Steven L Saxon vs. Paladin Protection Services Inc

2012-00123296-CU-PO

Steven L Saxon vs. Paladin Protection Services Inc

Nature of Proceeding: Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint

Filed By: Donavan, Monique R.

**If any party requests oral argument, then at the time the request is made, the
requesting party must inform the court and opposing counsel of the specific
causes of action or issues on which oral argument is sought.**

The demurrer of Defendant Paladin Protection Services, Inc. d/b/a Paladin Private
Security (“Paladin”) to the second amended complaint (“SAC”) of Plaintiffs Steven L.
Saxon (“Saxon”), Justin Bond, Jedediah A. Main, Darrin W. Martin, Joe Perrotta,
Michael Lee Hoyt Russell, Brian Craig Cresci, Aaron M. Cochran and Melsen A.
McCain (collectively “Plaintiffs”) is OVERRULED.

Paladin’s motion to strike the punitive damages allegations and related prayer from the
SAC is DENIED.

This is a dispute between lessees/sublessees of a condominium, on the one hand, and
a condominium homeowners’ association (Defendant Jasmine), its property
management company (Defendant Landmark), and Paladin, a private security firm that
the homeowners’ association and/or property management company hired, on the
other. Plaintiffs allege that Saxon leased the condominium from the owners and then
subleased it to the remaining Plaintiffs. According to Plaintiffs, Paladin officers forcibly
entered the premises in the middle of the night in April 2011 and removed Plaintiffs
Bartilotta, Bond, Main, Martin, Perrotta and Russell. Plaintiffs allege that the forcible
entry and removal occurred before an authorized levying officer levied a writ of
possession that followed a foreclosure and unlawful detainer proceeding.

In the SAC, Plaintiffs have pleaded against Paladin causes of action for trespass,
extortion, assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress (”IIED”), invasion of privacy and unfair business practices. Paladin demurs to
the causes of action for extortion, battery, IIED and unfair business practices on
grounds that the allegations fail to state a cause of action. Paladin also moves to
strike the punitive damages allegations and related prayer.

Preliminarily, the court notes that it will not sustain the demurrers based upon Plaintiffs’
failure to file and serve the SAC before a court-ordered deadline. Future failures to
comply with court orders, however, may result in appropriate sanctions.

The Demurrer

The Second Cause of Action for Extortion
The demurrer is OVERRULED.

First, Paladin argues that the demurrer should be sustained because extortion is not a
civil wrong. Although the court agrees with Paladin that the elements of civil extortion
are the elements of criminal extortion, it disagrees that extortion is inactionable as a
civil wrong. (See Mendoza v. Hamzeh (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 799, 802.)

Next, Paladin argues that the demurrer should be sustained because Plaintiffs have
not alleged that Paladin or its officers stood to benefit by causing Plaintiffs to relinquish
their property (i.e., their possessory interest in the premises). Paladin has not cited
any authority to support the notion that the defendant’s benefit is an element of
extortion, and the court rejects it. (See Cal. Pen. Code §§ 518-519; People v. Hesslink
(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 781, 789-790].)

The Fourth Cause of Action for Battery

The demurrer is OVERRULED.

First, Paladin argues that the demurrer should be sustained because Plaintiffs have
not alleged a physical touching. The court disagrees. (See SAC, ¶ 96.)

Next, Paladin argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged the intent to cause
harm. (See CACI Instr. No. 1300 [battery includes element of intent to harm or
offend].) Again, the court disagrees. (See FAC, ¶¶ 65, 101.)

The Sixth Cause of Action for IIED

The demurrer is OVERRULED.

Paladin argues that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct because
the allegations indicate that Paladin was acting pursuant to the other defendants’
instructions. Given Plaintiffs’ allegation that Paladin officers ejected Plaintiffs from the
premises with the intent to cause Plaintiffs severe emotional distress and to fear for
their safety, the court rejects the argument.

Next, Paladin argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege outrageous conduct because
the ejectment occurred against a background of foreclosure and unlawful detainer
proceedings. Absent an authority squarely supporting Paladin’s argument, the court
rejects it.

The Eighth Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices

The demurrer is OVERRULED.

Paladin argues that the demurrer should be sustained because Plaintiffs lump all the
defendants together and thus fail to alleged conduct with requisite specificity. Because
the only authority that Paladin cites for this proposition is a non-binding federal case,
and because federal courts have their own pleading standards based on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court is not persuaded.

Paladin argues next that the Plaintiffs may not direct an unfair business practices claim
against it on a theory of vicarious liability. Paladin cites Emery v. Visa InternationalAssociation (App. 3 Dist. 2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 952, 960, to support this argument.
Emery was a consumer action involving foreign lotteries advertising in California.
Because the lotteries allowed payments by VISA cards, the plaintiff named VISA as a
defendant. In that context, the Emery court concluded that VISA could not be held
vicariously liable for the lotteries’ allegedly unlawful solicitations in California. (See
th
Emery, 95 Cal.App.4 at 960 [“VISA exercised no control over the preparation or
distribution of the solicitations, nor did it have any relationship with the merchants who
did”].)

In the course of its analysis, the Emery court quoted People v. Toomey (1984) 157
Cal.App.3d 1, 14: “The concept of vicarious liability has no application to actions
brought under the unfair business practices act.” The Toomey court, however,
expressly stated that a corporate employee “can be held liable for violations of [B&P]
sections 17200 and 17500 by its employees.” (157 Cal.App.3d at 14 [citations
omitted].) In contrast, Toomey held that an individual business owner cannot be held
liable absent his/her personal participation in the allegedly unlawful acts. Thus,
Toomey and Emery do not stand for the proposition that a corporate employer such as
Paladin cannot be liable for its employees’ alleged violations of the unfair business
practices statutes. Consequently, the court rejects Paladin’s second argument as well.

Finally, Paladin argues that a single event, such as the alleged ejectment of Plaintiffs
during a single evening, cannot constitute an unfair business practice. Because
Paladin has not cited any authority to support this argument, the court rejects it.

The Motion to Strike

The motion is DENIED.

Paladin argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege malice, oppression or fraud by a
corporate employer as require by CC § 3294(b). Plaintiffs counter that their allegations
in paragraphs 17, 65, and 125-127 suffice in this respect.

Paragraph 17 in the SAC contains allegations that each defendant (Paladin, Jasmine
and Landmark) was the others’ agent and ratified its agents’ acts. Thus, Plaintiffs do
not predicate their punitive damage claims against Paladin solely upon the latter’s
employees’ conduct. As a result, CC § 3294(b), which only governs punitive damages
claims against a corporate employer based on the conduct of its employees, does not
require the court to grant the motion.

Conclusion

The demurrer is overruled, and the motion to strike is denied.

Paladin is directed to file and serve its answer no later than November 18, 2013.
Paladin’s answer to the SAC will be deemed its answer to any third amended
complaint that Plaintiffs file in response to the court’s concurrent order sustaining in
part the demurrers of Co-Defendant Jasmine and Landmark.

Counsel are advised that the Sacramento County Superior Court’s Local Rules were
revised and renumbered as of 01/01/13. When giving notice of the cou The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC 3.1312 or
further notice is required.

Item 10 2012-00123296-CU-PO

Steven L Saxon vs. Paladin Protection Services Inc

Nature of Proceeding: Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Complaint

Filed By: Sanders, David M.

**If any party requests oral argument, then at the time the request is made, the
requesting party must inform the court and opposing counsel of the specific
causes of action or issues on which oral argument is sought.**

The demurrers of Defendants Jasmine Homeowners Association (“Jasmine”) and
Landmark Limited, LLP (“Landmark”) (collectively “Defendants”) to the second
amended complaint (“SAC”) of Plaintiffs Steven L. Saxon (“Saxon”), Justin Bond,
Jedediah A. Main, Darrin W. Martin, Joe Perrotta, Michael Lee Hoyt Russell, Brian
Craig Cresci, Aaron M. Cochran and Melsen A. McCain (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are
OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part with leave to amend.

This is a dispute between lessees/sublessees of a condominium, on the one hand, and
a condominium homeowners’ association (Jasmine), its property management
company (Landmark), and a private security firm that the homeowners’ association
and/or property management company hired (Co-Defendant Paladin Private Security
(“Paladin”)), on the other. Plaintiffs allege that Saxon leased the condominium from
the owners and then subleased it to the remaining Plaintiffs. According to Plaintiffs,
Paladin officers forcibly entered the premises in the middle of the night in April 2011
and removed Plaintiffs Bartilotta, Bond, Main, Martin, Perrotta and Russell. Plaintiffs
allege that the forcible entry and removal occurred before an authorized levying officer
levied a writ of possession that followed a foreclosure and unlawful detainer
proceeding.

In the SAC, Plaintiffs have pleaded against Defendants herein causes of action for
trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), invasion of privacy and
unfair business practices. Defendants demur on grounds of uncertainty and failure to
state a cause of action. (Based upon the uncertain nature of the allegations,
Defendants advert to a demurrer for misjoinder of parties as well. The court construes
the subject demurrer as one for uncertainty, not a separate demurrer for misjoinder of
parties. See Demurrer at 2:4-6.)

Preliminarily, the court notes that it will not sustain the demurrers based upon Plaintiffs’
failure to file and serve the SAC before a court-ordered deadline. Future failures to
comply with court orders, however, may result in appropriate sanctions.

Uncertainty

The demurrers for uncertainty are SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

Plaintiffs’ initial allegations are unclear as to the number and identities of the plaintiffs
bringing this lawsuit. Plaintiffs acknowledge that there are one or more typographical
errors creating the uncertainty. The court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend in order to
cure the uncertainty.

Failure to State a Cause of Action

The First Cause of Action for Trespass

Defendants’ demurrers are OVERRULED.

First, the court rejects Defendants’ argument that the absence of specific allegations
that Landmark directed Paladin to recover possession of the premises results in
Plaintiffs’ failure to state any cause of action against Landmark. Plaintiffs have alleged
that each of the defendants was the others’ agent and that Landmark was charged
with hiring and supervising Paladin. (See SAC, ¶¶ 10, 14, 17.) At this stage of the
case, the court must draw all inferences in favor of the SAC, (Kruss v. Booth (2010)
185 Cal.App.4th 699, 727), and Plaintiffs’ allegations thus suffice to state causes of
action against Landmark on an agency theory.

Next, Plaintiffs argue that, because Paladin took possession pursuant to a lawful writ
of possession, Plaintiffs have failed to allege the unlawful intent necessary to state
trespass. The court disagrees.

In the SAC, Plaintiffs have provided detailed allegations that, when Paladin took
possession of the premises and ejected certain plaintiffs in April 2011, it did so before
the officer levying the writ of possession had complied with statutory service
requirements. Although Defendants argue that Paladin–a private company with no
evident authority to levy the writ of possession–took possession “pursuant to” the writ
of possession, they have failed to explain why they were authorized to do so before
the levying officer had levied the writ. Accordingly, Defendants have failed to
persuade the court that the allegations cannot be construed to state a trespass.

Furthermore, neither Defendants nor Paladin were required to intend to break the law.
All that a trespasser must do to satisfy the intent element of a trespass cause of action
is intend to be in the place where the trespass occurred. (See Miller v. National
Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1480-1481; see also Cassinos v.
Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1780 [“”A good faith belief that entry has
been authorized or permitted provides no excuse for infringement of property rights if
consent was not in fact given by the property owner whose rights are at issue”].)

The Sixth Cause of Action for IIED

Defendants’ demurrers are OVERRULED.

First, Defendants argue that the allegations do not establish the requisite outrageous
conduct. Whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support an IIED cause of
action is generally a question of fact. (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671-672
[citations omitted].) Here, Plaintiffs allege that Paladin, acting as Defendants’ agent,
forcibly and without authorization took possession of the premises in the middle of the
night, ejected certain plaintiffs and brandished tazers or pistols in the process. Absent
an authority holding that such conduct cannot be considered outrageous as a matter of
law, the court concludes that the issue of outrageousness presents a factual question that the court may not resolve at this juncture.

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged severe emotional
distress or the intent to cause emotional distress. In fact, Plaintiffs have alleged that
they suffered severe emotional distress and that Defendants intended to cause them
severe emotional distress. (SAC, ¶ 114.) Because there is no heightened pleading
requirement associated with IIED, these allegations suffice to withstand demurrer.

To the extent Defendants rely on non-binding federal authority to argue that the court
should sustain the demurrer, the authority fails to persuade the court.

Defendants’ reliance on Lee v. Bank of America (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 914 is
unavailing as well. Although that case involved a prayer for emotional distress
damages, it did not involve a demurrer to an IIED cause of action and therefore is
distinguishable.

The Seventh Cause of Action for Invasion of Privacy

Defendants’ demurrers are OVERRULED.

Defendants demur on grounds that Plaintiffs have not alleged all the elements of “false
light.” Defendants, however, have not addressed the sufficiency of the allegations to
state a cause of action for the separate tort of intrusion into private affairs. (See CACI
Instr. No. 1800.) Because Defendants have failed to explain why the seventh cause of
action must be construed solely as one for false light, the demurrers are overruled.

The Eighth Cause of Action for Unfair Business Practices

Defendants’ demurrers are OVERRULED.

Citing non-binding federal authorities only, Defendants make cursory arguments that
(1) Plaintiffs have not alleged any conduct that was unlawful, unfair or fraudulent within
the purview of the unfair business practice statutes (B&P Code §§ 17200 et seq.) and
(2) Plaintiffs have not alleged fraud and deceit against consumers. For reasons stated
above, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants engaged in
unlawful conduct. Moreover, Defendants’ arguments do not persuade the court that
Plaintiffs cannot be construed as consumers within the meaning of the unfair
competition statutes. Thus, the court overrules the demurrers.

The court disregards Defendants’ argument, made for the first time in the Reply, that
homeowners’ associations are not considered businesses under the unfair competition
statutes. Plaintiffs have not had a fair opportunity to respond to this argument.

Conclusion

Defendants’ demurrers that the SAC is uncertain with respect to the identities of the
plaintiffs are SUSTAINED with leave to amend. The balance of Defendants’
demurrers are overruled.

No later than November 21, 2013, Plaintiffs may file and serve a third amended
complaint (“TAC”) that clarifies the identities of the plaintiffs bring this action;
Defendants to file and serve their responsive pleading(s) within 10 days thereafter, 15
days if the TAC is served by mail. (Although not required by any statute or rule of
court, Plaintiffs are requested to attach a copy of the instant minute order to the TAC to
facilitate the filing of the pleading.)

The TAC shall omit any reference to Jacobs Law Group’s representation of Plaintiff
Perrotta. Counsel withdrew from the representation on April 29, 2013.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC 3.1312 or
further notice is required.

Counsel are advised that the Sacramento County Superior Court’s Local Rules were
revised and renumbered as of 01/01/13. When giving notice of the court’s tentative
ruling system, counsel should cite Local Rule 1.06, not former Local Rule 3.04.

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One thought on “Steven L Saxon vs. Paladin Protection Services Inc

  1. Daniel Glenn DeLuca

    They’ve been torturing my family with energy weapons.. and installed a x-ray/ thermal device with uhf vhf tech. I’ve caught them too many times. They’ve hacked me hurt my kids and wife. They threaten our family and everyone is scared .. they use studio 55 as a cover to operate energy weapons off their property to independent contractors. Help us..

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