Filed 8/18/20 Goodchild v. Mou CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SHARON GOODCHILD,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KAREN (CHIN-LI) MOU,

Defendant and Appellant.

H045654

(Santa Clara County

Super. Ct. No. 17CH007769)
LADISLAO GONZALES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KAREN (CHIN-LI) MOU,

Defendant and Appellant.

H045655

(Santa Clara County

Super. Ct. No. 17CH007757)
Appellant Karen (Chin-Li) Mou, representing herself, has filed two appeals arising out of civil harassment restraining orders entered against her pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. The orders generally restrain Mou from harassing or going near Sharon Goodchild (the manager at the residential complex where Mou lives) and Ladislao Gonzales (a maintenance person who works at the complex). Mou raises several claims against the restraining orders, including that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her based on defective service of process; the orders granted by the trial court lack sufficient evidence to support them; and her free speech and other constitutional rights have been violated. She also claims the trial court wrongfully denied her own request for a restraining order against Gonzales. For the reasons explained below, we reject Mou’s contentions and affirm the trial court’s orders.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background Facts
B.
Mou has lived for over 20 years at a condominium complex in San Jose. Goodchild is a property manager and Gonzales a maintenance person at the complex. The dispute at issue stems from an inspection of Mou’s home arranged by Goodchild and performed by Gonzales in early September, 2017. As discussed further below, following that inspection, Goodchild received several angry e-mails and phone calls from Mou. On September 11, Mou had a physical and verbal encounter with Gonzales at the pool located at the complex.

C. Section 527.6 Petitions
D.
1. Gonzales’s Petition (Case No. 17CH007757)
2.
On September 21, Gonzales filed a petition under section 527.6 seeking a restraining order against Mou (case No. 17CH007757). Gonzales described the September 11 incident, noting that Mou had approached him while he was working, called him names, tried unsuccessfully to get his cellphone, and then hit him on the chest. Gonzales stated he wanted to avoid any future confrontation with Mou.

The next day, the trial court granted Gonzales a temporary restraining order against Mou and set a future hearing date. Prior to that hearing, Mou filed a response to Gonzales’s petition generally denying his allegations. Along with the response, Mou submitted a declaration opposing the temporary restraining order. Her declaration generally disputed Gonzales’s allegations and claimed that he had physically assaulted her and verbally threatened and abused her. Mou did not assert she was inadequately served with court papers or raise any jurisdictional issue and acknowledged she was served with a “TRO” on or about September 28.

Both Gonzales and Mou appeared at a hearing on October 10. The record on appeal does not contain a reporter’s transcript for this hearing. The minute order reflects that Mou objected to the issuance of the restraining order against her. The trial court reissued the temporary restraining against Mou and set the matter for trial.

Mou also filed an ex parte application for a civil restraining order against Gonzales in the case. She stated Gonzales groped her breast, pushed her, and verbally threatened her during the September 11 incident, as well as verbally abused her by calling her names and saying she was “seriously mentally ill.” The trial court granted Mou a temporary restraining order and, at a later hearing, scheduled Mou’s request for a restraining order for trial.

As discussed further below, Gonzales’s petition and Mou’s petition were ultimately tried in a single proceeding on January 17, 2018, along with Goodchild’s petition.

3. Goodchild’s Petition (Case No. 17CH007769)
4.
On September 27, Goodchild filed a petition for a restraining order against Mou (case No. 17CH007769). Goodchild alleged Mou had sent harassing correspondence and made oral statements to Goodchild’s employer to get Goodchild fired and had left her phone messages. Goodchild stated Mou’s communications included foul language and contained false accusations.

Goodchild’s petition attached several documents, including several e-mails sent to her by Mou on September 9 following the inspection of Mou’s residence. One e-mail sent by Mou to Goodchild (copied to two other people, including Goodchild’s boss) complained about Goodchild’s inspection report and stated, “STOP lying about you believe in GOD. YOu [sic] are a LIAR.” E-mails sent later that day from Mou to Goodchild stated “go to hell. [Y]ou don’t believe in GOD, and you are a liar. No wonder you are a school drop out. On the other hand, I have a MS degree.” Mou sent more e-mails that day, including one that called Goodchild “FAT” and calling her a “LIAR” multiple times and to “GO to HELL soon and GOD will punish you!” Another e-mail stated, “Your uneducated background and gossip [sic] nature render you [sic] are totally NOT FIT for your job! AGAIN GO TO HELL!”

On September 12 (the day following the incident with Gonzales at the pool, described above), Mou sent another e-mail to Goodchild that accused Goodchild of gossiping “like old maid in the church” and complaining about Gonzales. Goodchild also noted in her petition that her phone had been “ringing off the hook” and that Mou “has a blocked number, so I am not answering those calls.”

The trial court granted Goodchild a temporary restraining order against Mou and scheduled a further hearing for October 17. Goodchild filed a proof of service using Judicial Council form CH-200 and signed by the process server that stated that the server had personally served Mou with the notice of court hearing, the temporary restraining order, and other court papers on September 29.

On October 6, Mou filed a “Declaration of Karen Mou in Special Appearance,” in which she stated that she was not properly served with Goodchild’s court papers but found a “big pile of document[s] rolled and tucked in my door knob [sic] .” In her declaration, Mou stated that she “requested the Court order her to properly serve the paper in a legal matter” and cited to the “equal protection clauses” and section 415.10. Mou did not file a motion to quash. That same day, Mou filed a “Second Declaration of Karen Mou in Opposition of TRO & Objections” that asserted various claims, including that Gonzales had sexually harassed her and alleging that Goodchild had a “history of hating” her and conspired with others to “file [a] false TRO against me.”

Four days later, Mou filed a response to Goodchild’s request for a restraining order that generally denied Goodchild’s allegations. Mou attached a document summarizing her grounds for opposing Goodchild’s petition. Mou stated she submitted this document “[i]n case” the trial court denied her “special appearance.” Mou also submitted declarations from other individuals, including one from her ex-husband that stated Mou had not done any “repeat calling.”

The trial court held a hearing on October 17 on Goodchild’s request for a restraining order against Mou. The record on appeal does not contain a reporter’s transcript for this hearing. The minute order reflects that both Goodchild and Mou appeared. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order against Mou and continued the hearing to November for trial setting.

In November, the trial court set a trial date of January 17, 2018, for both cases. The minute orders indicate that Mou appeared at the court date in which the trial court set the trial date.

The day before the trial, Mou submitted another declaration in both cases asserting that Gonzales had acted “illegally” by taking photographs and recording a conversation and alleging Goodchild “willfully conspired” with Gonzales.

E. Evidence at Trial
F.
On January 17, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on both Goodchild’s and Gonzales’s requests for a restraining order against Mou as well as Mou’s request for a restraining order against Gonzales. All parties appeared at the hearing and represented themselves. Several witnesses testified, including Gonzales, Goodchild, and Mou. Mou cross-examined witnesses, including Gonzales and Goodchild.

Gonzales testified that he had worked as a maintenance person at the complex for almost eight years. Gonzales had a history of negative interactions with Mou. Prior to the September 11 incident, Mou would come to the pool area while Gonzales worked to yell at him, sometimes “with no reason” and calling him “bad names” like “ ‘stupid asshole.’ ” Generally, Mou used the pool bathroom every day when it was open and would usually come in the morning.

Gonzales visited Mou’s residence on September 9 at Goodchild’s request to inspect for a pest problem. After Mou allowed him to enter, Gonzales inspected the residence and took pictures of areas where he saw evidence of rats. On the morning of September 11, Gonzales was working in the pool area. Mou approached him and started yelling at him and calling him a “ ‘liar’ ” and “ ‘stupid asshole’ ” and accused him of taking pictures without her permission. After she saw a phone in Gonzales’s hand, Mou got “really mad” and started “pushing” him and hitting him on the chest. He walked to the other side of the pool. Mou followed him. Gonzales left to get his leaf blower and Mou started yelling at him again. He started recording her on his phone and then left. Gonzales felt that Mou was harassing him and causing him stress and felt that because of her “suddenly my working area turns in[to] a bad place.”

Referencing the temporary restraining order in effect prior to trial, Gonzales stated Mou had not complied with the order because she had gone to his work area and had threatened him when the order was in effect. He testified that he was requesting a permanent restraining order because he was still working at the complex and felt there would be an ongoing problem with Mou. Gonzales stated he had not touched Mou’s breast or pushed her, and he did not threaten to beat her up or call her names. He also denied telling her she was seriously mentally ill or making other statements Mou had asserted in her petition.

A third party witness, who was a resident at the complex, testified that she was walking her dog on September 11 when she heard and saw Mou screaming and shouting at Gonzales near the pool area. She saw Mou pushing Gonzales and trying to get his cell phone and generally being abusive. Mou continued screaming and shouting at Gonzales for about “an hour.” The police were called. Before the police arrived, Gonzales kept trying to move away from the pool area, but Mou would follow Gonzales wherever he went. The witness did not see Gonzales push Mou or in any way physically touch her.

Goodchild testified that she had been the property manager at the complex for over 20 years. Goodchild and Mou had had negative interactions prior to September 2017, and Mou was under orders from the association governing the complex not to directly contact Goodchild. Goodchild said she had “ten tapes on file” of calls she had received from Mou that contained abusive language and threats. Goodchild used to live near Mou but decided to move “in order to eliminate some of the stress.” Although she was no longer generally on site at the complex, Goodchild continued to work as its property manager.

On Friday September 9, Goodchild received an e-mail from Mou reporting a concern about mice or rats in her house. That same day, Goodchild sent Gonzales to inspect and to document the inspection with photographs, as was customary. Following the inspection, Goodchild wrote a report to Mou about the inspection that included photographs taken during the inspection. Mou thanked Goodchild for the report.

Later that afternoon, however, Goodchild stated it was “like somebody flip[ped] a switch” and “very abusive verbal [sic] e-mails started coming through.” Some of Mou’s e-mails contained personal criticisms of Goodchild’s appearance and education level.

From September 19 through September 22, Goodchild received phone calls “incessantly,” about two to three minutes apart. The calls woke her up. Although she did not answer the calls, Goodchild stated Mou left several voicemails, at least seven of which Goodchild had saved on her phone. Certain of the voicemails included statements that “ ‘If you piss me off, I’m going to file legal charges and get you.’ ” Goodchild played for the trial court some of the voicemails that she had saved on her phone and described one call in which Mou stated “ ‘If you don’t improve your customer skills, I’ll complain about you, and once you piss me off, I’ll find a’ – sounded like ‘evil’ or ‘legal’ – ‘way to hurt you.’ ” Goodchild suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of Mou’s actions.

Mou testified that she had lived in the complex since 1994 and had known Gonzales for about four or five years. She did not yell at Gonzales but admitted she “raised [her] voice.” She generally denied Gonzales’s account of the events of the morning of September 11 and claimed that he had in fact pushed and assaulted her. Mou had not made any harassing calls to Goodchild and only recalled making “two or three” calls to Goodchild that were all “business related.” She admitted she wrote some e-mails to Goodchild, including an e-mail stating, “ ‘Go to hell. You don’t believe in God and you are a liar. No wonder you’re a school dropout. On the other hand, I have an MS degree.”

G. Trial Court’s Ruling
H.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court issued an oral ruling, finding Gonzales and Goodchild were entitled to restraining orders against Mou.

Regarding Gonzales’s case, the trial court found Gonzales “more credible and believable” than Mou about the September 11 incident. The court also credited the testimony of the third party witness who had seen and heard Mou pushing Gonzales and screaming at him. The trial court stated it “believe[d] that unlawful violence by Ms. Mou did take place,” and that “Mou engaged in [a] knowing, willful course of conduct, specifically directed at [Gonzales] that seriously annoyed him and which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.” The trial court relied on the evidence that Mou had called Gonzales a “ ‘stupid asshole’ ” on “many occasions when she was at the pool or pool bathroom.”

Regarding Goodchild’s case, the trial court credited Goodchild’s testimony that there was a “course of conduct of harassing e-mails and phone calls” from Mou to Goodchild. The trial court found that Mou’s e-mails went “over the line” and constituted harassment, stating, “I understand the idea that Ms. Mou is entitled to be able to complain about the manager’s conduct but not in the way that I see in the e-mails.” The trial court found the e-mails, “especially insults and other comments that were made by Ms. Mou in the e-mails,” would cause a reasonable person to feel substantial emotional distress and did actually cause Goodchild to experience substantial emotional distress. The trial court explained that “overall, taking into totality all of the calls and e-mails that occurred in September of 2017, coupled with the ones that happened before,” it found that the evidence showed “a knowing, willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarm[s], annoys, or harasses [Goodchild], and which serves no legitimate purpose.” The trial court granted Goodchild a restraining order against Mou.

Addressing Mou’s request for a restraining order against Gonzales, the trial court concluded that there was not clear and convincing evidence to justify issuing such an order. The trial court explained that it did not find clear and convincing evidence that the actions Mou accused Gonzales of doing had actually occurred.

That same day, on January 17, 2018, the trial court issued written civil harassment restraining orders that prohibit Mou from contacting or harassing Goodchild and Gonzales. The stay-away orders require Mou to keep at least 100 yards away from Gonzales while at the residential complex, prohibit her from going to the pool or pool restroom before noon on any given day, and otherwise require Mou to keep at least 300 yards away from Gonzales, his home, and his vehicle. The stay-away orders for Goodchild require Mou to keep at least 50 yards away from Goodchild, her home, and her vehicle and state Mou cannot “attend HOA board meetings if Ms. Goodchild is present.” The trial court set January 17, 2023, as the expiration date for both Goodchild’s and Gonzales’s restraining orders.

Mou timely appealed the January 17, 2018 orders in both cases.

II. DISCUSSION

Mou attacks on a number of grounds the restraining orders given by the trial court to Goodchild and Gonzales. Principally, Mou contends that the orders lack evidentiary support that she committed harassment as defined by section 527.6 because there was no physical harm in either case and both Goodchild and Gonzales had stated “many times” that Mou “was nice.”

In addition, Mou contends that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her in both cases because of defective service. She also argues the orders are unnecessary because neither Gonzales nor Goodchild has complained further about her conduct. In addition, Mou maintains that the orders infringe on her constitutional rights including her right to free speech. Mou also argues the trial court should have granted her own petition for a restraining order against Gonzales. Neither Goodchild nor Gonzales has participated in these appeals.

Before examining the merits of Mou’s contentions, we briefly set out the general principles guiding our review of the section 527.6 orders.

A. Section 527.6 and Standard of Review
B.
Section 527.6 is an antiharassment law that provides “quick, injunctive relief” for a victim of harassment. (Yost v. Forestiere (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 509, 520 (Yost).) It “was enacted ‘to protect the individual’s right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by the California Constitution.’ ” (Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1412 (Brekke).)

Section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1) provides that “[a] person who has suffered harassment as defined in subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this section.” The statute defines harassment as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) By its plain terms, therefore, section 527.6 defines harassment as “either (1) unlawful violence, (2) a credible threat of violence, or (3) a course of conduct. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).).” (Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 502 (Harris).) “ ‘Unlawful violence’ ” is defined as “any assault or battery, or stalking as prohibited in Section 646.9 of the Penal Code, but does not include lawful acts of self-defense or defense of others.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(7).) “ ‘Course of conduct’ ” is defined as a “pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail, facsimile, or email. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’ ” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) At the hearing on a petition under section 527.6, the judge “shall receive any testimony that is relevant, and may make an independent inquiry. If the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).)

“We review the trial court’s decision to grant the restraining order for substantial evidence. [Citation.] ‘The appropriate test on appeal is whether the findings (express and implied) that support the trial court’s entry of the restraining order are justified by substantial evidence in the record. [Citation.] But whether the facts, when construed most favorably in [petitioner’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil harassment under section 527.6, and whether the restraining order passes constitutional muster, are questions of law subject to de novo review.’ ” (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.)

C. Personal Jurisdiction
D.
We first address Mou’s threshold claim that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her in both cases because of defective service of process. Mou argues that in Goodchild’s case she was not personally served with the “summons and complaint,” and the trial court wrongfully denied her “special appearance” to challenge the “illegal proof of service.” In both cases, Mou contends that she was not properly served because the server did not inform her that she was being served with court papers.

Legal Principles

Section 527.6, subdivision (m), requires that a respondent be “personally served with a copy of the petition, temporary restraining order, if any, and notice of hearing of the petition.” Relating to personal service of the restraining order issued after hearing, section 527.6, subdivision (q)(1), provides that “[i]f a respondent named in a restraining order issued after a hearing has not been served personally with the order but has received actual notice of the existence and substance of the order through personal appearance in court to hear the terms of the order from the court, additional proof of service is not required for enforcement of the order.” (§ 527.6, subd. (q)(1).)

“ ‘On review, the question of jurisdiction is, in essence, one of law. When the facts giving rise to jurisdiction are conflicting, the trial court’s factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Even then, we review independently the trial court’s conclusions as to the legal significance of the facts. [Citations.] When the jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, the question of whether the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is purely a legal question that we review de novo.’ ” (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.)

A general appearance by a party satisfies the requirement of personal service of summons on such party. (§ 410.50.) “A defendant submits to the court’s jurisdiction by making a general appearance in an action and thereby waives the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] ‘ “A general appearance occurs when the defendant takes part in the action or in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.” [Citation.] Such participation operates as consent to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the proceeding. “Unlike jurisdiction of the subject matter[,] . . . jurisdiction of the person may be conferred by consent of the person, manifested in various ways” including a “general appearance.” [Citations.] By generally appearing, a defendant relinquishes all objections based on lack of personal jurisdiction or defective process or service of process.’ ” (ViaView, Inc. v. Retzlaff (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 198, 210 (ViaView).)

Although a general appearance satisfies the requirement of personal service, a defendant may file a motion to quash under subdivision (e)(1) of section 418.10, and “may move to quash coupled with any other action without being deemed to have submitted to the court’s jurisdiction.” (Roy v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 337, 345.) A section 418.10 motion to quash is the exclusive procedure for challenging personal jurisdiction at the outset of litigation and is “essential.” (Ibid.)

More generally, appealed judgments and orders are presumed correct, and error must be affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Mou must present an adequate record demonstrating purported error by the trial court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) This court must hold a self-represented litigant to the same procedural rules as an attorney. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)

5. Analysis
6.
Mou asserts that she was not properly served in both cases. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Mou was not properly served in one or both cases, the trial court gained personal jurisdiction over Mou based on her own conduct. Mou never filed a motion to quash pursuant to section 418.10 in either Goodchild’s or Gonzales’s case, and she personally appeared in both cases. Therefore, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over her.

Mou made a general appearance in Goodchild’s case as early as October 6, when she submitted her opposition to the merits of Goodchild’s petition and thereafter actively litigated the case on the merits. In Gonzales’s case, Mou generally appeared from the outset, including by seeking affirmative relief in the form of a restraining order against him, and therefore has relinquished any claim based on defective service of process. (ViaView, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 210.) By appearing before the trial court in both cases and by failing to make a motion to quash, Mou forfeited any objections to insufficient service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction.

E. Evidence Supporting Restraining Orders Protecting Gonzales and Goodchild
F.
Mou asserts that the trial court’s conclusions that she engaged in unlawful harassment of Gonzales and Goodchild lack evidence. For the reasons explained below, we disagree.

When issuing an order prohibiting harassment, a trial court must find by “clear and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists.” (§ 527.6, subd. (i).) The California Supreme Court has recently clarified that, when there is a finding that involves the clear and convincing evidence standard in the trial court, the appellate court must adjust its analysis to reflect the higher standard demanded by this standard of proof. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989 (O.B.).) In O.B., the California Supreme Court held that “the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1011–1012.) We have reviewed under this standard the evidence heard by the trial court.

1. Substantial Evidence of Unlawful Violence Against Gonzales
2.
Regarding Gonzales’s case, we conclude there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that it was highly probable that Mou committed unlawful violence, as defined by section 527.6, against Gonzales. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) The trial court credited both Gonzales’s and the third party witness’s testimony that Mou pushed Gonzales and verbally insulted him. Based on this testimony, the trial court had before it substantial evidence of Mou’s commission of unlawful violence.

Mou argues that the September 11 incident was “fake,” only involved a verbal confrontation, and outright accuses Gonzales of lying. With these arguments, Mou implicitly asks us to reweigh the evidence—an authority we do not possess. “[A]n appellate court reviewing a finding made pursuant to the clear and convincing standard does not reweigh the evidence itself. In assessing how the evidence reasonably could have been evaluated by the trier of fact, an appellate court reviewing such a finding is to view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below; it must indulge reasonable inferences that the trier of fact might have drawn from the evidence; it must accept the fact finder’s resolution of conflicting evidence; and it may not insert its own views regarding the credibility of witnesses in place of the assessments conveyed by the judgment.” (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1008.)

We also reject Mou’s argument that the trial court should have required Gonzales to make an evidentiary showing that Mou engaged in a “course of conduct” of harassment in addition to “unlawful violence.” Her argument misunderstands the requirements of section 527.6. “There is no requirement that the trial court must find harassment based on two out of the three circumstances described under section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3).” (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.)

For these reasons, we decide there is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mou engaged in unlawful violence constituting harassment under section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3), against Gonzales.

3. Substantial Evidence of Harassment of Goodchild
4.
We also conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that it was highly probable that Mou harassed Goodchild. The trial court concluded Goodchild had established Mou engaged in a “course of conduct of harassing e-mails and phone calls” against her. The trial court explained that “overall, taking into totality all of the calls and e-mails that occurred in September of 2017, coupled with the ones that happened before,” it found that the evidence showed “a knowing, willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarm[s], annoys, or harasses [Goodchild], and which serves no legitimate purpose.” Substantial evidence in the record supports these conclusions.

Mou appears to claim that the evidence showed only a “single incident” involving Goodchild which is insufficient to meet the “course of conduct” requirement. (See Leydon v. Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 4–5.) However, this argument is meritless. Keeping in mind the clear and convincing standard for the finding in the trial court, substantial evidence in the record confirms there was more than just a single incident involving Goodchild. Mou sent e-mails commenting on Goodchild’s appearance and level of education, and she made numerous phone calls that included threats such as that she would sue Goodchild.

Mou disputes that her communications directed at Goodchild were harassing and argues here, as she did in the trial court, that they were instead “business-related.” Notwithstanding her characterization of these communications, the trial court could reasonably infer from the communications themselves and Goodchild’s testimony about the content and frequency of the e-mails, calls, and voicemails that she received, that Mou was not trying to communicate about business issues. Based on the number of communications and the disparaging remarks directed at Goodchild, including negative comments about her appearance and level of education, the evidence supports that the communications were intended by Mou to seriously alarm, annoy, or harass Goodchild. This is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion by clear and convincing evidence that Mou engaged in a course of conduct of harassment against Goodchild.

5. Substantial Evidence of Emotional Distress
6.
Mou appears to claim that neither Gonzales nor Goodchild proved “substantial emotional distress” because they did not provide an “official doctor statement.” Subdivision (b)(3) of section 527.6 defines “ ‘[h]arassment’ ” as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)

Under the plain language of the statute, there was no requirement for Gonzales to show he suffered emotional distress. The trial court found that Mou had committed unlawful violence against him (based on the substantial evidence that she pushed him), not a course of conduct. The definition of unlawful violence in section 527.6 does not require any showing of emotional distress. (See § 527.6, subd. (b)(7).)

With respect to Goodchild’s case, the trial court found that Mou engaged in a course of conduct of harassment against her, which does require a showing of substantial emotional distress. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) “Section 527.6 does not define the phrase ‘substantial emotional distress.’ However, in the analogous context of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the similar phrase ‘severe emotional distress’ means highly unpleasant mental suffering or anguish ‘from socially unacceptable conduct’ [citation], which entails such intense, enduring and nontrivial emotional distress that ‘no reasonable [person] in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.’ ” (Schild v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762–763.)

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implicit finding that Goodchild suffered substantial emotional distress based on Mou’s disparaging statements about Goodchild’s appearance, intelligence, and level of education. Further, Goodchild testified to the substantial emotional distress she experienced from Mou’s conduct, including the worry that Mou would confront her physically as she had done to Gonzales, and she “was worried because how do I know that when I’m down there she’s not gonna come after me?” Notably, Mou cites no authority supporting her claim that a statement from a doctor is legally required to support evidence of substantial emotional distress. We reject Mou’s challenge to the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that Mou caused Goodchild to suffer substantial emotional distress.

7. Substantial Evidence of Threat of Future Harm or Harassment
8.
Mou appears to contend that there was not substantial evidence of future harm, a requirement for issuance of a restraining under section 527.6. A trial court may not issue an injunction under section 527.6 unless it “ ‘appears that harassment is likely to recur in the future.’ ” (Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 527; Russell v. Douvan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 399, 401.)

We conclude substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s implicit finding that Mou posed a future threat of harassment to both Gonzales and Goodchild. At the time of the hearing, Goodchild still worked as a manager for the complex at which Mou continued to reside, making it likely they would continue to interact if an order were not issued. Even on appeal, Mou continues to use explicitly disparaging language about Goodchild. Gonzales works at the complex where Mou resides. In addition, Gonzales testified that Mou continued to approach him in violation of the temporary restraining order issued by the trial court.

Having reviewed the evidence heard by the trial court, we decide substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions by clear and convincing evidence that Goodchild and Gonzales had met the requirements set forth in section 527.6 for restraining orders against Mou.

G. Free Speech Claim
H.
Mou asserts that the trial court violated her First Amendment rights by considering her e-mails and phone calls when deciding whether to issue orders pursuant to section 527.6. Mou contends she has a First Amendment right to state her opinions about Goodchild, which include that Goodchild “is fat and uneducated.” Mou also argues that the injunction “unreasonably” interferes with her “right to free speech and/or free association under the federal and state constitutions.”

Whether the restraining order passes constitutional muster, is “ ‘[a] question[] of law subject to de novo review.’ ” (Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497.) With respect to her freedom of association claim, Mou fails to provide any discernible argument or legal authority. We therefore decline to address that claim further (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill)) and focus only on Mou’s free speech claim.

The freedom of speech is not absolute. “The United States Supreme Court has ‘long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on “ ‘matters of public concern’ ” that is “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.” ’ ” (Brekke, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 1409.) “ ‘In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern’—while ‘not totally unprotected’—‘is of less First Amendment concern.’ ” (Ibid.) “When such speech—for example, as in defamation or the intentional infliction of emotional distress—causes damage, civil sanctions may be imposed because ‘ “[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Statements made on matters of a purely private concern and that were made to “ridicule and annoy” an individual are “not constitutionally protected.” (Id. at p. 1410.)

With these principles in mind, we are not persuaded the trial court’s order here violates Mou’s free speech rights. To the extent she claims that the trial court could not rely on her e-mails and communications to Goodchild to prove a course of conduct as to Goodchild because they were protected speech, she has not persuaded us that her communications were constitutionally protected. Rather, the communications were made on a purely private matter, and substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that the totality of the communications were made to harass, ridicule, or annoy Goodchild. Therefore, the trial court did not err in considering the calls and e-mails that Mou directed towards Goodchild.

Mou argues the permanent restraining order in Goodchild’s case infringes on her right to free speech. The order at issue prohibits Mou from contacting or harassing Goodchild, requires Mou to stay at least 50 yards away from Goodchild, her home, and her vehicle, and states Mou cannot “attend HOA board meetings if Ms. Goodchild is present.” The order does not regulate the content of Mou’s speech. (See R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 191 (R.D.) [describing a restraining order as content neutral because it does not “mention or explicitly prohibit” the subject of the order “from engaging in any particular form of speech with respect to [the protected person]”].)

The stay-away order relating to HOA meeting attendance does not prohibit Mou from communicating about issues related to the complex. The order does not prohibit her from making statements in other fora about Goodchild or to other third parties. Rather, the order prohibits Mou from contacting or harassing Goodchild and requires her to stay away from Goodchild, her home, and her vehicle, and to not attend HOA meetings if Goodchild is present. At the hearing, the trial court explained that it was not limiting Mou’s right to complain about Goodchild to other parties. It noted that it was not prohibiting Mou from posting on “Next Door or Yelp” about Goodchild, as such a restriction was beyond the relief that trial court could grant. The trial court told Mou, “So you need to stay away from her. You can’t attend HOA meetings if Ms. Goodchild is going to be there. You’re free to submit written questions and written suggestions and comments to the board. And you can talk with the board’s attorney, as long as you’re civil, about the best way to do that.”

When evaluating a content-neutral injunction, a reviewing court must determine whether “the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.” (Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) 512 U.S. 753, 765.) We review the restraining order to ascertain “whether it imposes no more burden than is necessary to serve its legitimate governmental interests and whether it is thus a reasonable ‘time, place, and manner’ restriction in light of the importance of those interests.” (R.D., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 192.)

Based on our independent review of the order’s terms, we decide it does not unduly burden Mou’s right to free speech. The order “serves an important governmental and public purpose—the prevention of violence and harassment, and the protection of [the victim’s] and her family’s right to safety and privacy—that Section 527.6 was enacted to serve” (R.D., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 192) and imposes no more burden on Mou’s speech than is necessary to further this objective.

The order pertaining to Goodchild is not analogous to the cases cited by Mou that involved constitutionally invalid prior restraints on speech. In Evans v. Evans (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1157, for example, the injunction prohibited the enjoined party from, among other acts, “publishing any ‘false and defamatory’ statements on the Internet,” which the Court of Appeal concluded was constitutionally invalid. (Id. at p. 1169.) The order here contains no such content-based restriction. Similarly, the injunction at issue in Smith v. Silvey (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 400, another case cited by Mou, is also distinguishable. In Silvey, the lower court had restrained a defendant from initiating certain complaints with public agencies and from contacting third parties, which the appellate court held unlawfully infringed on the defendant’s right to free speech and his right to petition for redress of grievances. (Id. at pp. 402, 406.) No such similar restrictions are at issue here.

I. Mou’s Request for a Restraining Order Against Gonzales
J.
Mou appears to argue that the trial court wrongfully denied her request for a restraining order against Gonzales. While her argument is cursory, she seems to contend that the trial court’s conclusion that there was not clear and convincing evidence of any harassment of Mou by Gonzales lacks substantial evidence. We disagree.

Mou’s briefing ignores the substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s decision, including the testimony of a third party witness who was walking her dog and observed and heard the altercation on September 11, and who did not see Gonzales physically touch Mou. Gonzales also denied that he touched Mou’s breast, pushed her, threatened, or verbally abused her. The trial court explicitly found Gonzales more credible than Mou. We have no authority to disturb that finding on appeal. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1001.)

Mou also argues the trial court erred by considering her request for a restraining order against Gonzales at the end of the contested hearing. After Mou informed the trial court about her petition for a restraining order, the trial court noted that “right now the only cases that are here are the cases where they are trying to seek a restraining order against you” but that, regarding “any cases that you have against them . . . [w]e can talk about it at the end.”

Mou did not object to this ordering of the cases but rather stated “Your honor, I submitted in November.” The trial court responded, “I’m not saying we can’t talk about it. I want to first work on those cases first, and then we’ll get to your cross-restraining order.” Later in the hearing, the trial court noted that it had confirmed that Mou’s “cross-request for restraining order against Mr. Gonzales is active and will be decided today [and] that you served him with the proper papers. [¶] So when Mr. Gonzales testifies, he’ll testify not only about evidence supporting his motion against you, he can testify about your motion against him.” Mou did not make any discernable objection to that sequencing of the testimony.

Based on these circumstances, we conclude Mou has forfeited any challenge to the order in which the trial court considered the petitions by failing to object on this ground in the trial court. “ ‘An appellate court will not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been, but was not, raised in the court below.’ [Citation.] It is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an alleged error on appeal where it could easily have been corrected at trial.” (Children’s Hosp. & Medical Center v. Bontᾴ (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 776.)

Moreover, even if were to decide her claim on the merits, we conclude she has not established prejudicial error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780.) Mou had a full opportunity to present her version of the facts and cross-examine witnesses, including Gonzales.

K. Other Claims of Error
L.
Mou makes several other claims of error in her appeals that we address briefly.

Mou appears to claim that Goodchild’s and Gonzales’s petitions should have been dismissed because the petitions failed to state a “cause of action” and there was no possibility that they would prevail on the merits of their claims because they did not allege any physical threat or physical harm. Mou does not provide any relevant legal authority for her argument. Both Goodchild and Gonzales submitted their initial petitions using and completing a mandatory Judicial Council form (see Yost, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 521), and on them they described the alleged harassment they faced from Mou. Mou does not cite to any authority pertinent to section 527.6 proceedings that supports her claim that their petitions were facially deficient.

Mou also does not provide any meaningful legal authority to support her alternative argument that the trial court should have denied Goodchild’s and Gonzales’s requests for permanent restraining orders because they had “unclean hands.” We therefore do not discuss this claim further. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)

More generally, Mou claims the trial court was biased against her and violated her due process rights and her rights under the equal protection clause. Other than her conclusory assertions, however, she fails to present argument grounded in any legal authority. Because her due process and equal protection claims again rest on bare assertions of error and do not present argument and pertinent legal authority, we decline to consider them further. (Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.) Moreover, even assuming for purpose of argument that she has properly presented those claims, we have reviewed the entire record and conclude that it does not support her attacks on the trial court’s competence, fairness, and impartiality.

III. DISPOSITION

The trial court’s January 17, 2018 orders in case Nos. 17CH007757 and 17CH007769 are affirmed.

______________________________________

Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

Greenwood, P.J.

____________________________________

Grover, J.

H045654 – Goodchild v. Mou

H045655 – Gonzales v. Mou