Case Name: Spielbauer Law Office v Midland Funding, LLC et al
Case No.: 18CV339157

On July 5, 2019, the Court granted the Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Defendants Midland Funding, LLC and Midland Credit Management (collectively “Midland”) against the complaint filed by Plaintiff Spielbauer Law Office (“Plaintiff”). In that complaint, Plaintiff claimed that Midland had interfered with his relationship with his client Melanie Barr, by settling Midlands’ claims against her without notifying Plaintiff about those discussions, even though Melanie Barr had confirmed in writing that she was no longer represented by Plaintiff.

Midland requests attorney fees of $42,278.50 for pursuing the Anti-SLAPP motion, and $5002.50 incurred to bring this motion for fees and costs, plus $6065 for preparation of the reply papers.
“[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) When a defendant is only partially successful, he or she may ordinarily recover a reduced amount of fees and costs commensurate with his or her level of success. (See Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 82.) Here, the Court granted the motion to strike the entire complaint and no allocation is required.

Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion, and Midland filed a reply, with a supplemental declaration detailing time spent on the reply for this motion. Plaintiff first argued the motion was premature, for reasons that appear to be some effort at reconsideration of the Court’s ruling on the Anti-SLAPP motion, which are not properly made here. The Court will not consider that argument, and declines to stay this motion until after the appeal that he has filed is concluded.

Plaintiff also objects to the amount sought, or even to any award of fees at all because of attorney fees awards in other cases in other counties, alleged general misconduct by Midland (that appears to be unrelated to the facts of this case), and Plaintiff’s argument that fees may be reduced or rejected outright if the Court concludes that the request is “unreasonable and inflated.” Plaintiff submitted a declaration by Kevin Sullivan in the nature of expert analysis, claiming among other things that Midland has a history of inflated fee requests, again citing to cases in other counties.

The Court sustains Midland’s objection to the Request for Judicial Notice, as the Consent Decree is not relevant to any issue to be decided by the Court. The Court also sustains the objections to the Declaration of Kevin Sullivan, on the grounds stated.

A trial court “assessing attorney fees begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney…involved in the presentation of the case.’” (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321, quoting Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131–1132.) “The court tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Christian Research Institute, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321.)

Counsel to appear on the issue of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded.