Sobhani Group LLC v. County of Santa Barbara
Case No: 18CV05413
Hearing Date: Tue Sep 17, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Motion Compel Further Resp. to Form Interrog General (Set One); Further Resp. to Inspection Demand to Pftf (Set One); Further Resp. to Special Interrog (Set One

Defendant County of Santa Barbara’s motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories General (Set One); Request for Sanctions

Defendant County of Santa Barbara’s motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One); Request for Sanctions

Defendant County of Santa Barbara’s motion to Compel Further Responses to Inspection Demand (Set One); Request for Sanctions

Attorneys:

For Plaintiff: Craig S. Granet (Fell, Marking, et al.)

For Defendant: Lina Somait, Deputy County Counsel

Rulings:

1. The Court grants, in part, defendant County of Santa Barbara’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories General (Set One), and orders plaintiff Sobhani Group, LLC, to provide further responses to Form Interrogatories ##4.1, 4.2, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 9.1, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 13.2, 13.3, and 50.1. The Court orders plaintiff and its counsel to pay defendant County of Santa Barbara a monetary sanction of $714.35.

2. The Court grants, in part, defendant County of Santa Barbara’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One), and orders plaintiff Sobhani Group, LLC, to provide further responses to Special Interrogatories ## 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 18, 20, and 21. The Court orders plaintiff and its counsel to pay defendant County of Santa Barbara a monetary sanction of $500.04.

3. The Court grants, in part, defendant County of Santa Barbara’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Inspection Demand (Set One), and orders plaintiff Sobhani Group, LLC, to provide further responses to Requests for Production ## 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 15, 23, 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 42. The Court denies the request for a monetary sanction.

Background

This action arises out of a written lease between plaintiff Sobhani Group, LLC (“Sobhani”) and defendant County of Santa Barbara whereby County agreed to lease from Sobhani real property at 4 East Carrillo Street in Santa Barbara. The initial term of the lease was for a period of seven and one half years and terminated on March 31, 2003. Under the terms of the lease, County was granted an option to renew the lease for three consecutive five-year terms following expiration of the original term. County exercised each of these options and the lease was scheduled to expire on March 31, 2018.

On July 3, 2017, Gloria Sobhani, the sole managing member of Sobhani, sent County’s Director of Child Support Services asking if County would be exercising its option to renew for another five years. On September 29, 2017, Carrie Topliffe, Director of Child Support Services for County, called Gloria Sobhani to inform her that County would not be exercising its option. On October 2, 2017, Topliffe sent a letter to Sobhani confirming the conversation and the County’s decision not to exercise its option. Sobhani contends that County exercised its option on May 10, 2017, when it provided a Tenant Estoppel Certificate for Sobhani’s lender indicating a lease termination date of March 31, 2023.

Sobhani’s complaint asserts a single cause of action for breach of contract. MSC is scheduled for January 10 and trial for January 28, 2020.

Motions

County has filed three motions to compel further responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and inspection demand. In the three motions, County requests monetary sanctions of $714.35, $500.04, and $1,107.24, respectively. Sobhani opposes the motion and seeks a monetary sanction of $9,180.

A. Meeting and Conferring: Motions to compel further responses to interrogatories and inspection demands must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under CCP § 2016.040. CCP §§ 2030.300(b), 2031.310(b)(2). “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” CCP § 2016.040.

A party must make “a serious attempt to obtain ‘an informal resolution of each issue.’” Townsend v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435 (1998). “A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel…. Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate.” Id. at 1439. An attempt at “informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent ‘to persuade the objector of the error of his ways.’” Clement v. Alegre, 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294 (2009).

Deputy County Counsel Lina Somait submits a declaration. She says that she and Deputy County Counsel Teresa M. Martinez made a reasonable and good faith effort to resolve discovery issues informally. [Somait Dec. ¶4] On June 4, 2019, Martinez sent a 28-page letter requesting that Sobhani’s counsel, Craig S. Granet, meet and confer regarding inadequate responses. [Id. ¶5, Exh. 10] Between then and June 13, counsel exchanged emails about conferring and deadlines. [Id. ¶6, Exhibit 11]

Somait took over the matter from Martinez and corresponded with Granet on June 28. Granet responded that Somait’s email ignored the lengthy meet and confer conference with Martinez during which he agreed to produce documents. [Id. ¶6, Exhibit 12] Between July 9 and July 19, counsel sent emails back and forth discussing documents, one resolved interrogatory, and one outstanding interrogatory. [Id. ¶6, Exhibit 14] On July 31, Granet sent an email regarding more documents and a list of documents submitted to the lender. [Id. ¶6, Exhibit 13] Somait sent an email on August 16 acknowledging the extension of the deadline for a motion to Monday, August 26. [Id. ¶6, Exhibit 14]

Granet says there was a lengthy conference with Martinez on June 13 to resolve County’s objections to Sobhani’s responses. He says they agreed that, rather than identifying the documents that reflected the nature and extent of Sobhani’s damage claims, they agreed to production of documents reflecting those damages. He says they did produce documents and Martinez never contacted him following the production of documents to indicate that she believed that the production did not fully comply with what had been agreed to in the meet and confer conference. [Granet Dec. ¶2] Granet says that Somait did not acknowledge resolutions reached with Martinez. [Id. ¶3]

Granet wrote an email on August 22 proposing to provide supplemental responses by August 30 to at least narrow the issues. He also agreed to an extension of time to file the motion to compel. [Id. ¶4, Exh. A] (Mr. Granet has not provided electronic bookmarks for his exhibits in violation of CRC 3.1110(f)(4).) Somait did not respond to that email before filing and serving these motions on Friday, August 23. [Id. ¶4]

County submits with its reply Teresa Martinez’s declaration. County does not explain why that was not submitted with the motions. Martinez describes the conference with Granet and says Granet agreed to produce documents no later than June 21; and stated he had not discussed some of the interrogatories with his client, he would need to follow up with his client, and he would provide a date by which he would provide supplemental responses to interrogatories. [Martinez Dec. ¶4] Granet produced documents on June 23. [Id. ¶5] She says they did not come to an agreement that Sobhani would not need to supplement responses and the only outstanding issue was when Sobhani would supplement its responses. [Id. ¶6]

It appears that the parties met in good faith. They do not appear to agree on what was said. Granet provides no detail regarding any agreement related to the multiple issues addressed regarding interrogatories in the June 4 letter.

The meet and confer process was not successful. Nor was it insufficient.

B. Form Interrogatories (“FI”):

1. FI ##4.1, 4.2: FI #4.1 asks if there is insurance coverage for the damages/claims in this case. FI #4.2 asks if Sobhani is self-insured under any statute for the damages/claims. Sobhani interposed objections, which it says were only for preservation of the objections and they do not affect the answers to the form interrogatories. Therefore, for the purpose of the answers to form interrogatories, the Court overrules the general objections.

Sobhani answered: “any insurance Plaintiff may have is irrelevant to Defendant’s liability in this case.” This answer is ambiguous as it could mean there is insurance coverage for the damages but Sobhani does not think it is relevant or there is no coverage for these types of damages. In opposition to the motion, Sobhani says there is no insurance that would insure a landlord for breach by a tenant. Sobhani also says that, at a subsequent deposition, Morris Sobhani said there is no insurance for “people abandoning our building” or for tenant defaults. It is not clear why Sobhani did not simply answer “no” in response to these FIs. Subsequent depositions and oppositions to motions are not substitutes for direct answers to interrogatories. The Court orders further responses to FI ##4.1 and 4.2.

2. FI ##7.1, 7.2, 7.3: These FIs ask about damage to property. Sobhani says to see the response to FI #9.1. But FI #9.1 does not ask about damage to property. Rather, it asks about “other damages.” The Court orders a further response.

3. FI #9.1: Sobhani did not respond to subpart (d). The Court orders a further response.

4. FI 9.2: In his declaration, Craig Granet specifically states that he and Teresa Martinez agreed that “rather than identifying the documents that reflected the nature and extent of Sobhani’s damage claims, we agreed that we would produce the documents reflecting those damages, and we did so.” In her declaration, Martinez does not address this specific agreement. Therefore, the Court will not order a further response.

5. FI #12.1: Sobhani objected that this FI is “more for an automobile accident type of case.” Sobhani focuses on the term “INCIDENT.” But the FIs define “INCIDENT” to include “breach of contract giving rise to this action or proceeding.” Sobhani says that, notwithstanding its objections, it identified individuals with knowledge of the matters at issue. Sobhani does not say it withheld any names because of objections. While Sobhani did name certain individuals in response to this question, it also responded by stating employees of County, Symetra Life Insurance Company, and The Alison Company, “including but not limited to” named individuals. That leaves the answer open-ended. If there are others, Sobhani must name them. If not, Sobhani must indicate it has identified all individuals with knowledge. The Court orders a further response.

6. FI ##12.2, 12.3, 12.6: FI #12.2 asks about interviews of individuals. FI #12.3 asks if Sobhani obtained a written or recorded statement from any individual. FI #12.6 asks if any person made a report concerning the “incident.” Sobhani objects based on attorney-client and attorney work product privileges. Sobhani explains that interviews were done by counsel for Sobhani and are protected by the attorney work product privilege and interviews of members of the Sobhani family are protected by the attorney-client privilege. As to the attorney-client privilege, for each of these FIs, Sobhani must list the persons interviewed or from which statements were obtained with respect to whom Sobhani claims the privilege. The identity of the individuals are not privileged, only the content of the communications.

As to work product, the taking of “statements from one or more of those individuals whom everyone in the case knows are percipient witnesses, that fact does not show anything definite about the attorney’s evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, attorney strategy or tactics, or even the relative strength of any particular witness.” Coito v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.4th 480, 502 (2012). Information responsive to these FIs “is not automatically entitled as a matter of law to absolute or qualified work product privilege.” Id. Sobhani must identify these individuals.

The Court orders further responses to FI ##12.2, 12.3, and 12.6, including all subparts. (As to all further responses, Sobhani must provide responses to applicable subparts, not just these three.)

7. FI ##12.4, 12.5: FI #12.4 asks if Sobhani knows “of any photographs, films, or videotapes depicting any place, object, or individual concerning the INCIDENT or plaintiff’s injuries.” FI #12.5, similarly asks if there are any diagrams, reproductions, or models of any place or thing concerning the breach.

Again, Sobhani objects that “INCIDENT” is unintelligible and vague—it is not. Sobhani then asserts the attorney-client and work product privileges. The question does not ask for the content of communications, so it is not apparent that the attorney-client privilege could apply. Sobhani does not suggest counsel took any photographs or videos or that they would reveal counsel’s evaluation, strategy, or tactics. Instead, in opposing the motion, Sobhani takes a different approach: “This Interrogatory is nonsensical in the context of this action. There could not be any photographs, films or videotapes of the breach of lease by the County, and Sobhani’s Objection on that ground is appropriate.” It is not nonsensical. The answer may be “no.” But there is an answer and Sobhani must give it. The Court orders a further response.

8. FI ##13.2, 13.3: These FIs asks if Sobhani has conducted any surveillance of any individuals involved in the breach or any party to the action and if a report was made of any surveillance. Sobhani asserts the same objections as it did for FI ##12.2, 12.3, 12.6. In its opposition to the motion, Sobhani makes the same argument it made regarding FI ##12.2, 12.3, 12.6. For the same reasons, the Court orders further responses to FI ##13.2 and 13.3.

9. FI #50.1: This FI asks for six categories of documents and information for each agreement alleged in the pleadings. Sobhani responds: “The Lease Agreement, attached as Exhibit ‘B’ to the Complaint.” Sobhani did not respond to the six subparts. The Court orders a further response.

10. Monetary Sanction: CCP § 2030.300(d) provides that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against the party who unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories, unless it finds that the party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. The court may order “that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct.” CCP § 2023.030.

County asks that the Court order Sobhani and its counsel to pay $714.35 as compensation for the fees incurred as a result of filing the motion. The Court finds this amount reasonable.

11. Order: The Court grants, in part, defendant County of Santa Barbara’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories General (Set One), and orders plaintiff Sobhani Group, LLC, to provide further responses to Form Interrogatories ##4.1, 4.2, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 9.1, 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 13.2, 13.3, and 50.1. The Court orders plaintiff and its counsel to pay defendant County of Santa Barbara a monetary sanction of $714.35.

C. Special Interrogatories (“SI”): Again, Sobhani says it asserted general objections to preserve them and the objections did not affect any of its answers to special interrogatories. Therefore, for the purpose of the answers to special interrogatories, the Court overrules the general objections.

1. SI #1: County asks Sobhani to identify the person who initially prepared the Tenant Estoppel Certificate (“TEC”). Sobhani answered that it believes the TEC “was first prepared either by Plaintiff’s lender, Symetra Life Insurance Company, or its agent, The Alison Company, by Nancy Craven, Senior Vice President of the Loan Closing Department.” County contends that Sobhani did not fully respond by stating the person’s full name, last known residence and business address, e-mail address, and business, personal, and mobile telephone numbers. Sobhani says that this information is in emails from Craven which were produced to County. But Sobhani misunderstands its obligation to respond to interrogatories. That identifying information may exist in documents provided is not the equivalent of a statement under penalty of perjury what the last known information is. To the extent that Sobhani does not know the answer, it must “so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations….” CCP § 2030.220(c). (This requirement applies to all interrogatory responses. The Court will not repeat this for all other special interrogatories.) The Court orders a further response.

2. SI #2: This SI asks for the date the TEC was prepared by the individual identified in response to SI #1. Sobhani responds that it first received the TEC from Nancy Craven on or about April 24, 2017. That does not answer the question asked. If Sobhani doesn’t know, it shall comply with CCP § 2030.220(c). The Court orders a further response.

3. SI #3: This SI seeks identification of all persons who drafted any portion of the TEC. Sobhani responded that it believes that, after the initial draft, representatives of County completed portions of the TEC. This does not answer the question or comply with CCP § 2030.220(c). The Court orders a further response.

4. SI ##6, 7: These SIs asks Sobhani to identify all information and documents provided to the lender. Sobhani objected on various grounds, including a privacy privilege. Then it said that it had provided a copy of the Lease Agreement. The SI simply asks Sobhani to identify the information provided.

In opposition to the motion, Sobhani says that its counsel, Craig Granet, “proposed, and Ms. Martinez accepted, a compromise whereby Mr. Granet would produce a list of all documents provided to the lender so that the County could review that list.” But this compromise is not set forth in Granet’s declaration. There is no reason why the information on such a list could not be stated in response to SI #6 under penalty of perjury.

Sobhani says that it produced some of the documents, including rent rolls. But the option to respond by providing documents requires the responding party to “specify the writings from which the answer may be derived or ascertained,” in “sufficient detail to permit the propounding party to locate and to identify, as readily as the responding party can, the documents from which the answer may be ascertained.” CCP § 2030.230.

Sobhani says the Court can see that the documents are not relevant to the issues in this case and they invade the privacy of the Sobhani family. First, identifying documents does not invade privacy, as Sobhani admits by having provided a list, albeit not under penalty of perjury.

As to relevancy, “[f]or discovery purposes, information is relevant if it ‘might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for trial, or facilitating settlement.’ [Citation]” Lipton v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 (1996). Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence. CCP § 2017.010. In light of “the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 785, 790 (1982). See also Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th 531, 542 (2017). The TEC is central to the issues in this case and it was a document provided to the lender. County is entitled to explore the context of the TEC in the overall loan process.

The Court orders further responses to SI ##6 and 7.

5. SI #8: This SI asks for the dates Sobhani provided the information identified in SI #6. Sobhani says it provided a copy of the Lease Agreement sometime between January 9 and June 1, 2017. Since the answer is limited to the Lease Agreement, it is not a full response. The Court orders a further response.

6. SI #9: This SI asks who provided the information identified in SI #6. Sobhani said the Lease Agreement would have been provided by either Morris Sobhani or Paree Sobhani Moradpour. Again, the response is limited to the Lease Agreement and not the other information. The response “would have been provided” is ambiguous. The Court orders a further response.

7. SI #11: This SI asks what collateral secures the loan. Sobhani objects on grounds of relevance and privacy—the latter as to any collateral provided by the individuals. The Court does not see how this might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and County does not describe how it might. The Court will not order a further response.

8. SI #12: “For the time period between June 1, 2015 to May 30, 2017, IDENTIFY each loan YOU attempted to obtain prior to YOU obtaining the LOAN with LENDER.” Sobhani objects on grounds of relevance and privacy. The Court does not see how this might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and County does not describe how it might. The Court will not order a further response.

9. SI #16: County asks for identification of all communications between Sobhani and County regarding the option to extend the term of the lease to March 31, 2023. County responded that there were a number of communications and documents reflecting those communications which would be produced. In its opposition, Sobhani says Granet and Martinez agreed that production of documents was an appropriate resolution. However, Granet does not say that in his declaration. Also, it is not clear how documents would reflect oral communications. The response is not adequate and does not comply with CCP § 2030.230. The Court orders a further response.

10. SI ##18, 20: SI #18 asks for identification of documents supporting Sobhani’s contention that it relied on the TEC in obtaining the loan. SI #20 asks for identification of documents supporting the contention that County exercised its option to renew the lease by signing the TEC. Sobhani said it would produce documents but does not identify any documents. Again, Sobhani refers to an agreement between Granet and Martinez that is not reflected in Granet’s declaration. The response is not adequate and does not comply with CCP § 2030.230. The Court orders further responses to SI ##18 and 20.

11. SI #21: “State all facts that demonstrate YOUR attempts to obtain an occupant for the PREMISES, in whole or in part, from October 1, 2017 to the present.” Sobhani responded: “Since Defendant breached the Lease Agreement, … Plaintiff has been attempting to find another tenant for the premises subject to that Agreement. In order to do so, Plaintiff has had to remove tenant improvements constructed by Defendant for its particular use, as well as debris left by Defendant in the leased premises. In addition, Plaintiff has contacted various businesses and other entities in its attempt to find another tenant for the leased premises.”

By starting with “Since Defendant breached the Lease Agreement,” Sobhani is not necessarily responding to the question starting with October 1, 2017. In its complaint, Sobhani alleges that County breached the lease on April 2, 2018. [Complaint ¶11] Also, the response contains ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. The Court orders a further response.

12. Monetary Sanction: County asks that the Court order Sobhani and its counsel to pay $500.04 as compensation for the fees incurred as a result of filing the motion. The Court finds this amount reasonable.

13. Order: The Court grants, in part, defendant County of Santa Barbara’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One), and orders plaintiff Sobhani Group, LLC, to provide further responses to Special Interrogatories ## 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16, 18, 20, and 21. The Court orders plaintiff and its counsel to pay defendant County of Santa Barbara a monetary sanction of $500.04.

D. Requests for Production (“RFP”): Again, Sobhani says it asserted general objections to preserve them and the objections did not affect any of its answers to requests for production. Therefore, for the purpose of the answers to requests for production, the Court overrules the general objections.

1. RFP ##1, 2, 3: RFP ##1 and 2 seek documents related to the formation of Sobhani and operation of Sobhani. RFP #3 seeks documents demonstrating Sobhani is authorized to do business in California. Sobhani says the request is overbroad and seeks documents that have nothing to do with the issues in the case. The structure and membership of Sobhani is relevant to authority of persons in contact with County on behalf of Sobhani. Sobhani says it has produced some documents responsive to this request but it does not say that it has produced all documents responsive to this request, such as, without limitation, operating agreements, member agreements, appointments, and minutes. The Court orders a further response to RFP ##1 and 2 but not 3. With respect to RFP ##1 and 2 and generally, the Court admonishes Sobhani to comply with CCP §§ 2031.220, 2031.230, and 2031.240 to the extent applicable.

2. RFP #4: This RFP seeks all documents that comprise, reflect, or refer to the TEC, including all communications. Sobhani said it would produce any documents that relate to the TEC. It says it has done so. The Court will not order a further response.

3. RFP #5: This RFP seeks all documents between Sobhani and the lender regarding the lease, including all communications. Sobhani said it would produce all documents that relate to communications with the lender regarding the Lease Agreement. It says it has done so. The Court will not order a further response.

4. RFP #6: This RFP seeks all diaries, calendars, or other notes relating to the incident. Sobhani’s response is that the term “incident” is unintelligible, vague, and ambiguous. In its opposition, Sobhani says the incident was defined as breach of the lease, which is not unintelligible, vague, or ambiguous. Then Sobhani says that there was an agreement to produce all communications relating to the breach. There is no evidence of that agreement regarding RFP #6, which requests more than communications. And the opposition is not the place to provide the statement, under penalty of perjury, “that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.” CCP § 2031.220. The Court orders a further response.

5. RFP #7: This RFP seeks all written contracts, agreements, or understandings that Sobhani entered into with any person during the lease term concerning the premises, including documents that demonstrate any monetary, propriety, or contractual interest in the premises. Sobhani stands by its objections that the RFP is overly broad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, unintelligible, vague, ambiguous, does not describe the documents with reasonable particularity, and does not seek documents that are relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to discover admissible evidence.

The Court finds that the request is not overly broad, unintelligible, vague, or ambiguous and it does describe the category of documents with sufficient particularity.

“The objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required, while to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” W. Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 407, 417 (1961). “An ‘objection based upon burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required.’” Williams v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.5th 531, 549 (2017) Plaintiff makes no attempt at such a showing.

County maintains that this request is reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence concerning Sobhani’s standing to maintain this action, motivation to obtain a loan, motivation to defraud County, others who may have information relevant to this case, interpretation of the TEC, and damages. Given the broad relevance in discovery, the Court does not find the request outside the bounds of relevance.

The Court overrules all objections and orders a further response.

6. RFP ##8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 35: These RFPs seek documents supporting the contentions that County breached the lease, owes rent for April through November 2018 and future rent from December 1, 2018 through March 31, 2023, owes common area maintenance charges from February through March 31, 2023, and owes sewer and elevator repair costs; documents that relate to County’s exercise of the option to extend the lease in 2002, 2007, 2012; documents that evidence charges for repairs and maintenance after March 31, 2018, monies paid which relate to damages, and attempts to obtain an occupant for the premises after October 1, 2017; documents regarding costs associated with leasing to a tenant other than County after March 31, 2018; and documents reflecting communications regarding costs associated with leasing to a tenant other than County after March 31, 2018. Some requests seek documents identified in response to form interrogatories. Sobhani responded that, “subject to the foregoing”—meaning general objections, it would produce any documents relating to those contentions, lease extensions, repairs and maintenance, damages, attempts to obtain a tenant, and costs associated with post-March 31, 2018 efforts to efforts to release the premises. Sobhani says it will produce documents identified in responses to form interrogatories. It says it has produced the promised documents. Sobhani assures the Court that the “subject to” general objections language is solely intended to preserve objections and did not limit the production. The Court will take Sobhani at its word. The Court will not order further responses to these RFPs.

7. RFP #12: This RFP seeks all documents that comprise, reflect, or refer to the loan. Sobhani asserted the same objections asserted with respect to RFP #7 above but said it would produce the loan agreement. Sobhani said it subsequently agreed to produce more documents. The Court overrules the objections. County should be able to explore the context of the loan that resulted in the TEC. The Court orders a further response.

8. RFP #13: This RFP seeks documents relating to attempts to obtain a loan prior (June 1, 2015, to May 30, 2017) to the loan that resulted in the TEC. Sobhani responded only with the objections discussed above. Sobhani says that Morris Sobhani testified at his deposition that there were no other loans applied for. As there are no responsive documents and the request is of marginal relevance, the Court will not order a further response.

9. RFP #14: This RFP asks for all notices of termination sent by Sobhani to County during the lease term. Sobhani objects that there is no reference to a “Notice of Termination” in ¶6 of the complaint. In its opposition, Sobhani refers to how the term “Notice of Termination” is defined in the inspection demand. Since the response puts the definition of “Notice of Termination” at issue, it is incumbent on County to provide all the information the Court needs to assess the request and response. “The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response.” CRC 3.1345(c). It must include the text of all definitions. 3.1345(c)(4). For failure to do this, the Court will not order a further response to RFP #14.

10. RFP #15: This RFP seeks all documents that support Sobhani’s contention that it performed all obligations under the lease except those obligations Sobhani was prevented or excused from performing as alleged in the complaint. Sobhani objected that the RFP is overly broad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, unintelligible, vague, and ambiguous; and does not describe the documents requested with reasonable particularity. The Court overrules these objections. In its opposition, Sobhani says “it is nonsensical to request documents that support the proper performance of one’s obligations.” The Court disagrees. The Court orders a further response.

11. RFP #23: This RFP seeks documents that support the contention that County owes $1,200 in statutory attorney fees. Sobhani objected on the grounds of attorney-client privilege and said that any amount relating to the claim for attorney fees will be the subject of a post-trial motion. In its opposition, Sobhani says it “properly complied with this Request by producing all documents that reflect those amounts owed by the County.” The opposition is wholly inconsistent with the response to RFP #23.

When a party objects, it must identify with particularity the documents falling within the category to which it objects; set forth the privilege; and, if a claim of privilege, “provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log.” CCP § 2031.240(b), (c). “The purpose of a ‘privilege log’ is to provide a specific factual description of documents in aid of substantiating a claim of privilege in connection with a request for document production. The purpose of providing a specific factual description of documents is to permit a judicial evaluation of the claim of privilege.” Hernandez v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.App.4th 285, 292 (2003) (citations omitted).

“[A] privilege log typically should provide the identity and capacity of all individuals who authored, sent, or received each allegedly privileged document, the document’s date, a brief description of the document and its contents or subject matter sufficient to determine whether the privilege applies, and the precise privilege or protection asserted.” Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court, 242 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1130 (2015).

The Court orders a further response consistent with this discussion.

12. RFP ##25, 33: RFP #25 asks for documents that evidence charges for repairs and maintenance during the lease term. RFP #33 seeks documents regarding monies that County provided to finance facility improvements during the lease term. Sobhani responds with the same objections discussed above with respect to RFP #15 and others. In this instance, the Court agrees that the requests are overly broad and oppressive. The lease dates back to 1995. It is also not clear why repairs, maintenance, and improvements dating back 20 years or more would have any bearing on this case or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Balancing the lack of relevance with the amount of work (albeit not quantified) necessary to comply with this request leads the Court to conclude that no further response is warranted.

13. RFP #27: “All DOCUMENTS that reflect monies received by YOU from any source between January 2017 to the present which relate to the PREMISES involved in this lawsuit.” The Court agrees that this request is unintelligible as to what are monies relating to the premises. The Court will not order a further response.

14. RFP #29: This request seeks documents regarding fair market value of the premises for the period October 1, 2017, to present. Sobhani asserts the usual objections, which the Court overrules. In its opposition, Sobhani states that County was obligated to pay rent at the rate set in the lease agreement, not fair market value. The request relates to damages and mitigation, not County’s obligation. The Court orders a further response.

15. RFP #34: This RFP seeks documents identified in response to FI #7.2. The response says to see responses to FI #7.2 and RFP #35. County did not provide the response to FI #7.2 in the separate statement. The response to RFP #35 immediately follows, but it refers to Sobhani’s response to FI #9.2 and County does not provide that. For failure to comply with CRC 3.1345(c), the Court will not order a further response.

16. RFP ##36, 37, 38, 39, 42: These RFPs seek documents identified in response to FI ##12.3, 12.4, 12.6, and 13.2; and SI #7. Sobhani responds that no documents were identified in response to those FIs. As to SI #7, Sobhani says it provided a copy of the lease agreement. But the Court has ordered further responses to those FIs and SI #7. To the extent that documents are identified in responses to those FIs and more documents are identified in response to SI #7, the Court orders further responses to RFP ##36, 37, 38, 39, 42.

17. RFP ##45, 46: These RFPs seek documents or tangible items County intends to use or admit into evidence at trial. Sobhani objects that its decision to use or admit documents at trial is protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges. Some four months out from trial, counsel’s decisions regarding exhibits are protected work product. In California, the work product privilege is to “encourage them to prepare their cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the unfavorable aspects” of their case. Dowden v. Superior Court, 73 Cal.App.4th 126, 132 (1999). To identify exhibits counsel presently intends to introduce would exposes counsel’s thought processes. These may not be the exhibits that eventually will be used or offered at trial. The parties will eventually exchange exhibit lists. The Court will not order a further response to RFP ##45 and 46.

18. RFP #47: This RFP seeks documents on which Sobhani relies in support of its contention that County committed any wrongdoing or improper act that harmed Sobhani. In addition to the familiar objections, Sobhani says it will produce documents relating to the allegation that County breached the lease agreement. The Court will not order a further response because County does not state where Sobhani contends that County committed any wrongdoing or improper act other than breach of the lease.

19. Monetary Sanction: CCP § 2031.310(h) provides that the court shall impose a monetary sanction against the party who unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel further responses to requests for production, unless it finds that the party acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.

The Court is ordering a further response to only ten RFPs. That the Court and Sobhani had to wade through so many RFPs to which the Court is not ordering a further response constitutes a circumstance making the imposition of a sanction unjust.

20: Order: The Court grants, in part, defendant County of Santa Barbara’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Inspection Demand (Set One), and orders plaintiff Sobhani Group, LLC, to provide further responses to Requests for Production ## 1, 2, 6, 7, 12, 15, 23, 29, 36, 37,38, 39, and 42. The Court denies the request for a monetary sanction.