Filed 1/13/20 Marriage of Gray CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of SHIRLEY and KEITH GRAY.

B287867

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BD610556

SHIRLEY GRAY,

Respondent,

v.

KEITH GRAY,

Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Dean Hansell, Judge. Vacated and remanded with directions.

Oliveri Law, Matthew M. Oliveri and Meghan E. Oliveri for Appellant.

Alison F. Triessl for Respondent.

_________________________

Appellant Keith Gray appeals from an order granting respondent Shirley Gray’s request to modify a spousal support order contained in a Utah divorce decree and judgment. Keith contends the trial court erred by increasing spousal support without the requisite showing of a material change in circumstances. As we explain, however, the statutory law pertaining to interstate support orders permits enforcement— but not modification—of foreign spousal support orders. We therefore vacate the trial court’s order modifying spousal support.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2006, Keith and Shirley divorced in Utah after being married for almost 19 years. On December 28, 2006, a Utah court entered a stipulated judgment, which both parties signed. Shirley was awarded assets in the divorce, including the marital home, a vehicle, and one-half of the parties’ retirement account. The judgment also obligated Keith to pay spousal support, which the parties agreed would be $3,500 per month. The support was to continue until Shirley remarried, cohabitated, or June 30, 2025.

In 2007, both Shirley and Keith relocated to California, with Keith taking up residence in Northern California and Shirley in Southern California. The Utah judgment of dissolution was registered in California on December 10, 2014.

On October 12, 2016, Shirley filed a request for order (RFO) seeking an upward modification of monthly spousal support from $3,500 to $13,000 and an extension of the 2025 termination date. On January 18, 2017—after failed attempts at mediation—Shirley filed an amended RFO seeking the same relief. She cited Keith’s increased income, her inability to work due to health problems, and her recent bankruptcy. Keith opposed the request, stating his increase in earned income was due to post-dissolution efforts and that he had no evidence about Shirley’s purported health issues. Shirley replied, reiterating her allegations and noting the cost of living is higher in California than it is in Utah.

On December 4, 2017, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court issued an order modifying the Utah dissolution judgment by increasing monthly spousal support from $3,500 to $6,500, to continue through the termination date specified in the Utah judgment. The court also ordered Keith to pay $5,000 in attorney fees to Shirley’s counsel.

This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In ruling on the modification request, the trial court concluded it had the power to modify spousal support under Family Code section 3651, because “neither party pointed to any provision in the 2006 agreement that, in any respect, limited the power the court could make such a modification.” However, section 5700.211, enacted in accordance with the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), prohibits modification of a spousal support order issued by a foreign state deemed to have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. There is no indication the trial court considered section 5700.211, or was directed to any UIFSA provisions by the parties.

We asked the parties to file supplemental letter briefs addressing whether—in light of UIFSA—the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify a spousal support order rendered by a Utah court. The parties submitted their responses, with Keith asserting the trial court lacked jurisdiction and Shirley contending otherwise. In arguing in favor of jurisdiction, Shirley makes no mention of the statutes enacted under UIFSA. Instead, she asserts, “Utah relinquished its continuing exclusive jurisdiction, or never had such jurisdiction in the first place.” As we explain, while a rendering state may lose jurisdiction over child support under limited circumstances, its jurisdiction over spousal support is permanent and exclusive.

1. The rule at issue is one of subject matter jurisdiction

“ ‘ “Subject matter jurisdiction . . . is the power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.” ’ ” (Saffer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1248.) It is conferred by constitutional or statutory law. (Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42.) By contrast, “ ‘the lack of subject matter jurisdiction means the entire absence of power to hear or determine a case; i.e., an absence of authority over the subject matter.’ ” (Saffer, at p. 1248.) Section 5700.211 confers exclusive jurisdiction over modifications of spousal support orders on the issuing state. Because the rule confers jurisdiction on one court, and explicitly withholds it from another, it is a rule of subject matter jurisdiction. (§ 5700.211; Lundahl v. Telford (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 305, 312 (Lundahl) [question of whether California had exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support is one of subject matter jurisdiction].)

An order entered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void and vulnerable to direct or collateral attack at any time. (San Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 416, 427.) Thus, it may be considered for the first time on appeal (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 225), and requires no particular procedural vehicle. (Great Western Casinos, Inc. v. Morongo Band of Mission Indians (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1417–1418.)

The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. (Robbins v. Foothill Nissan (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1769, 1774; Lundahl, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 312.)

2. The UIFSA

The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), now codified in California at section 5700.101 et seq., provides a comprehensive and efficient scheme for the enforcement of foreign support orders. All 50 states have adopted UIFSA, with California and Utah adopting it in 1997. (de Leon v. Jenkins (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 118, 124 (de Leon); In re Marriage of Haugh (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 963, 968 (Haugh); Cal. Stats. 1997, ch. 194, § 2, codified at Fam. Code, §§ 4900–4976; Utah Laws 1997, ch. 232 [renumbering UIFSA codification at Utah Code from § 78-45f-100 to § 78-45f-901].)

“UIFSA was designed to eliminate the ‘multiple support order system’ that had evolved under the previous uniform statute, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA).” (de Leon, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 124.) Under RURESA, new support orders in a sister state were deemed to be a cumulative remedy, not a modification of the original order. (Lundahl, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 317.) This left obligors facing multiple support obligations. (Id. at pp. 317-318.) In contrast, UIFSA ensures that in every case only one state exercises jurisdiction over support at any given time. (Haugh, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 968.) “The ‘cornerstone’ of the UIFSA is the concept of ‘continuing, exclusive jurisdiction,’ . . . .” (Id. at p. 969; see also In re Marriage of Gerkin (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 604, 612.)

Under UIFSA, the rules differ for spousal support and child support. With regard to child support orders, the issuing state retains exclusive jurisdiction “only for as long as at least one of the parties—the obligor, the obligee, or the child—resides in the issuing state.” (In re Marriage of Rassier (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1437 (Rassier); § 5700.205, subd. (a), formerly § 4909, subd. (a).) The issuing state loses jurisdiction over child support if all relevant parties have permanently left the issuing state, or the relevant parties expressly consent to allow another state to assume exclusive jurisdiction. (Haugh, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 969; § 5700.205, subd. (a), formerly § 4909, subd. (a).)

However, as decisional law in California recognizes, a state issuing a spousal support order has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the support order throughout the entire existence of the support obligation. (In re Marriage of Connolly (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 395, 403; § 5700.211, subd. (a), formerly § 4909, subd. (f).) Thus, “ ‘the CEJ [Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction] of the issuing State over a spousal support order is permanent.’ ” (Lundahl, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at pp. 317–318, italics added.) This rule is firmly established by UIFSA, and has been in existence since its inception. (Id. at p. 318; Connolly, at p. 403.).

3. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the Utah-issued spousal support order

In this case, a Utah court ordered spousal support as part of an original judgment of dissolution. In so doing—and under the UIFSA—the Utah court obtained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support between Keith and Shirley. (State, Dept. of Human Services v. Jacoby (Utah Ct.App. 1999) 975 P.2d 939, 945–946 (Jacoby) [Utah obtains “ ‘continuing, exclusive jurisdiction’ ” over a spousal support order issued by its own tribunals].) Utah’s jurisdiction continues throughout the existence of the support obligation and—contrary to Shirley’s suggestion—cannot be relinquished by the relocation of the parties or their appearance in a Los Angeles Superior Court. (See Rassier, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437 [noting for purposes of spousal support under UIFSA, “the residence of the parties is irrelevant as to whether the issuing court has continuing exclusive jurisdiction”]; Sampsell v. Superior Court (1948) 32 Cal.2d 763, 776-777 [submission of personal jurisdiction to a court does not confer jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action], questioned on other grounds by Robinson v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 379, 385.)

To the extent the Utah divorce decree and judgment was registered in California, that registration—consistent with the Full Faith and Credit Clause—allows enforcement of the Utah-issued support order. (See Scheuerman v. Hauk (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144; § 5700.601, formerly § 4950; § 5700.603, subd. (c), formerly § 4952, subd. (c); In re Marriage of Crosby & Grooms (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 201, 206.) It does not confer jurisdiction on a California tribunal to alter or modify the order. (Scheuerman, at p. 1144 [“although the California court must recognize and enforce a registered order, it may not modify the order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction”].) Thus, the registration of the Utah spousal support order in California for enforcement has no bearing on the outcome of this case.

Accordingly, the trial court lacked the power to modify the Utah spousal support order. If either Shirley or Keith wishes to modify the spousal support order, they must attempt to do so in the Utah courts. (See Rassier, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1434–1438 [notwithstanding passage of time and relocation of parties to California, Florida—as the issuing court—“retains jurisdiction over [the spouses] for the purpose of determining whether the support order should be modified”]; accord, Jacoby, supra, 975 P.2d at pp. 945–946 [“a Virginia court issued the spousal support order and therefore, the order could not be modified by the trial court in Utah”].) The trial court’s order in this case must be deemed void. (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 196 [“any judgment or order rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is ‘void on its face’ ”].)

DISPOSITION

The order modifying spousal support is vacated. The matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a new order dismissing Shirley Gray’s amended RFO for lack of jurisdiction.

The spousal support order contained in the 2006 Utah divorce decree and judgment remains the controlling order between the parties.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

LAVIN, J.