Case Name: Rutledge, et al. v. HP, Inc.
Case No.: 1-03-CV-817837

On July 22, 2015, the Sixth District Court of Appeal issued a ruling which, inter alia, reversed the 2007 ruling by this Court (Hon. Komar) denying Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a nationwide class and instead certifying a California-only class on Plaintiffs’ UCL and breach of warranty claims. The parties dispute the impact of the reversal and, at this Court’s request, have submitted briefing on the issue.

Generally, an unqualified reversal remands the cause for a new trial and places the parties in the trial court in the same position as if the cause had never been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the court on appeal must be followed so far as applicable. (Hall v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381.) There is a limitation to this rule, however. As explained by one court:

The fact that the rule we discuss is a ‘general’ rule implies that it has limitations. One limitation is that a case is to be set at large for retrial only when that is the intent of the appellate court. ‘Judgment reversed’ at the end of an opinion is, of course, strong indication of such intent. But when the opinion as a whole establishes a contrary intention, the rule is inoperative. To hold otherwise would be to make a fetish of form.

(Stromer v. Browning (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 513, 518-519.)

The appellate court in this instance examined the issue of whether this Court erred in failing to certify a nationwide class. (Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Company (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1185.) The court stated that a nationwide class is proper under constitutional law when a state has significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts to the claims asserted by each member of the plaintiff class, contacts creating state interests, in order to ensure that the choice of forum is not arbitrary or unfair. (Id. at p. 1186.) Following an analysis of this issue, the court found that “appellants established sufficient contacts with California as to each class member’s claims such that application of California law to non-resident plaintiffs would not be ‘arbitrary and unfair.’” (Id. at p. 1187.) The court stated further that “choice-of-law rules, under which the trial court determines whether the law of other states is materially different and whether other states have an interest in having their law applied, support the application of California law to a nationwide class.” (Ibid.) The court found that California has the “predominant interest” in applying its law. (Id. at pp. 1187-1188.)

Ultimately, the court held the following:

We find the trial court’s order denying nationwide class certification must be reversed. The record shows that California had sufficient contacts with the claims such that California has an interest in applying its laws to nonresident plaintiffs satisfying constitutional principles. In addition, HP did not satisfy its burden of showing that other state’s interests in applying their law were greater than California’s. Here, the court improperly used the possibility of differing warranty laws as a reason to deny nationwide certification without considering whether other jurisdictions had an interest in applying those laws. Finally, the court improperly required appellants to demonstrate why California had a “special obligation” in applying its consumer protection laws to nonresident plaintiffs. Such consideration is not a proper one for a choice-of-law analysis.

(Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Company, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1189.)

The appellate court’s ruling in this regard is now law of the case. (See Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 298, 309.) Therefore, the main factors justifying the certification of a nationwide class have been established. Further, the language and tone of the court’s opinion indicate that the intention of the appellate court is that a nationwide class is appropriate in this instance and should have been certified. Accordingly, pursuant to the appellate court opinion, this Court orders that a nationwide class be certified.