Case Number: BC587898 Hearing Date: January 12, 2018 Dept: NCD

TENTATIVE RULING

MOTION TO RECLASSIFY CASE AS LIMITED CIVIL ACTION

[CCP §403.040]

Calendar: 10

Date: 1/12/17

Case No: BC 587898 Trial Date: February 26, 2017

Case Name: Celestino v. Chen, et al.

Moving Party: Defendants Nancy Chen and David Alan Davis

Responding Party: Plaintiff Pedro Celestino

RULING:

Defendants’ Motion for Reclassification of Action (Limited Jurisdiction) is DENIED. It is not clear from the pleadings, file and the showing made in the motion that the verdict in this case would necessarily result in a verdict below this court’s jurisdictional amount. See Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262; Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005, 2nd Dist.) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 277.

RELIEF REQUESTED:

Order reclassifying this action as a limited jurisdiction civil case.

SUMMARY OF FACTS:

Plaintiff Pedro Celestino alleges that on July 25, 2013 he was driving his truck eastbound on Main Street and Meridian when defendants Nancy Chen and David Alan Davis drove their car into plaintiff’s truck, as a result of which plaintiff suffered injuries and damages.

ANALYSIS:

Defendant argue that this matter should be reclassified as a limited jurisdiction matter, as plaintiff Celestino has waived all special damages, including all medical expenses, loss of earnings and loss of earnings capacity, so that it has become clear that any verdict based on general damages in this matter will necessarily fall short of $25,000.

Under CCP § 403.040(b),

“If a party files a motion for reclassification after the time for that party to …respond to a complaint… the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied;

(1) The case is incorrectly classified.

(2) The moving party shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.”

The California Supreme Court in construing when a case could be transferred to a municipal court under previous CCP § 396 held that a matter could be transferred when it would “necessarily” result in a verdict below the jurisdictional amount. Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 262. The court stated that this standard “requires a high level of certainty that a damage award will not exceed $25,000 and is not satisfied by a finding that such an award is merely ‘unlikely’ or ‘not probable’.” Walker, at 269.

Walker authorizes the court to conduct a pretrial hearing to obtain information about whether the amount of a judgment requires reclassification. See Walker, at 268, Stern v. Superior Court (2003 Second District) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 231.

The appellate court reviews a reclassification order “according to the abuse of discretion standard, i.e., whether the court made an informed decision within its discretion or whether the order exceeded the bounds of reason.” Stern v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 223, 231; citing Walker at 272.

The Second District in Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266 set forth the standard to be applied when considering reclassification of cases, noting,

“The trial court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount of the demand.”

Ytuarte, at 277, citing Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal. App.4th 397 (in which court of appeal reversed transfer of a case to limited jurisdiction in automobile accident case where plaintiff demonstrated $7,000 in medical expenses and possibility of future surgery even though there was no loss of earnings claim and an arbitration award of less than $25,000).

The Second District in Ytuarte reiterated that reclassification orders should be sparingly made:

“The high threshold required to reclassify a case from an unlimited action to a limited action is warranted in view of the circumscribed procedures and recovery available in the limited civil courts. “A transfer must be made only when the lack of jurisdiction is clear on the face of the record before the court because the transfer [i.e., reclassification

[*279] as a limited case] deprives the plaintiff from attempting to prove damages greater than those available in [the limited civil] court.” Williams v. Superior Court (Gemco/Lucky Stores) (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 171,175-176. To that end superior courts have long been cautioned to order transfers sparingly and only in the clearest of circumstances after a thorough review of the facts of the case. (Walker v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 270-271, [calling for “[C]aution … in this context” and “the transfer power [should not be used] as ‘an unfettered means of clearing crowded … calendars … “].)

Ytuarte, at 278-279.

Here, the moving papers are based on photographs of plaintiff’s vehicle, purportedly showing that the vehicle was barely damaged, so that the vehicle was in only a minor accident. [McAdams Decl., para. 4, Ex. A]. Defendants also rely on a meet and confer letter in connection with plaintiff’s motions in limine in this matter, as well as those motions, in which plaintiff states that he is waiving all medical bills, loss of earning capacity and loss of earnings. [McAdams Decl., paras. 5, 6, Exs. B, C].

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s overestimation of the amount he can recover in non-economic damages should not warrant maintaining this action classified as unlimited, but that the amount in controversy is necessarily below $25,000. Defendants also argue that good cause exists for defendants no seeking reclassification earlier, as they became aware of the waiver of economic damages in November of 2017, promptly reserved a hearing date, and filed the motion on November 17, 2017.

The opposition argues that in October of 2017, counsel for defendants offered to settle this matter for $60,000, and that plaintiff’s counsel has recently settled other cases in which special damages were waived for sums in excess of $25,000. [Easterwood Decl., paras, 2, 3].

There is no evidence offered showing what the non-economic damages in this matter are likely to be, such as a declaration from plaintiff explaining what he will be claiming.

The reply concedes that defendants have made two statutory offers to compromise this matter, one for $60,000, but argues that these offers were made before the parties had concluded discovery, before plaintiff waived economic damages, and so should not defeat the current argument that the verdict will necessarily fall below $25,000.

The showing of the basis for plaintiff taking the position that this case should be valued at more than $25,000 is very thin. In fact, although not argued by defendants, under Walker, information obtained in settlement negotiations should not be considered by the trial court in determining this type of motion. Walker, at 271. This leaves only counsel’s vague reference to settlements negotiated in other cases with waivers of economic damages, which does not explain how these cases are somehow relevant to the expected damages in this particular action.

Although this is a case where plaintiff may not recover more than $25,000, the standard is extremely high, and while the damage to the vehicle appears minimal, the vehicle appears to be quite a sturdy one, and this does not foreclose the possibility that plaintiff will be able to prove non-economic damages from the accident, such there is no “high level of certainty that a damage award will not exceed $25,000” in this case. The motion is denied.