Case Number: BC564241 Hearing Date: August 04, 2015 Dept: 91
Defendant County of Los Angeles’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED without leave to amend.

This case arises out of a November 29, 2013, injury sustained by Plaintiff Rosie Altamirano as she was exiting a bus operated by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority in the City of Bell. Plaintiff alleges that the bus driver failed to close the window vent, which allowed water to pool on the floor of the bus. Plaintiff then slipped and fell in the pool of water.

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges causes of action for: (1) general negligence; and (2) vehicular negligence against LACMTA, as well as against the County of Los Angeles and the City of Los Angeles.

A statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings is generally reviewed as the functional equivalent to a general demurrer. (Lance Camper Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. of America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) Like demurrers, motions for judgment on the pleadings challenge the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not their veracity. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

Any defects must either appear on the face of the pleading, or else be taken by judicial notice. (See Bezirdjian v. O’Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-22; and Anmaco, Inc. v. Bholken (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 891, 900.) The parties’ ability to prove their respective claims is of no concern. (Lance Camper Mfg., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at 198; see also Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 99.) Thus, the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint and answer as true. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 515.) That said, the Court “does not consider conclusions of law or fact, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or facts that are judicially noticed.” (Stevenson Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Servs., Inc. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1219-20.)

If judgment on the pleadings is granted, it may be granted with or without leave to amend. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (h)(1).) As with a demurrer, “leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.” (Virginia G. v. ABC Unif. Sch. Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.)

“In view of the fact that tort causes of action against public entities are now based on statute, the general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity is applicable. Every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded.” (Susman v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809; see also Richardson-Tunnell v. Sch. Ins. Program for Emps. (SIPE) (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061 [quoting ibid].)

Here, the driver of the bus was a LACMTA employee. However, Plaintiff also alleges “Defendants” owned the bus that LACMTA’s employee operated, without specifying which defendant or defendants allegedly owned it. She also alleges that unspecified “Defendants” negligently owned, operated, serviced, managed, maintained, inspected and controlled” the LACMTA bus.

She thus has not pled facts with sufficient particularity against public entity defendants. There are no allegations that plead how the County could own or control a LACMTA bus driven by a LACMTA.

Moreover, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the County and LACMTA are separate legal entities, and that LACMTA is not under the County’s jurisdiction or control. This fact is not reasonably subject to dispute. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) Accordingly, it appears that the County cannot be held liable for the operation of LACMTA buses.

As Plaintiff has filed no opposition, leave to amend is not granted.