Case Name: Randy Cono v. Diane Brown
Case No.: 1-13-CV-255313
Demurrer by Defendant Diane Brown to the First Amended Complaint

Defendant Diane Brown’s (“Brown”) request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Brown argues that the litigation privilege bars the first cause of action for slander of title and second cause of action for fraudulent deceit. In its previous order, the Court ruled that the litigation privilege did not apply. Repeat demurrers on grounds previously overruled simply are requests from a party for the trial court to reconsider an earlier order, and are not allowed unless they comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 437c or 1008. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108; see, e.g. Memorandum at pp. 8:15-10:2 [maintaining that the Court’s interpretation of Edwards v. Centrex (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15 was too “restrictive,” and citing Cabral v. Martin (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471 in an attempt to have the Court review and overturn its previous ruling].) Thus, Brown’s arguments regarding the litigation privilege are misplaced.

Brown contends that the second cause of action for fraudulent deceit remains inadequately pled. In its prior order, the Court sustained the demurrer as to this cause of action because plaintiff Randy Cono’s (“Cono”) allegations regarding reliance were not pled with the requisite specificity. With his first amended complaint, Cono has remedied this defect. Cono clarifies that emails referred to in paragraph 16 between Cono’s counsel and Brown do not serve as the misrepresentation giving rise to this claim. Instead, the cause of action is based on the filing of the false deed. (First Amended Compl., ¶ 26.) As a result, Cono alleges he relied on the fraudulent deed and the facts contained therein. (Id., ¶ 29.) Cono alleges that his reliance led to a delay in the filing of his unlawful detainer action, and forced him to initiate legal proceedings to establish ownership of the property. (Id., ¶¶ 16-17, 29.) Although Brown argues that the contents of the emails between herself and Cono’s counsel show that Cono could not possibly have relied on the fraudulent deed, this argument is beyond the scope of this demurrer as it is the filing of the false deed that serves as the basis for this claim, not the emails.

Moreover, Brown’s averment that Cono filed his unlawful detainer action before he learned of the allegedly false deed on November 28, 2011 is not supported by the unlawful detainer action attached as exhibit A to Brown’s request for judicial notice. The unlawful detainer complaint is dated January 4, 2012, not October 26, 2011 as Brown asserts.

Finally, Brown’s belief that the second cause of action does not allege damages is belied by the allegations in paragraph 17. Cono alleges that due to the filing of the false deed he incurred legal fees and lost rental income. (Id., ¶ 17.)

Accordingly, Brown’s demurrer to the first cause of action for slander of title and second cause of action for fraudulent deceit based on the ground of failure to state sufficient facts is OVERRULED.