19CV345499

Sergev Firsov vs Yevgeniy Babichev et al

Currently before the Court are the following matters: (1) the special motion by defendant Ekaterina Berman (“Berman”) to strike the first cause of action of the first amended complaint (“FAC”) of plaintiff Sergey Firsov (“Plaintiff”); and the special motion by defendant Yevgeniy Babichev (“Babichev”) to strike the seventh cause of action of Plaintiff’s FAC.

Factual and Procedural Background

This action for intentional torts stems from three underlying cases: (1) a marital dissolution case, Evgeniya Kulikova v. Sergey Firsov (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 18-FL-000341); (2) a civil harassment case, Ekaterina Berman v. Sergey Firsov (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 19-CH-008591); and (3) a civil harassment case, Sergey Firsov v. Evgeniy Babichev (Santa Clara County Superior Court, Case No. 19-CH-008613).

Berman, an attorney, represents Plaintiff’s ex-wife in the ongoing dissolution action. In that case, Berman helped her client file requests for orders regarding child custody, child support, visitation, spousal support, the disclosure of documents, and attorney fees. Berman also filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order against Plaintiff on behalf of her client. Although a temporary restraining order against Plaintiff was granted, the request for a permanent restraining order was denied after a hearing on the matter.

Plaintiff has also filed several motions to modify support and visitation, requests for fee waivers, and a request for a domestic violence restraining order against his ex-wife in the marital dissolution action. Berman requested attorney fees for work done in connection with those matters.

On February 13, 2019, Berman submitted a stipulation between her client and Plaintiff for a “dissolution, status only” judgment to the court.

Two days later, Berman’s client forwarded her an email from Plaintiff, which was written in Russian. In the email, Plaintiff purportedly accused his ex-wife and Berman of lying, asked his wife who should be punished, and asked his ex-wife to choose who should be killed. In the email, Plaintiff used the word “mochit,” which has multiple meanings and can be translated literally as “to make wet” or as slang for “whacked,” “rubbed out,” or “kill.”

Berman showed the email to her mother and step-father, Babichev, to discuss how to handle the matter. They decided Berman should ask for a restraining order, and Babichev, who is fluent in Russian, translated the email so Berman could submit it to the court.

On February 19, 2019, Berman filed a civil harassment case, seeking a restraining order against Plaintiff. Berman attached Plaintiff’s email and Babichev’s translation as exhibits to her petition. The court granted Plaintiff a temporary restraining order against Plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a request for a fee waiver in the case, which was granted.

Plaintiff sent Berman another email on February 28, 2019, regarding the marital dissolution action, which distressed her. Berman then called the San Jose Police Department and provided it with a copy of Plaintiff’s email.

In late February and early March 2019, Berman told translators, Luba Chernov (“Chernov”) and Omar Kitanoff (“Kitanoff”), about her civil harassment case and obtained translations of Plaintiff’s emails from them. Berman filed the translations of Plaintiff’s emails with the court. Berman also told other attorneys in the Russian community, who she is friends with, that Plaintiff threatened her and she had a restraining order against him.

In March 2019, Berman saw that Plaintiff was posting negative comments about her on Facebook, which distressed her. Berman then called the San Jose Police Department to inform it about Plaintiff’s comments, and she was told that Plaintiff would be arrested for violating the temporary restraining order.

Around the same time, Babichev posted comments on Facebook regarding Plaintiff.

On March 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed a civil harassment case, seeking a restraining order against Babichev.

Subsequently, Plaintiff was arrested in court because Berman called the San Jose Police Department and informed it that Plaintiff continued to harass her despite the temporary restraining order. Berman also asked bailiffs to walk with her to hearings at which Plaintiff was present.

In April 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit for intentional torts against several defendants, including Berman and Babichev. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a request for a fee waiver, which was granted.

One month later, Berman sent a letter to the presiding judge and chief executive officer of the court, asking the court to revoke Plaintiff’s fee waivers in connection with the instant lawsuit and the underlying marital dissolution and civil harassment cases. Berman attached documents regarding Plaintiff’s finances, such as wage and tax forms, as exhibits to the letter.

In June 2019, Babichev filed a response to Plaintiff’s request for a civil harassment restraining order. Babichev attached a copy of a webpage owned by Plaintiff and his translation of the webpage as exhibits to his response.

Plaintiff filed the operative FAC on July 16, 2019, alleging causes of action for: (1) intentional torts (against Berman); (2) intentional torts (against defendant Department of Justice (“DOJ”); (3) negligence (against DOJ); (4) intentional torts (against Chernov); (5) intentional torts (against Kitanoff); (6) intentional torts (against defendant Kitanoff Group International); and (7) intentional torts (against Babichev).

According to the allegations of the FAC, Berman’s wrongful conduct consists of: filing fake and incorrect translations with the court; making false written statements to the court; making false statements about Plaintiff to lawyers in the Russian community; making false statements to the “translator’s community”; submitting Plaintiff’s personal financial information to the court; telling family, friends, and others about the status of Plaintiff’s cases; directing her client to lie in the marital dissolution action; filing a request for a domestic violence restraining order on behalf of her client; filing “uncompleted requests” in the marital dissolution action; sending Plaintiff “already filled forms” with the incorrect contact information for the court; talking to Plaintiff “with disdain”; delaying her client’s production of documents in the marital dissolution action; offering Plaintiff money to resolve the dissolution action and remove Facebook comments; refusing to respond to Plaintiff’s phone calls or emails in the marital dissolution action; requesting attorney fees in the marital dissolution action; “show[ing] hysterics” to the judge in her civil harassment case; and calling the police and asking the police to arrest Plaintiff.

Additionally, Babichev’s alleged wrongful conduct consists of: incorrectly translating the word “mochit” in Plaintiff’s email and submitting the translation to the court; posting false and defamatory statements about Plaintiff on Facebook; asking third parties in the Russian community to pressure Plaintiff’s current wife to have Plaintiff remove Facebook comments about Berman; posting information about Plaintiff’s arrests on Facebook; receiving Plaintiff’s financial information from Berman and providing it to the court; and translating Plaintiff’s website and submitting the copy of the website and the translation to the court.

On August 12, 2019, Berman and Babichev filed the pending anti-SLAPP motions. Plaintiff filed declarations in opposition to the motions on September 5, 2019. On October 21 and 22, 2019, Berman and Babichev filed reply papers in support of their respective motions. Plaintiff filed sur-replies with supporting declarations on October 24, 2019.

Discussion

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, Berman moves to strike the first cause of action of Plaintiff’s FAC and Babichev moves to strike the seventh cause of action of Plaintiff’s FAC.

I. Procedural Issues Regarding the Parties’ Papers

Preliminarily, the parties’ papers suffer from multiple procedural defects.

First, Berman’s and Babichev’s memoranda of points and authorities are procedurally defective because each memorandum exceeds 10 pages, but does not include a table of contents or a table of authorities. (See Cal. Rules Ct., rule 3.1113(f) [“A memorandum that exceeds 10 pages must include a table of contents and a table of authorities.”].) Berman and Babichev are admonished that all future filings must comply with the California Rules of Court.

Second, Plaintiff’s opposition papers consist solely of declarations by Plaintiff, which improperly contain arguments regarding the merits of the motions and the FAC. (See In re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 28, 30, fn. 3 (Heggie) [“The proper place for argument is in points and authorities, not declarations.”].) The inclusion of argument in declarations “is a sloppy practice which should stop.” (Ibid.) “Even at its most benign, it is a practice that forces the trial and appellate courts, and opposing counsel, to sort out the facts that are actually supported by oath from material that is nothing more than the statement of an opinion ostensibly under oath. More fundamentally, however, it makes a mockery of the requirement that declarations be supported by statements made under penalty of perjury.” (Ibid.) Plaintiff his admonished to avoid this practice in the future.

Third, Plaintiff filed sur-replies with supporting declarations in connection with the pending motions. But there is no legal authority which allows Plaintiff to file a sur-reply. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(a) provides that, “[u]nless otherwise ordered or specifically provided by law, all moving and supporting papers must be served and filed in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 1005.” Code of Civil Procedure section 1005 authorizes the filing of moving, opposition, and reply papers prior to the hearing. The statute does not authorize the filing of sur-replies. Therefore, the Court declines to consider Plaintiff’s sur-replies and the supporting declarations.

II. General Anti-SLAPP Principles

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides in part, “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

“ ‘The purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to encourage participation in matters of public significance and prevent meritless litigation designed to chill the exercise of First Amendment rights. [Citation.] The Legislature has declared that the statute must be “construed broadly” to that end.’ ” (Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 268; Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).) “The point of the anti-SLAPP statute is that you have a right not to be dragged through the courts because you exercised your constitutional rights.” (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1317.)

A. Protected Activity

Resolving the issue of whether a complaint should be stricken under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 involves two steps. (San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego State University Research Foundation (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 477, 93 (San Diegans).) “ ‘First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.’ [Citation.] The defendant meets this burden by showing the act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action fits one of the categories of protected speech enumerated in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Ibid.; Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 50-51.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e) provides that an “‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”

“The ‘principal thrust or gravamen’ of [a plaintiff’s] claim determines whether section 425.16 applies. [Citations.] The ‘ “meaning of ‘gravamen’ is clear; ‘gravamen’ means the ‘material part of a grievance, charge, etc.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.] [¶] In the context of the anti-SLAPP statute, the “gravamen is defined by the acts on which liability is based ….” [Citation.] The “focus is on the principal thrust or gravamen of the causes of action, i.e., the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct that provides the foundation for the claims. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Olive Properties v. Coolwaters Enterprises, Inc. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1175.) Thus, a defendant need only make a prima facie showing that complaint and the claims asserted therein “arise[] from” its exercise of free speech or petition rights as defined in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Governor Gray Davis Committee v. American Taxpayer Alliance (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 449, 458-459.)

In making its determination, the court “shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability … is based.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) “Courts must be careful to distinguish allegations of conduct on which liability is based from allegations of motives for such conduct. The court reviews the parties’ pleadings, declarations, and other supporting documents to determine what conduct is actually being challenged, not to determine whether the conduct is actionable. [Citation.]” (San Diegans, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 94.)

C. Probability of Success on the Merits

“ ‘If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.’ [Citation.]” (San Diegans, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 94.) “ ‘ “To satisfy this prong, … ‘the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Freeman v. Schack (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 719, 726–27; Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 934.) “The second prong … is considered under a standard similar to that employed in determining nonsuit, directed verdict or summary judgment motions. … The plaintiff may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence. [Citation.] In reviewing the plaintiff’s evidence, the court does not weigh it; rather, it simply determines whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of facts necessary to establish its claim at trial. [Citation.]” (Paiva v. Nichols (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1017; San Diegans, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 94-95.)

It is important to note the anti-SLAPP statute does not immunize or insulate a defendant from any liability for claims arising from protected activity; rather, it “provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, such claims that are meritless. [Citations.]” (San Diegans, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 95.)

III. Berman’s Motion

Berman argues that the first cause of action should be stricken because the cause of action arises of out of protected activity—the right to petition—and Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish a probability of success on the merits of his cause of action.

With respect to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Berman argues that the acts underlying Plaintiff’s first cause of action fit the categories of protected activities set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1), (2), and (4). Berman asserts that, notwithstanding the vague nature of the first cause of action, it is readily apparent that her alleged wrongful conduct is comprised of statements and conduct at, or in connection with, the underlying judicial proceedings. Berman points out that she obtained and filed translations, made statements to the court, and called the police in connection with her civil harassment case against Plaintiff. Berman also notes that she filed the request for a domestic violence restraining order, made statements to the court, submitted Plaintiff’s financial documents as exhibits, directed her client to make statements to the court, took actions regarding discovery, exchanged documents with Plaintiff, and requested attorney fees in connection with the marital dissolution action.

As Berman points out, the specific nature of the first cause of action is vague as it references multiple different intentional torts (i.e., false imprisonment, defamation, fraud, “confidence,” and intentional infliction of emotional distress). Nonetheless, as Berman persuasively argues, it is clear that the vast majority of the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct consists of statements and conduct at, or in connection with, the underlying judicial proceedings. (See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 (Navellier) [“The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability-and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.”].)

Specifically, making statements to others, such Babichev, while evaluating legal action against Plaintiff, obtaining and filing translations of Plaintiff’s email with the court, making statements to translators about Plaintiff’s conduct (i.e., Chernov and Kitanoff) and obtaining translations from them, and “show[ing] hysterics” to the judge all constitute statements, writings, and/or communicative conduct at, or in connection with, Berman’s civil harassment case. (See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115 (Briggs) [the constitutional right to petition includes filing litigation, prosecuting litigation, testifying, and making statements preparatory to or in anticipation of judicial proceedings]; see also Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 28, 35 (Rohde) [statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute]; Ludwig v. Super. Ct. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 8, 19–20 (Ludwig) [Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 extends to “any act … in furtherance of … the … right to petition ….”].)

Similarly, Berman’s calls to the police and requests that the police arrest Plaintiff were made in anticipation of judicial proceedings (i.e., the civil harassment action) and in connection with that action (i.e., the maintenance and Plaintiff’s purported violation of the temporary restraining order). (See Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 941 [“The law is that communications to the police are within SLAPP.”]; see also Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1286 [statements made to police in response to perceived wrongdoing for the purpose of garnering police assistance are within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute]; Chabak v. Monroy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1512; Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1570.)

Next, filing a request for a domestic violence restraining order on behalf of her client, submitting Plaintiff’s financial information to the court, delaying the production of documents, sending Plaintiff “already filled forms” with the incorrect contact information for the court, filing “uncompleted requests” with the court, discussing settlement, directing her client to make certain statements to the court, refusing to respond to Plaintiff’s phone calls or emails, and requesting attorney fees all constitute statements, writings, and/or communicative conduct at, or in connection with, the marital dissolution action. (See Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1115 [the constitutional right to petition includes filing litigation, prosecuting litigation, testifying, and making statements preparatory to or in anticipation of judicial proceedings]; see also Rohde, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 35 [statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute]; Ludwig, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 19–20 [Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 extends to “any act … in furtherance of … the … right to petition ….”].)

Lastly, although Plaintiff also alleges that Berman made statements that do not appear to be in furtherance of the right to petition—such as making false statements about Plaintiff to lawyers in the Russian community, telling family, friends, and others about the status of Plaintiff’s cases, and talking to Plaintiff “with disdain”—Plaintiff expressly alleges that his damages only were caused by Berman’s statements in court that were used to receive the temporary domestic violence restraining order and civil harassment restraining order. (FAC, p. 8, ¶ 3.) Thus, the gravamen of the first cause of action is that Berman made statements or writings at, or in connection with, the marital dissolution and civil harassment cases that allegedly caused Plaintiff harm. (See Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1167–1168 (Fremont) [the court looks to the conduct that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s harm to determine the gravamen of the cause of action].) For these reasons, the first cause of action for intentional torts arises from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. (See ibid.)

With respect to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to establish a probability of success on the merits. Plaintiff does not submit a memorandum of points and authorities or otherwise present any reasoned argument addressing the nature of the first cause of action, identifying the elements of his claim, or explaining how admissible evidence supports each and every element of his cause of action. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie) [“When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”]; see also Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612, 619, fn. 2 (Schaeffer) [same].) Moreover, as stated above, Plaintiff’s opposition consists solely of his declaration, which is largely comprised of inadmissible hearsay and argumentative statements of opinion. (See People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674 (Sanchez) [discussing inadmissible hearsay statements]; see also Heggie, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 30, fn. 3 [discussing inadmissible statements of opinion].) Once the inadmissible statements are disregarded, the few remaining statements that are arguably admissible are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case for any legally cognizable cause of action.

Accordingly, Berman’s special motion to strike the first cause of action is GRANTED.

IV. Babichev’s Motion

Babichev argues that the seventh cause of action should be stricken because the cause of action arises of out of protected activity—the right to petition—and Plaintiff cannot meet his burden to establish a probability of success on the merits of his cause of action.

With respect to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Babichev argues that the acts underlying Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action fit the categories of protected activities set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1), (2), and (4). Babichev asserts that, notwithstanding the vague nature of the seventh cause of action, it is readily apparent that his alleged wrongful conduct is comprised of statements and conduct at, or in connection with, the underlying judicial proceedings. Babichev points out that he translated Plaintiff’s email and made statements to the court regarding Plaintiff’s email in connection with Berman’s civil harassment case. Babichev also notes that he filed a response to Plaintiff’s request for a restraining order against him, which included a copy and translation of Plaintiff’s website, and allegedly submitted Plaintiff’s financial information to the court in connection with Plaintiff’s civil harassment case.

As Babichev points out, the specific nature of the seventh cause of action is vague as it references multiple different intentional torts (i.e., defamation, fraud, “confidence,” and copyright infringement). Nonetheless, as Babichev persuasively argues, it is clear that the vast majority of the allegedly wrongful and injury-producing conduct consists of statements and conduct at, or in connection with, the underlying judicial proceedings. (See Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th 82, 92 [“The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her asserted liability-and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.”].)

Specifically, translating Plaintiff’s email and submitting the translation to the court, receiving Plaintiff’s financial information from Berman and providing it to the court, and translating Plaintiff’s website and submitting the copy of the website and the translation to the court all constitute statements, writings, and/or communicative conduct at, or in connection with, the civil harassment actions. (See Briggs, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1115 [the constitutional right to petition includes filing litigation, prosecuting litigation, testifying, and making statements preparatory to or in anticipation of judicial proceedings]; see also Rohde, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 35 [statements, writings and pleadings in connection with civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute]; Ludwig, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 19–20 [Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 extends to “any act … in furtherance of … the … right to petition ….”].)

Although Plaintiff also alleges that Babichev made statements that do not appear to be in furtherance of the right to petition—such as posting information false and defamatory statements about Plaintiff on Facebook and asking third parties in the Russian community to pressure Plaintiff’s current wife to have Plaintiff remove Facebook comments about Berman—Plaintiff expressly alleges that his damages only were caused by the fact that his translation was used in court to obtain a temporary restraining order. (FAC, p. 52, ¶ 3.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s injuries—his arrest, time spent in jail, loss of bail money, lost work for the day, and loss of future employment—allegedly resulted from the court orders issued in the underlying cases. Thus, the gravamen of the first cause of action is that Babichev made statements or writings at, or in connection with, the civil harassment cases that allegedly caused Plaintiff harm. (See Fremont, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1167–1168 [the court looks to the conduct that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s harm to determine the gravamen of the cause of action].) For these reasons, the seventh cause of action for intentional torts arises from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. (See ibid.)

With respect to the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to establish a probability of success on the merits. Plaintiff does not submit a memorandum of points and authorities or otherwise present any reasoned argument addressing the nature of the seventh cause of action, identifying the elements of his claim, or explaining how admissible evidence supports each and every element of his cause of action. (Badie, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at pp. 784-785 [“When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”]; see also Schaeffer, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 619, fn. 2 [same].) Moreover, as stated above, Plaintiff’s opposition consists solely of his declaration, which is largely comprised of inadmissible hearsay and argumentative statements of opinion. (See Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 674 [discussing inadmissible hearsay statements]; see also Heggie, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 30, fn. 3 [discussing inadmissible statements of opinion].) Once the inadmissible statements are disregarded, the few remaining statements that are arguably admissible are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case for any legally cognizable cause of action.

Accordingly, Babichev’s special motion to strike the seventh cause of action is GRANTED.