Case Name:    Steven Lui, et al. v. Jovita Lai, et al.

Case No.:        1-12-CV-227186

Date:               April 24, 2014

Time:              9:00 a.m.

Dept:               8

Defendants Jovita Lai (“Jovita”) and Tai Lai (“Tai”) (collectively, “Defendants”) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to plaintiffs Steven Lui and Betty Lui’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) second amended complaint (“SAC”) on the ground of failure to allege sufficient facts.  (See Code of Civ. Proc. [“CCP”], § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).)

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice in support of their opposition is GRANTED.  (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (c); see also Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 264.)

Defendants argue that the Court should grant their motion because the SAC fails to join “necessary” parties.  This argument is unavailing because defect or misjoinder of parties is not a ground for a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  (See CCP, § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).)

With respect to the first cause of action, Defendants argue that the tender rule applies.  However, the court (Hon. Carol Overton) already determined that “the tender rule is inapplicable” to this case.  (Order re: Demurrer to FAC, at p. 2:22-27.)  Moreover, the SAC alleges sufficient facts to support the elements of a claim for quiet title.  (See CCP, § 761.020 [elements of quiet title]; see also SAC, ¶¶ 1 [describing the property], 10-17 & 19-26 [the basis for Plaintiffs’ claim for title], 22-25 [Defendants’ asserted adverse claim], 22 [date of determination], and p. 10 ¶ 1 [alleging that Plaintiffs seek title in fee simple and praying for the determination of their title against adverse claims].)

Turning to the fraud claim, the elements of fraud must be specifically alleged.  (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73; see Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 [elements of fraud are misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance, and resulting damage]; see also Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (2004) 121 Cal App 4th 282, 191 [active concealment by a nonfiduciary constitutes fraud].)  Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, Plaintiffs specifically plead that Jovita fraudulently misrepresented that Defendants and Eric Lam owned the subject property and would sell it to Plaintiffs; however, at the time of the representation, Jovita allegedly intended for Defendants to retain their ownership.  (SAC, ¶¶ 10 & 28-29.)  The SAC also specifically alleges that Tai actively concealed from Plaintiffs the material fact that Defendants intended to retain their interest in the subject property when they orally agreed to sell the property.  (Id., ¶¶ 21 & 28-29.)

As for the third cause of action, Defendants argue that the SAC does not allege the parties’ capability to enter into a contract, mutual consideration, and mutual consent.  However, a plaintiff is only required to plead existence of a contract, not facts in support of each element necessary to ultimately prove that the alleged contract is valid.  (Roth v. Maison (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557 [elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) existence of a contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance; (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) damage].)  Whether Plaintiffs are able to prove the validity of the alleged contract is inconsequential.  (See Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal App 4th 995, 999.)  Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs failed allege the exact terms of the contract.  Since the alleged contract is oral, Plaintiffs are only required to plead its general legal effect.  (See Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)  The SAC alleges that the legal effect was to convey ownership of the property to Plaintiffs.  (SAC, ¶¶ 14-15.)  Lastly, Defendants assert the statute of frauds.  However, the statute of frauds only supports a motion for judgment on the pleadings “when the complaint shows on its face” that the contract “is within the statute of frauds and does not comply with its requirements.”  (See Parker v. Solomon (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d 125, 136.)  The SAC alleges that Plaintiffs performed under the oral contract by taking possession of the property (SAC, ¶ 11), and thus, the alleged contract is not within the statute of frauds.  (Calanchini v. Branstetter (1890) 84 Cal. 249, 253 [oral contract to sell real property is enforceable where the buyer partially performs by taking possession of the subject property]; see also Civ. Code, §§ 1624 & 1972.).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.