Case Number: NC058474    Hearing Date: September 03, 2014    Dept: 93

NOTE: THE HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HEARD ON SEPTEMBER 3 AT 3:30 P.M.

Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
Department 93

SANOVA A. ANDERSON,

Plaintiff(s),
v.

CATALINA EXPRESS, et al.

Defendant(s). Case No.: NC058474

Hearing Date: August 28, 2014

[TENTATIVE] RULING RE:
DEFENDANT CATALINA EXPRESS’ MOTION TO RECLASSIFY THIS CASE TO A COURT OF LIMITED JURISDICTION

Defendant Catalina Express’ Motion to Reclassify this Case to a Court of Limited Jurisdiction is GRANTED.

Evidentiary Objections

Defendant Catalina Express’ objections to Plaintiff’s evidence are ruled on follows:
• To Novik Decl.: Nos 3, 4, 6 sustained.

• To Novik Decl.: No. 5 overruled

Factual Background

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that on February 7, 2012, she was a passenger on a boat owned and operated by Defendants, and that as a result of their negligence, Plaintiff fell and fractured her ankle. In the motion, Plaintiff claims that she has incurred medical specials of $17,315; however, as will be discussed below, there is no evidence presented by Plaintiff to support this amount of medical specials. Rather, Defendants have provided evidence that the actual amount of money paid or owed by Plaintiff or Medicare/Medi-Cal are only $2,568.59 because of negotiated reductions in medical charges accepted by the providers.

Legal Standard

CCP § 403.040 states in relevant part:

(a) The plaintiff, cross-complainant, or petitioner may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to amend the initial pleading. The defendant or cross-defendant may file a motion for reclassification within the time allowed for that party to respond to the initial pleading. The court, on its own motion, may reclassify a case at any time. A motion for reclassification does not extend the moving party’s time to amend or answer or otherwise respond. The court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification, regardless of any fault or lack of fault, if the case has been classified in an incorrect jurisdictional classification.

(b) If a party files a motion for reclassification after the time for that party to amend that party’s initial pleading or to respond to a complaint, cross-complaint, or other initial pleading, the court shall grant the motion and enter an order for reclassification only if both of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The case is incorrectly classified.

(2) The moving party shows good cause for not seeking reclassification earlier.

The appropriate standard for determining whether a matter must be reclassified for failing to meet the jurisdictional threshold for the amount of recovery is not whether damages “realistically” will exceed the threshold, but rather whether it is possible that the damages will exceed the jurisdictional limit. (See Maldonado v. Superior Court of Orange County (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 402 (“the trial court looks to the possibility of a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict, not to its probability.”); see also Walker v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270 (“the [trial] court may believe it highly unlikely that plaintiff will recover the amount demanded, but this is not enough to defeat jurisdiction, unless it appears to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover the amount [of the] demand.”); see also Ytuarte v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 278-79.)

Discussion

Plaintiff’s medical specials are limited to the amount her medical providers have accepted in payment for her treatment. (See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541.) As the court held in Howell: “We hold, therefore, that an injured plaintiff whose medical expenses are paid through private insurance may recover as economic damages no more than the amounts paid by the plaintiff or his or her insurer for the medical services received or still owing at the time of trial.” (Id. at 566.)
In this case, Plaintiff contends that she has incurred past medical expenses of $17,351.00, but presents no evidence to support this figure. (Opp., p. 19-28.) Defendant Catalina Express presents evidence that Plaintiff’s medical expenses are limited to $2,568.59. (Motion, West Decl. (“West Decl.”) ¶¶3-6.) (Reply, p. 3:15-24; West Decl. (“West Decl.”), Exhs. 1-12.) This amount includes all payments made by Medicare/Medi-Cal, all balances owed, and the Los Angeles Fire Department Ambulance bill for $1005.50, which has not yet been paid or adjusted. (Id.)

Further, Plaintiff has not made an adequate showing that Plaintiff’s general damages will raise the total value of her case beyond $25,000.00. Plaintiff’s injury was on February 7, 2014, and she was almost fully recovered by August 2012. (Motion, Forman Decl. (“Forman Decl.”) ¶¶4-6.) Indeed, Plaintiff was fully recovered within one year of her accident and has no current disability or deficit in her injured ankle. (Forman Decl. ¶¶4-8.) Plaintiff is not claiming any lost wages or lost future earnings.
It is correct, as Plaintiff argues, that there is no standard for determining general damages. Reasonableness is the only limit on the amount of pain and suffering damages. (Cal. Civil Code §, 3359; CACI 3905A) No definite standard or formula is prescribed by law to fix reasonable pain and suffering compensation, and the law does not permit opinion testimony on the amount of such reasonable compensation, and argument urging a particular calculation or amount cannot be considered evidence. (Loth v. Truck-A-Way Corp. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 757, 764-768.) However, to say that the Court cannot find to a legal certainty the general damages will not raise the value of a case above the jurisdictional is to preclude the Court from ever granting a motion to transfer in a personal injury action. This is not reasonable.

The cases relied on by Plaintiff are distinguishable. In Maldonado v. Superior Court of Orange County, the plaintiff’s medical expenses exceeded $7,000.00 and an expert opined the plaintiff might need surgery in the future. ((1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 402.) Singer v. Superior Court is likewise distinguishable, as there was evidence in that case that the plaintiff lost earnings in excess of $25,000.00 ((1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) In order to recover more than the jurisdictional limit, Plaintiff would have to be awarded general damages in excess of $22,000.00.

To a legal certainty, she will not be awarded more than $22,000.00 in pain and suffering for a mild ankle injury for which she only suffered several months of disability and has no current complaints.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

DATED: August 28, 2014
_________________________
Hon. Gail Ruderman Feuer
Judge of the Superior Court