Case Name: Shahir Ghaffari v. John H. Sanford, Jr.
Case No.: 17-CV-310287

Currently before the Court is the motion by defendant John H. Sanford, Jr. (“Defendant”) for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff Shahir Ghaffari’s (“Plaintiff”) first amended complaint (“FAC”).

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a limited civil action for negligence. Plaintiff filed his original complaint against Defendant on April 17, 2017. In June 2017, Defendant filed a motion to strike the complaint. Plaintiff opposed the motion. The matter proceeded to hearing on July 11, 2017. According to the minute order from the hearing, the tentative ruling—granting the motion to strike with leave to amend—was not contested. Consequently, the Court adopted its tentative ruling.

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC against Defendant on July 17, 2017, alleging causes of action for: (1) negligence per se under Vehicle Code sections 23103, 23153, and 22350; and (2) negligence.

In the first cause of action for negligence per se Plaintiff alleges that “the violation of California Vehicle Code Section 23153 by [Defendant] was a substantial factor in causing [his] vehicle damages.” (FAC, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “was driving recklessly at the time of the collusion [sic] in violation of Vehicle Code Section 23103.” (Id. at ¶ 3, emphasis omitted.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that “the violation of … Vehicle Code Section 22350 by [Defendant] was a substantial factor in causing damages to [his] vehicle.” (Id. at ¶ 4, emphasis omitted.)

In the second cause of action for negligence, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owed a duty of care to him to “lease manage, maintain, control, entrust, and operate the Subject Vehicle in a reasonable manner.” (FAC, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “carelessly, grossly negligently, and recklessly, leased, managed, maintained, controlled, entrusted, and operated the Subject Vehicle so as to directly, legally, and proximately cause the same collusion [sic] and damages into [his] Vehicle.” (Id. at ¶ 8.)

After pleading the first and second causes of action, Plaintiff sets forth facts “common to all causes of action.” (FAC, ¶¶ 10-17.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that “the collusion [sic] incident occurred on April 21, 2016 … .” (Id. at ¶ 10.) On the day of the incident, Defendant identified Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. as the insurer of his rental vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff was allegedly unable to resolve the matter with “the insurer” and, therefore, filed an action in small claims court. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-14.) Thereafter, Plaintiff allegedly received a note from Sedgwick, providing that it was not the owner of the vehicle driven by Defendant or “the insurer/insurance company/carrier/provider.” (Id. at ¶ 15.) Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that “both [the] Small Claim court Judge and the Sedgwick representative agreed that … Sedgwick was not the insurer of Defendant[’s] rental vehicle, and [he] must have [Defendant] as the Defendant to the case rather than Sedgwick.” (Id. at ¶ 16.)

Finally, after setting forth facts common to the first and second causes of action, Plaintiff includes legal arguments challenging Defendant’s motion to strike the complaint. (FAC, pp. 4:9-5:13.)

In August 2017, Defendant filed a motion to strike portions of the FAC. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. The Court granted Defendant’s motion, without leave to amend, on December 15, 2017. As a result of the December 15, 2017 order, the following portions of the FAC were stricken: (1) the entirety of the first cause of action for negligence per se (i.e., paragraphs 1-5 of the FAC); (2) paragraphs 8-17 of the FAC; (3) the “entirety of the sections entitled respectively ‘IV. Legal Standard[ ] and V. Plaintiff’s Exhibit List’ ”; (4) paragraph 2 of the Prayer for Relief; (5) “[t]he entirety of the paragraph marked MV-2 (f) on the form complaint page labeled ‘1 Cause of Action-Motor Vehicle’ ”; and (6) “[t]he entirety of the form complaint attachment labeled as ‘2 Cause of Action-Breach of Contract.’ ” (December 15, 2017 Order, p. 2:4-17.)

On April 18, 2018, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff filed papers in opposition to the motion on May 7, 2018. The next day, Defendant filed a reply. On May 21, 2018, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply.

Discussion

Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the FAC on the ground that the pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.

I. Legal Standard

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer. (Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 548; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999; Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254 (Shea).) A defendant can move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that (1) the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint and/or (2) the complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).) “The grounds for the motion must appear on the face of the complaint, and in any matters subject to judicial notice. [Citation.] The court accepts as true all material factual allegations, giving them a liberal construction, but it does not consider conclusions of fact or law, opinions, speculation, or allegations contrary to law or judicially noticed facts. [Citations.]” (Shea, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1254; Kapsimallis v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 667, 672.)

Notably, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is directed to the FAC as a whole, as opposed to individual causes of action. A motion for judgment on the pleadings directed to the pleading as a whole will be granted only when all counts are defective; if one count is good, the motion will be denied. (See Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298 [on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court examines the complaint and determines whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any theory]; see also Warren v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 24, 29 [holding, in the contest of a demurrer, that a judgment of dismissal based upon demurrers attacking the complaint as a whole could be affirmed only if no count of the complaint stated facts sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to relief on any theory].)

II. Analysis

Defendant argues that the Court should strike the FAC in its entirety because “[t]he only allegations that survived [his motion to strike portions of the FAC] do not state a cause of action.” (Mem. Ps. & As., p. 4:6-8.) Specifically, Defendant asserts that only paragraphs 6 and 7 of the FAC remain viable. Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot cure the defects in his FAC because Plaintiff was not given leave to amend.

In opposition, Plaintiff does not address Defendant’s argument regarding the effect of the December 15, 2017 court order and the legal sufficiency of the remaining allegations of the FAC.

“To state a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must allege (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages or injuries. [Citation.]” (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 62.)

Following the December 15, 2017 court order, the only allegations that remain part of the FAC are: (1) paragraphs 6 and 7; and (2) paragraphs 1 and 3-6 of the Prayer for Relief. These remaining allegations fail to state a claim. Paragraph 6 attempts to incorporate by reference into the second cause of action “every allegation contained in previous paragraphs” of the FAC. However, all of the preceding paragraphs were stricken pursuant to the December 15, 2017 court order. Next, paragraph 7 states that Defendant “owned [sic] a duty of care to all reasonably foreseeable people, including [Plaintiff], to lease, manage, maintain, control, entrust, and operate the Subject Vehicle in a reasonable manner.” (FAC, ¶ 7.) Although this allegation addresses the element of duty, it does not address the elements of breach, causation, or damages. Finally, paragraphs 1 and 3-6 of the Prayer for Relief merely state that Plaintiff seeks to recover general and special damages, costs of suit, statutory damages, and interest. These allegations do not address any of the elements of a cause of action for negligence. Therefore, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action.

Moreover, as the prior motion to strike portions of the FAC was granted without leave to amend, it is unclear how Plaintiff can amend his pleading so as to state a claim. Notably, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that there is a reasonable possibility that he can cure these defects by amendment. Therefore, leave to amend the FAC is not warranted. (See Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 521, 544 [“the plaintiff must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the complaint’s defects can be cured by amendment”]; see also Davies v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1097 [appellate court determined that trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend after plaintiff had previous opportunities to amend the complaint].)

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, without leave to amend.