Case Number: BC484903 Hearing Date: May 14, 2014 Dept: 92

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

ROGELIO GRANADOS,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.

LOS ANGELES HARBOR GRAIN TERMINAL, ET AL.,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: BC484903

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO BIFURCATE

Dept. 92
1:30 p.m. — #36
May 14, 2014

Defendant, Official Safety Solutions, Inc.’s Motion to Bifurcate is Granted.

1. Facts
Plaintiff, Rogelio Granados filed this action against Defendants, Los Angeles Harbor Grain Terminal, Official Safety Solutions, Inc., and Mortimer & Wallace, Inc. for injuries sustained when he came into contact with an exposed auger without a safety guard.

2. Motion to Bifurcate
Defendant, OSS moves to bifurcate the issue of liability from the issue of damages in this case. CCP § 1048(b) provides: “The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action … or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues … ”

Additionally, CCP § 598 provides that the court may order certain issues tried before others “when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice or the economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby.” This section is generally relied upon for bifurcation—i.e., to try issues of liability before damages issues. It serves the salutory purpose of avoiding wasting time and money, and prevents possible prejudice to a defendant where a jury might look past liability to compensate a plaintiff through sympathy for his or her damages.

Where a separate trial is ordered on the issue of liability, the procedure is commonly referred to as “bifurcation.” The objective of bifurcation, of course, is to avoid wasting time and money on the trial of damages issues if the liability issue is resolved against plaintiff. Horton v. Jones (1972) 26 CA3d 952, 954. Granting or denying of a motion for separate trials lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, and is subject to reversal on appeal only for clear abuse. Grappo v. Coventry Financial Corp. (1991) 235 CA3d 496, 504.

Plaintiff argues bifurcation is not appropriate in this case, relying on Cohn v. Bugas (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 381, 385 to support his position. Notably, the issue in Cohn was whether the trial court properly applied the §597 bifurcation statute, which statute concerns trial of affirmative defenses prior to trial of the merits of the plaintiff’s lawsuit. That statute is not at issue here. The portion of the case upon which Plaintiff relies is the Court’s discussion of another case, Cook v. Superior Court (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 832; Cook concerned the unique circumstances that apply to a case for legal malpractice, and the requirement that the plaintiff in such a case prove up not only his case in chief, but also his underlying case. Cook is not applicable to this case, which is a simple personal injury matter.

Defendant made an adequate showing that bifurcation could potentially conserve court resources, party time, attorney time, and witness time in this case; if Plaintiff does not successfully show that OSS is liable for the injury at issue, then the case will not need to proceed to the damages stage. As Defendant correctly notes in its moving papers, this issue turns not on the typical apportionment of fault that must be done in personal injury cases, but instead of interpretation of a contractual agreement between it and Plaintiff’s employer. Thus, there is a very real possibility of a 100% defense verdict, which would render the damages phase of trial moot.

Defendant also made an adequate showing that Plaintiff was seriously injured in the subject accident, such that trial of the liability issue prior to the damages issue has the added effect of ensuring the jury is not prejudiced by introduction of proof of Plaintiff’s injuries before determining whether Defendant is liable for the subject accident. While Plaintiff correctly notes in opposition that he will testify during the liability phase of the trial, and that the jury will therefore see that his leg was amputated in connection with the subject incident, this is different from full details and testimony concerning his accident.

Plaintiff also argues that the liability and damages witnesses will substantially overlap. Plaintiff fails, however, to establish that anyone other than himself will testify in both portions of the trial. Plaintiff contends that the witnesses to the accident will testify in both phases, but fails to explain how the witnesses’ testimony will be relevant to the issue of damages.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the damages phase of trial will not be particularly complex, and that bifurcation is not necessary. However, Defendant establishes that Plaintiff has named a total of 57 retained and non-retained expert witnesses in this matter; while Plaintiff contends in opposition that he intends to limit that number at trial, Defendant establishes in reply that Plaintiff has refused, during meet and confer, to limit that number conclusively. Additionally, Plaintiff’s own retained expert, Dr. Tauber, testified that the traumatic amputation is much more complex than a typical personal injury damages case.

The Court finds bifurcation is in in the interest of justice, and grants the motion to bifurcate.

Dated this 14th day of May, 2014

Hon. Elia Weinbach
Judge of the Superior Court