Case Number: BC538300 Hearing Date: May 05, 2016 Dept: 98

SANDRA DERPIC,
Plaintiff,
vs.

PASADENA RECOVERY CENTER, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO: BC538300

[TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 98
1:30 p.m.
May 5, 2016

I. BACKGROUND

On March 4, 2014, Plaintiff Sandra Derpic (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendant Pasadena Recovery Center (“Defendant”) alleging a single cause of action for negligence. Defendant now moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff’s Complaint.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In analyzing motions for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent’s claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294. “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. . . .” Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 437c(c). Generally, “the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections

Objection to Declaration of Melissa M. Wetkowski, Exhibit D OVERRULED

Defendant is a drug and alcohol treatment facility. Plaintiff was a live-in resident with Defendant from August 11, 2013 to September 4, 2013. During her residency with Defendant, Plaintiff met Robert Ruffin (“Ruffin”), Defendant’s male night shift supervisor. Plaintiff also met another employee, Jennifer. Jennifer, Ruffin, and Plaintiff met and conversed at least ten times during Plaintiff’s stay. Jennifer provided Plaintiff with her cell phone number and, when Plaintiff had checked out, Jennifer and Plaintiff texted each other to keep in touch. Plaintiff asserts that she never exchanged any personal information with Ruffin. On September 19, 2013, Ruffin sent Plaintiff a text message on her cell phone. Plaintiff and Ruffin exchanged friendly text messages. Plaintiff and Ruffin planned to get lunch on October 8, 2013. Plaintiff alleges that Ruffin kissed her after their lunch meeting, which made her uncomfortable. When she informed him that it had made her feel uncomfortable, he apologized and did not contact her again. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant failed to protect her private information from being used by Ruffin, allowing him to obtain her contact information from her confidential file.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the following grounds: 1) it did not owe Plaintiff a legal duty; 2) even if such duty existed, Defendant had no notice of the possibility that its employee, Ruffin, was engaging in any sort of relationship with Plaintiff; 3) Defendant cannot be held liable for the independent, unauthorized behavior of its employee, as Ruffin was acting outside the course and scope of his employment; and 4) Plaintiff waived her right to sue when she signed a Release of Liability upon entrance into Defendant’s facilities.

Defendant supports its Motion with the declaration of Clark E. Smith, M.D., a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of California with more than thirty years of experience as a board-certified addiction psychiatrist. Dr. Smith states that he is familiar with the standards of care and customs and practices applicable to Defendant. Declaration of Clark E. Smith, M.D., ¶ 4. Based on his review of Plaintiff’s medical records, deposition transcript, Defendant’s policies and procedures manual, and the NAADAC (Association for Addiction Professionals) Code of Ethics, Dr. Smith concludes that Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding employee conduct comport with the customs and practices and standards of care in the industry. Id., ¶ 8.

Defendant also offers the declaration of Michael Bloom, Defendant’s owner and founder. Mr. Bloom declares that Defendant’s staff members are strictly barred from intimate or physical relationships between clients, both current and former, and are apprised of this policy before they have any interaction with clients. Declaration of Michael Bloom, ¶ 3. Defendant proffered periodic training exercises to ensure that staff members avoided untoward behavior and staff members were instructed to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Id. Prior to the incident underlying this action, Ruffin never engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a client and had been a “model” employee. Id., ¶ 6. Ruffin did not inform Defendant about his relationship with Plaintiff. Id., ¶¶ 9-11.

Lastly, Defendant submits Plaintiff’s records from her stay with Defendant, which include a document titled Pasadena Recovery Center Release of Liabilities. It is signed by Plaintiff and a staff member of Defendant’s and is dated August 12, 2013. The document states: “I, Sandi derpic [sic], do voluntarily and willfully agree to release Pasadena Recovery Center” for: 1) personal injuries while a resident at PRC; 2) accidents or personal injury incurred while out of jurisdiction of PRC staff; and 3) injuries incurred while voluntarily participating in recreational activities.

Plaintiff contends that the reasonable inference from the undisputed facts is that Ruffin obtained her personal information from Defendant’s files. Plaintiff therefore argues that Defendant breached its duty to protect her information, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 290dd-2(a); NAADAC Code of Ethics; and HIPAA regulations. Records of the identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient which are maintained in connection with the performance of any program or activity relating to substance abuse rehabilitation, which is conducted, regulated, or directly or indirectly assisted by any department or agency of the United States shall be confidential and be disclosed only for the purposes and under the circumstances expressly authorized. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a). According to the NAADAC Code of Ethics, once private information is obtained by addiction professionals, standards of confidentiality apply.

To plead negligence, a plaintiff must plead duty, breach, causation, and damages. County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318. “[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for the damage done.” Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 434. “Thus, it is fundamental that whenever circumstances are such that one person’s failure to use ordinary care in his conduct would cause a danger of injury to the person or property of another, a duty arises to use ordinary care to avoid that danger.” Megeff v. Doland (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 251, 256.

The Court finds that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care to protect her confidential information. However, the Court also finds that Defendant did not breach said duty and at all times acted reasonably and within the applicable standard of care. Thus, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant breached its duty of care and her negligence cause of action fails.

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Dated this 5th day of May, 2016

Hon. Holly J. Fujie
Judge of the Superior Court