Lead Case Name: Richard Daly, et al. v. Victor Garcia, et al.

Lead Case No.: 19CV352764
Subsidiary Case: Michael Kee, et al. v. Victor Garcia, et al., Case No. 19CV353498

This consolidated action arises out of a multi-vehicle collision on Highway 101. Defendant Maria Isabel Andino allegedly entrusted her vehicle to defendant and driver Victor Garcia, who was intoxicated and under the influence of alcohol. When the heavy traffic ahead of Garcia and Andino came to a stop, Garcia failed to stop in time and rear-ended one or more cars in front of him, including cars with plaintiffs Richard and Shannon Daly as well as plaintiffs Michael Kee, Luis Moran, and Oscar Carcamo. Richard and Shannon Daly filed a complaint asserting claims for negligence and loss of consortium. Kee, Moran, and Carcamo (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint asserting a claim for negligence and seeking punitive damages in connection therewith. Currently before the Court is Garcia’s motion to strike Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.

A party may move to strike out improper allegations in a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 435, subd. (b)(1), 436.) If a claim for punitive damages is not properly pleaded, the claim and related allegations may be stricken. (See Grieves v. Super. Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.) In order to plead a claim for punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege the defendant was guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud and the ultimate facts underlying such allegations. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a); Clauson v. Super. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Absent an allegation of intent to harm, a plaintiff must allege the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her despicable conduct and willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. (Taylor v. Super. Ct. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895–96.) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) As relevant to the definitions of both malice and oppression, despicable conduct is defined as being “‘so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.’ [Citation.]” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.)

“In determining whether a complaint states facts sufficient to sustain punitive damages, the challenged allegations must be read in context with the other facts alleged in the complaint.” (Monge v. Super. Ct. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510.) “Further, even though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to [a defendant’s] conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of punitive damages.” (Ibid.)

Garcia takes the position that the allegations about drunk driving here are insufficient to rise to the level of malice or oppression necessary to properly plead entitlement to punitive damages. Garcia seeks to establish his position by attempting to analogize this action to cases in which punitive damages were not recoverable and to distinguish cases in which a claim for punitive damages arising out of intoxicated driving was allowed to proceed. Although there is nothing improper about this approach as a general matter, it is unavailing here. First, the cases Garcia attempts to analogize concern entirely distinct conduct—such as ski racing or battery by a physician—and many cases concern the sufficiency of evidence at later stages of litigation. (See, e.g., Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188 [claim for punitive damages arising from skier-snowboarder collision subject to summary adjudication].) Second, Garcia does not effectively and persuasively distinguish cases involving claims for punitive damages arising from intoxicated driving, such as Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 and Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82. This is because Garcia does not fairly grapple with the facts pleaded in the complaint, which allegations closely resemble the facts at issue in Taylor and Dawes. Garcia’s analysis on this particular point consists of italicizing the word “facts” and then concluding without explanation that Plaintiffs’ allegations are too conclusory; he tacitly suggests but does not actually explain how Taylor and Dawes are distinguishable. This insufficient analysis is an adequate basis for refusing to accept his conclusion. (People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282.) And, the Court also finds that the facts pleaded here are sufficient. (See, e.g., Peterson v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 162–63.) Plaintiffs do not simply allege Garcia was driving under the influence. They allege many details about the circumstances of Garcia’s conduct, including his knowledge of the risks of his behavior, history of driving under the influence, the manner of his consumption of alcohol prior to the collision, and level of intoxication at the time. (Compl., ¶¶ 25–37.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is adequately pleaded.

In consideration of the foregoing, Garcia’s motion to strike is DENIED.

The Court will prepare the order.