Case Name: Sergio Rodriguez v. Najam Ahmad, et al.
Case No.: 1-12-CV-230817

Defendant Najam Ahmad (“Defendant”) brings a motion to strike the punitive damages claim from the first amended complaint (“FAC”) of plaintiff Sergio Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) on the ground that it is an irrelevant and improper matter. (See Code Civ. Proc. [“CCP”], § 436, subd. (a).)

Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED. (See Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1) [malice includes “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others”]; see also Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 [punitive damages claim must be supported by factual allegations].)

In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 (“Taylor”), the California Supreme Court concluded that the act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated may constitute an act of malice under Civil Code section 3294. (Taylor, supra, at pp. 897-898 [“[o]ne who wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed, reasonably may be held to exhibit a conscious disregard of the safety of others”].) In 1987, the Legislature amended the definition of “malice” by requiring proof that the defendant’s conduct is “despicable” and “willful.” (See Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 5, p. 5780.)

Defendant contends that Taylor is distinguishable because the complaint alleged that the defendant was an alcoholic who had been arrested several times for drunk driving. However, the Taylor court explained that “while a history of prior arrests, convictions and mishaps may heighten the probability and foreseeability of an accident, . . . these aggravating factors [are not] essential prerequisites to the assessment of punitive damages in drunk driving cases.” (Taylor, supra, at p. 896.) Furthermore, even after the definition of malice was amended to require that the conduct be despicable, those aggravating factors are not necessary to plead malice. (See Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1211-1212, n.14.) Thus, Defendant’s argument is unavailing.

Defendant further argues that Plaintiff will not be able to prove that Defendant was intoxicated, but Plaintiff’s ability to prove his allegations is of no consequence. (See CCP, § 437, subd. (a) [grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or from any judicially noticeable matter].) Defendant’s assertion is therefore not well-taken. The FAC alleges that Defendant consumed alcohol before driving on July 25, 2011, was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of drinking before getting behind the wheel of an automobile, and consciously and deliberately disregarded the risks posed by driving under the influence of alcohol. (FAC, p. 6 at ¶ EX-2.) These facts are sufficient to support the claim that Defendant’s conduct was despicable and carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.