Filed 11/12/19 Marriage of Dodson CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re the Marriage of ROY and DENISE DODSON.

ROY T. DODSON IV,

Appellant,

v.

DENISE L. DODSON,

Respondent.

E070719

(Super.Ct.No. FAMSS1600938)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven J. Singley, Judge. Affirmed.

Roy T. Dodson IV, in pro. per., for Appellant.

Karen B. Miller for Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

In this marital dissolution proceeding, appellant, Roy T. Dodson IV (Roy), appeals from the May 3, 2018, order awarding his former spouse, respondent, Denise L. Dodson (Denise), $10,000 in attorney fees. (Fam. Code, §§ 2030, 4320.) Roy claims the court abused its discretion in making the award. We disagree and affirm.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

Roy and Denise were married on January 30, 2006, and separated on December 30, 2015, one month before what would have been their 10-year anniversary. In February 2016, Roy petitioned to dissolve the marriage. Roy initially represented himself in these proceedings. Roy and Denise have no children together, and Denise entered the marriage with no children, but Roy entered the marriage with four children. At the beginning of the marriage, Roy had sole legal and physical custody of his three youngest children (two daughters and one son) and joint legal and physical custody of his oldest son. When the parties separated in December 2015, Roy’s youngest two children were still minors.

B. Denise’s Request for Order (RFO) for Temporary Spousal Support and Attorney Fees (June 2016)

On June 3, 2016, Denise, represented by counsel, filed an RFO seeking $2,000 in temporary monthly spousal support, plus $7,750 in attorney fees, and an order requiring Roy to remove her from his health insurance. In her supporting declaration, Denise claimed she was disabled and had been unable to work since 2013. She had been diagnosed with several chronic illnesses, including lupus, which had been “the source of most of [her] health problems and [her] inability to work.” She had recently been approved to receive disability benefits. She had been employed as a private school teacher from 1996 to 2013 and was earning $1,700 per month before her employment ended. She has a bachelor’s degree in “liberal studies” but no teaching certificates. She left her residence with Roy in December 2015 and had since been living with her parents. She had less than $5 in each of two bank accounts, and significant out-of-pocket medical expenses, which her father was paying along with her living expenses. She needed to be removed from Roy’s health insurance so she could be covered solely by MediCal and reduce her out-of-pocket medical expenses.

The hearing on Denise’s RFO was initially set on July 14, 2016, but was twice continued, first to September 15 then to October 27, 2016. At the May 3, 2018, hearing on Denise’s motion for attorney fees, Denise’s counsel claimed that Roy’s refusal to agree to continue the hearing, and Roy’s failure to produce documentation of his income and assets at or before the continued July 14 and September 15 hearing dates, caused Denise to incur unnecessary attorney fees. On July 1, 2016, Roy filed and served a response to Denise’s RFO without including an income and expense declaration or paystubs documenting his income.

At the May 3, 2018, hearing, Denise’s counsel claimed she needed to ask the court to continue the July 14, 2016, hearing because she did not have an “accurate idea” of Roy’s income to calculate Roy’s spousal support obligation or of Roy’s assets for purposes of Denise’s request for attorney fees. Counsel claimed that Roy responded to Denise’s discovery in June 2016, but his responses omitted requested documentation of his income and assets. Counsel claimed Denise incurred $1,875 in “unnecessary” attorney fees just for having to appear in court on July 14, 2016, to continue the RFO hearing to September 15.

On September 15, 2016, the court held a status conference and continued the hearing on Denise’s RFO to October 27. As of September 15, Roy had not served Denise with a complete income and expense declaration or a complete schedule of assets and debts. On September 15, the court ordered Roy to file and serve a declaration regarding service of declaration of disclosure and income and expense declaration (Judicial Council form FL-141), a preliminary declaration of disclosure, Roy’s two most recent paystubs, and a new income and expense declaration if his income as shown on his paystubs was higher than he said it was at the status conference. Denise’s counsel then met with Roy outside the courtroom and gave him a list of the forms he needed to complete and produce.

On September 30, 2016, Roy filed a form FL-141, along with two paystubs showing his income for his pay periods ended August 28 and September 4. But Roy’s paystubs did not match the income shown on his most recent income and expense declaration, and Roy did not file or serve a preliminary declaration of disclosure, as he had been ordered to do on September 15.

On October 27, 2016, the court held the hearing on Denise’s RFO and ordered Roy to pay Denise temporary spousal support of $1,486 per month, retroactive to June 15, 2016. Roy’s spousal support arrearage totaled $6,687, and Roy was ordered to pay Denise an additional $100 per month for the arrearages, or $1,586 per month, until the arrearage was fully paid. The court based Denise’s temporary spousal support award on Roy’s paystubs.

C. The Parties’ Discovery Dispute, Additional RFO’s, and Other Proceedings

Also on September 30, 2016, Roy filed an RFO asking the court to order Denise to pay Roy 50 percent of a $24,300 lump-sum disability benefit that Denise had recently received from the California State Disability Department. The hearing on Roy’s RFO was initially set on October 27, with the hearing on Denise’s RFO for temporary spousal support, but Denise’s counsel claimed Roy’s RFO was untimely served, and the hearing on Roy’s RFO was continued to December 8.

On October 27, 2016, the hearing date on Denise’s RFO for temporary spousal support, Denise’s counsel filed an RFO to compel Roy to produce a preliminary declaration of disclosure (§ 2107, subd. (c)), and that Roy be ordered to pay Denise $2,500 in sanctions (§ 271), including $1,812.50 in attorney fees incurred in preparing the RFO and in appearing at the hearing on the RFO. Among other things, Denise’s counsel claimed Roy had failed to comply with the court’s September 15 orders by failing to provide his two most recent “full and complete” paystubs, an updated income and expense declaration, and a preliminary declaration of disclosure. Denise’s counsel argued that Roy’s failure to provide these documents was “delaying this case’s progress toward trial or settlement of the issue[s] of property division and permanent spousal support.”

On November 30, 2016, Roy hired counsel to represent him in the case, filed an updated income and expense declaration, and served a preliminary declaration of disclosure (§ 2104) without any attachments documenting his assets and debts. Through their counsel, the parties stipulated to continue the hearings on Denise’s RFO for discovery, attorney fees, and sanctions, and on Roy’s RFO for 50 percent of Denise’s $24,300 lump-sum disability payment, from December 8, 2016, to February 23, 2017. Roy’s and Denise’s counsel then met and conferred concerning Roy’s production of documentation to support Roy’s preliminary declaration of disclosure. According to Denise’s counsel, on February 22, 2017, Roy “finally” produced documents supporting his 401k assets, pension plan, and other assets.

At the February 23, 2017, hearing on the parties’ pending RFO’s, Roy stipulated to pay Denise’s counsel $2,000 in sanctions regarding Denise’s RFO to compel Roy to provide his preliminary declaration of disclosure and supporting documents, and the parties’ respective RFO’s were vacated. In April 2017, the court issued a status-only judgment ending the parties’ marriage. At a mandatory settlement conference in July 2017, the court set a trial on spousal support, property division, and attorney fees for December 11, 2017. On December 6, 2017, Roy’s counsel substituted out of the case, and Roy began representing himself again. Roy incurred a total of $6,500 in attorney fees, and he paid the fees by borrowing from his 401k. On December 11, 2017, the trial was continued at Denise’s request because her counsel was ill.

On December 26, 2017, Roy filed an RFO to modify (reduce) his temporary spousal support obligation. Roy claimed his net monthly income was $3,828 and his expenses were $3,375, leaving him with only $453 to pay temporary spousal support to Denise. Roy averred that his $1,586 monthly spousal support obligation had rendered him unable to afford his place of residence, his basic needs, the needs of his one minor child living in his household, AND the transportation costs of his 90-mile round trip commute to his place of employment.

On January 9, 2017, at Denise’s request, the court continued the hearing on Roy’s RFO from January 17 to February 28. At a trial setting conference on January 17, the court vacated Roy’s RFO to modify (reduce) his spousal support obligation, and determined that the issues to be resolved at trial were spousal support, property and debt division, and attorney fees.

D. The March 3, 2018, Trial on Spousal Support, Property, and Debt Issues

At trial on March 8, 2018, Denise was awarded $500 in monthly spousal support from April 1, 2018, until the earliest of (1) April 1, 2022 (48 months), (2) the death of either party, or (3) Denise’s remarriage. Roy’s community property portion of Denise’s $24,300 lump-sum disability benefit was applied toward Roy’s temporary spousal support arrearage, reducing the arrearage to $1,086. Denise was awarded a property/debt division equalization payment of $1,075. The court reserved jurisdiction to determine Denise’s request for attorney fees and sanctions (§§ 2030, 271), and set a May 3, 2018, hearing on Denise’s request.

E. Roy’s Motion and Supplemental Trial Brief Regarding Attorney Fees

On April 23, 2018, Roy filed a notice of intent to seek attorney fees and sanctions from Denise (§ 271) at the hearing or continued trial on May 3, 2018, based on Denise’s and her counsel’s alleged misconduct in delaying the proceedings. The record does not indicate that Roy’s motion was timely filed or served, or that it was set for hearing on May 3, 2018.

In his motion, Roy argued Denise and her counsel had “abused the Court’s process in repeatedly asking for continuances, thus prolonging the litigation process” and causing Roy to owe Denise $1,584 in monthly temporary spousal support “for an extended period.” Roy also claimed that Denise had purposefully delayed the proceedings in order to mitigate her obligation to pay Roy his community property share of Denise’s $24,300 lump-sum disability benefit, and that Denise had unlawfully spent Roy’s share of the benefit without Roy’s consent or a court order. Thus, in his motion, Roy asked the court to order Denise to pay Roy $11,214 in sanctions based on her breach of her fiduciary duty to Roy regarding her disability payment (§ 1101) plus attorney fees and costs, or an amount the court found “just and reasonable.” Roy additionally argued that Denise’s pending request for attorney fees and sanctions was based on her October 27, 2016, RFO, which had been resolved by his agreement to pay $2,000 in sanctions in December 2016. Roy claimed Denise’s October 27, 2016, RFO had no merit because he had timely provided Denise’s counsel with all of the discovery she had requested.

Four days later, on April 27, 2018, Roy filed a supplemental trial brief responding to Denise’s pending request for attorney fees and sanctions. In his supplemental trial brief, Roy argued it would be unjust to require him to pay any part of Denise’s attorney fees, given that he could not afford an attorney during most of the proceedings, that Denise had used her $24,300 disability payment to purchase a new vehicle rather than to pay her attorney fees, and that Denise should have been able to pay all of her own attorney’s fees with her $24,300 disability payment and his spousal support payments. Roy also argued that Denise’s counsel’s multiple requests for continuances were intended to exhaust Roy, both financially and emotionally, and that Denise’s counsel’s skills and efforts were not “wisely devoted to the expeditious disposition of the case.”

F. The Order Awarding Denise $10,000 of Denise’s Attorney Fees

At the continued trial on May 3, 2018, Denise’s counsel told the court that Denise had been seeking attorney fees under section 2030 since June 2016, and had been seeking sanctions under section 271 since October 2017, but the requests had been continued. The court noted that Roy’s motion for attorney fees was untimely, and was therefore not before the court, and limited the hearing to Denise’s request for attorney fees based on “need and ability” to pay under section 2030 and as sanctions under section 271. Denise’s counsel later told the court that Denise was seeking sanctions only as an alternative basis for awarding Denise attorney fees under section 2030.

In ruling on Denise’s request for attorney fees, the court took judicial notice of “all of the previous filings” in the case. It was undisputed that Roy incurred a total of $6,500 in attorney fees and that Denise incurred a (rounded down) total of $24,000, for a combined total of $30,500. Denise had paid approximately $8,140 toward her $24,000 in attorney fees, leaving an “exact balance” of $15,994.20.

Denise’s counsel submitted a DissoMaster report showing that Roy had 73 percent and Denise had 27 percent of the parties’ “net spendable income” after considering Roy’s $500 monthly spousal support obligation to Denise. Counsel asked the court to order Roy to pay $15,765, or nearly all, of Denise’s unpaid attorney fees, calculated as follows: 73 percent times $30,500 equals $22,265, less $6,500, equals $15,765. Thus, counsel asked the court to order Roy to pay 73 percent of the parties’ combined $30,500 in attorney fees. Counsel noted that Roy had a pension and a 401k account that he could use to pay the additional attorney fees. (§ 2030, subd. (c).) Counsel also noted that Roy had been represented by counsel for around one year, beginning in November 2016, but Denise had been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, since February 2016. Counsel argued that, before Roy hired counsel in November 2016, “it took three hearings . . . to even get a spousal support award,” and that most of Denise’s fees were either incurred before Roy hired counsel or for trial when Roy was representing himself.

Denise’s counsel then asked the court to consider her requests for attorney fees and sanctions “cohesively,” or as alternative bases for awarding Denise $15,765 in attorney fees. Counsel explained that Denise’s attorney fee request was partly based on Denise’s June 3, 2016, RFO for temporary spousal support and the difficulties counsel had in prosecuting that RFO. Counsel recounted that Roy filed a late response to the RFO on July 1; his response did not include an income and expense declaration; and the July 14 hearing on the RFO was continued to September 15, then to October 27—all because Roy, unrepresented by counsel, would not produce documents necessary to support his preliminary declaration of disclosure, which Denise’s counsel needed in order to have an “accurate picture” of Roy’s income, assets, and debts, for purposes of Denise’s RFO for temporary spousal support and for apportioning attorney fees between the parties. Counsel told the court that her firm had been “fronting” a lot of attorney time for Denise to get her “through to the end of her trial.”

In response, Roy argued he had never been uncooperative with the court or with Denise’s counsel, and he did not like the “tone” that Denise’s counsel took with him during their first phone conversation, so he had insisted that they communicate only through e-mail. The court asked Roy whether he knew when he had produced the documents necessary to make his preliminary declaration of disclosure. But before Roy could explain, and just before the morning break, the court said that the “bigger issue” to the court was the “disparity in access to funds” between the parties, not whether Roy had been uncooperative or warranted sanctions. The court indicated it did not believe that Roy had done anything “deliberately” to warrant sanctions, although the court had the impression that Roy’s self-representation and misunderstanding of what he needed to produce and when had caused some delays. Still, the court said it was more concerned with the parties’ “pretty significant disparity in access to funds.”

In response, after the break, Roy argued: (1) counsel’s DissoMaster report, which showed his monthly income was $5,819, was incorrect, the correct number was $5,065; (2) Denise had kept her entire $24,300 lump-sum disability payment, without paying Roy his one-half share, and Denise should have used her share of the disability payment to pay her attorney fees; (3) Roy had to borrow $3,500 from his 401k account to pay his attorney, he still owed his attorney $3,000, and he did not know how he was going to pay his attorney the $3,000 balance; AND (4) Roy was still paying Denise’s attorney $100 per month for the $2,000 in sanctions he agreed to pay in 2016 on the advice of his attorney, but he now believed it was a mistake to agree to pay the sanctions. Roy also noted that his income and expense declaration was based on his actual expenses, while Denise’s was based on her “proposed needs.” Denise did not pay rent, but he paid rent; Denise was not working, but he was working; Denise had few living expenses, but he had many, including the cost of commuting to Los Angeles for work. Roy said he had only $13,000 in his 401k account, because he had not invested in it for 20 years. In sum, Roy argued he was unable to pay any of Denise’s attorney fees because he had been financially “in the hole” for almost two years, unable to pay his living expenses, his attorney fees, and Denise’s spousal support.

Denise’s counsel then clarified that the $2,000 in sanctions that Roy agreed to pay in 2016 was “to settle” Denise’s motion to compel Roy’s preliminary declaration of disclosure, which was to be heard on December 8, 2016. Counsel also reminded the court that (1) Roy’s share of Denise’s $24,300 disability payment was awarded to Denise to satisfy most of Roy’s temporary spousal support arrearage; (2) at trial on March 8, 2018, “it came out” that Roy’s fiancée was paying around one-half of Roy’s expenses, as shown on Roy’s most recent income and expense declaration; and (3) Roy was also covering expenses of his adult children, whom he did not have a financial obligation to support. Counsel argued that Denise’s attorney fees “probably could have been cut in half” if Roy had “read forms and followed the instructions.” Roy pointed out and the court acknowledged that Roy still had one minor child in his household whom he was obligated to support.

At the conclusion of the May 3, 2018, hearing, the court found that Roy had committed no “new” section 271 or sanctionable violations, and there was no basis for imposing sanctions on Roy apart from Roy’s 2016 agreement to pay Denise’s counsel $2,000 in sanctions. The court took the section 2030 issue—the question of Roy’s liability to pay part of Denise’s attorney fees—under submission. Then, on June 11, 2018, the court issued its findings and order after hearing, requiring Roy to pay $10,000 of Denise’s attorney fees directly to Denise’s counsel, at the rate of $150 per month, beginning on June 1, 2018. Roy timely appeals.

III. DISCUSSION

For multiple reasons, Roy claims the court abused its discretion in ordering Roy to pay $10,000 of Denise’s $24,000 in attorney fees, which effectively made Roy liable for $16,500, or just over one-half, of the parties’ combined $30,500 in attorney fees. We find no abuse of discretion in the making of the award, or its amount.

A. Applicable Legal Principles

In a marital dissolution proceeding, section 2030 requires the court to “ensure that each party has access to legal representation, including access early in the proceedings, to preserve each party’s rights by ordering” one party to pay the other party’s attorney fees and costs, “if necessary based on the [parties’] income and needs assessments.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1).) When a party requests an award of attorney fees and costs under section 2030, the court is required to “make findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs under [section 2030] is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal representation of both parties.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) The court is required to make an award of attorney fees and costs “[i]f the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay.” (Ibid.)

The making of an attorney fee and cost award under section 2030, and its amount, must be “just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.” (§ 2032, subd. (a).) “In determining what is just and reasonable . . . the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party’s case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320.” (§ 2032, subd. (b).) The court may order payment of an award of attorney fees and costs from any type of property. (§ 2032, subd. (c).)

“[T]he proper legal standard for determining an attorney fee award requires the trial court to determine how to apportion the cost of the proceedings equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances. [Citation.] In making this determination, the trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for fees and costs; we will not reverse absent a showing that no judge could reasonably have made the order, considering all of the evidence viewed most favorably in support of the order. [Citation.] However, ‘although the trial court has considerable discretion in fashioning a need-based fee award [citation], the record must reflect that the trial court actually exercised that discretion, and considered the statutory factors in exercising that discretion.’” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 975; Alan S. v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 238, 254-255.)

B. Analysis

Roy advances several arguments in support of his claim that the family court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay $10,000 of Denise’s attorney fees. Roy’s arguments fall into two broad categories: (1) Roy’s claims that the court failed to consider that Denise’s counsel incurred unnecessary fees through multiple continuances, and thus did not wisely devote her skill and effort to the expeditious disposition of the case; and (2) Roy’s claims that the court failed to consider Roy’s inability to pay, and Denise’s ability to pay, $10,000 of Denise’s attorney fees.

1. The Continuances

Roy claims the record does not show that the court considered whether Denise’s counsel’s skill and effort were “‘“wisely devoted to the expeditious disposition of the case.”’” (In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 866-870.) Roy maintains that, “but for Denise’s own misconduct in the misappropriation of court time for repeated requests for continuances, the vast majority of the attorney’s fees incurred would be non-existent for both parties, as there were few legal issues in this matter justifying substantial litigation activity.” Roy specifically argues that Denise’s counsel caused five separate “delays” in the proceedings through continuances, and that these continuances caused Denise to incur unspecified amounts of unnecessary and unreasonable attorney fees.

The only continuances that were discussed at the May 3, 2018, hearing were the two continuances that Denise obtained, over Roy’s objection, of the hearing on Denise’s June 3, 2016, RFO for spousal support and attorney fees, first from July 14, 2016, to September 15, then from September 15 to October 27, 2016. The record shows that these continuances were reasonably necessary and that Roy, not Denise or her counsel, caused the need for these continuances.

At the May 3, 2018, hearing, Denise’s counsel explained in detail how Roy had delayed the proceedings and had caused Denise to incur attorney fees by failing to produce requested documents supporting his income, assets, and debts, which Denise needed in order to obtain orders for temporary spousal support and attorney fees, and as Denise was seeking in her June 3, 2016, RFO. The court reasonably credited Denise’s counsel’s statements concerning Roy’s failure to produce requested documents, because the record as described above amply supports it.

The court also observed that Roy had “caused some unnecessary delay” because he was self-represented and apparently did not understand what documents he needed to produce and when he needed to produce them. Thus, the court reasonably determined that Roy caused the need to continue the hearing on Denise’s June 3, 2016, RFO to September 15, then to October 27, 2016, and the attorney fees associated with these delays.

The record also shows that Denise’s counsel reasonably incurred fees in filing, on October 27, 2016, an RFO to compel Roy to produce a preliminary declaration of disclosure. (§ 2107, subd. (c).) This RFO was necessary because, as Denise’s counsel explained at the May 3, 2018, hearing, Roy failed to comply with the court’s September 15 order directing Roy to provide Denise’s counsel, by October 27, with Roy’s two most recent “full and complete” paystubs, an updated income and expense declaration, and a preliminary declaration of disclosure. Roy claims he produced these documents on September 30, 2016, but the record belies Roy’s claim because it shows that Roy agreed, through his counsel, whom he hired in November 2016, to continue the hearing on Denise’s October 27, 2016, RFO from December 8, 2016, to February 23, 2017. According to Denise’s counsel, Roy “finally” produced documents supporting his 401k assets, his pension plan, and his other assets on February 22, 2017. Roy stipulated, on the advice of his counsel, to pay Denise $2,000 in sanctions to “settle” Denise’s October 27, 2016, RFO, and the RFO was vacated.

Still, Roy maintains that Denise’s October 27, 2016, RFO constituted “Delay No. 2” because the RFO was unnecessary, given that he had previously produced the requested documents supporting his preliminary declaration of disclosure through his responses to Denise’s form interrogatories. Roy claims Denise’s counsel “inadvertently” admitted in her declaration supporting Denise’s October 27, 2016, RFO that Roy had already produced the requested documents. But the record contains no such admission. To the contrary, at the May 8, 2018, hearing, Denise’s counsel told the court that Denise’s attorney fees “probably could have been cut in half” had Roy “read forms and followed the instructions.” Thus, the record supports a reasonable inference and the court reasonably could have determined that around one-half of Denise’s attorney fees were necessarily incurred to obtain documents from Roy.

Roy also claims Denise’s counsel caused three additional delays and unspecified unnecessary fees by (1) refusing to take Denise’s October 27, 2016, RFO off calendar (“Delay No. 3”), (2) failing to show up for trial on December 11, 2017, “claiming illness/urgent care” (“Delay No. 4”), and (3) claiming that Roy’s RFO to modify (reduce) Roy’s temporary spousal support obligation was untimely filed, and requesting a continuance of the hearing on that RFO, which was ultimately heard at trial on March 8, 2016 (“Delay No. 5”). At the March 3, 2018, hearing, Roy did not claim that any of these continuances were unwarranted or caused Denise to incur any unnecessary fees. Nor, in this appeal, has Roy shown that they did.

2. Roy’s Ability to Pay Part of Denise’s Attorney Fees

In his remaining arguments, Roy claims the record does not show that the court, in ordering Roy to pay $10,000 of Denise’s $24,000 in attorney fees, properly considered or evaluated Roy’s inability to pay any part of Denise’s attorney fees, or Denise’s ability to pay all of her attorney fees with her temporary spousal support payments, her lump-sum disability payment, and her monthly disability payments.

Roy claims the court, in making the $10,000 fee award, improperly relied “solely” on the DissoMaster report submitted by Denise’s counsel at the May 3, 2018, hearing, which showed that the parties had a 73 percent to 27 percent disparity in access to their “net spendable funds,” rather than weighing all of the factors the court was required to weigh and consider in determining whether an attorney fee award was “just and reasonable” under all of the circumstances. (§§ 2030, 2032, subd. (b), 4320.) But the record belies Roy’s claim that the court relied solely on the DissoMaster report in making the $10,000 fee award. If the court had relied solely on the DissoMaster report in determining the fee award, it would have awarded Denise $15,765 in attorney fees (73 percent times $30,500 equals $22,265, less $6,500, equals $15,765), as Denise’s counsel requested at the May 3, 2018, hearing.

Roy principally claims that the court failed to consider that the $10,000 fee award left him with inadequate funds to pay for his own necessities, and with a “minimal share” of the parties’ net available funds. He claims the $10,000 fee award did not place the parties on equal parity; rather, it gave Denise almost all of the parties’ net spendable income, even though Denise has no children and lives rent-and utility-free with her parents, whereas Roy has “actual rent, expenses and sole physical and legal custody of a minor child.” The record shows, however, that the court thoroughly considered Roy’s financial circumstances, along with Denise’s, in ordering Roy to pay $10,000 of Denise’s $24,000 in attorney fees.

At the May 3, 2018, hearing, Denise’s counsel pointed out that, at trial on March 8, 2018, the court reviewed Roy’s expenses “line item by line item” and “it came out” that Roy’s fiancé was paying around one-half of Roy’s expenses, as shown on Roy’s most recent income and expense declaration. Thus, although Denise was living rent- and utility-free, Roy was also receiving substantial assistance with his living expenses. In addition, Roy’s one-half community property share of Denise’s $24,300 lump-sum disability payment was credited to Denise at the March 8, 2018, trial, in order to reduce Roy’s temporary spousal support arrearage. The record also shows that Roy was incurring expenses to support his adult children. And, as the court pointed out at the May 8, 2018, hearing, there was a substantial disparity in the parties’ access to funds. (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) Roy was earning taxable income of $5,065 per month. But apart from Roy’s spousal support payments, which were reduced from $1,486 per month to $500 per month at the March 3, 2018, trial, Denise had only $1,064.60 in monthly disability payments.

Lastly, Roy complains he was ordered to pay attorney fees “to protect the rights of DENISE” even though he represented himself throughout most of the proceedings and thus did not have the same legal protection as Denise. He points out that section 2030 requires the court to “ensure that each party has access to legal representation, including access early in the proceedings, to preserve each party’s rights . . . .” (§ 2030, subd. (a).) The record shows, however, that Denise needed legal representation early in the proceedings to protect her rights to spousal support. Without legal representation, it appears that Roy would not have paid Denise any spousal support, leaving her with only her parents and her disability income to support her. (In re Marriage of Duncan (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 617, 629 [the purpose of an attorney fee award, in a martial dissolution proceeding, is “to provide one of the parties, if necessary, with an amount adequate to properly litigate the controversy.”].) And, as noted, as much as one-half of Denise’s attorney fees were incurred due to Roy’s failure to timely document his assets early in the proceedings.

Contrary to Roy’s claims, the record shows that the $10,000 fee award to Denise was not the product of “a truncated process” in which the court merely determines which party has the higher income, but was, rather, the product of a deliberated process in which the court based the award on the total picture of the parties’ respective abilities to pay. (See Alan S. v. Superior Court, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 254-255.)

We are mindful, and the record shows, that these dissolution proceedings were very stressful and difficult for Roy, both emotionally and financially. But Denise earned very little income throughout the parties’ marriage. She was only earning $1,700 per month before she stopped working as a private school teacher in 2013. We are hopeful that Roy will find a way to move past this very difficult and stressful period in his life and find a happier and brighter future for himself, his fiancé, and his adult children.

IV. DISPOSITION

The May 3, 2018, judgment awarding Denise $10,000 in attorney fees is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS

J.

We concur:

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

MILLER

J.