Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1032(b) and 1033.5(a)(10) collectively provide that the prevailing party in a civil action may recover, as a matter of right, attorney’s fees when authorized by contract or statute. The “prevailing party” is the party with a net monetary recovery or for whom judgment is entered. CCP §1032(a)(4).
There is no dispute here that defendant is the prevailing party.
There is also no dispute that defendant, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover fees based on the Lease Agreement and, to the extent applicable for the roof door, the prior settlement agreement. The precise vehicle is actually immaterial for present purposes.
This issue here is with the amount sought.
The method and manner of calculating what fees are recoverable is generally left to the agreement of the parties. CCP §1021. Where an agreement for fees exists, but the method is not defined, courts will weight various factors to reach a “reasonable” amount to award as fees – commonly referred to as the lodestar. PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. Courts begin with an independent review of the evidence to determine the reasonableness of the hours actually spent litigating the matter and to assess whether there was padding, over-staffing, duplication or marked inefficiency. Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 272. Other factors courts consider include the development of the case, the complexity of the issues, and how long the court estimates it should have taken to perform the services. Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.
Plaintiff first takes issue with defendant’s failed law and motions matters (demurrer and summary judgment). According to plaintiff, this was a simple, fact-driven UD action in which law and motion served little purpose. While it is true defendant lost the motions filed, the test is not whether the party prevailed on every step along the way, but rather were the services “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation” (see CCP §1033.5(c)(2)). Given that the inspection issue was at all times de minimus and the roof door issue suspect (to say the least), this Court cannot conclude that the time spent on law and motion was unreasonable.
Plaintiff next takes issue with defendant’s allegedly lackluster settlement efforts. There is no provision within Civil Code §1717 or CCP §1033.5 requiring good faith settlement efforts in order to trigger a right to recoup fees. There are similar hurdles imposed by CCP §998 for other trial costs, but that it not in issue here. As with any case, both sides are to blame when settlement fails, but it is not clear how defendant’s failure (assuming that to be true) had any impact here. The inspection was a single isolated incident, and the roof door was there since 2006 – so what was defendant to offer in settlement? It was at all times in plaintiff’s hands to safely dismiss the action and avoid paying defendant its attorney fees. The decision to press forward, like all litigation decisions, came with risk.
Plaintiff finally takes issue with particular time entries, too many to enumerate in detail. This Court has undertaken its duty to independently review the billing summary, and finds no glaring anomalies. Giving Ms. Boekamp some trial experience as a second chair is perfectly reasonable. Attending a site inspection is reasonable. There may have been a slight amount of duplication and/or excess in the “review” categories, but again nothing that jumps out as unreasonable or unrelated to litigation demands. Moreover, this excess is easily resolved with an adjustment in the hourly rate.
After the courts determine the number of hours reasonably necessary to the conduct of litigation, the next step is to determine an appropriate hourly rate for the work performed, based on market trends in the particular region for that kind of work. Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 619; Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260.
Here, $395 is on the high side for UD work, as is $350 and $295 for the junior associates on the file. This is particularly evident when compared to the number of hours spent on particular projects. For example, the $350/hr associated spent over 20 hours preparing the modest moving papers for the summary judgment motion (separate statement with 9 facts and a 5-page memorandum). There are other examples, but this drives the point home that a $200/hr attorney can take longer to prepare a motion, but a higher-priced one should be faster.
Motion for fees GRANTED, except that defendant is to recalculate fees based upon the following attorney rates:
Ali Parvaneh ($325)
Barry Sabahat ($275)
Ashley Boekamp ($250)
Defendant to provide amended judgment with allowed costs and attorney fees within 15 days.