Case Name: Stephen Klein v. Francisco Javier Preciado, et al.
Case No.: 17-CV-304897

Currently before the Court is the motion by defendants Francisco Javier Preciado (“Preciado”) and The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University (“Stanford”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for summary judgment of the complaint of plaintiff Stephen Klein (“Plaintiff”).

Factual and Procedural Background

This personal injury action arises out of a motor vehicle accident. On October 5, 2015, at Stock Farm Road and Oak Road in Stanford, California, Defendants negligently made an unsafe turn and collided with Plaintiff, who was riding a bicycle. (Complaint, ¶¶ MV-1, MV-2, GN-1.) In addition to operating the motor vehicle, Defendants allegedly “employed the persons who operated a motor vehicle in the course of their employment”; “owned the motor vehicle which was operated with their permission”; “entrusted the motor vehicle”; and “were the agents and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope of the agency.” (Id. at ¶¶ MV-2 and GN-1.)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging claims for: (1) motor vehicle; and (2) general negligence.

Subsequently, Defendants filed the operative first amended answer (“FAA”) to the complaint, generally denying the allegations of the complaint and alleging various affirmative defenses. As is relevant here, the twentieth and twenty-first affirmative defenses allege that Plaintiff’s claims are subject to the exclusivity remedy of workers’ compensation law.

On November 15, 2017, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment of the complaint. Plaintiff filed papers in opposition to the motion on February 23, 2018.

Discussion

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, Defendants move for summary judgment of the complaint on the ground that “Plaintiff’s claims … are completely precluded by the ‘exclusive remedy’ doctrine as set forth in California Labor Code §§3600 and 3601, et seq.” (Ds’ Ntc. Mtn., p. 2:5-7; Mem. Ps. & As., pp. 3-4.)

I. Requests for Judicial Notice

A. Defendants’ Request

Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the complaint, their original answer to the complaint, and the FAA is GRANTED as the documents are proper subjects of judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d) [permitting judicial notice of court records]; see also People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 (Lockyer) [the court may properly take judicial notice of court records if those records are deemed to be necessary and relevant to the disposition of the motion]; People v. Woodell (1998) 17 Cal.4th 448, 455 [courts may “take judicial notice of the existence of judicial opinions and court documents, along with the truth of the results reached—in the documents such as orders, statements of decision, and judgments—but [the court] cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions or court files, including pleadings, affidavits, testimony, or statements of fact.”].)

B. Plaintiff’s Request

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is DENIED because the subject facts are not necessary or relevant to the disposition of the pending motion. (See Lockyer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 422, fn. 2 [the court may properly take judicial notice of court records if those records are deemed to be necessary and relevant to the disposition of the motion].)

II. Legal Standard

The pleadings limit the issues presented for summary judgment or summary adjudication, and such a motion cannot be granted or denied on issues not raised by the pleadings. (Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life & Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 73; Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663.) A defendant seeking summary judgment or summary adjudication “must show that at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. … The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show there is a triable issue of material fact on that issue.” (Alex R. Thomas & Co. v. Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 66, 72; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) “ ‘There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.’ ” (Madden v. Summit View, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1272, internal citations omitted; see also Raghavan v. Boeing Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1132; see also Intrieri v. Super. Ct. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 72, 82.)

For purposes of establishing their respective burdens, the parties involved in a motion for summary judgment or adjudication must present admissible evidence. (See Saporta v. Barbagelata (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 463, 468.) The motion may not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the papers submitted, if such inferences are contradicted by other inferences which raise a triable issue of fact. (Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co. (Hepp) (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 714, 717-718 (Hepp).) Additionally, in ruling on the motion, a court cannot weigh said evidence or deny summary judgment or adjudication on the ground that any particular evidence lacks credibility. (See Melorich Builders v. Super. Ct. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 931, 935; see also Lerner v. Super. Ct. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 656, 660.) As summary judgment “is a drastic remedy eliminating trial,” the court must liberally construe evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (See Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389; see also Hepp, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 717.)

III. Governing Law

A. Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity

California’s Workers’ Compensation Act (Labor Code, § 3600 et seq.) provides an employee’s exclusive remedy against his or her employer for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. (Wright v. State (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1229 (Wright).) Specifically, Labor Code section 3600, subdivision (a), states: “Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person …, shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the employment ….” (Vaught v. State (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1543.) The phrase “arising out of” refers to the origin or cause of the injury, while the phrase “in the course of employment” refers to the time and place of the injury. (Wright, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1229.)

In addition, Labor Code section 3601 states: “Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover such compensation is the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his employment.” (Lab. Code, § 3601.) Thus, where an employee is injured by any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his or her employment, workers’ compensation is generally the exclusive remedy of the employee against the co-employee. (See Saala, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 126-29.)

Notably, “the provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act must be liberally construed in the employee’s favor, and all reasonable doubts as to whether an injury arose out of employment are to be resolved in favor of awarding the injured employee compensation. [Citations.] This rule of liberal construction applies to ‘factual as well as statutory construction. [Citations.] Thus, “[i]f a provision in [the Workers’ Compensation Act] may be reasonably construed to provide coverage or payments, that construction should usually be adopted even if another reasonable construction is possible.” [Citation.] The rule of liberal construction “is not altered because a plaintiff believes that [he or she] can establish negligence on the part of [his or her] employer and brings a civil suit for damages.” [Citation.] It requires that we liberally construe the Act “in favor of awarding work[ers’] compensation, not in permitting civil litigation. [Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Wright, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1229-30.)

B. The Going and Coming Rule and the Premises Line Rule

“The California Supreme Court ‘adopted the “going and coming rule” as an aid in determining whether an injury occurred in the course of the employment.’ [Citation.] ‘The going and coming rule precludes compensation for injury suffered during the course of a local commute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of exceptional circumstances. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘For purpose of the rule, the employment relationship does not begin until an employee enters the employer’s premises. Prior to entry, the going and coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery …. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Schultz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1135 (Schultz); see Wright, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.)

The going and coming rule has become the subject of significant criticism with “the California Supreme Court, for example, describing it as a ‘slippery concept,’ ‘riddled with exceptions,’ and difficult to apply uniformly. [Citation.] Such criticism led, among other things, to the premises line rule.” (Wright, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230.)

“In an effort to create a ‘sharp line of demarcation’ as to when the employee’s commute terminates and the course of employment commences, courts adopted the premises line rule, which provides that the employment relationship generally commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises. [Citation.] ‘The “premises line” has the advantage of enabling courts to ascertain the point at which employment begins—objectively and fairly. This outweighs the disadvantages incurred by attempting to formulate and apply a subjective rule justly.’ [Citation.] Succinctly put, prior to entry on the employer’s premises, ‘the going and coming rule ordinarily precludes recovery; after entry, injury is generally presumed compensable as arising in the course of employment.’ [Citations.]” (Wright, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1231; see Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135.) “The employer’s premises include his parking lot as well as plant or office, and once the employee has reached the premises, employment is not interrupted by crossing public property while travelling from one part of the premises to another.” (General Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 595, 598-99 (General Ins.).) In most of the cases where the premises line rule is applied, “the employee had entered the employer’s premises prior to injury and was injured while travelling from the point of entry to his work station.” (Id., at p. 599.) “The liability of an employer for injuries sustained by his employees on the employment premises is exceedingly broad. Extending his liability to the total premises is somewhat arbitrary but as a practical measure is well established.” (North American Rockwell Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp.App. Bd. (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 154, 159 (North American).)
IV. Analysis

Defendants argue that there is a complete defense to Plaintiff’s motor vehicle and general negligence causes of action as the claims are barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. Defendants assert that the premises line rule applies and Plaintiff’s injuries are arising out of and in the course of his employment with Stanford such that his sole and exclusive remedy against Stanford is the right to recover workers’ compensation benefits. Defendants further assert that Plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy against Preciado is the right recover workers’ compensation benefits because Preciado was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

Defendants’ arguments are well-taken. Defendants’ UMF and evidence establish that Stanford was Plaintiff’s employer, Plaintiff was on his way to work, and the accident occurred on Stanford’s premises, i.e., the Stanford University campus. (See UMF Nos. 1-3 and 5-6; see also Index of Exhibits, Exs. D (McManus Dec.), ¶ 4, E (P’s Depo. Transcript), pp. 13:23-14:23, 15:13-16:7, 16:13-18:5, 25:14-27:9, 28:3-24, 29:16-30:20, 32:1-33:14-16, F (map of Stanford University campus), G (Preciado Dec.), ¶¶ 2 and 4, H (Bousson Dec.), ¶ 4 and Ex. A thereto; Ds’ RJN, Ex. A (Complaint), ¶ MV-2(a) and (e).) Consequently, the premises line exception to the going and coming rule applies and Plaintiff’s injury was “arising out of and in the course of employment” such that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule bars Plaintiff’s claims against Stanford. (See UMF Nos. 1-6; see also Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1135.) Furthermore, the UMF and evidence demonstrate that Preciado was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident such that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule bars Plaintiff’s claims against Preciado. (See UMF Nos. 1-6; see also Saala, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 126-29.)

In opposition, Plaintiff initially takes issue with Defendants’ description of the applicable exception to the going and coming rule as the “perimeter line rule.” (Opp’n., pp. 1:25-2:3.) The alternative terminology used by Defendants is of no moment. It is readily apparent that Defendants are referring to the exception that courts sometimes call the premises line rule. Plaintiff does not present any legal authority or reasoned argument showing that Defendants’ decision to call the applicable exception the perimeter line rule is material to the Court’s analysis. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 (Badie); see Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612, 619, fn. 2 (Schaeffer) [“[A] point which is merely suggested by a party’s counsel, with no supporting argument or authority, is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion.”].)

Next, Plaintiff contends that he had not reached his employer’s premises at the time of the accident because he had not reached the building where he worked, the Avery Aquatic Center. (Opp’n., pp. 2:10-11 and 5:14-6:11.) Plaintiff points out that the Stanford University campus is large and estimates that he was over a mile away from the Avery Aquatic Center when he was injured. (Id., at p. 6:2-24; P’s Dec., ¶ 5.) This argument lacks merit. Plaintiff cites no legal authority whatsoever establishing that the employer’s premises should be narrowly defined for purposes of the premises line rule as the specific building where the employee works. The term “premises” is typically understood to mean a building along with its grounds, such as the buildings and land used by a company. (Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) [“premises (prem-ə-siz) (15c) … 3. A house or building, along with its grounds; esp., the buildings and land that a shop, restaurant, company, etc. uses .”], italics added.)

Moreover, it is well-established that employees may be on their employers’ premises for purposes of the premises line rule even though they are injured outside of the building where they worked. (See Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1128–31, 1136, and 1138 [the employee was on his employer’s premises—Edwards Air Force Base—for purposes of the premises line rule even though he was injured in a car accident approximately three to five miles from the his work destination, Building No. 1440]; see also Wright, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1222-23, 1226, fn. 3, 1231, and 1237 [although the premises line rule did not apply to an employee who was injured on the San Quentin premises, multiple city blocks from the prison building where he carried out his duties, because he live on the premises, the rule would apply to those employees who were so injured and lived off of the prison property]; General Ins., supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 598–99 [“The employer’s premises include his parking lot as well as plant or office, and once the employee has reached the premises, employment is not interrupted by crossing public property while travelling from one part of the premises to another.”], italics added; Lewis v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 559, 561 [holding that the premises line rule applied when the employee parked in a parking lot leased by her employer, which was located approximately 3 blocks from her place of work, and was thereafter injured on a public street one block from her office]; Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Commission (1946) 28 Cal.2d 329, 337-38 [holding that the premises line rule applied when the vehicle in which the employee was injured was partially on a parking lot maintained by the employer and located three and one-half blocks from the actual place of work]; California Cas. Indem. Exchange v. Industrial Acc. Commission (1943) 21 Cal.2d 751, 753 [the employee was on her employer’s premises as she was feet away from the building where she worked when she was injured in a driveway located on a lot owned by her employer ].) Consequently, the employer’s premises for purposes of the premises line rule is broadly understood to be all of the real property owned or controlled by the employer. (See North American, supra, 9 Cal.App.3d at p. 159 [“The liability of an employer for injuries sustained by his employees on the employment premises is exceedingly broad. Extending his liability to the total premises is somewhat arbitrary but as a practical measure is well established.”], italics added.)

The cases relied upon by Plaintiff do not suggest otherwise. For example, in Santa Rosa Junior College v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 345, 353, the court found that the premises line rule did not apply because the college instructor was killed in an accident which “occurred miles away from the [college] campus” where the instructor worked. Here, it is undisputed that the accident occurred on the Stanford University campus where Plaintiff worked. (UMF Nos. 2-3 and 5; Index of Exhibits, Exs. E (P’s Depo. Transcript), pp. 15:20-22, 27:4-6, 28:3-24, 32:11-13, and 33:14-16, G (Preciado Dec.), ¶ 4, H (Bousson Dec.) ¶ 4 and Ex. A thereto.)

In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding the application of the premises line exception and whether his injury was “arising out of and in the course of employment” such that the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule bars his claims against Stanford. Furthermore, as Plaintiff does not dispute that Preciado was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, he fails to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule bars his claims against Preciado.

For these reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.