The court grants the motion of Plaintiff Marian Robinson, by and through her Successor in Interest, Theresa Robinson, to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set 2), specifically nos. 25-27, as set forth below.

Interrogatories in Dispute

Atlantic objected that interrogatory nos. 25-27 were: (1) overly burdensome and oppressive; (2) improper, overly broad invasion of privacy in that the information sought discloses third party unintended witnesses; (3) seek private, personal information from third parties without a sufficient showing of a compelling need for the information; (4) seek information protected under HIPAA Privacy and Security regulations; and (5) see information protected by the physician patient privilege.

In addition, Atlantic objected to SI no. 27 on the grounds that it is “vague, ambiguous, uncertain, overly broad, irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in violations of CCP § 2017.010.” (See Opposition Separate Statement, p. 30:24-26.)

The court summarily overrules Atlantic’s objections of burden and oppression as to all interrogatories, and of ambiguity, uncertainty and relevance to SI no. 27. They are specious, and even Atlantic does not discuss them in its Opposition.

As for Atlantic’s HIPAA and privacy concerns, such rights are not absolute. Indeed, HIPAA provides standards for the disclosure of protected health information in judicial and administrative proceedings. (See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e).) To the extent Atlantic argues Plaintiff failed to meet those standards, Atlantic shares responsibility for such failure—it did not respond to Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter suggesting alternatives to disclosure of third party information.

The discovery sought is relevant to obtain the identity of potential witnesses, but the serious privacy concerns raised by such disclosure are obvious. To address these privacy concerns, Plaintiff has proposed that Atlantic send out what is essentially a more protective Colonial Life letter, asking third parties to contact Plaintiff’s counsel if they would like to speak to counsel. (See Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 3741-375, discussing Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785.) The letter sufficiently addresses any privacy concerns because it requires the individual to affirmatively contact Plaintiff’s counsel, thereby consenting to the disclosure. Plaintiff’s proposed letter also adequately addresses Atlantic’s objection based on the physician-patient privilege. For this reason, the court grants Plaintiff’s request that Atlantic send out the modified, more protective Colonial Life letters.

Plaintiff shall draft the proposed letter and submit the draft to Atlantic for review and comment. Email service is acceptable. Atlantic shall have 5 court days thereafter to propose revisions. The parties are strongly encouraged to work toward agreeing on the form of the letter, which should address the privacy concerns of HIPAA and Pioneer Electronics, without the need for further court assistance. The letters shall be sent no later than 30 days after Plaintiff’s submission of the initial draft. The actual costs of any mailing/copying of the letters shall be shared equally by Plaintiff and Atlantic.

Finally, Atlantic’s objection to the 11-month time period for the requested information is granted. Marian Robinson was a resident for the latter 4 months of that period. It is not reasonable for Plaintiff to request information for the 7 months preceding her stay.

Sanctions

The court issues sanctions of $500 against Defendant Atlantic. Sanctions are appropriate against Atlantic because it never responded to Plaintiff’s attempt to meet and confer on the interrogatories. (See Cronk Decl., ¶¶ 4-5; Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.020 [“Notwithstanding the outcome of the particular discovery motion, the court shall impose a monetary sanction ordering that any party or attorney who fails to confer as required pay the reasonable expenses . . .”].)

Plaintiff’s Inclusion of Other State Trial Court Orders

In support of the Reply, Plaintiff offers a supplemental declaration from her counsel. The declaration attaches copies of 16 superior court trial orders and/or notices of rulings from various counties throughout California. (See Cronk Decl. in support of Reply; ¶¶ 8-23, Exs. D-S.) Although the Reply does not cite to the exhibits themselves, it does cite to the paragraphs introducing the exhibits to support two arguments. Submission of these 16 trial court rulings was improper.

First, the rulings do not support Plaintiff’s first argument. (See Reply, p. 5:21-23,)

Second, the rulings are not admissible evidence to support Plaintiff’s second argument (see Reply, p. 6:8-10). The law on judicial notice is instructive. Judicial notice of court orders is proper under Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d), to establish the existence of the findings and decisions made, but not the truth of those findings. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564-1566.) For reasons discussed below, the existence of the other superior court’s findings on discovery motions in elder abuse cases are not relevant here. And the truth of those findings cannot be judicially noticed. The inclusion of these rulings in counsel’s declaration does not compel a different result.

Third and finally, “trial courts make no binding precedents.” (Fenske v. Bd. of Admin. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 590, 596.) Indeed, parties are not permitted to cite to unpublished appellate court opinions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115.) Trial court orders from other superior courts in other cases should not be cited either. (See Santa Ana Hosp. Med. Ctr. v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 830-831 [illogical to conclude that trial court orders may be cited because not expressly excluded by Cal. Rules of Court 997 (now 8.1115)].) Although the Reply did not cite to the trial court rulings, its citation to counsel’s supplemental declaration essentially directed the court to the 16 rulings. The invitation to consider the rulings was implicit. And the court declines the invitation.

Deadline for Compliance and Service of Notice

Moving Party is ordered to serve notice of ruling. Sanctions to be paid within 30 days after service of notice.