the requests violate Civil Code section 3295 by attempting to obtain pre-trial discovery of its financial condition. (Opp’n., p. 5:4-27, 6:1-2.) U.S.-Sino asserts that Ms. Pacheco is attempting to “bypass this bar to discovery, [namely Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c),] based upon their alter ego allegations” and that her “alter ego allegation [. . .] cannot create a shortcut around [Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (c)] because U.S.-Sino’s finances do not go ‘to the heart’ of any of plaintiffs’ causes of action.” (Opp’n., p. 5:10-11, 16-18.)

U.S.-Sino did not raise an objection based on Civil Code section 3295 in its initial responses to the RPD. Any objection to discovery not raised in the initial response is waived. (Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 273.) Thus, any objection to RPD Nos. 51-52, 57-62, 67-72, and 87-94 based on Civil Code section 3295 has been waived.

Moreover, while Civil Code section 3295 provides that pretrial discovery of the financial condition of the defendant is not permitted for the purpose of recovering punitive damages unless the court enters an order permitting such discovery, Ms. Pacheco seeks discovery of U.S.-Sino’s corporate and financial information for the purpose of discovering facts supporting her alter ego claim. As such, the requirements of Civil Code section 3295 do not apply. Accordingly, this objection otherwise lacks merit.

c. Tax Privilege

In its opposition, U.S.-Sino objects to RPD Nos. 60-61 on the ground that they seek tax records and returns that are protected under the tax return privilege provided by California Revenue and Tax Code section 26451 and discussed by the California Supreme Court in Schnabel v. Super. Ct. (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 704.

U.S.-Sino did not object to RPD Nos. 60-61 based upon the tax return privilege in its original responses to the RPD and cannot now assert that privilege for the first time in opposition to a motion to compel. (See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., supra, 59 Cal. App. 4th at p. 273 [waiver occurs where the responding party fails to timely raise an objection in its initial response]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (b)(2) [responses shall set forth any objections].) Accordingly, this objection is overruled.

d. Trade Secrets

In its opposition, U.S.-Sino objects to RPD Nos. 71, 84, and 92-94 on the ground that they require the production of trade secrets.

U.S.-Sino did not raise an objection to RPD Nos. 71, 84, and 92-94 in its responses to the RPD on the ground that the requests require the production of trade secrets. Since U.S.-Sino failed to timely raise such an objection, any trade secret objection to RPD Nos. 71, 84, and 92-94 has been waived. (See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., supra, 59 Cal. App. 4th at p. 273.)

e. Privacy

In its responses to RPD Nos. 56-59, 62, 67-70, 72, 74, 87-88, and 98-100, U.S.-Sino objected to the requests on the grounds that they violate its right to privacy.

“The right to privacy protects an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Pioneer Electronics, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 370.) The right to privacy conferred by the California Constitution is limited to “people,” meaning natural persons. (Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 770, 791; Ameri-Medical Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1287-1288.)

While corporations retain a lesser right to privacy under the United States Constitution, it is not cast in terms of a fundamental right. (Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 796; see also Schnabel v. Super Ct. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 710, 718 [affirming trial court’s holding that any privacy interest of corporation in business records such as bank activity statements, accounts receivable and payable listings, ledgers, cash receipts and disbursement records, and sales and purchase registers did not prohibit discovery of these documents].) A corporation may have a protectible privacy interest depending on the strength of the nexus between the artificial entity and human beings and the context in which the controversy arises. (Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 411-412.)

Where a serious invasion of the right to privacy is shown, the proponent of the discovery must demonstrate that the information sought is “directly relevant” to a claim or defense, and “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Britt v. Super. Ct. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859.) Once direct relevance has been demonstrated, the proponent of discovery must show that the information sought is not available through less intrusive means. (Allen v. Super. Ct. (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 447, 449.) The court must then carefully balance the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right of civil litigants to discover facts, on the other. (Pioneer Electronics, Inc. v. Super. Ct., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 371.)

Here, U.S.-Sino argues that it has a protectible right to privacy in its financial information because the nexus between it and Mr. Liu is extremely close. Even assuming arguendo that U.S.-Sino has a limited protected privacy interest in its financial information, the documents sought by the RPD are directly relevant to Ms. Pacheco’s alter ego claims because they seek documents reflecting corporate formation, corporate capitalization, the possible commingling of funds and assets, whether corporate formalities were observed, and the manipulation of assets between and amongst entities. (See Flora Crane Serv., Inc. v. Super. Ct., supra, 234 Cal. App. 2d at p. 778-79; see also Zoran Corp. v. Chen, supra, 185 Cal. App. 4th at p. 811.) The parties have not proposed alternative, less intrusive means to accurately determine whether U.S.-Sino may be the alter ego of Mr. Liu. While providing information concerning U.S.-Sino’s corporate structure and financial transactions would indisputably result in a certain amount of intrusion into its privacy, the information will permit Ms. Pacheco to uncover essential evidence necessary to prove her alter ego claim. Thus, U.S.-Sino’s objection based on its right to privacy is overruled.

However, the Court finds that a protective order providing that any responsive documents pertaining to U.S.-Sino’s private financial information shall be designated as confidential, and shall not to be shown to any person except for the parties’ counsel and any persons such as witnesses, experts, outside consultants, and insurers with whom it is necessary to consult with in connection with this action, would assuage much of U.S.-Sino’s privacy concerns. (See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37.)

U.S.-Sino also objected to RPD Nos. 71, 84, and 92-94 on the ground that they violate third party privacy rights. U.S.-Sino argues that RPD Nos. 71, 84, and 92-94 violate third party privacy rights to the extent that they seek documents that may contain their contact and financial information.

With respect to the identities and contact information of the third parties, U.S.-Sino argues that that RPD Nos. 71 and 92-94 could result in the disclosure of Mr. Liu’s immediate family members’ and customers’ contact information and RPD No. 84 could result in the disclosure of the contact information for individuals with whom it has shared office space.

Although disclosure of the contact information of the individuals with whom U.S.-Sino may have shared office space may invade their privacy, there is generally no protection for the identity, addresses, or phone numbers of percipient witnesses. (See Puerto v. Super. Ct. (2008) 158 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1251-1252 [“[a] percipient witness’s willingness to participate in civil discovery has never been considered relevant [to the privacy analysis]—witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify whether they want to or not”].) Here, Ms. Pacheco contends that such individuals may be able to testify as to U.S.-Sino’s corporate practices. Moreover, while the individuals’ identities and contact information are personal, they are not particularly sensitive. Similarly, Mr. Liu’s immediate family members are percipient witnesses because they may have information as to whether U.S.-Sino commingled funds, failed to uphold corporate formalities, or if Mr. Liu treated U.S.-Sino’s assets as his own. In her reply, Ms. Pacheco also indicates that she needs to contact U.S.-Sino’s former customers to determine whether U.S.-Sino “is being candid about having no employees and about [Mr. Luo] and others not being its long time employees.” (Reply, p. 10:1-3.) Thus, U.S.-Sino’s customers may also be percipient witnesses.

Accordingly, U.S.-Sino’s objection to the disclosure of third party contact information based on privacy is overruled.

With respect to third party financial information, U.S.-Sino argues that RPD Nos. 71, 84, and 92-94 may result in disclosure of its customer and Mr. Liu’s family members’ personal financial information.

RPD No. 84 asks U.S.-Sino to produce documents that reflect the identity of any person with whom it has shared office space with at a Fremont, California location. Thus, on its face, RPD No. 84 does not appear to call for the disclosure of any documents that would result in the disclosure of third party financial information.

RPD No. 71 asks U.S.-Sino to produce all documents evidence any “revenue generating projects” that it worked on from 1 January 2008 to 28 January 2012. RPD Nos. 92-94 ask U.S.-Sino to produce documents that reflect payments made by U.S.-Sino to members of Mr. Liu’s immediate family to cover debts or expenses and any reimbursement made to U.S.-Sino for such payments. Thus, it appears that RPD Nos. 71 and 92-94 could result in the disclosure of U.S.-Sino’s customers’ and Mr. Liu’s immediate family members’ financial information.

The Court finds that U.S.-Sino’s customers’ and Mr. Liu’s immediate family members’ financial information is private. (See Cobb v. Super. Ct. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 543, 550 [it is well established that a person’s financial information is private].)

Though disclosure of the financial documents sought may result in an intrusion upon the privacy rights of third parties, as indicated above they are directly relevant to Ms. Pacheco’s alter ego claims. (See Flora Crane Serv., Inc. v. Super. Ct., supra, 234 Cal. App. 2d at p. 778-79; see also Zoran Corp. v. Chen, supra, 185 Cal. App. 4th at p. 811.) The parties have not proposed alternative, less intrusive means to accurately determine whether U.S.-Sino may be the alter ego of Mr. Liu. While disclosing financial information would result in an intrusion into the third parties’ privacy rights, the information will permit Ms. Pacheco to uncover essential evidence necessary to prove her alter ego claim. Thus, U.S.-Sino’s objection on the ground of the privacy rights of third parties is overruled.

However, the Court finds that a protective order providing that any responsive documents pertaining to U.S.-Sino’s customers’ and Mr. Liu’s immediate family members’ financial information shall be designated as confidential, and shall not to be shown to any person except for the parties’ counsel and any persons such as witnesses, experts, outside consultants, and insurers with whom it is necessary to consult and in connection with this action, would assuage much of the privacy concerns. (See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 37.)

The Court notes that U.S.-Sino requests that the court issue a protective order providing that “notice be given to any nonparty to make them aware that their private information is subject to disclosure and that [it] need only produce such documents for which the nonparty waives their right to privacy.” (Opp’n., p. 9:4-6.) The Court finds that such a protective order would be inappropriate as it would effectively enable a third party to prevent Ms. Pacheco from obtaining discovery which the Court has found to be directly relevant to her claims of alter ego. Moreover, any third party privacy rights are adequately protected by the terms of the protective order outlined above.

4. Substantive Responses

RPD Nos. 51-52, 85-86, 89, and 91-96 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all: “IRS Form 1099’s;” “IRS Form W-2’s;” documents that reflect any workers’ compensation insurance policies; loans between U.S.-Sino and Mr. Liu; payments made by U.S.-Sino for Mr. Liu’s or his immediate family’s debts or expenses; reimbursements made to U.S.-Sino for such payments; documents that reflect the relationship between U.S.-Sino and RE Realty Experts, and RE Realty Experts and U.S.-Sino Investment, LLC. U.S.-Sino provided identical substantive responses to the RPD, stating that it was “unable to comply” with the requests “because the responsive documents never existed” and it “conducted a diligent search and made a reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply.”

U.S.-Sino’s substantive responses to RPD Nos. 51-52, 85-86, and 91-96 are code-compliant because they contain a representation of inability to comply with the demands that affirms that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply and specifies that the inability to comply is because the particular item or category of documents has never existed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) Thus, no further responses are warranted to RPD Nos. 51-52, 85-86, 89, and 91-96.

RPD No. 53 asks U.S.-Sino to produce all corporate filings it has made with the State of California. U.S.-Sino provided a substantive response to the RPD, stating that it would comply with this request “by producing hard copies of the formation documents filed with the Secretary of State.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 24:24-25.)

U.S.-Sino’s substantive response to RPD No. 53 is not code-compliant. Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210, subdivision (a) states that the responding party can answer a request for production of documents with: (1) a statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection; (2) a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection; or (3) an objection to the particular demand for inspection. U.S.-Sino’s response to the RPD does not contain a statement that U.S.-Sino will fully comply with the request or that it is unable to comply, but merely indicates that U.S.-Sino will produce its formation documents and it is not clear that the formation documents are the only corporate filings made with the State of California. Thus, a further response to RPD No. 53 is warranted.

RPD Nos. 54-55 and 65 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all of its articles of incorporation, bylaws, and minutes of its board of directors meetings. U.S.-Sino provided identical substantive responses to the RPD, stating unambiguously that it would comply with the RPD. U.S.-Sino’s substantive responses to RPD Nos. 54-55 and 65 are code-compliant because U.S.-Sino provided an unambiguous statement of compliance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210.) Thus, no further responses to RPD Nos. 54-55 and 65 are warranted.

RPD Nos. 63-64, 66, 75-83, and 97 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all: corporate resolutions; minutes of shareholder and officer meetings; documents identifying its shareholders, officers, and directors; documents reflecting the issuance to stock to any person; documents reflecting the election of corporate officers, directors; and documents reflecting the relationship between Mr. Liu and RE Realty Experts. U.S.-Sino provided identical substantive responses to these requests, stating that it could not comply with the requests “because the responsive documents either never existed, were lost, destroyed, or misplaced.”

U.S.-Sino’s substantive responses to RPD Nos. 63-64, 66, 75-83, and 97 are not code-compliant because they do not clearly indicate why the documents responsive to the RPD do not exist, but instead provide a laundry list of various possible reasons why it may not be able to comply. Ms. Pacheco is entitled to clear and straightforward answers about why U.S.-Sino is unable to produce responsive documents and what happened to any documents responsive to the RPD. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) Thus, further responses to RPD Nos. 63-64, 66, 75-83, and 97 are warranted.

RPD Nos. 71 and 73 ask U.S.-Sino to produce all documents that it contends were signed by Mr. Liu on its behalf , and reflect any revenue generating projects of any type that it worked on from 1 January 2008 to 28 January 2012. U.S.-Sino provided identical substantive responses to the RPD, stating that it had “previously made files related to other construction projects available” and those “files remain available and are at least partially responsive to this request.” U.S.-Sino further stated that due to “the voluminous nature of the response and the expense of scanning the documents, they will be made available on 3 days notice” at the office of U.S.-Sino’s former defense counsel.

U.S.-Sino’s substantive responses to RPD Nos. 71 and 73 are not code-compliant because they do not contain an unambiguous statement of compliance or inability to comply. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210.) Instead, the responses state only that construction files that were previously “made available” are “at least partially responsive.” This response is incomplete and evasive as U.S.-Sino does not agree to produce all responsive documents, but merely asserts that it will make some specific documents available to Ms. Pacheco.

Furthermore, U.S.-Sino fails to justify its decision to only make the documents available to Ms. Pacheco instead of producing the responsive documents directly to her. In its opposition, U.S.-Sino does not provide the Court with any information about the time and expense it would take it to produce the responsive documents. U.S.-Sino indicates only that there are a large number of responsive documents and that they remain available at its counsel’s office in Oakland, California. Thus, further responses to RPD Nos. 71 and 73 are warranted.

RPD No. 84 asks U.S.-Sino to produce all documents reflecting the identity of any persons who shared office space with U.S.-Sino at a location in Fremont, California. U.S.-Sino provided a substantive response to the RPD, stating that it could not comply with the request even though it conducted a diligent search and made a reasonable inquiry “because the responsive documents never existed.” U.S.-Sino further stated that the subject location in Fremont, California was the office of RE Realty Experts and was occupied by real estate brokers and agents. U.S.-Sino indicated that Mr. Liu was a real estate agent affiliated with RE Realty Experts, but it does not have information about the individual agents and brokers who did business at the Fremont, California location. U.S.-Sino indicated that “this information would be available from Bill Harkopf, broker at RE Realty Experts.”

U.S.-Sino’s substantive response to RPD No. 84 is code-compliant because U.S.Sino states that it is unable to comply with the RPD. U.S.-Sino’s statement of inability to comply is complete as it provides that the documents never existed, it made a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in an effort to respond, and responsive documents may be in the possession of Bill Harkopf. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) Thus, no further response is warranted to RPD No. 84.

RPD No. 90 asks U.S.-Sino to produce all documents reflecting any payments made by U.S.-Sino to Mr. Liu. U.S.-Sino provided a substantive response to the RPD, stating that it would produce “redacted Form 1099’s responsive to this request and check payment stubs for payments made in 2010.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 86:25-26.)

U.S.-Sino’s substantive response to RPD No. 90 is not code-compliant. Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.210, subdivision (a) states that the responding party can answer a request for production of documents with: (1) a statement that the party will comply with the particular demand for inspection; (2) a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply with the demand for inspection; or (3) an objection to the particular demand for inspection. U.S.-Sino’s response to the RPD does not contain a statement that U.S.-Sino will comply with the request or that it is unable to comply, but merely indicates that U.S.-Sino will produce responsive documents of its own choosing. Thus, a further response to RPD No. 90 is warranted.

5. Conclusion

Accordingly, the U.S.-Sino motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED as to RPD Nos. 53, 56-64, 66-70, 71-83, 87-88, 90, and 97-100 and DENIED as to RPD Nos. 51-52, 54-55, 65, 84-86, 89, and 91-96.

Documents responsive to RPD Nos. 53, 56-64, 66-70, 71-83, 87-88, 90, and 97-100 shall be produced subject to a protective order. Specifically, documents pertaining to U.S.-Sino’s private financial information, U.S.-Sino’s customers’ contact and financial information, and Mr. Liu’s immediate family members’ financial information shall be designated as confidential, and shall not to be shown to any person except for the parties’ counsel and any persons such as witnesses, experts, outside consultants, and insurers with whom it is necessary to consult and in connection with this action.

II. The Luo Motion

A. Attendance at Deposition

Ms. Pacheco moves to compel Mr. Luo’s attendance at deposition on the grounds that he failed to attend his properly noticed deposition on 20 May 2014, and did not serve a valid objection to the same. Mr. Luo opposes the motion and argues that Ms. Pacheco failed to adequately meet and confer prior to filing the instant motion.

1. Procedural Issue

As a preliminary matter, Mr. Luo objects to “the setting of this hearing date for [the Luo] motion” on the ground that Ms. Pacheco’s counsel did not “[attempt] to obtain agreement on the hearing date from [his] counsel.” (Opp’n., p. 1:1-8.)

Mr. Luo’s objection is without merit as there is no requirement that the moving party clear a hearing date with the opposing party. (See Super Ct. Santa Clara County, Local Civil Rules, rule 7C [party scheduling a hearing on the discovery calendar should obtain agreement to the date from all opposing parties “if possible”].) Moreover, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel advised Mr. Luo’s counsel on 19 May 2014, that Ms. Pacheco would proceed with filing a motion to compel Mr. Luo’s attendance at deposition to be heard on 27 June 2014, and there is no indication that Mr. Luo’s counsel objected to the 27 June 2014 date at that time. (Laiw Dec., Ex. 3.) Accordingly, Mr. Luo’s objection is overruled.

2. Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (a) provides that if, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action [. . .] without having served a valid objection [. . .] fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, or to produce for inspection any document [. . .] described in the deposition notice, the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony, and the production for inspection of any document.

While the statute requires the moving party to demonstrate good cause for the production of documents requested in a deposition notice, there is no such requirement where the moving party is seeking an order compelling a party to attend a deposition and provide testimony in accordance with a deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(1).) Thus, as to a motion seeking an order compelling attendance, the moving party need only show that he or she served the responding party with the deposition notice, that the party failed to appear, and that the moving party contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2); see also Leko v. Cornerstone Bldg. Inspection Service (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1124.)

3. Meet and Confer

Mr. Luo argues that Ms. Pacheco failed to adequately meet and confer prior to filing the instant motion.

A motion to compel attendance or production must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration or a declaration stating that the moving party has contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2); Leko v. Cornerstone Bldg. Inspection Service (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1124 [indicating that, in accordance with former section 2025, subdivision (j)(3)(B) governing failure to comply with deposition notice, the moving party must make an effort to informally resolve the reason underlying the party’s nonappearance].)

Mr. Luo asserts that Ms. Pacheco failed to adequately meet and confer after learning that he would not be appearing for the 20 May 2014 deposition because Ms. Pacheco did not “[confirm] the deposition with [him] in the first place,” and refused to continue the deposition unless certain conditions were met, despite being advised of his unavailability and his counsel’s recent retention.

Mr. Luo’s arguments are without merit. Nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure requires a party serving a deposition notice to clear the date of the deposition with the deponent before serving the notice. Conferring with a witness as to his or her availability for the deposition is recommended by the Santa Clara County Bar Association Code of Professionalism, but the failure to clear the date with the deponent does not render the deposition notice inoperative.

Moreover, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel attempted to meet and confer with Mr. Luo regarding the date of his deposition prior to issuing the deposition notice, but Mr. Luo refused to provide any dates on which he was available and indicated that he was unavailable on each and every date proposed by Ms. Pacheco’s counsel. (Millen Dec., p. 2:11-14.) Moreover, Mr. Luo did not provide Ms. Pacheco’s counsel with any explanation as to why he was unavailable on the dates that were proposed. (Id.) Thus, it was reasonable for Ms. Pacheco to issue the deposition notice on 7 April 2014, setting Mr. Luo’s deposition for 20 May 2014.

Additionally, Ms. Pacheco engaged in further efforts to meet and confer with Mr. Luo regarding his deposition date during the week prior to 20 May 2014. On 14 May 2014, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel sent an email to Mr. Luo and left him a voicemail regarding the 20 May 2014 deposition. (Millen Dec., p. 23-24, Ex. G.) Ms. Pacheco’s counsel also attempted to reach Mr. Luo through his former counsel, Ms. Thomason, and Mr. Rockwell. (Millen Dec., p. 2:18-22, Ex. H; Mem. Ps & As., p. 3:3-4.)

Furthermore, Ms. Pacheco’s decision not to continue the deposition unless certain conditions were met was reasonable under the circumstances. Even though Mr. Luo’s counsel advised Ms. Pacheco’s counsel on 19 May 2014, that Mr. Luo was unavailable for his deposition on 20 May 2014, Mr. Luo’s counsel did not provide any reason for why Mr. Luo was unable to attend or any alternative dates for the deposition. In light of Mr. Luo’s prior refusal to provide any dates on which he was available to be deposed, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel’s demand that Mr. Luo provide alternative dates for his deposition prior to entering into any agreement to continue the matter was reasonable. Additionally, given that Mr. Luo waited until the day prior to his 20 May 2014 deposition to advise Ms. Pacheco that he would not be attending, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel’s request for payment of the non-refundable fees incurred was reasonable as well. Since Mr. Luo’s counsel clearly rejected those demands and stated that Mr. Luo would not attend the 20 May 2014 deposition, it is apparent that any further effort to meet and confer on the matter would have been fruitless.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Ms. Pacheco’s meet and confer efforts were adequate under the circumstances.

4. Analysis

Ms. Pacheco seeks an order compelling Mr. Luo to submit to a deposition. Ms. Pacheco asserts that Mr. Luo is a principal percipient witness and his testimony is crucial to this case because Mr. Amador directly handed him the stop work order.

Ms. Pacheco has met all of the requirements to compel Mr. Luo’s deposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450. As indicated above, the moving party need only show that he or she served the responding party with the deposition notice, that the party failed to appear, and that he or she contacted the deponent to inquire about the nonappearance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.450, subd. (b)(2); see also Leko v. Cornerstone Bldg. Inspection Service, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1124.)

Here, Ms. Pacheco served Mr. Luo with notice of deposition on 7 April 2014. Mr. Luo was legally obligated to attend on the date specified in the notice. Mr. Luo did not serve any objections to the deposition notice and if he had a conflict on the date specified in the notice, the proper recourse was to file a motion for a protective order under section 2025.420. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.420, subd. (b).) Mr. Luo did not exercise his right to file a motion for a protective order. He was therefore obligated to attend the deposition on 20 May 2014.

Ms. Pacheco’s counsel exchanged multiple emails with Mr. Luo’s counsel on 19 May 2014, regarding Mr. Luo’s intention to not appear at the 20 May 2014 deposition. At no time did Mr. Luo’s counsel indicate why Mr. Luo was unable to attend the deposition as scheduled. Mr. Luo, as promised, then failed to appear at his deposition.

The Court notes that Wendy Yang, a paralegal and legal secretary with the law firm of Fredickson, Mazeika & Grant, LLP, and Andy Chen, an associate the law firm of Fredickson, Mazeika & Grant, LLP, have submitted declarations in support of Mr. Luo’s opposition which indicate that they have attempted to contact Mr. Luo on 16 May 2014, 19 May 2014, and “every business day since May 19, 2014,” except for 5 June 2014 and 6 June 2014, in an effort to obtain alternative dates for his deposition. (Yang Dec., p. 2:2-4; Chen Dec., p. 2:2-6.) Mr. Luo has not returned their phone calls or provided any alternative dates for his deposition. The Court finds it particularly troubling that Mr. Luo has repeatedly refused to provide any alternative dates for his deposition and asserts that he is unavailable for all dates proposed, without providing any reasons for his unavailability. Accordingly, Ms. Pacheco’s motion to compel Mr. Luo’s attendance at deposition is GRANTED.

B. Time Limit

Ms. Pacheco requests that the Court “order that the deposition of [Mr. Luo] is not subject to any time limitation [. . .] and shall continue from day to day until completed,” as provided in the 7 April 2014 deposition notice. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 7:2-4.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.290, “a deposition examination of [a] witness by all counsel, other than the witness’ counsel of records, shall be limited to seven hours of total testimony.” The section goes on to state, however, that “[t]he court shall allow additional time, beyond any limits imposed by this section, if needed to fairly examine the deponent.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290, subd. (a).) In addition, the 7-hour time limit does not apply to any case brought by an employee or applicant for employment against an employer for acts or omissions arising out of or relating to the employment relationship. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.290, subd. (b)(4).)

Ms. Pacheco argues the Court should find that Mr. Luo’s deposition is not subject to a time limitation “due to the litigation conduct of [Mr. Luo], the fact that a Mandarin interpreter will be required, the fact that there are many parties in this case, and the fact that this case is an employment case.” (Mem. Ps & As., p. 6:26-27, 7:1.) Mr. Luo does not make any argument in opposition to Ms. Pacheco’s request.

Here, there are multiple parties that are represented by separate counsel. Mr. Luo is one of the principal percipient witnesses in this matter and it is likely that all parties will want an opportunity to question him at deposition. Given the multiple parties and the need for the Mandarian interpreter, it does appear that the deposition will likely exceed the 7-hour time limit. In addition, Plaintiffs’ FAC raises allegations relating to the non-payment of wages and waiting time penalties, such that the case arises out of and/or relates to the employment relationship that purportedly existed between Defendants and Mr. Mercado, Faustino Zapata Mercado, Martin Valenzuela Gaytan, Carlos Bochel Chiyal, and Francisco Javier Sanchez.

Accordingly, the Court orders that Mr. Luo’s deposition shall not be subject to the 7-hour time limitation under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.290 and shall continue from day to day until completed.

C. Production of Documents

Ms. Pacheco asks the Court to compel Mr. Luo to produce at his deposition the documents described in his deposition notice. In his opposition, Mr. Luo does not address this aspect of Ms. Pacheco’s motion.

Ms. Pacheco’s motion, as it pertains to the requested documents, is premature. As indicated above, the service of a deposition subpoena is effective to require any witness to appear and testify at a deposition at the location, date, and time specified in the subpoena “as well as to produce any document . . . or tangible thing for inspection.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.280, subd. (a).) The statute contemplates that a deponent asked to bring documents to the deposition for inspection may object to the production of such documents at the deposition itself. (See Carter v. Super. Ct. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997 [noting that procedure relating to inspection demands “is quite different from a deposition at which a party is required to bring documents”].)

Once the party appears for the deposition and either objects to the document requests or simply fails to produce them, the requesting party then may file a motion to compel production. (See Carter v. Super. Ct, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at p. 997.) This procedure is also consistent with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a)(5), which requires a motion to compel production of documents or tangible things at a deposition to be accompanied by a separate statement setting forth the particular documents or demands at issue, the responses received, and the reasons why production should be compelled. Given that the motion to compel production of documents is premature, it is not surprising that Ms. Pacheco has not submitted a separate statement in compliance with rule 3.1345(a)(5) because she does not yet have the information that would have been included in the statement.

Based upon the above discussion, Ms. Pacheco’s motion to compel the production of documents described in the deposition notice is DENIED, without prejudice.

D. Initial Responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD

Ms. Pacheco moves to compel Mr. Luo to provide initial responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD on the ground that he has failed to provide any response to the discovery requests.

1. Legal Standard

A responding party has 30 days to respond to inspection demands, requests for admission, and interrogatories. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.260, subd. (a) [interrogatories], 2031.260, subd. (a) [requests for production], 2033.250, subd. (a) [requests for admission].) If service of a discovery request is by mail, the time to respond to the request is extended by 5 days. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1013, subd. (a), 2016.050.) Failure to serve a timely response to inspection demands, interrogatories, and requests for admission results in the waiver of all objections to the requests, including objections based on attorney-client privilege and attorney work product. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (a) [interrogatories], 2031.300, subd. (a) [requests for production], and 2033.280, subd. (a) [requests for admission].)

If the responding party does not provide responses to interrogatories or inspection demands, the propounding party may move to compel responses. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subd. (b) [interrogatories], 2031.300, subd. (b) [requests for production].)

For requests for admission, the propounding party may move to deem the requests admitted if the responding party has not served timely responses. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) However, the court may not deem the requests admitted if the responding party has subsequently served responses to the requests for admission that are in substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (c).)

2. Nature of the Motion as to the RFA

Ms. Pacheco moves to compel Mr. Luo to provide verified initial responses to the discovery requests without objections. Ms. Pacheco’s motion to compel includes the RFA. However, as discussed above, there is no statutory authority to move to compel initial responses to requests for admission. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) Instead, Ms. Pacheco may move to have the RFA deemed admitted. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280, subd. (b).) It appears that this was Ms. Pacheco’s intent as she cites Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280 in her notice of motion. Accordingly, the Court will construe Ms. Pacheco’s motion as one to compel initial responses to the FI, SI, and RPD, and deem the RFA admitted.

3. Analysis

Here, Ms. Pacheco’s counsel declares that he caused the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD to be served via U.S. mail on 7 April 2014. (Millen Dec., p. 3:14-17.) Since the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD were served by mail on 7 April 2014, Mr. Luo’s responses were due within 30 days, plus 5 additional calendar days, on 12 May 2014. Ms. Pacheco indicates that Mr. Luo had yet to serve any responses as of 19 June 2014, the date of the filing of Ms. Pacheco’s reply papers. (Reply, p. 2:17.) Thus, Mr. Luo failed to serve timely initial responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD.

Moreover, Mr. Luo does not oppose the motion to compel initial responses to the discovery requests or otherwise indicate that he has subsequently served responses to the requests for admission that are in substantial compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220.

By failing to provide responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD, Mr.Luo has waived any objections to the requests. Furthermore, as the FI, SI, RFA and RPD were properly propounded and responses have yet to be served, the motion to compel initial responses to the FI, SI, and RPD, and deem the RFA admitted is GRANTED.

III. Ms. Pacheco’s Requests for Sanctions

Ms. Pacheco requests monetary sanctions in connection with the U.S.-Sino Motion and the Luo motion.

A. The U.S.-Sino Motion

Ms. Pacheco requests monetary sanctions against U.S.-Sino and its counsel in the amount of $6,350.00.

Ms. Pacheco does not clearly indicate the statutory basis for her request for sanctions in her moving papers. In her notice of motion, Ms. Pacheco states that the motion is made on the grounds that U.S.-Sino’s responses to the SI and RPD contain meritless objections, are incomplete and/or evasive, and violate numerous sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, including Code of Civil Procedure sections 2017, 2023, 2023.010, 2030.220, 2030.300, 2031.210, 2031.230, 2031.240, 2031.310, and 2031.320. (Notice of Motion, p. 2:14-20.) However, Ms. Pacheco does not indicate under which statute she is requesting monetary sanctions.

In her memorandum of points and authorities, Ms. Pacheco argues that sanctions are warranted because U.S.-Sino’s responses to the SI and RPD were not code-compliant and U.S.-Sino failed to meet and confer in good faith. However, Ms. Pacheco does not cite any statute which permits an award of sanctions on those grounds. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 13:7-27, 14:1-2.) Since Ms. Pacheco does not identify a statutory basis for her request, her request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

B. The Luo Motion

Ms. Pacheco requests monetary sanctions against Mr. Luo and his counsel, Mr. Heath, in the amount of $3,802.85.

Ms. Pacheco does not clearly indicate the statutory basis for her request for sanctions in her notice of motion or memorandum of points and authorities. In her notice of motion, Ms. Pacheco states that instant motion is made on the grounds that Mr. Luo failed to provide initial responses to the FI, SI, RFA, and RPD, did not appear for his deposition, and violated numerous sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, including Code of Civil Procedure sections 2017, 2020.240, 2023, 2023.010, 2025.440, 2025.480, 2033.220, 2030.300, 2031.240, 2031.310, 2033.280, and 2033.290. (Notice of Motion, p. 2:22-27, 3:1-4.) However, Ms. Pacheco does not indicate under which statute she is requesting monetary sanctions.

In her memorandum of points and authorities, Ms. Pacheco argues that sanctions are warranted because Mr. Luo “served no response at all, and [has] refused to meet and confer,” but does not cite any statute which permits an award of sanctions on those grounds. (Mem. Ps & As., p. 7:18-23.)

In her reply, Ms. Pacheco discusses her request for sanctions at length and cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030. (Reply, p. 3:128, 4:1-12.) However, Code of Civil Procedure 2023.030, subdivision (a) does not provide an independent basis for an award of sanctions as it indicates that a court may award sanctions against a party that commits a misuse of the discovery process, but only “[t]o the extent authorized by the chapter governing any particular discovery method or any other provision of this title.” Thus, this statute does not provide a basis for an award of monetary sanctions.

Since Ms. Pacheco does not identify a statutory basis for her request that provides an independent basis for the imposition of sanctions, her request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

Conclusion and Order

The U.S.-Sino motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

The U.S.-Sino motion is GRANTED as to SI Nos. 1-13 and 14 (as modified above), and RPD Nos. 53, 56-64, 66-70, 71-83, 87-88, 90, and 97-100. The U.S.-Sino motion is DENIED as to SI No. 15, and RPD Nos. 51-52, 54-55, 65, 84-86, 89, and 91-96.

Accordingly, within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this Order, U.S.-Sino shall provide verified code-compliant further responses, without objections, to SI Nos. 1-13 and 14 (as modified above), and RPD Nos. 53, 56-64, 66-70, 71-83, 87-88, 90, and 97-100, and produce documents in accordance with its responses to the RPD.

Documents responsive to RPD Nos. 53, 56-64, 66-70, 71-83, 87-88, 90, and 97-100 shall be produced subject to the following protective order: the documents pertaining to U.S.-Sino’s private financial information, U.S.-Sino’s customers’ financial information, and Mr. Liu’s immediate family members’ financial information shall be designated as confidential, and shall not to be shown to any person except for the parties’ counsel and any persons such as witnesses, experts, outside consultants, and insurers with whom it is necessary to consult and in connection with this action.

The Luo motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

The Luo motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks to compel Mr. Luo’s attendance at deposition, to compel initial responses to the FI, SI, and RPD, and to deem the RFA admitted. The Luo motion is DENIED without prejudice to the extent it seeks to compel Mr. Luo to produce documents described in his deposition notice.

Accordingly, Mr. Luo is required to submit to a deposition within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this order on a date and time mutually agreed upon by the parties. Furthermore, within 20 calendar days of the date of the filing of this order, Mr. Luo shall provide verified code-compliant responses to the FI, SI, and RPD, without objections, and produce documents in accordance with his responses to the RPD.

Ms. Pacheco’s request for monetary sanctions in connection with the U.S.-Sino motion is DENIED.

Ms. Pacheco’s request for monetary sanctions in connection with the Luo motion is DENIED.