Case Name: Burt v. The City of San Jose, et al.
Case No.: 2015-1-CV-280121

This is a putative class action. Plaintiff Shauncey Burt (“Plaintiff”) is an African-American man residing in the County of Santa Clara. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) He alleges that the San Jose Police Department has a practice of requiring African-American and Hispanic persons to be handcuffed, sit on the curb, or sit in the back of a police car during routine traffic stops. (Complaint, ¶ 1.) He alleges he was subject to three separate incidents of detention and search.

On September 8, 2014, at approximately 12:30 in the afternoon, Plaintiff was exercising at a park in San Jose. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Three officers of the San Jose Police Department, dressed in plain clothes and driving an unmarked car, arrived at the park and detained Plaintiff by ordering that he “come over here, right now.” (Complaint, ¶ 14.) The sole reason for the detention was that the vehicle Plaintiff had driven to the park did not have a front license plate and was in violation of several other provisions of the California Vehicle Code, all of which were infractions. (Complaint, ¶ 15.) During the detention the officers handcuffed Plaintiff and forced him to sit on the ground while they searched his entire vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was detained for a period of nearly one hour, while the officers rifled through his belongings, interrogated him about what he was doing in the area, and generally subjected him to the humiliation of being detained in handcuffs in front of a number of onlookers. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) The search turned up nothing; the officers cited Plaintiff for the minor Vehicle Code violations and released him. (Complaint, ¶ 20.)

On November 8, 2014, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Plaintiff was driving down North First Street in San Jose when he was pulled over by two San Jose Police Officers wearing plan clothes and in an unmarked police vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 21.) The reason given for the stop was that Plaintiff was speeding. (Complaint, ¶ 22.) The officers ordered Plaintiff out of the vehicle and forced him to sit on a curb. (Complaint, ¶ 23.) The officers detained Plaintiff for approximately 40 minutes while they searched his entire vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 24.) Plaintiff was then released without being issued a citation. (Complaint, ¶ 26.)

On March 12, 2015, Plaintiff was driving on Monterey Road in San Jose when he was pulled over by a uniformed San Jose Police Officer driving a marked police vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 27.) The officer immediately ordered Plaintiff out of his vehicle and asked whether he had any weapons. (Complaint, ¶ 28.) The officer informed Plaintiff that there had been reports of “a lot of gang activity” in the area. (Complaint, ¶ 29.) Plaintiff is not a member of any gang and was not wearing any clothing, insignias, or markings that would be indicative of membership in a gang. (Complaint, ¶ 29.) The officer ordered Plaintiff to sit on the curb while she searched his vehicle. (Complaint, ¶ 30.) Plaintiff was detained for more than 30 minutes. (Complaint, ¶ 31.) The search yielded nothing and Plaintiff was released without being issued a citation. (Complaint, ¶ 33.)

The Complaint, filed on May 4, 2015, sets forth the following causes of action: [1] Action for Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Civil Code § 52.1; [2] Action for Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Civil Code § 52.1; [3] Action for Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and [4] Declaratory Relief. Defendant City of San Jose (“Defendant”) demurs to each cause of action in the Complaint on the ground that each cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and on the ground that each cause of action is uncertain.

Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action rely on Civil Code § 52.1, which states:

If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured.

(Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).)

The first cause of action is based on an underlying violation of the Vehicle Code for failure to cite and release pursuant to Vehicle Code section 40300, et seq. The second cause of action is based on an underlying violation of the Equal Protection clause of the California Constitution. The third cause of action is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, i.e. a violation of the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution. The fourth cause of action is for declaratory relief and is based on the same allegations as the first three causes of action.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are comprised of legal conclusions and that Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing there was no probable cause for the detentions and the searches of his car. It is true that Plaintiff has alleged certain legal conclusions. For example, Plaintiff alleges each search of his vehicle was unsupported by probable cause. (Complaint, ¶¶ 18, 25, 32.) However, Plaintiff has also alleged facts regarding each of the detentions. The facts alleged do not demonstrate that the police officers had probable cause to support their actions.

For example, Plaintiff alleges the officers searched his vehicle. (Complaint, ¶¶ 17, 24, 30.) At least one of the searches, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, appears to have been a search for weapons. (See Complaint, ¶¶ 28-30.) As one case has stated, “if mere presence in a vehicle were a ground for a reasonable suspicion that a person was armed, every traffic stop would automatically support a frisk of every person in the stopped vehicle.” (King v. State (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 285.) Moreover, an arresting officer in an ordinary traffic violation case cannot reasonably expect to find contraband or weapons in the offender’s vehicle. (People v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 186, 205-206.) The facts alleged involve only minor traffic infractions, so it is not apparent what reason the officers believed they had to conduct searches of Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Defendant seems to contend that Plaintiff needs to allege additional facts on which the police officers may have based their searches in order to show that those facts do not give rise to probable cause. As pointed out by Plaintiff, however, Plaintiff alleges the officers did not have probable cause and that there were no facts giving rise to probable cause. It is not clear how Plaintiff can allege facts he claims do not exist. If Defendant believes there are additional facts supporting the officers’ conduct that have not been alleged, those facts can be presented as evidence by Defendant at a later time, such as in connection with a summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff alleges he was handcuffed and/or detained for an amount of time that could be considered excessive considering each detention was based on minor traffic infractions or simply the fact there was “gang activity” in the area. Defendant states in its reply papers that Plaintiff’s argument is based on the erroneous assumption that Plaintiff’s stop was solely for traffic violations, not for a felony, and that the conduct described by Plaintiff is standard operating procedure in felony investigations for the protection of officers. This argument is an evidentiary one that goes beyond the four corners of the pleading. Plaintiff does not allege any conduct related to a felony and on demurrer the Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true.

Defendant cites to Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959, for the proposition that a violation of the Bane Act requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself. In Shoyoye, the court found that the plaintiff in its case was inadvertently and negligently detained in jail when he should have been released. The court stated that any intimidation or coercion that occurred was simply that which is reasonable and incident to maintaining a jail. (Id. at p. 961.) However, the Shoyoye court distinguished those facts from the facts of Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, stating that in Venegas “the evidence presented could support a finding that the probable cause that initially existed to justify stopping the plaintiffs eroded at some point, such that the officers’ conduct became intentionally coercive and wrongful, i.e., a knowing and blameworthy interference with the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” In this case, it is not apparent from the facts alleged that the officers had probable cause not only to stop Plaintiff, but also to detain him for prolonged periods of time under the circumstances. Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to support his first cause of action.

With regard to the equal protection claims, “an equal protection claim contains the following essential elements: (1) plaintiff was treated differently from other similarly situated persons; (2) the difference in treatment was intentional; and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” (Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 605.) Plaintiff alleges that within the span of about half a year he was stopped and detained and in two instances handcuffed while his vehicle was searched. He alleges that at most the officers had reason to suspect certain traffic infractions. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant has a practice of subjecting individuals to prolonged detentions after a Vehicle Code violation stop based on their race. (Complaint, ¶ 34.) These allegations of an insufficient reason for a prolonged detention coupled with a practice of prolonged detentions based on race can support the finding that the reason for prolonged detentions of Plaintiff may have been based on Plaintiff’s race.

In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes to support the first three causes of action. The fourth cause of action is for declaratory relief. For the same reasons already discussed, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support the declaratory relief cause of action.

Defendant also demurs to the class action allegations of the Complaint. The Court finds that it is preferable in this instance to defer a ruling on class issues until they can be fully fleshed out in a motion for class certification. (See Beckstead v. Superior Court (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 780.)

In sum, Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.