Case Name: Salvador Aceves, et al. v. California Great America, et al.
Case No.: 17-CV-307998

Currently before the Court is the motion by plaintiff Salvador Aceves (“Salvador”) for terminating, issue, evidentiary, and/or monetary sanctions or, in the alternative, further responses to special interrogatories, set one (“SI”), Nos. 7-10 and 14-15 and requests for production of documents, set one (“RPD”), Nos. 2, 4-6, 17, 20, 41-43, and 52-53, the production of documents responsive to the RPD, and an award of monetary sanctions.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a personal injury action. On October 2, 2015, Salvador and his minor children (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) went to defendant California Great America (“Great America”), which does business as an amusement park. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2 & 8.) “While at the park, the family rode on the ride called: ‘Snoopy Space Ride’ and/or ‘First Beagle on the Moon’ …, which involved sitting in self-contained seats that were mechanically lifted off the ground, to the approximate height of eight feet.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) The ride was staffed and fun by ride operators, who were employed by Great America and/or defendant Cedar Fair Entertainment. (Id. at ¶¶ 4, 8, 12, & 20.) While Plaintiffs were on the ride, “the self-contained seats and/or mechanical arm suddenly, and without warning failed, causing their seat to fall approximately eight feet to the concrete below.” (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 21, & 32.) As a result, Plaintiffs were injured. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-18, 23-24, & 28-29.)

Great America, Cedar Fair Entertainment, and the ride operators (collectively, “Defendants”) allegedly “owned and/or occupied the premises where Plaintiff[s] fell and had a duty to ensure the back porch/stoop was safely constructed.” (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were “negligent in the use or maintenance of the premises, and/or the way in which they each owned, leased, occupied, controlled, operated, and/or managed the premises.” (Ibid.) Specifically, Defendants “failed to use reasonable care to keep the premises, and [the ride], in a reasonably safe condition, to discover any unsafe conditions, and/or to repair, replace, or give adequate warning of anything that could be reasonably expected to harm others including Plaintiffs.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs alleged that “[t]he aforesaid unsafe and dangerous condition was known, or in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care should have been down, to Defendants …, in adequate time for a reasonably prudent person to avoid, warn of, or make safe, the condition and unreasonable risk of harm of which Plaintiffs were at all times herein mentioned unaware.” (Id. at ¶ 16.) Defendants negligently failed to take steps “to either make [the ride] safe, warn Plaintiffs and/or not divert Plaintiffs’ attention of the dangerous condition, all of which caused the self-contained seats to plummet from a height of approximate eight feet, causing [Plaintiffs’] injuries and damages … .” (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 22, & 27.)

Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging causes of action for: (1) negligence/premises liability; (2) failure to warn; (3) failure to maintain; and (4) res ipsa loquitur. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed an amendment to the complaint, stating that they designated a defendant in the complaint by the incorrect name of Cedar Fair Entertainment, the defendant’s correct name was Cedar Fair Entertainment Company, and the defendant’s true name was substituted for the incorrect name wherever it appeared in the complaint.

A few months later, Cedar Fair L.P. dba California’s Great America (“Cedar Fair”) filed an answer to the complaint, stating that it was erroneously sued as Cedar Fair Entertainment.

Discovery Dispute

On April 12, 2018, Salvador served Cedar Fair with the SI and RPD. Cedar Fair’s counsel subsequently requested an extension of time to June 8, 2018, for Cedar Fair to respond to the discovery. Salvador’s counsel agreed to the extension of time. No further extensions of time were requested or granted. Cedar Fair served Salvador with its initial responses to the SI and RPD on August 6, 2018.

On October 3, 2018, Salvador filed a motion to compel further responses to SI Nos. 2-12, 15-29, and 31-42 and a motion to compel further responses to RPD Nos. 1-13, 15-18, 20-34, 36, 38-43, and 47-55 and production of documents in accordance with those responses. Salvador argued that Cedar Fair’s unverified, objection-only responses to the SI and RPD were not code-complaint because Cedar Fair’s responses were untimely and, therefore, all objections were waived. Cedar Fair did not file any opposition to Salvador’s motions.

Following meet and confer efforts, Cedar Fair served Salvador with its first amended responses to the SI and RPD on December 12, 2018. Three days later, Cedar Fair served Salvador with its second amended responses to the SI and RPD.

Salvador’s discovery motions proceeded to hearing on December 18, 2018. The minute orders from the hearing state that the court (Hon. Theodore C. Zayner) adopted its tentative rulings granting Salvador’s motions. The court ordered Cedar Fair to serve Salvador with further responses to SI Nos. 2-12, 15-29, and 31-42 and RPD Nos. 1-13, 15-18, 20-34, 36, 38-43, and 47-55, and produce documents in accordance with its responses, no later than January 4, 2019.

On January 3, 2019, Cedar Fair served Salvador with its third amended responses to the SI and RPD. (Beecher Dec., Exs. 13-14.)

Salvador’s counsel sent a meet and confer letter to Cedar Fair’s counsel on January 4, 2019. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 12.) Salvador’s counsel stated that Salvador had not yet received Cedar Fair’s third amended responses, and he asked Cedar Fair to provide those responses, and documents in accordance with those responses, no later than January 18, 2019. (Ibid.)

On January 6, 2019, Cedar Fair produced the following documents with its third amended responses: “five photographs of the ride ‘Snoopy’s Space Buggies’ with Safety Guide and Warning Signs; GA (‘Great America’) Daily Maintenance Pre-Opening Inspection Detail for Snoopy’s Space Buggies dated August 3, 4, and 5, 2015 (each of these reports further indicate that the manufacturer of the ride is Zamperla, Zamperla’s name for this ride is the ‘Jump Around’, and this ride was manufactured in 2015); the 2015 Repair and Replacement Log for the Jump Around for the period April 4, 2015 through September 4, 2015; GA Monthly Inspection and Lubrication for the Jump Around dated August 2015; the GA Weekly Inspection and Lubrication for the Jump Around dated August 2, 2015; Great America (GA) Guest First Aid Reports dated August 2, 2015 for [Plaintiffs]; the Santa Clara Fire Department EMS Reports dated August 2, 2015, for [Salvador] and [one of his minor children]; and the Investigation Report by Apex Investigation on [Salvador] dated November 19, 2018.” (Roth Dec., ¶ 5.)

Cedar Fair’s counsel replied to the meet and confer letter from Salvador’s counsel on January 31, 2019. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 16.) Cedar Fair’s counsel asserted that the meet and confer letter from Salvador’s counsel “was sent prematurely” because Cedar Fair had served Salvador with its third amended responses to the SI and RPD and, thereafter, produced documents in accordance with its responses. (Ibid.) Cedar Fair’s counsel further stated, “[E]nclosed with this correspondence are the remainder of any and all documents responsive to all and each of Plaintiff’s requests. No documents have been withheld on any basis, whatsoever.” (Ibid.)

Specifically, Cedar Fair produced: “[e]ight photographs of the Jump Around; a document entitled ‘Description of Responsibilities’ of Seller and Buyer in connection with the purchase of the Jump Around; a letter dated September 18, 2015 from Zamperla to GA re: okay to operate cars 1 and 6 of the Jump Around; drawing of the rotating center/lower bracket/bracket shim on the Jump Around dated September 4, 2015[;] the GA Daily Maintenance Pre-Operating Inspection Detail for the Jump Around for July 25, 2015 through July 30, 2015, and for August 3, 2015 through August 10, 2015; the GA Weekly Inspection and Lubrication Reports for the Jump Around dated July 25, 2015, August 2, 2015, and August 9, 2015; the GA Monthly Inspection And Lubrication Report for July, August and September of 2015 for the Jump Around; the GA Three Month Inspection and Lubrication Report for June 2015 for the Jump Around; the GA Six Month Inspection and Lubrication Report for September 2015 for the Jump Around; the 2015 Repair and Replacement Log for the Jump Around; Zamperla’s drawings for the Jump Around; the GA Daily Inspection Procedures Manual for the Zamperla Jump Around; the Jump Around Technical Report from Zamperla; four emails dated August 3, 2015 between GA and Zamperla regarding the incident on the Jump Around; seven emails dated between August 6-11, 2015, between GA and Zamperla regarding the step height or car height of the Jump Around; and six emails dated between August 31- September 18, 2015, between GA and Zamperla regarding bumper issues on the Jump Around.” (Roth Dec., ¶ 6.)
Cedar Fair’s counsel then addressed specific categories of documents discussed in the meet and confer letter from Salvador’s counsel. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 16.) With respect to surveillance videos and pictures, Cedar Fair’s counsel stated: “All surveillance video and pictures of Plaintiff through our investigators have been produced. I believe your correspondence was sent at the time that those documents were enroute to your office. Please confirm receipt.” (Ibid.) As to communications with investigators, counsel stated, “[A]ll documents related to our investigator were produced. Please confirm that you have received those documents.” (Ibid.) Regarding Cedar Fair’s internal communications and emails, counsel stated that “[a]ll documents responsive to this inquiry are produced herein.” (Ibid.) With respect to guest first aid reports, counsel stated, “These documents were previously produced to your office and we believe your meet and confer correspondence was sent while those documents were sent enroute. Please confirm that you have received those documents.” (Ibid.) As to repair and replacement logs prior to September 4, 2015, associated documents, Great America monthly inspection and lubrication reports, daily maintenance pre-opening inspection details, internal guidelines, instructions, training manuals, documents and communications with third parties regarding repairs, defect documents, counsel stated that all documents in Cedar Fair’s “possession, custody or control are produced herein.” (Ibid.)

Finally, notwithstanding his earlier assertion that “[n]o documents have been withheld on any basis, whatsoever,” Cedar Fair’s counsel asserted that objections based on the attorney-client privilege were not waived and, consequently, Cedar Fair would not comply with any requests seeking documents protected by the privilege. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 16.) Counsel further stated that although documents relating to any retained expert would be protected by the attorney-client privilege, Cedar Fair had not yet retained any experts and, thus, documents relating to Cedar Fair’s retained experts did not exist. (Ibid.)

On February 20, 2019, Salvador’s counsel sent a meet and confer email to Cedar Fair’s counsel regarding Cedar Fair’s production of documents. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 17.) Salvador’s counsel asserted that Cedar Fair’s production of documents was incomplete because the production did not include: (1) any internal Cedar Fair documents (such as communications, reports, or inspections) regarding an overtravel alarm on the ride; and (2) daily maintenance pre-opening inspection details for August 1 and 2, 2015.

Later that day, Salvador’s counsel and Cedar Fair’s counsel meet and conferred via telephone. (Beecher Dec., ¶ 19.) Thereafter, Salvador’s counsel sent Cedar Fair’s counsel a confirming email, which stated: “This will confirm that Defendant has until March 8. 2019 to deliver further responses and production and specifically the documents regarding the overtravel alarm and Defendant’s response to it as well as Defendant’s daily inspection reports for August 1 and 2, 2015. You also agreed to extend Plaintiff’s deadline to file any applicable discovery motion/sanctions motion/motion to compel to March 29, 2019.” (Id. at Ex. 18.) However, Cedar Fair did not served Salvador with any further responses or make an additional production of documents.

Consequently, on March 20, 2019, Salvador filed the instant motion before the Court. Cedar Fair filed papers in opposition to the motion on April 26, 2019, in which it requests an award of monetary sanctions. On May 2, 2019, Salvador filed a reply.

Discussion

Salvador primarily moves for an order imposing terminating, issue, evidentiary, and/or monetary sanctions on Cedar Fair for failure to comply with a court order. In the alternative, Salvador moves for an order compelling Cedar Fair to provide further responses to SI Nos. 7-10 and 14-15 and RPD Nos. 2, 4-6, 17, 20, 41-43, and 52-53 and produce documents in accordance with its responses to the RPD, and for an award of monetary sanctions.

I. Motion for Terminating, Issue, Evidentiary, and/or Monetary Sanctions

Salvador contends that the Court should impose terminating, issue, evidentiary, and/or monetary sanctions on Cedar Fair because Cedar Fair failed to comply with the court order granting his earlier motions to compel further responses to SI Nos. 2-12, 15-29, and 31-42 and RPD Nos. 1-13, 15-18, 20-34, 36, 38-43, and 47-55.

A. Legal Standard

As a preliminary matter, Salvador does not identify any statute authorizing his motion. Nonetheless, it is readily apparent given the nature of Salvador’s arguments that his motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (e), and 2031.310, subdivision (i).

Those statutes provide that if a party fails to obey an order compelling further responses to interrogatories or requests for production of documents, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (e) & 2031.310, subd. (i).) The statutes further provide that in lieu of, or in addition to, non-monetary sanctions, the court may impose a monetary sanction. (Ibid.)

Two facts are generally prerequisite to the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions: (1) there must be a failure to comply with a court order; and (2) that failure must be willful. (Miranda v. 21st Century Ins Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 929.) It is the moving party’s burden to establish the responding party’s failure to obey the prior discovery order. (Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 200-201.) If noncompliance is shown, then the burdens shifts to the opposing party to show that his or her noncompliance was not willful. (Id. at p. 201.)

Even where these prerequisite facts are present, the trial court has broad discretion in imposing discovery sanctions and the “decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly.” (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 992 (Doppes); see Reedy v. Bussell (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1293.) In exercising this discretion, the trial court should consider both the conduct being sanctioned and its effect on the party seeking discovery. (See Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992; see also Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 796-797.) Additionally, the trial court should “attempt to tailor the sanction to the harm caused by the withheld discovery” (Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 992) and the court’s discretionary authority in determining the appropriate sanction is limited by the principle that discovery sanctions are meant to be remedial rather than punitive (see Kahn v. Kahn (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 372, 381). Put another way, the discretionary imposition of a sanction is proper when it is suitable and necessary to enable the party seeking discovery to obtain the objects of the discovery sought, but not when it places the prevailing party in a better position than if discovery had been obtained. (See Wilson v. Jefferson (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 952, 958.)

Finally, non-monetary sanctions are imposed upon an incremental basis depending upon the severity of the violation. (See Doppes, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 992.) “If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.” (Ibid., internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)

B. Merits of the Motion

The minute orders from the December 18, 2018 hearing on Salvador’s prior motions to compel further responses to SI Nos. 2-12, 15-29, and 31-42 and RPD Nos. 1-13, 15-18, 20-34, 36, 38-43, and 47-55 state that the court granted Salvador’s motions. The court ordered Cedar Fair to serve Salvador with further responses to SI Nos. 2-12, 15-29, and 31-42 and RPD Nos. 1-13, 15-18, 20-34, 36, 38-43, and 47-55, and produce documents in accordance with its responses, no later than January 4, 2019.

In his moving papers, Salvador argues that Cedar Fair failed to comply with the court order because Cedar Fair has not produced documents or disclosed facts in its discovery responses regarding an overtravel alarm that occurred on the ride. (Mtn. Term. Sanc., pp. 1:2-19, 2:6-25, 8:8-16, 9:10-28, 12:3-4 17:3-6.)

First, Salvador has not shown that the SI that were the subject of the prior court order (i.e., SI Nos. 2-12, 15-29, and 31-42) necessarily required Cedar Fair to disclose facts regarding an overtravel alarm that occurred on the ride.

Salvador highlights SI No. 14. But that request was not at issue in Salvador’s prior motion to compel further responses to the SI. In his prior motion, Salvador only moved to compel further responses to SI Nos. 2-12, 15-29, and 31-42. Consequently, any deficiencies in Cedar Fair’s response to SI No. 14 does not demonstrate non-compliance with the prior court order.

Salvador also highlights SI No. 10. SI No. 10 asks Cedar Fair to describe any and all inspections of the ride from January 1, 2010 to the present. However, Salvador does not establish that the overtravel alarm resulted in any inspection of the ride. Salvador presents an email from Zamperla, the manufacturer of the ride, to Great America wherein Zamperla states that the ride was shut down due to an overtravel alarm and maintenance cleared the alarm and reopened the ride. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 1.) It is not readily apparent, and Salvador does not present any evidence establishing, that clearance of the overtravel alarm and reopening the ride necessarily resulted in an inspection of the ride. Consequently, Salvador has not demonstrated that Cedar Rapid was required to provide facts regarding the overtravel alarm in response to SI No. 10.

In his moving papers, Salvador further highlights SI No. 15. SI No. 15 asks Cedar Fair to state all facts supporting its contention that it made an effort during the two years prior to Plaintiffs’ accident to prevent users of the ride from suffering injuries. Salvador does not present any evidence or argument showing that the overtravel alarm somehow constituted part of Cedar Fair’s efforts to prevent injuries on the ride. Moreover, it is unclear to the Court why SI No. 15—which asks for facts regarding Cedar Fair’s efforts to prevent injuries—necessarily requires Cedar Fair to provide facts regarding the overtravel alarm. Thus, Salvador has not demonstrated that Cedar Rapid was required to provide facts regarding the overtravel alarm in response to SI No. 15.

Salvador also contends that SI Nos. 7-9 obligated Cedar Fair to provide facts regarding the overtravel alarm. SI No. 7-9 ask Cedar Fair to describe “any and all changes caused by [it] to the [machine] from January 1, 2010 to present,” “any and all repairs to the [machine] from January 1, 2010 to present,” and “any and all maintenance to the [machine] from January 1, 2010 to present.” (Beecher Dec., Ex. 3.) As explained above, Salvador presents an email from Zamperla, the manufacturer of the ride, to Great America wherein Zamperla states that the ride was shut down due to an overtravel alarm and maintenance cleared the alarm and reopened the ride. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 1.) But it is not readily apparent, and Salvador does not present any evidence establishing, that clearance of the overtravel alarm and reopening the ride necessarily constituted a change to the machine, a repair of the machine, or maintenance of the machine. Consequently, Salvador has not demonstrated that Cedar Rapid was required to provide facts regarding the overtravel alarm in response to SI Nos. 7-9.

In sum, SI Nos. 7-9, 10, and 15 do not expressly ask Cedar Rapid to provide facts regarding the overtravel alarm and Salvador has not otherwise shown that facts regarding the overtravel alarm fall within the scope of the requests. In light of the foregoing, Salvador has not shown that Cedar Fair failed to comply with the court order because it did not disclose facts in its responses to the SI regarding the overtravel alarm.

Second, Salvador has not established that Cedar Fair failed to produce documents in response to the RPD that were the subject of the prior court order (i.e., RPD Nos. 1-13, 15-18, 20-34, 36, 38-43, and 47-55) regarding an overtravel alarm that occurred on the ride.

Salvador insists that documents regarding the overtravel alarm—other than the email from Zamperla to Great America—must exist because “it defies logic that [Cedar Fair] would receive an alarm, respond to an alarm, try to fix the machine and clear the alarm, take notes, send those notes up its chain of command and speak with the manufacturer about the notes, and receive emails with the manufacturer about the alarm—and all without generating a single internal document[.]” (Mtn. Term. Sanc., p. 17:8-11.)

Salvador’s argument is not well-taken. In essence, Salvador is arguing that Cedar Fair must have additional documents regarding the overtravel alarm in its possession, custody, or control because he believes it would be logical for Cedar Fair to have such documents. The fact that it would make sense for Cedar Fair to have additional documents does not mean that it actually does. Salvador does not present any evidence showing that written “notes” were taken regarding the overtravel alarm or that those “notes” were passed up the chain of command. Salvador contends that Cedar Fair tried “to fix the machine” as a result of the overtravel alarm, but there is no evidence supporting his contention. Further, he does not present any evidence showing that an attempt to fix the machine would necessarily result in the creation of a document regarding the overtravel alarm. Similarly, as previously explained, there is no evidence that the clearance of the overtravel alarm and reopening of the ride resulted in any repairs or maintenance to the machine. Moreover, Salvador does not present any evidence showing repairs or maintenance to the machine would necessarily result in the creation of a document regarding the overtravel alarm.

Salvador also contends that Cedar Fair failed to produce a “maintenance inspection report for August 2, 2015 (which would discuss the overtravel alarm) … .” (Mtn. Term. Sanc., p. 17:4-5.) Salvador presents evidence that Cedar Fair produced maintenance inspection reports for the time period of July 25 to August 10, 2015, but did not produce reports for August 1 and 2, 2015. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 15.) Salvador also highlights some of Cedar Fair’s responses to the SI, which state that Cedar Fair “routinely inspects and maintains the rides on a daily basis.” (Mtn. Term. Sanc., p. 18:9-14.)

This evidence suggests that Cedar Fair typically prepared daily maintenance pre-opening inspection detail reports regarding the ride. (Beecher Dec., Ex. 15.) But the fact that Cedar Fair usually prepares daily maintenance pre-opening inspection detail reports regarding the ride does not necessarily mean that those reports would discuss an overtravel alarm. According to the reports, a technician visually inspects the ride as indicated in the reports, checks off items as directed by a checklist in the report, and certifies that the ride is ready for operational testing procedures. (Ibid.) But the reports themselves do not reveal whether the occurrence of an overtravel alarm on the ride, at some point in time, would necessarily be reflected in the reports. Furthermore, Salvador does not present any evidence demonstrating that an overtravel alarm on the ride would necessarily be reflected in the reports.

Additionally, Salvador has not established that daily maintenance pre-opening inspection detail reports for the dates of August 1 and 2, 2015, actually exist and Cedar Fair failed to produce those reports. While the evidence shows that Cedar Fair typically prepared daily maintenance pre-opening inspection detail reports regarding the ride, it is possible that reports for August 1 and 2, 2015 never existed, were destroyed, were lost, misplaced, or stolen, or were never, or are no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of Cedar Fair. Salvador contends that Cedar Fair’s responses to the RPD should, but do not, contain such information. But that purported fact does not demonstrate that Cedar Fair withheld the reports for August 1 and 2, 2015 from production. At most, it would mean that Cedar Fair’s responses to the RPD are not code-compliant.

In light of the foregoing, Salvador has not shown that Cedar Fair failed to comply with the court order because it did not produce documents in response to the RPD regarding the overtravel alarm.

For these reasons, Salvador’s motion for terminating, issue, evidentiary, and/or monetary sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (e), and 2031.310, subdivision (i) is DENIED.

II. Alternative Motion for Further Responses to SI Nos. 7-10 and 14-15 and RPD Nos. 2, 4-6, 17, 20, 41-43, and 52-53, Production of Documents, and Monetary Sanctions

Salvador contends that the Court should compel Cedar Fair to provide further responses to SI Nos. 7-10 and 14-15 and RPD Nos. 2, 4-6, 17, 20, 41-43, and 52-53, and produce documents in accordance with its responses, because its third amended responses are defective.

A. Legal Standard

As a preliminary matter, Salvador does not identify any statute authorizing his motion. Nonetheless, it is readily apparent given the nature of Salvador’s arguments that his motion is brought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (a), and 2031.310, subdivision (a).

If a party demanding a response to an interrogatory deems that an answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete, an exercise of the option to produce documents is unwarranted or inadequate, or an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling a further response under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (a). (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a)(1)–(3).) If a timely motion to compel a further response to an interrogatory has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection to the discovery request. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

If a party demanding a response to a request for production of documents deems that a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or an objection in the response is without merit or too general, that party may move for an order compelling a further response under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.310, subdivision (a). (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) On a motion to compel a further response to a request for production of documents, it is the moving party’s burden to demonstrate good cause for the discovery sought. (Kirkland v. Super. Ct. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 (Kirkland).) “Good cause” requires a showing or both relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case) and specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 53 Cal.4th 1113, 1117.) Once good cause has been shown, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections. (Kirkland, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 98.)

B. Merits of the Motion

Salvador contends that Cedar Fair’s third amended responses to SI Nos. 7-10 and 14-15 are deficient because Cedar Fair “fails to answer the call of the question, which specifically requests dates [on which] a specific act was performed.” (Sep. Stmt., pp. 74-88.)

Salvador’s argument is not well-taken. Upon review, it is readily apparent that Cedar Fair’s third amended responses to SI Nos. 7-10 and 14-15 respond to the call of the question and provide a specific date when asked to do so. For example, SI No. 7 asks Cedar Fair to describe “any and all changes caused by [it] to the [machine] from January 1, 2010 to present.” (Sep. Stmt., p. 73:4-6.) In its third amended response, Cedar Fair stated, “On September 17, 2015, shim plates were installed to the Car One and Care [sic] Six of the ride.” (Id. at p. 73:23-25.) Cedar Fair’s third amend response to SI No. 7 directly responds to the request with responsive information. Similarly, SI No. 14 asks Cedar Fair to state the date that it first became aware “of the problem with the [machine] that caused the [incident].” (Id. at p. 83:13-15.) In its third amended response, Cedar Fair stated, “August 2, 2015.” (Id. at p. 83:23-25.) Cedar Fair’s third amend response to SI No. 14 directly responds to the request with the sought-after date. Because Salvador’s argument lacks merit, further responses to the SI are not warranted.

Next, Salvador contends that further responses to RPD Nos. 2, 4, 17, 20, and 41-43 are warranted because even though Cedar Fair’s third amended responses to those requests provide that Cedar Fair will produce all documents in its possession, custody, and control, Cedar Fair “continues to wrongfully withhold documents.” (Sep. Stmt., pp. 4:14-17, 10:23-25, 29:17-19, 36:7-9, 42:15-17, 48:21-23, & 55:3-5.)

Salvador’s argument lacks merit. It is not disputed that Cedar Fair provided code-compliant responses to RPD Nos. 2, 4, 17, 20, and 41-43, stating that it would unconditionally comply with the requests. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220 [providing that a statement of compliance with the request is a permissible response].) Thus, further responses to those requests are not warranted.

Notably, to the extent Salvador seeks to compel compliance with Cedar Fair’s statements of compliance as set forth in its third amended responses to RPD Nos. 2, 4, 17, 20, and 41-43, it must bring a properly noticed motion to compel compliance under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.320, subdivision (a).

Finally, Salvador contends that further responses are warranted to RPD Nos. 5-6 and 52-53 because Cedar Fair’s statements of inability to comply are incomplete. As a threshold matter, the Court finds that there is generally good cause for the discovery sought by RPD Nos. 5-6 and 52-53. The requests seek documents relating to problems with the ride, complaints and comments regarding the ride, and communications regarding the incident. (Sep. Stmt., pp. 16-22 & 50-66.) Such documents may help Salvador evaluate his case and prepare for trial. Furthermore, Cedar Fair’s statements of inability to comply in its third amended responses to the requests are incomplete. Its responses do not “specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession, custody, or control of the responding party” or “set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) Consequently, further responses to RPD Nos. 5-6 and 52-53 are warranted.

Accordingly, Salvador’s motion to compel Cedar Fair to provide further responses to SI Nos. 7-10 and 14-15 and RPD Nos. 2, 4-6, 17, 20, 41-43, and 52-53, and produce documents in accordance with those responses, is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART. The motion is DENIED as to SI Nos. 7-10 and 14-15 and RPD Nos. 2, 4, 17, 20, and 41-43. The motion is GRANTED as to RPD Nos. 5-6 and 52-53. Within 20 days of the date of filing of the Order, Cedar Fair shall serve Salvador with verified, code-compliant further responses to RPD Nos. 5-6 and 52-53, without objections, and produce documents in accordance with its further responses.

C. Salvador’s Request for Monetary Sanctions

In connection with his motion to compel further responses, Salvador requests an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $10,507. (Ntc. Mtn., p. 6:24-28.)

However, as Cedar Fair persuasively argues, Salvador’s request for monetary sanctions is deficient because Salvador does not specifically identify the party or person against whom monetary sanctions are sought in his notice of motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040 [“[a] request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought”].)

Accordingly, Salvador’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

D. Cedar Fair’s Request for Monetary Sanctions

In connection with its opposition, Cedar Fair requests an award of monetary sanctions in the amount of $7,310 against Salvador and his attorney pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010. Cedar Fair asserts that it is entitled to an award of monetary sanctions because “insofar as [Salvador’s] motion seeks to compel further responses from [it] to special interrogatories and requests for production in dispute, the motion is without substantial justification.” (Oppn., p. 18:5-7.)

As an initial matter, the statutory authority cited by Cedar Fair in support of its request for an award of monetary sanctions does not authorize the imposition of monetary sanctions. Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010 merely defines acts that constitute misuses of the discovery process, and does not itself set forth any provisions regarding the issuance of a monetary sanction.

Because Cedar Fair seeks an award of monetary sanctions in connection with Salvador’s alternative motion to compel further responses, the statutes that govern its request for monetary sanctions are Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, subdivision (d) and 2031.310, subdivision (h). Those statutes provide that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response to special interrogatories of requests for production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300, subd. (d) & 2031.310, subd. (h).)

The Court finds that Cedar Fair is not entitled to an award of monetary sanctions because Salvador was partially successful on his motion and the motion was brought with substantial justification.

Accordingly, Cedar Fair’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.