Case Name: Shauna Renee Gutierrez, et al. v. Regional Medical Center of San Jose, et al.
Case No.: 19CV340879

I. Background

This action arises from the alleged mishandling of human remains. According to the allegations in the first amended complaint (“FAC”), Steven Ruben Gutierrez, Jr. (“Decedent”) passed away on January 16, 2018, at Regional Medical Center of San Jose (“Hospital”). Decedent’s remains were mishandled and mutilated in the days after his death such that his family could not hold an open-casket ceremony and had to cremate his remains. And so, this action was commenced by Decedent’s surviving family members (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), namely: (1) Monica Renee Ruiz (his girlfriend and mother of his children); (2) Shauna Renee Gutierrez (Decedent’s child with Ms. Ruiz); (3) Steve Ruben Gutierrez, III (Decedent’s child with Ms. Ruiz); and (4) Raymond Ruiz (Ms. Ruiz’s brother). Plaintiffs assert causes of action against Hospital, providers of medical care , and Martinez Family Funeral Home for: (1) negligence; (2) fraud; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages. Currently before the Court is Hospital’s demurrer and motion to strike.

II. Demurrer

Hospital demurs on the grounds of uncertainty and failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e)–(f).)

A. Uncertainty

Hospital demurs to the second and third causes of action on the ground of uncertainty.

A demurrer on the ground of uncertainty tests whether a pleading is ambiguous, uncertain, or unintelligible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).) “[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Reg. Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135; accord Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.) A demurrer on the ground of uncertainty “is not intended to reach the failure to incorporate sufficient facts in the pleading, but is directed at the uncertainty existing in the allegations actually made.” (Butler v. Sequeira (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 143, 145–46.) “A demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled when the facts as to which the complaint is uncertain are presumptively within the defendant’s knowledge.” (Chen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 822.)

Hospital argues the second and third causes of action are uncertain because Plaintiffs lump the defendants together such that it is unclear what allegedly tortious conduct is attributable to each defendant, including Hospital. While it is true that Plaintiffs refer to the defendants collectively and could better specify what tortious conduct they attribute to each, the Court is not persuaded the pleading is so ambiguous and uncertain that Hospital cannot reasonably respond. (See, e.g., Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) Plaintiffs allege Decedent passed away at Hospital’s facility and the timeframe in which the remains were allegedly mishandled. These allegations along with Hospital’s presumptive knowledge about its own procedures for handling a patient’s remains and collaborating with a mortuary or funeral home thereafter reflect that the pleading is not impermissibly ambiguous and uncertain. To be sure, Hospital does not cite and the Court is not aware of any authority supporting a contrary conclusion. Consequently, Hospital’s demurrer on the ground of uncertainty to the second and third causes of action is OVERRULED.

B. Failure to State Sufficient Facts

Hospital demurs to the first, second, and third causes of action on the ground of failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

In general, “a complaint must contain ‘[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.’” (Davaloo v. State Farm Insurance Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 409, 415, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) “This fact-pleading requirement obligates the plaintiff to allege ultimate facts that as a whole apprise[ ] the adversary of the factual basis of the claim.” (Davaloo, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 415 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) A plaintiff is not ordinarily required to allege “‘each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff’s proof….’ [Citation.]” (Ferrick v. Santa Clara University (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1341.)

1. First Cause of Action

Hospital argues Ms. Ruiz and her brother lack standing to assert a negligence claim based on the mishandling of remains because they do not qualify as close family members. Hospital asserts that only individuals with the right to control the disposition of remains may assert claims based on the mishandling of those remains. In advancing this argument, Hospital seems to suggest that an unmarried partner, like Ms. Ruiz, do not have the same rights as a spouse irrespective of the duration and familial or marital character of the relationship.

As a threshold matter, Hospital inaptly frames its argument as an argument about the concept of standing. In California, “[e]very action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 367.) Of course, Ms. Ruiz and her brother have the right to assert claims on their own behalf. They do not purport to vindicate rights belonging to someone else. And so, the issue is not truly whether they have standing. Rather, the issue is simply whether they suffered any injury and, thus, state any claim against Hospital.

Because Plaintiffs assert a negligence claim—and as reflected in a number of cases cited by Hospital—the real issue raised by the demurrer is whether Hospital owed Ms. Ruiz and her brother a legal duty. (See, e.g., Catsouras v. Dept. of Cal. Highway Patrol (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 856, 881–82.) At this juncture, Hospital does not provide sufficient analysis of applicable legal principles and misapplies existing precedent such that it fails establish it did not owe Ms. Ruiz and her brother a duty of care.

In the foundational case of Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, the California Supreme Court held that the class of persons who may recover for emotional distress negligently caused by the mishandling or mutilation of human remains was not limited to individuals with a statutory right to control the disposition of the remains (Health & Saf. Code, § 7100) or those who contract with a mortuary or funeral home. Instead, the Court in Christensen focused on the foreseeability of harm and a number of the Rowland factors to conclude that a legal duty was owed to “close family members who were aware that funeral and/or crematory services were being performed, and on whose behalf or for whose benefit the services were rendered.” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 875, 885–86, 894–98; see also Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 596, 605–610.) Despite acknowledging this precedent, Hospital ultimately argues that Ms. Ruiz and her brother cannot assert a negligence claim because they have no statutory right to control the disposition of remains under Health and Safety Code section 7100. Because Hospital’s argument rests on an inaccurate legal premise (notwithstanding its initially accurate summary of Christensen), its argument lacks merit. Hospital does not otherwise analyze the Rowland factors as necessary to establish no duty was owed based on the applicable standard. Also, Hospital does not explain and it is not otherwise apparent how Christensen—a case that still stands—is distinguishable in a meaningful and legally-significant way. (Compare Catsouras, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 881–84; Saari v. Jongordon Corp. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 797 [companion of decedent] with Aguirre-Alvarez v. Regents of the University of Cal. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1066; Melican v. Regents of the University of Cal. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 177–180.) Finally, it is not necessarily obvious that Hospital’s narrow definition of family is correct under these particular circumstances in light of the approach the California Supreme Court has taken when evaluating other rights of unmarried individuals in relationships of a marital or familial character. (See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660.)

For all of these reasons, Hospital does not substantiate its argument that Ms. Ruiz and her brother Raymond Ruiz cannot assert a negligence claim against it. Hospital’s demurrer to the first cause of action as asserted by Ms. Ruiz and her brother is, therefore, OVERRULED.

2. Second Cause of Action

Hospital argues the second cause of action for fraud is not properly pleaded.

The essential elements of a fraud claim are: “(1) the defendant made a false representation as to a past or existing material fact; (2) the defendant knew the representation was false at the time it was made; (3) in making the representation, the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (5) the plaintiff suffered resulting damages.” (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 792, citing Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) A plaintiff must plead these elements with specificity. (Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 644–45.) “The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.” (West, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.)

Hospital argues Plaintiffs fail to allege all of the essential elements of their fraud claim with specificity. The Court agrees. Plaintiffs’ claim rests on a general allegation that they were led to believe Decedent’s remains would be properly preserved and able to be viewed at an open-casket ceremony. This is insufficient. Plaintiffs must allege the specific facts described above to state a viable claim.

Hospital also cites Civil Code section 3294 and asserts Plaintiffs do not adequately allege ratification by an officer, director, or managing agent. But Civil Code section 3294 sets the standard for pleading and proving entitlement to punitive damages, not the standard for stating a fraud claim. As Hospital otherwise appears to acknowledge, a demurrer is not the proper procedural vehicle for challenging the sufficiency of punitive damages allegations; such allegations may be tested by motion to strike. (Grieves v. Super. Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163; see also Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 385, disapproved on another ground in ZB, N.A. v. Super. Ct. (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn. 8.) Thus, Hospital’s argument based on Civil Code section 3294 does not provide additional justification for sustaining the demurrer.

In conclusion, Hospital’s demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend after service of the signed order.

3. Third Cause of Action

Hospital argues Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

“The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: 1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct…. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 903 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)

Here, Hospital seems to focus on whether Plaintiffs adequately allege it intentionally engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct directed at them. In presenting this argument, Hospital repeatedly italicizes the word “facts.” And so, the Court understands its argument to be that Plaintiffs do not plead facts with sufficient particularity or specificity to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. But Hospital does not: clearly articulate what degree of specificity it believes is required; cite authority establishing its proffered pleading standard is correct; and provide a fair and reasoned analysis of the facts pleaded to support its position. It is not the case that the pleading is devoid of facts. And, it is not self-evident that the facts alleged here are comparable to those deemed to be insufficient in Christensen. (See Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 903–906.) In the absence of a well-reasoned discussion, Hospital does not establish the facts pleaded are insufficient.

For these reasons, Hospital’s demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

III. Motion to Strike

Hospital moves to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages and related allegations. It argues the claim for punitive damages is improper because Plaintiffs failed to seek leave to include the prayer in their complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, subdivision (a) states: “In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed.” When a plaintiff fails to seek leave to assert a claim for punitive damages under Section 425.13, the prayer and related allegations may be stricken. (Cryolife, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1150–51.) Here, although Hospital asserts Plaintiffs must comply with Section 425.13 because it is a healthcare provider within the meaning of the statute as a licensee under Health and Safety Code section 1200, it does not identify facts before the Court to establish the same. Nevertheless, the Court has no reason to doubt Hospital’s representation particularly because Plaintiffs filed no opposition to the motion to strike. In other words, although Plaintiffs opposed Hospital’s demurrer, they have not opposed the motion to strike such that they appear to concede it is meritorious. Accordingly, Hospital’s motion to strike is GRANTED. Plaintiffs must comply with Section 425.13 in the event they wish to seek punitive damages.

The Court will prepare the order.