This case arises from a dispute regarding a stock purchase agreement under which John O’Brien agreed to sell his interest in JM Medical to Arthur Keshishyan and Jacob Tchamanian. The Cross-Complainant, John O’Brien, claims that the Cross-Defendants, Jacob Tchamanian and Arthur Keshishyan, breached an agreement to purchase 100% of the stock for JM Medical Supplies, Inc. under a payment plan and to act as general managers during the purchase period.
Trial is set for March 24, 2014.
At this hearing, the Cross-Defendant, Arthur Keshishyan, seeks an order that withdraws his admission of the Cross-Complainant’s requests for admissions. On December 20, 2013, the Court issued an order that deemed the Cross-Defendant to have admitted the requests for admissions. The Cross-Defendant’s attorney provides evidence to demonstrate that the failure to serve responses was caused when the Cross-Defendant substituted Michael Jehdian in place of his former attorney.
CCP section 2033.300 permits the Court to grant leave to a party to withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission on a noticed motion. Section 2033.300 permits the Court to grant leave to withdraw or amend only if the Court determines that the admission was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, and that the party who obtained the admission will not be substantially prejudiced in maintaining that party’s action or defense on the merits. Finally, section 2033.300(c) permits the Court to impose conditions on the granting of the motion that are just, including an order that a party may seek additional discovery and the party withdrawing or amending its response must bear the costs of this additional discovery.
Section 2033.300 eliminates undeserved windfalls obtained through requests for admission and furthers the policy favoring the resolution of lawsuits on the merits. New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 1403, 1418. Because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 2033.300 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief. Id. at 1420 to 1421. Accordingly, the Court’s discretion to deny a motion under the statute is limited to circumstances where it is clear that the mistake, inadvertence, or neglect was inexcusable, or where it is clear that the withdrawal or amendment would substantially prejudice the party who obtained the admission in maintaining that party’s action or defense on the merits. Id.
The statutory language in section 2033.300, “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect”, is identical to some of the language used in CCP section 473(b). Id. The use of identical terms in two different statutes serving similar purposes suggests that the Legislature intended those terms to have the same meaning in both statutes. Id. Moreover, the legislative history of former section 2033(m), which is the predecessor of section 2033.300, suggests that the Legislature intended “mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect” to have the same meaning in the statute as those terms have in section 473(b). Id.
The Cross-Defendant, Arthur Keshishyan, provides facts to demonstrate that he initially hired Mark Said to present him. Mr. Keshishyan provides facts to demonstrate that after he received no communications from Mr. Said, he consulted Michael Jehdian in December 2013. Mr. Keshishyan states in paragraph 4 that he first learned about the Cross-Defendant’s discovery at that time and that he met with Mr. Jehdian and served responses on December 19, 2014. Mr. Keshishyan states in paragraph 6 and 7 that he has been diligently working with his new counsel and that he would have served timely responses to the Cross-Complainant’s requests for admissions, if his former attorney had informed him about the discovery.
First, these facts indicate that Cross-Complainant’s requests for admission should not have been admitted on December 20, 2013. Under CCP section 2033.280(c), the Court shall make an order deeming requests for admissions admitted unless the Court finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response that is in substantial compliance. Here, the Cross-Defendant has provided evidence that he served responses on December 19, 2013, which was before the hearing. This alone is ground to authorize the Cross-Defendant to withdraw the admissions.
Second, these facts indicate that the requests were deemed admitted due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship between the Cross-Defendant and his former attorney, Mark Said. Since there was a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, the order deeming the admissions admitted was caused by his mistaken reliance on his former counsel or his excusable neglect in ascertaining the status of his case from his former counsel. This is further grounds to authorize the Cross-Defendant to withdraw the admissions.
Finally, there is no evidence of substantial prejudice to the Cross-Complainant. Requests for admission have the purpose of setting to rest triable issues in the interest of expediting trial. Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 618, 634. The discovery procedure is designed to uncover undisputed factual issues. Shepard & Morgan v. Lee & Daniel, Inc. (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 256, 261. Permitting the Cross-Defendant to withdraw the admissions will not result in substantial prejudice; instead, the Cross-Complainant now has to try and establish facts and issues that are disputed. This will ensure that the case is resolved on the merits, as opposed to the Cross-Complainant obtaining an “undeserved windfall” that resulted from a breakdown in communication between his adversary and his adversary’s counsel.
Therefore, the Court will grant the Cross-Defendant’s motion and authorize the Cross-Defendant to withdraw the admissions.
RULING:
Grant motion.