Case Name: Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. v. Rajaraman, et al.
Case No.: 2015-1-CV-275167

This is a property dispute. Plaintiff Santa Clara Valley Water District (“Plaintiff” or “District”) owns real property along Calabazas Creek in Saratoga. (See complaint, ¶ 1.) Defendants Raja and Charu Rajaraman (collectively, “the Rajaramans”), Marc P. and Caroline M. Schuyler (collectively, “the Schuylers”) and Mohammad Reza Safa (“Safa”) (collectively, with the Rajaramans and the Schuylers, “Defendants”) own real property on Arroyo De Arguello in Saratoga. (See complaint, ¶¶ 4-6.) Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, asserting causes of action for: trespass; mandatory injunction; and, declaratory relief. Plaintiff District moves for summary adjudication of certain stipulated issues as to defendant Safa’s affirmative defenses.

Plaintiff files a joint stipulation stating the issues to be adjudicated, and a declaration from each stipulating party that the motion will further the interest of judicial economy by decreasing trial time or significantly increasing the likelihood of settlement. (See Pl.’s request for judicial notice, exh. 1.) The motion is in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (t).

According to the stipulation:
• District filed the instant action on December 30, 2014 against Safa and the other defendants;
• On March 31, 2015, Safa filed his answer to the complaint and pled thirteen affirmative defenses;
• District owns certain real property along and adjacent to Calabazas Creek located in Saratoga;
• Safa is the owner of real property commonly referred to as 12574 Arroyo De Arguello in Saratoga;
• In November 2013, District completed a property line survey, and survey markers identifying the property line were installed, and survey maps showing the encroachments were prepared;
• District alleges that Safa has encroached upon District property by 24 feet and the encroached upon area includes a pool deck and pool equipment and extends to the top of the Calabazas Creek bank;
• District has requested Safa to remove the encroachment and return the property line to its legal location and Safa has not removed the encroachment;
• The parties dispute as to whether District can recover its real property;
• The parties dispute whether the complaint is barred by: the statute of limitations; laches; unclean hands; equitable estoppel or estoppel and detrimental reliance; and,
• For purposes of this motion, there is an encroachment on District property and the full nature and extent of the encroachment is not at issue.

(Joint stipulation stating the issues to be summarily adjudicated, pp.1:24:28, 2:1-28, 3:1-28, 4:1-20.)

District moves for summary adjudication as to:

• Safa’s sixth affirmative defense of the statute of limitations;
• Safa’s seventh affirmative defense of laches;
• Safa’s eighth affirmative defense of unclean hands;
• Safa’s ninth affirmative defense of equitable estoppel; and,
• Safa’s tenth affirmative defense of estoppel and detrimental reliance.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. (Evid. Code § 452, subds. (a)-(d), (h).)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a public entity that is a Special District created under the California Water Code. (See Pl.’s separate statement of undisputed material facts, no. (“UMF”) 1.) The District was created by the California Legislature to provide comprehensive water management for all beneficial uses and protection from flooding within Santa Clara County. (UMF 2.) The District owns its property in trust for the public to accomplish its statutory objectives and mandates, as required by law and pursuant to its mission. (UMF 4.) The District’s statutory objectives and mandates include, but are not limited to, providing a reliable and safe supply of water, enhancing waterways through restoration, erosion control measures, habitat protection, and riparian corridor protection, providing flood protection for homes, schools and business, and partnering with other agencies to provide trails, parks, and open space for community recreation. (UMF 5.) The District owns and manages approximately 275 miles of creeks and ten surface water reservoirs in Santa Clara County, all of which border privately owned real property. (UMF 6.) The District provides flood protection and management to the community within Santa Clara County by building projects and managing a flood protection infrastructure. (UMF 7.) The District also has a Stream Maintenance Program that provides the framework that balances effective and efficient maintenance of the District’s waterways with anticipated impacts on the environment. (Id.) The District’s projects have protected nearly 100,000 parcels, and the District has 18 projects to protect 25,000 more parcels over the next five years. (Id.) The District cannot accomplish its statutory objectives and mandates without access along and to District property. (UMF 8.)

Following the completion of a flood protection project in 2011, District staff addressed several unpermitted outfall pipes along Calabazas Creek. (UMF 9.) During the review, it was discovered that some properties in this area and located on Arroyo De Arguello and adjacent to the Creek had potentially extended fences and yards onto District property. (UMF 9.) In the summer of 2013, a large oak tree fell on District property behind one of the Arroyo De Arguello properties that had been fenced in by the residents as their backyard, and the tree needed immediate attention. (UMF 10.) Plaintiff contends that it could not access the tree from District property and had to access it through neighboring properties because of the unresolved encroachment. (Tippets decl., ¶ 9.) After the large oak tree fell in 2013, the District began its current effort to address any remaining encroachments along the Creek in order to prevent a similar occurrence. (UMF 11.) In October 2013, the District informed the Arroyo De Arguello residents that it intended to survey District property, and the property line survey was completed in November 2013. (UMF 11.)

Plaintiff contends that it is the owner of certain real property along the Creek, which is described in a GRANT Deed dated December 31, 1968 from Claude T. Lindsay, Inc. to Santa Clara County Flood Control & Water District, the District’s predecessor-in-interest, and duly recorded at Book 8395, page 432, in the Santa Clara County Recorder’s Office. (McAllister decl., ¶ 4, exh. 1.) It is undisputed that defendant Safa is the owner of real property commonly referred to as 12574 Arroyo De Arguello in Saratoga, which is more formally described as Lot 2, as delineated upon that certain Map entitled “TRACT NO. 3900 WALNUT LANE”, filed for record in the Office of the Recorder of the County of Santa Clara on October 24, 1967 in Book 229 of Maps, at page 25, Assessor’s Parcel No. 366-25-025 (“subject property”). (UMF 12.) The survey completed in November 2013 included a survey of District property adjacent to Safa property. (UMF 13.) Plaintiff contends that the legal property contained within Safa’s title to the subject property does not encompass District property. (McAllister decl., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff also contends that it first discovered the issue with the property line in November 2013 after the survey was completed, and discovered that there existed an encroachment upon District property adjacent to the subject property. (Tippets decl., ¶ 15.)

It is undisputed that a rear yard which comprises some Safa property and some District property contains a fence that was erected prior to Safa purchasing the property, as well as additional encroachments, most of which were created prior to Safa purchasing the property. (UMF 16.) Safa has had no communications with the District at or prior to purchasing the subject property. (UMF 17.) Plaintiff contends that Safa thus could not have relied on any affirmative conduct on the part of the District when he purchased his property. (Oneal decl., exh. 1 (“Safa depo”), pp.35:18-23 (Safa testifying that he did not rely upon anything the water district said with respect to any property boundaries at the time he purchased the subject property and didn’t have any discussions with the water district), 39:9-15 (Safa testifying that he did not receive any documentation from District concerning the property, the boundary, the fence, the creek or anything at the time or before the purchase).)

As soon as the District discovered Safa’s encroachment upon District property, District contends that it immediately requested that Safa remove the encroachment and return the property line to its legal location, which he has failed to do. (Tippets decl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff contends that it did not and has not granted Safa permission to encroach upon District property. (Safa depo, p. 40:11-21 (Safa testifying that the first time he had any contact with District was when he got a knock on the door in October of 2013); see also Tippets decl., ¶ 11; see also Water Resources Protection Ordinance for Santa Clara County Valley Water District, Article 2.2.1 (stating that “2.2.1 Encroachment Permit Required… No Person will do or cause to be done any Modification on or within a District Facility or District Easement, or use any such Facility or District Easement, unless an Encroachment Permit for the Modification and/or use has been issued and is in effect. An Encroachment Permit is not transferable unless its conditions provide otherwise”).)
Sixth affirmative defense of statute of limitations

In his opposition to the motion, defendant Safa states: “SAFA concedes that the DISTRICT’s Motion for Summary Adjudication on the defense of Statute of Limitations should be granted.” (Def. Safa’s opposition to Pl.’s motion for summary adjudication of stipulated issues (“Opposition”), p.2:11-12.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication of the sixth affirmative defense of statute of limitations is GRANTED. (See also Civ. Code § 1007 (stating that “no possession by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long continued of any land, water, water right, easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to a public use by a public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public entity, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against the owner thereof”); see also Daly City v. Holbrook (1918) 39 Cal.App. 326, 329 (stating that “[n]o rights can be acquired against the public by adverse possession”); see also Humboldt County v. Van Duzer (1920) 48 Cal.App. 640, 644 (stating that “property once dedicated, set apart, or held for a public use cannot be acquired by a private owner by adverse possession, even while its public use may be discontinued”); see also Placer County v. Lake Tahoe Ry. & Transportation Co. (1922) 58 Cal.App. 764, 783 (stating that “it is well settled that where a piece of ground is reserved for or dedicated to public purposes and, therefore, becomes public property, title thereto cannot be acquired as against the public by adverse possession and the right of action to recover possession of the same for the public purposes to which it has been dedicated is not subject to the statute of limitations”); see also City of Berkeley v. Gordon (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 461, 464-65 (stating that “Civil Code section 1007 and numerous cases decided thereunder establish that adverse title by prescription cannot be gained against a city or other public body on land that is dedicated for a public use”).)

Seventh through tenth affirmative defenses

Plaintiff argues that the seventh through tenth affirmative defenses are equitable in nature, and, there are no facts suggesting the application of any equitable affirmative defenses as it has not engaged in any misconduct in connection with the subject property that would support the application of those equitable affirmative defenses. Plaintiff indeed presents Safa’s deposition testimony indicating that he had never contacted or received any kind of contact from District until a knock on his door in October 2013—when District informed the Arroyo De Arguello residents that it intended to survey District property. (See UMF 11, Safa depo, pp. 35:18-23 (Safa testifying that he did not rely upon anything the water district said with respect to any property boundaries at the time he purchased the subject property and didn’t have any discussions with the water district), 39:9-15 (Safa testifying that he did not receive any documentation from District concerning the property, the boundary, the fence, the creek or anything at the time or before the purchase), 40:11-21 (Safa testifying that the first time he had any contact with District was when he got a knock on the door in October of 2013); see also Tippets decl., ¶ 11; see also Water Resources Protection Ordinance for Santa Clara County Valley Water District, Article 2.2.1 (stating that “2.2.1 Encroachment Permit Required… No Person will do or cause to be done any Modification on or within a District Facility or District Easement, or use any such Facility or District Easement, unless an Encroachment Permit for the Modification and/or use has been issued and is in effect. An Encroachment Permit is not transferable unless its conditions provide otherwise”).) (See Donovan v. City of Santa Monica (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 386, 394-395 (stating that “the general rule is that estoppels will not be invoked against the government or its agencies except in rare and unusual circumstances… the exception to the general rule of estoppel prevailed by reason of an innocent party’s reliance in good faith upon an affirmative act of the municipality and a change of position to the detriment of such party”); see also San Diego County v. California Water & Tel. Co. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 817, 826 (stating that “the doctrine of estoppel nor any other equitable principle may be invoked against a governmental body where it would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public”); see also City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 493 (stating that “an estoppel will not be applied against the government if to do so would effectively nullify ‘a strong rule of policy, adopted for the benefit of the public’”).) Plaintiff meets its burden to demonstrate that Safa has not relied on any affirmative act of District and changed his position due to any act by District, and that there are no unusual or rare circumstances such that justice and right would require the application of any equitable affirmative defenses. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Safa to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to each of seventh through tenth affirmative defenses. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

As to the seventh affirmative defense of laches, for the purposes of the instant motion, the parties stipulated to the fact that District owns the property and that there is an encroachment on District property. As stated by Plaintiff in its supporting memorandum, in Feduniak v. California Coastal Comm’n (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1346, the court stated that “[t]he defense of laches requires unreasonable delay plus either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.” (Id. at p.1381.) “Moreover, as with estoppel, laches is not available where it would nullify an important policy adopted for the benefit of the public.” (Id.) Plaintiff has demonstrated that there was neither unreasonable delay nor acquiescence in the act, or prejudice to Safa. Plaintiff also demonstrates that a refusal to enforce the District’s rights in the subject property would undermine the District’s ability to enforce its rights as to other properties in compliance with District’s mission, the Santa Clara Valley Water District Act and The Water Resources Protection Ordinance of the Santa Clara Valley Water District. Accordingly, as Plaintiff meets its initial burden to demonstrate that the seventh affirmative defense lacks merit, the burden shifts to Safa to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to the seventh affirmative defense of laches. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

As to the eighth affirmative defense of unclean hands, in order for such an affirmative defense to apply, there must be some misconduct by the plaintiff that “must relate directly to the transaction concerning which the complaint is made, i.e., it must pertain to the very subject matter involved and affect the equitable relations between the litigants directly to the cause at issue… so that it would be inequitable to grant the requested relief.” (Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Super. Ct. (E & J Gallo Winery) (1999) 76 Cal.App. 4th 970, 979.) Again, for reasons stated above, Plaintiff has met its burden to demonstrate that it has not engaged in misconduct and thus, the eighth affirmative defense lacks merit; accordingly, the burden shifts to Safa to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to the eighth affirmative defense of unclean hands. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

As to the ninth and tenth affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and estoppel, “four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” (City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 489.) As previously stated, District has demonstrated that it was not apprised of the facts, and did not engage in any conduct that was acted upon by Safa, or that Safa could have possibly relied on any conduct by District to his detriment as the first time he had any contact with District was when District knocked on his door in October 2013. Accordingly, District meets its burden to demonstrate that the ninth and tenth affirmative defenses lack merit, and the burden shifts to Safa to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to the ninth and tenth affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and estoppel. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(1).)

In opposition, Safa contends that Mansell actually supports its position as “[t]he same identical ‘rare and unusual circumstances’ are present here as they were in Mansell.” (Opposition, p.5:13-14.) However, Safa does not demonstrate that there are similar facts to that in Mansell that allowed for the application of equitable estoppel. Unlike Mansell, no municipality had agreed to transfer ownership of the subject property, and there was no legislative act disclaiming interest in the subject property. In opposition, Safa has not presented any admissible evidence regarding any act or misconduct by District that resulted in inequity. Safa presents a declaration from a private investigator, Don Vo, which contains a number of speculative, hearsay statements that were purportedly made by Jeannie Lahde to Mr. Vo. Objections 1-10 to Mr. Vo’s declaration are SUSTAINED. Objections 1-2 to the Lozano declaration regarding Mr. Vo’s declaration are also SUSTAINED.

Safa also argues that “the DISTRICT, by its conduct in this case of never defining its borders through inaction, has led adjoining homeowners to rely on its[] inaction to their detriment.” (Opposition, p.6:14-15.) “Call it fraud, constructive fraud, or apply whatever moniker you want, Mansell makes it clear that Equitable Estoppel will apply to reinforce justice and equity.” (Id. at p.6:15-17.) However, as stated above, District has demonstrated that it was not apprised of any facts, such that the equitable affirmative defenses would apply. Safa has not presented any admissible evidence to the contrary.

Safa also contends that “[t]he issues upon which a court must base its decision in equity require a factual determination of such disputed issues as to whether the conduct of the DISTRICT in failing to act upon its property rights satisfies the Mansell test for applying the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel.” However, again, on summary judgment, Safa is required to meet his burden to demonstrate that triable issues of material facts exist. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Safa has not presented any admissible evidence to suggest that application of the equitable defenses would be appropriate based on the facts presented.

Finally, Safa argues that there is a triable issue as to whether he received clear title to the property. However, the parties appear to agree that this is not actually an issue as the issue regarding the subject property line is not in dispute as stipulated. (See Opposition, p.9:15-19; see also Pl.’s reply brief, p.8:8-10.) Further, this issue does not affect the applicability of any equitable affirmative defense as Safa does not demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to: District’s appraisal of any facts; Safa’s reliance on any affirmative act of District and resulting change in his position due to any act by District; the existence of any unusual or rare circumstances such that justice and right would require the application of any equitable affirmative defenses; District’s unreasonable delay in addressing the encroachment; District’s acquiescence in the encroachment; or District’s affirmative misconduct resulting in detriment. As Safa has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact, Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication of the sixth through tenth affirmative defenses is GRANTED in its entirety.

Safa’s objections do not comply with Rule of Court 3.1354, subdivisions (b) and (c); accordingly, the objections are OVERRULED.

The remaining evidence to which Plaintiff objects is not the basis for the Court’s ruling.

The Court will prepare the order.