SHARON MEHDIAN vs. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY

Case Number: BC583740 Hearing Date: March 08, 2018 Dept: 92

SHARON MEHDIAN, an Individual,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.

Defendants.

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Case No.: BC583740

[TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dept. 92

1:30 p.m.

March 8, 2018

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University is DENIED.

Plaintiff Sharon Mehdian filed this action against Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University for damages arising out of a trip and fall over wires connected to a projector system in a classroom. The complaint contains a sole cause of action for dangerous condition of public property against Defendant.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on November 22, 2017, arguing there was no dangerous condition on the property because there was no substantial risk of injury when the property was used with due care.

The motion was originally set to be heard on February 6, 2018. On February 5, 2018, Plaintiff applied ex parte for a continuance, to allow additional time to submit an opposition. The Court granted the ex parte and continued the motion to March 8, 2018.

On February 22, 2018, in opposition, Plaintiff filed a separate statement, a compendium of evidence, and an expert declaration. On February 23, 2018, she filed a notice of errata, attaching additional evidence to the expert declaration. However, Plaintiff failed to file any memorandum of points and authorities.

A “dangerous condition” is a condition of property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property is used with due care in a manner which is reasonably foreseeable. Gov. Code § 830(a). The Government Claims Act’s definition of “substantial risk of injury” requirement for a dangerous condition on public property means that a condition is dangerous when the risk that an injury will result from the condition is substantial; a condition that creates only a remote possibility of injury is not dangerous even if the extent of injury that may occur is substantial. (Cordova v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 212 Cal.App.4th 243.)

“As a general rule, the issue of whether a given set of facts and circumstances amounts to a dangerous condition poses a question of fact.” (Biscotti v. Yuba City Unified School Dist. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 554, 558.) “Nevertheless, that question may be decided as a matter of law if no reasonable person could conclude the property’s condition is dangerous as that term is statutorily defined. In such cases, summary judgment is proper.” (Id. at 559 [internal citations omitted].) “It is for the court to determine whether, as a matter of law, a given defect is not dangerous.” (Salas v. California Dept. of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1070.)

A number of factors are relevant to determining whether a condition is dangerous. “The court should consider both the physical description of the condition, and whether there existed any circumstances surrounding the accident which might have rendered the defect more dangerous than its mere abstract [description] would indicate. Where appropriate, the court should consider not only the intrinsic nature and quality of the condition, but also other factors such as the time and place of the occurrence. Furthermore, the court should see if there is any evidence that other persons have been injured on this same defect.” (Sambrano v. City of San Diego (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 225, 243 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)

Defendant provides photos of the projector, cords, electrical box, and lay out of the classroom where Plaintiff tripped, which Defendant argues demonstrates that the cords in question were visible and obvious. (See Lake Decl., Exh. B.) Defendant also argues they were placed in an area of the classroom where students normally did not walk. (Jackson Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Mehdian Depo. 66:14-67:1.) Additionally, there had been no prior accidents. (Telles Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.) In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes Defendant has satisfied its initial burden of showing as a prima facie matter that the area was not substantially, as opposed to minimally, dangerous when used with due care.

In opposition, Plaintiff submits the testimony of her expert witness, a civil engineer, who declares “[t]he subject outlet box and unsecured cords in the classroom presented a substantial trip hazard for pedestrians exercising reasonable care.” (Rosescu Decl. ¶ 9.) His opinion is supported by various reasons which provide foundation for his opinion. See Plaintiff’s Additional Fact Nos. 5-7. Plaintiff also points to her own deposition testimony, which indicates that she was following closely behind other students were also walking in this area before she tripped and as a result her view of the unsecured cords was obstructed. See Plaintiff’s responding separate statement, Defendant’s Fact Nos. 2, 6 and Plaintiff’s Additional Fact No. 4.

The Court concludes the foregoing is sufficient to raise triable issues of material fact as to whether the condition was a dangerous condition under the circumstances described by Plaintiff, where she was following other students into a crowded room. Considering “whether there existed any circumstances surrounding the accident which might have rendered the defect more dangerous” than usual, the Court notes that the crowd entering together, which allegedly impeded Plaintiff’s view, may have rendered the area more dangerous than usual. The foregoing issues should therefore be resolved by a trier of fact.

Conclusion

Defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Dated this 8th day of March, 2018

Hon. Marc Gross

Judge of the Superior Court

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