Case Number: BC449616    Hearing Date: July 10, 2014    Dept: 46

Posted 7-9-2014 at 1:35 p.m.

Case Number: BC449616
RYAN ATKINS ET AL VS CITY OF LOS ANGELES ET AL
Filing Date: 11/16/2010
Case Type: Other Employment Complaint (General Jurisdiction)
Status: Verdict 05/05/2014

TENTATIVE RULINGS

07/10/2014
Motion for Judgment NOV

1. “‘The court … either of its own motion … or on motion of a party against whom a verdict has been rendered, shall render judgment in favor of the aggrieved party notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for directed verdict … should have been granted had a previous motion been made . . .’ [CCP § 629 (emphasis added)].” Wegner, Fairbank & Epstein, CAL.PRAC.GUIDE: CIV. TRIALS & EVIDENCE (The Rutter Group 2013) ¶ 18:3.

2. “A JNOV motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party’s evidence (‘a demurrer to the evidence’). I.e., it challenges whether that evidence was sufficient to prove the claims or defenses asserted by the opposing party and now embodied in the jury’s verdict. [See Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 C3d 104, 110; Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1978) 22 C3d 865, 877; Moore v. San Francisco (1970) 5 CA3d 728, 733–734]. It thus has the same function as a motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, the only difference being that the JNOV motion lies after a verdict for the opposing party has been rendered. [Beavers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1990) 225 CA3d 310, 327; CC-California Plaza Assocs. v. Paller & Goldstein (1996) 51 CA4th 1042, 1050].” Id. at ¶ 18:4 (emphasis theirs).

3. “[A]ll evidence supporting the verdict is presumed true. The issue is whether these facts constitute a prima facie case or defense as a matter of law. [Moore[, supra,] 5 CA3d [at] 733; Fountain Valley Chateau Blanc Homeowner’s Ass’n v. Department of Veterans Affairs (1998) 67 CA4th 743, 750].” Id. at ¶ 18:54 (emphasis theirs).

4. “The trial judge cannot weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses on JNOV motions (as it may do on a motion for new trial). [Hauter[, supra,] (1975) 14 C3d [at] 110; Clemmer[, supra,] 22 C3d [at] 877; Carter v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (2004) 122 CA4th 1313, 1320]. Conflicting evidence is resolved against the moving party. The party in whose favor the verdict was rendered is ‘entitled to the benefit of every favorable inference which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence and to have all conflicts in the evidence resolved in his favor.’ [Castro v. State of Calif. (1981) 114 CA3d 503, 507 (emphasis added); Fountain Valley [ ], supra, 67 CA4th at 750].” Id. at ¶ 18:55.

5. “A JNOV motion ‘may be granted only if it appears from the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support.’ [Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 C4th 62, 68; Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television (2008) 162 CA4th 1107, 1137–1138]. Conversely, a JNOV motion must be denied if ‘substantial evidence’ supports the verdict. [Begnal v. Canfield Assocs., Inc. (2000) 78 CA4th 66, 72; Campbell v. Cal–Gard Sur. Services, Inc. (1998) 62 CA4th 563, 569; Linear Technology Corp. v. Tokyo Electron, Ltd. (2011) 200 CA4th 1527, 1532]. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict: ‘If there is any substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in support of the verdict, the motion should be denied.’ [Hauter [ ], supra, 14 C3d at 110; Campbell [ ], supra, 62 CA4th at 569].” Id. at ¶ 18:56.

6. Presuming all the evidence to be true, the court cannot find grounds to grant a JNOV in this case. Therefore the motion is DENIED. The motion is based upon three grounds. City of Los Angeles contends: (1) it bore no legal obligation to make Plaintiffs light-duty assignment permanent and the LAPD had reasonably accommodated Plaintiffs temporary injuries by temporarily assigning them to light duty for extended periods of time; (2) Plaintiffs were not even entitled to this accommodation since they were conditional employees who never met the condition of their employment which was completion of the Academy training.; and (3) the verdict is unsupported by the evidence.

6.a. The first argument is based upon the case of Raine v. City of Burbank (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1215, cited by City of Los Angeles, which stands for the rule that an employer has “no duty under FEHA to make [the patrol officer employee] Raine’s temporary front-desk assignment permanent because that would, in effect, require the City to create a new sworn-officer position just for Raine, an obligation not imposed by FEHA’s accommodation requirements. The Raine case is factually different since it was undisputed in Raine that there were no vacant positions open in Burbank to which Raine could be accommodated, there was no history of accommodation of police officer accommodation, there was no evidence of any city charter provision like L.A. City Charter Provision 1014, any union collective bargaining provision like that in the present case, or evidence of a civil service rule such as Section 7.14 of the Civil Service Rules in evidence in the present case.

6.b. The second argument relates to a contention based upon Hastings. In Hastings it was held that the defendant was not required to reclassify a disabled correctional officer as an accommodation to reassignment to a position in a different civil service classification without complying with competitive examination requirements because to do so would violate rules requiring civil service employees seeking assignment to different classifications to take competitive examination. Plaintiffs presented evidence that the City Charter provision 1014 authorized reassignment of the plaintiffs without a civil service examination. As such Hastings does not apply.

6.c. The opposing papers and arguments clearly document that on the legal grounds and factual grounds presented for the JNOV motion that the present case is distinguishable from prior actions wherein the courts of appeal have denied recovery. In the present action because all Plaintiffs in this action were employed by the City of Los Angeles which had specific civil service, city charter, and contractual obligations that defined the types of accommodations to be afforded to recruit officers without taking civil service examinations. In the court’s view, the combination of these rules and undertakings by City of Los Angeles made the issues of violation of FEHA, reasonable accommodations, and participation in the interactive process a question of fact for determination by the jury and not a question of law.

6.d. For example, the union collective bargaining contract and City Charter Provision 1014 present a different legal and factual context in this case. Corina Lee testified regarding the agreement (Exhibit 77, page 1) to swear in officers at a later time to start the 2-year period for completion of the academy as required by Penal Code 832 ticking later so that officers injured in training could be rehabilitated to complete their training. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the evidence established that the City of Los Angeles undertook to treat disabled officers in training differently than other employees and they agreed to “obtain suitable employment [for injured officers in training] elsewhere in the City” in addition to the obligation to do this under Section 1014 of the City charter. These rules were to apply to all officers in training. Exhibit 94A is a list of recruit officers that were accommodated in this manner in the years of 2008, 2009, and 2010. The City’s present argument that the collective bargaining agreement was void and was not signed by the City was never raised at trial and is contradicted by Corina Lee’s testimony. Furthermore, the collective bargaining agreement was duplicative the City’s undertaking under City Charter Provision 1014, its practice to extend permanent jobs to injured recruits as documented by the list of officers so accommodated as shown by Exhibit 94A, and Exhibit 127, page 41 which is Section 7.14 of the Civil Service Rules which indicate that an employee, if injured should be accommodated until capable of return to their old position. A fair understanding of the evidence presented was that the LAPD department of City of Los Angeles agreed to make good faith efforts to assist recruit officers who, because of an illness or injury, are unable to perform the essential duty functions of their position and obtain for them suitable employment elsewhere in the City without civil service examination.

6.e. On the last ground stated, that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence, the court finds that the overwhelming evidence is to the contrary. The compendium of exhibits filed by Plaintiffs supports every aspect of the verdict.

7. New trial on the issue of excessive damages under CCP §657(5) is DENIED. This ground in effect asks for a limited new trial—i.e., a new trial limited to the issues of damages (findings re liability, etc. to be kept intact).” Id. at ¶ 18:158 (emphasis theirs).

7.a. “In deciding a motion for new trial on this ground, the court has the power (and responsibility) to reweigh the evidence: ‘A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of . . . excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.’ [CCP § 657 (emphasis added)]. ‘The judge is not permitted to substitute his judgment for that of the jury on the question of damages unless it appears from the record that the jury verdict was improper.’ [Bigboy v. County of San Diego (1984) 154 C.A.3d 397, 406].” Id. at ¶ 18:159.

7.b. “When damages are determined to be ‘excessive,’ the court may grant a new trial conditionally: i.e., upon condition that the motion for new trial will be denied if plaintiff consents to a reduction (a ‘remittitur’) of damages in an amount determined by the court. [CCP § 662.5(a)(2) (amended eff. 1/1/12)].” Id. at ¶ 18:164 (emphasis theirs).

7.c. The economics testimony from Karen Smith were admitted into evidence as Exhibit 83A. These conclusions were unchallenged. Each plaintiff testified to their damages which were not reasonably challenged. The court cannot find that any of the damages awards are close to unreasonable or that another or different verdict should have been reached.

8. Motion for new trial on the basis of “Error in law” during trial pursuant to CCP § 657(7) is DENIED.

8.a. “A new trial cannot be granted for error of law unless the error was prejudicial (see Cal. Const. Art. VI, § 13). I.e., the error must likely have affected the outcome of the trial: ‘If it clearly appears that the error could not have affected the result of the trial, the court is bound to deny the motion.’ [Bristow v. Ferguson (1981) 121 C.A.3d 823, 826; see Mosesian v. Pennwalt Corp. (1987) 191 C.A.3d 851, 866-867 (disapproved on other grounds in People v. Ault (2004) 33 C.4th 1250, 1272, fn. 15)].” Id. at ¶ 18:192 (emphasis theirs).

8.b. The legal challenges made by Defendant are discussed above relative to the motion for JNOV. The court does not find any error in the law.