The Parsons Group, Inc vs David Rea
Case No: 19CV02153
Hearing Date: Fri Sep 27, 2019 9:30

Nature of Proceedings: Motion: Injunctive Order for Injunction Staying Proceedings

TENTATIVE RULING:

For the reasons set forth herein, the motion of defendant David Rea for an injunction to stay proceedings in this action is denied.

Background:

This action is a limited jurisdiction unlawful detainer action (case No. 19CV02153, the UD Case) Related to this action is an unlimited jurisdiction disability discrimination case (case No. 19CV02931, the Discrimination Case). The plaintiff in the UD Case, The Parsons Group, Inc. (Parsons), is the defendant in the Discrimination Case; the plaintiff in the Discrimination Case, David Rea, is the defendant in the UD Case.

The UD Case was filed on April 22, 2019. The UD Case is based upon a thirty-day notice to quit which asserts that Rea has violated the terms of his lease to premises located at 1116 De La Vina Street #113, Santa Barbara (the Premises), which is within “Garden Court,” by failing to maintain proper sanitary conditions of both his person and property, by repeatedly interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the community by others, and by failing timely to pay rent and other charges. (UD Complaint, exhibit B.)

On April 29, 2019, Rea filed his answer in the UD Case, generally denying the allegations of the complaint and asserting affirmative defenses including defenses that Parsons is discriminating against Rea for not providing reasonable accommodations for Rea’s disabilities and that Parsons accepted rent to cover a period of time after the notice to quit. (UD Answer, ¶¶ 3h, 3k.)

On June 4, 2019, Rea filed his complaint in the Discrimination Case, asserting causes of action for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, financial elder abuse, and unfair business practices. The complaint seeks, among other things, compensatory damages and an injunction prohibiting Parsons from evicting Rea from the Premises.

On June 10, 2010, Rea filed a motion to consolidate the UD Case with the Discrimination Case for all purposes. The motion was opposed by Parsons.

On July 26, 2019, the court heard and denied the motion to consolidate. Among other things, the court stated that consolidation was not appropriate under the circumstances in part because an injunction to stay the UD Case could accomplish the same goals sought by Rea in moving to consolidate, but the court could more flexibly analyze and address the issues in the context of an injunction motion.

On August 13, 2019, Rea filed this motion for an injunction to stay this action. (Note: As explained below, because this motion is brought in this UD Case, it is properly identified as a motion to stay. The court will refer to this motion as a motion to stay hereafter.)

On August 15, 2019, the court, on the stipulation of the parties, ordered the Discrimination Case related to this case and transferred to this Department.

On September 10, 2019, Parsons filed its opposition to the motion to stay this action.

(1) Evidence Presented in Support of Motion

In support of the motion to stay, Rea presents the declarations of defendant Rea, Angelica Salazar-Flores, David Dodson, M.D., and attorney Eric A. Woosley.

In his declaration, Rea states that he has been residing at the Premises since December 3, 2018. (Rea decl., ¶ 3.) Rea received a Section 8 voucher based on his age, disabilities, and income, so that his share of the lease payment is $276.00 per month. (Rea decl., ¶ 4.) Rea is age 69. (Rea decl., ¶ 2.)

At the time Rea moved into the Premises, he suffered from the following disabilities: (a) anxiety disorder; (b) chronic pain in feet and back; (c) urinary control issues most likely associated with his prostate; (d) alcoholism; and, (e) he is a recovering drug addict. (Rea decl., ¶ 5.) Rea takes for his disabilities diuretics, Quinapin and methadone. (Rea decl., ¶ 6.)

Rea has no housing arrangements available other than the Premises. (Rea decl., ¶ 8.) He has no family to provide housing. (Ibid.) He has no funds available for unsubsidized housing. (Ibid.) There are lengthy waiting lists to get into other Section 8 facilities within Santa Barbara County. (Ibid.) If Rea is required to move out of the Premises before another facility can be arranged, he will be left homeless and forced to live on the streets. (Rea decl., ¶ 10.)

Rea is doing his best to comply with all of the requests made of him by Parsons to satisfy its concerns but his condition makes it difficult. (Rea decl., ¶ 9.) Rea has been attempting to pay his share of the lease payments, but Parsons has refused his payment. (Rea decl., ¶ 11.)

Salazar-Flores is a social worker for Adult Protective Services of the County of Santa Barbara. (Salazar-Flores decl., ¶ 1.) Rea suffers from a variety of disabilities for which he receives treatment, including (a) a history of polysubstance abuse with active alcoholism, (b) cellulitis, (c) CHF (congestive heart failure), (d) chronic ulcer of right and left foot, (e) failure to thrive adult, (f) cirrhosis, (g) osteomyelitis of ankle or foot, acute, right (CMS/HCC), (h) peripheral neuropathy, and (i) renal failure. (Salazar-Flores decl., ¶ 3.) It is Salazar-Flores’s experience that Rea’s uncleanliness and urination issue is confined to Rea’s room with little to no impact on passersby. (Salazar-Flores decl., ¶ 4.)

Because of Rea’s financial condition, Rea qualifies for a Section 8 housing voucher. (Salazar-Flores decl., ¶ 5.) Without this voucher, and a facility that will accept it, Rea has no housing alternatives. (Ibid.) The current waitlist for such facilities in Santa Barbara County is not months but years. (Ibid.) If Rea is evicted from the Premises, Rea has no alternative living arrangements. (Salazar-Flores decl., ¶ 6.) Being forced to live on the street is likely to have dire consequences for Rea. (Ibid.)

David Dodson, M.D., is Rea’s treating physician since November 30, 2015. (Dodson decl., ¶ 1.) Rea suffers from (a) a history of polysubstance abuse with active alcoholism, (b) cellulitis, (c) CHF (congestive heart failure), (d) chronic ulcer of right and left foot, (e) failure to thrive adult, (f) cirrhosis, (g) osteomyelitis of ankle or foot, acute, right (CMS/HCC), (h) peripheral neuropathy, and (i) chronic kidney disease. (Dodson decl., ¶ 2.) Rea is currently prescribed diuretics, Quinapin, and methadone. (Dodson decl., ¶ 3.) Rea has great difficulty walking and currently utilizes a wheelchair or electric scooter to move about. (Dodson decl., ¶ 4.) Given Rea’s numerous physical disabilities, he would not fare well if forced to leave permanent housing and live on the street, and his condition would not only decline but that it would be the death of him. (Dodson decl., ¶ 5.)

Eric A. Woosley is counsel for Rea. (Woosley decl., ¶ 1.) On May 29, 2019, co-counsel, attorney Alexander Lambrous, sent correspondence to counsel for Parsons asserting that Parsons’ actions constitute discriminatory conduct and requesting that Rea’s disability be accommodated by the dismissal of the UD Case, by management refraining from any and all threats, harassment, or other forms of intimidation directed towards Rea, and by Parsons cooperating with Rea, his social workers, Adult Protective Services, and residential caretakers “to allow Mr. Rea to receive the care he needs to alleviate the symptoms of his disabilities.” (Woosley decl., ¶ 3 & exhibit 2, p. 2.) No response was received by counsel. (Woosley decl., ¶ 3.) As of August 6, 2019, there were no citations against Rea, or against Parsons based on Rea’s conduct, for health or safety related violations by any authority charged with such compliance. (Woosley decl., ¶ 4.) There were, however, a plethora of complaints about Rea “most relatively minor.” (Ibid.)

(2) Evidence Presented in Opposition to the Motion

In opposition to the motion, Parsons presents the declarations of Charlene Fletcher, Carole McHugh, Chris Tucker, and attorney Cristi Michelon Vasquez.

Charlene Fletcher is the Director of Residents Services of Parsons. (Fletcher decl., ¶ 1.) Fletcher recounts observing an incident occurring on June 14, 2019, as follows:

“While in the office I observed Rea in the common hallway on his motorized scooter traveling at a very fast and unsafe speed. I had explained to Rea many times previously that he must use the slowest setting on his motorized scooter while inside the building at Garden Court. I asked Rea to slow down. Without slowing, Rea responded to me, ‘yeah, yeah, kid.’” (Fletcher decl., ¶ 2.) “Rea then turned the corner in the hallway, continuing to travel very fast on his scooter. Soon I heard someone yelling “STOP, STOP, STOP!” from around the corner, and then I heard someone screaming. We [Fletcher and volunteer Diane Brocklesby] then ran down the hallway and around the corner just in time to see Garden Court Resident Carole McHugh removing her leg from being pinned against the wall behind Rea’s scooter. Gerald Dietz, another Garden Court resident, was helping Carole.” (Fletcher decl., ¶ 3.) “We watched as Gerald and Carole retreated down the hallway in our direction. Rea then stood up from his scooter and ran down the hallway toward the four of us, swinging his fists and yelling aggressively ‘I used to be a pro boxer, I’m going beat the shit out you!’ ” (Fletcher decl., ¶ 4.) “Rea then lunged toward the entire group, continuing to swing his fists and yelling, ‘come back here, I’m going to beat the shit out of you!’ I was able to block Rea with my body, while Rea continued to swing his fists over my head and shoulders toward Carole and Gerald. Diane ushered Gerald and Carole into an open office and locked the door behind them. Rea then demanded that I provide him with Gerald’s name and apartment number. When asked why he needed this information, Rea responded, ‘because I am going to beat the shit out of him.’ ” (Fletcher decl., ¶ 5.)

Fletcher also recounts witnessing Rea on a regular basis verbally abusing Garden Court female residents and others. (Fletcher decl., ¶¶ 6, 7.) Further, on June 26, 2019, Rea set off the fire alarm in Garden Court from smoke caused by an unauthorized kitchen top skillet which had caught fire. (Fletcher decl., ¶ 7.)

Carole McHugh, age 86, confirms the incident recounted by Fletcher. (McHugh decl., ¶¶ 2-5.) McHugh was left shaken and terrified by the attack by Rea and lives in fear Rea will attack and hurt her at any moment. (McHugh decl., ¶ 6.)

Chris Tucker is the Executive Director for Parsons. (Tucker decl., ¶ 1.) Garden Court, which includes the Premises, is an independent living facility for low-income seniors. (Tucker decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Garden Court is not a licensed assisted living or skilled nursing facility and does not provide medical or health services for tenants. (Tucker decl., ¶ 3.) Services provided by Parsons at Garden Court include three daily meals, housekeeping twice monthly, transportation, 24-hour staffing, maintenance, and recreational and educational activities. (Ibid.) Parsons’ staff at Garden Court are not equipped or licensed to take care of tenants’ daily medical needs, and Garden Court does not have the facilities or human resources to provide such services. (Ibid.)

At the time Rea was referred to Garden Court, Parsons had no knowledge of Rea’s issues with addiction, intoxication, causing property damage, or altercations with staff or residents. (Tucker decl., ¶ 4.) Parsons was not aware that Rea had bladder and bowel incontinence and an alleged inability to self-manage his incontinence. (Ibid.) Parsons was not aware that Rea had a history of heroin, methadone, and alcohol addiction. (Ibid.) Parsons was not aware that Rea had a history of unwillingness to bathe and a tendency to wear soiled clothes. (Ibid.) Parsons was not aware Rea’s anti-social behavior included the use of physically, racially, and sexually abusive language. (Ibid.) Had Parsons known Rea would require assisted living services to manage his medical condition, or had Parsons been aware of the threat Rea would pose to the health and wellbeing of Garden Court staff and residents, Parsons would not have accepted Rea for tenancy at Garden Court. (Ibid.)

Parsons has received numerous reports of lease violations by Rea, including objectionable odors in common areas, creation of a hostile workplace for Garden Court staff, creation of an unhealthy living environment for Garden Court tenants, verbal and physical assaults and threats of assault on Garden Court tenants, damage to Garden Court property. (Tucker decl., ¶¶ 5-6 & exhibit 1.)

Throughout Rea’s tenancy, Parson has made numerous efforts to accommodate Rea’s needs, including Enrolling Rea in the In-Home Supportive Services program (IHSS) and helping to schedule and coordinate his hours, suggesting, coordinating, and transporting Rea to the Cottage Hospital detoxification program, coordinating, at no charge, on four occasions, the full cleaning of the Premises after bouts of incontinence, replacing the refrigerator Rea broke at no charge, replacing the bathroom door Rea broke at no charge, replacing the closet doors Rea broke at no charge, contracting and coordinating with Visiting Nurse medical assistance on Rea’s behalf on multiple occasions, contacting Adult Protective Services on multiple occasions to coordinate support services for Rea, activating the Housing Authority’s Home Care Program and enrollment for Rea, and scheduling visits to the Premises on Rea’s behalf. (Tucker decl., ¶ 7.)

Observations by Parsons staff indicate that Rea is capable of modifying his behavior if he so desires, such as changing into unsoiled clothing, bathing himself, and refraining from engaging in verbal abuse of others. (Tucker decl., ¶ 8.)

There are 18 ALW facilities in Los Angeles County that currently have availability for Rea. (Tucker decl., ¶ 10.)

Tucker notes that Salazar-Flores visits Rea at the Premises on a monthly basis. (Tucker decl., ¶ 12.)

Attorney Cristi Michelon Vasquez is counsel for Parsons and a prior counsel of record in this matter. (Vasquez decl., ¶ 1.) Vasquez disputes the circumstances regarding efforts to resolve Rea’s issues among counsel as asserted by Rea. (Vasquez decl., ¶¶ 6-13.)

(3) Reply Evidence

In reply, Rea presents the supplemental declarations of Salazar-Flores, Dodson, and Woosley. The court considers the supplemental declarations notwithstanding that they are provided in reply. Parsons may respond to the reply declarations, as necessary or appropriate, at the hearing of this matter.

Salazar-Flores responds to Tucker’s declaration by stating that Tucker never provided her a list of potential facilities to house Rea. (Salazar-Flores decl., ¶ 2.) The only information Tucker provided was contact information for the California Assisted Living Waiver program for Medi/Medi, of which Salazar-Flores was already aware. (Ibid.) Salazar-Flores explained to Tucker that it had no facilities available in Santa Barbara County and it would require Rea to leave Santa Barbara County, which Rea did not want to do. (Ibid.)

Dr. Dodson responds that he examined Rea on August 19, 2019, so that he could issue him a clearance to enter into a detoxification program. (Dodson decl., ¶ 3.) Rea was issued the required clearance, apart from a pending tuberculosis test. (Dodson decl., ¶ 4.) The TB result was negative and Rea entered the detoxification program at Cottage Hospital. (Dodson decl., ¶ 5.) Rea completed the detoxification program at Cottage and then was transferred to Providence Ojai, a skilled nursing facility, to deal with some of his physical disabilities, where he is still a resident. (Dodson decl., ¶ 6.)

Dr. Dodson states his opinion that the reported incidents were symptoms of, and directly related to, Rea’s diagnosed disabilities, including alcohol abuse. (Dodson decl., ¶¶ 8-11.) Not consuming alcohol should eliminate most of the reported issues. (Dodson decl., ¶ 12.) Dr. Dodson disputes Tucker’s opinions as to whether Rea can or could change the effects that alcohol has on him. (Dodson decl., ¶ 13.)

Analysis:

(1) Procedural Posture

This motion follows from the court’s prior ruling denying consolidation of the UD Case and the Discrimination Case. In that ruling, the court stated:

“Although the manner in which the litigation between the parties is resolved must be resolved consistent with Rea’s due process rights, the court does not find that consolidation is the appropriate procedural vehicle. As the court in Asuncion v. Superior Court [(1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 141, 146-147], pointed out, consolidation and joint litigation is only one possibility—a stay of the unlawful detainer action based on the authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 526 for a preliminary injunctions is another.

“In the context of these actions, a motion for stay of this action (preliminary injunction) to be made in the Discrimination Case is a much better procedural vehicle to address this issue. … There are several bases asserted for termination of the tenancy, including disruptive behavior in violation of the terms of the tenancy. Parsons also asserts health and safety issues arising from Rea’s conduct that may need to be separately addressed from the claims of discrimination. The court in this UD Case is not now in a position to address these issues. The court addressing a stay motion (preliminary injunction), which motion would be supported and opposed by appropriate evidence, would be in a good position to balance the traditional factors of a preliminary injunction. If relief is warranted, the court could fashion that relief with appropriate qualifications or conditions to balance the need for prompt adjudication of the issue of possession with Rea’s need for time to litigate his discrimination claims. Under the circumstances now presented in the context of this motion, the court does not find that consolidation is appropriate.” (Minute Order, filed July 26, 2019, p. 3.)

This motion is filed in this UD Case and not in the Discrimination Case. Thus, the motion seeks an order staying the proceedings in this case as opposed to an order seeking to prevent proceedings in a different case. It is properly a motion to stay and not a motion for an injunction. (See Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 385.) Notwithstanding the technical differences between a stay and an injunction, a motion for a stay is analogous to an injunction and here raises the same equitable issues. (See Asuncion v. Superior Court, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 147.) The analytic framework of an injunction serves the analysis of this motion well and will be used herein.

It is important to note that the procedural posture of this case is that trial has not occurred and no trial date is now scheduled. The outcome of this motion will, of course, determine whether a trial may be set. But a significant consequence is that there has been no judicial determination of the merits of the UD Case. Moreover, where an unlawful detainer action results in a judgment, a stay of the resulting unlawful detainer judgment pending appeal is possible subject to statutory standards and restrictions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1176, subd. (a).)

(2) General Principles

“The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. [Citations.] ‘[By] balancing the respective equities of the parties, [the court] concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.’ [Citations.]” (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206.) As in typical law and motion matters, Rea, as the party seeking relief has the burden of proof. (See Evid. Code, § 500; O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481 [preliminary injunction].)

(3) Likelihood of Greater Injury

The greater injury analysis is a comparison of the potential injuries if the injunction is granted or denied erroneously. If the court granted the motion to stay and Parsons ultimately prevails, the injury to Parsons is in the delay in obtaining possession of the Premises from Rea. If this occurs, the trier of fact will have found that Rea did violate the terms of his tenancy by the actions asserted in the notice to quit and, unless based solely on a failure to pay rent, that Parsons did not refuse reasonable accommodations relating to Rea’s disabilities. The delay inherently deprives Parsons of its right to an expedited hearing through the unlawful detainer process. (See Martin-Bragg v. Moore, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at p. 390; Code Civ. Proc., § 1170.5.) This action’s impingement on that right has been somewhat muted by the delay already in bringing this case, filed April 22, 2019, to trial.

However, the evidence presented by the parties strongly suggests that this delay has already had, and by implication will continue to have, a serious detrimental effect upon Parsons by Rea’s continued presence at the Premises. Although the UD Case was filed in April 2019 based upon alleged acts of Rea occurring before then, Parsons presents evidence of Rea’s further activity in violation of the tenancy with respect to the incident involving Carole McHugh in June 2019. Erroneously granting the injunction would serve to enable further incidents, of this kind or otherwise of the kind upon which the notice to quit is based.

If the court denied the motion to stay, the effects on Rea are cloudy. The immediate effect would be to facilitate a prompt trial in the UD Case. Although there is argument that a prompt trial would violate Rea’s due process rights, there is no persuasive evidence presented to support this argument. There has already been substantial time since the filing of this action beyond the ordinary time for trial of an unlawful detainer action. The Discrimination Case was filed on June 4, 2019. There is no evidence presented that, with the opportunities to prepare for trial already existing, trial within the next 30 days would prevent Rea from presenting his defense in the UD Case. The court notes that discrimination claims, as limited to the issue of the basis for the termination of tenancy upon which the UD Case is based, may be properly asserted in defense of an unlawful detainer action. (Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 242, 255; see also Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 724.) If Rea prevails at that trial, then there is no apparent injury to Rea by the denial of the motion to stay.

The harm asserted in support of the motion, namely, that Rea will be dispossessed of the Premises and thrown out onto the street, assumes that Rea will lose on the merits of the UD Case if the motion to stay is denied. Such harm would occur, as it relates to this analytical issue, only to the extent that Rea was prevented, either by law or by the requirement of a prompt trial, from asserting his defense consistent with his due process rights. Again, there is no persuasive evidence presented to support the argument that Rea could not present a defense fully consistent with his due process rights.

Assuming that a prompt trial in the UD Case occasioned by the deny of the stay would lead to Rea’s loss on the merits, Rea presents evidence in his moving papers that this would mean that Rea would be forced to live on the streets and would likely die as a result. In opposition, Parsons presents evidence that, although there is a years-long wait for Section 8 housing in Santa Barbara County, there is such housing available now in Los Angeles County. In reply, there is a dispute as to how and when Los Angeles County availability was conveyed to Rea, but no factual dispute that there are out-of-county alternatives available, even if Rea does not wish to leave Santa Barbara County. Notwithstanding, Rea also presents evidence in reply that he is currently in a facility in Ojai, which is not located in Santa Barbara County.

(4) Probability of Success on the Merits

In order to analyze these interrelated questions, it is necessary to identify how these questions apply to the order that is sought. The motion is to stay these proceedings, that is, to delay trial on the merits on the UD Case until trial of the Discrimination Case. As the evidence is presented in connection with this motion, Rea does not substantively dispute the facts of his conduct or that his conduct objectively violates the express terms and conditions of his tenancy. In his moving papers, Rea merely states that he is doing his best to comply with Parsons’ requests to satisfy its concerns. (Rea decl., ¶ 9.) In reply, and in response to Parsons’ argument that the moving papers do not demonstrate that Rea’s conduct was caused by his disabilities, Dr. Dodson provides an opinion that Rea’s conduct and incidents are symptoms of his disabilities and would be resolved by Rea’s sobriety. (Dodson decl., ¶¶ 8-12.) There is no substantial dispute in the evidence that Rea suffers from multiple disabilities, including active alcoholism, and that the incidents asserted by Parsons as the basis for termination of Rea’s tenancy violate the express terms and conditions of that tenancy.

The issue presented is thus whether Rea can defeat the unlawful detainer claim by asserting that Rea’s conduct is a consequence of his disabilities. “A person renting, leasing, or otherwise providing real property for compensation shall not refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or services, when those accommodations may be necessary to afford individuals with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy the premises.” (Civ. Code, § 54.1, subd. (b)(3)(B).)

The issue of whether the asserted disability discrimination may defeat the unlawful detainer claim is a narrower issue than whether Rea may obtain damages from Parsons for disability discrimination. The issue is narrower because there are multiple bases asserted for termination of Rea’s tenancy. If it were true that some bases for termination were improper because there was a failure to make a reasonable accommodation, those failures could perhaps support a claim for damages for disability discrimination. However, if there are other bases for termination that do not reflect a failure to make a reasonable accommodation, that fact may be sufficient to support termination of the tenancy. In other words, Parsons does not need to succeed on every asserted basis for termination of the tenancy in order to prevail in the UD Case. The two cases overlap somewhat, but present different issues.

The issue of reasonable accommodation as to conduct is not a subject of much discussion in the case law in the housing context. However, reasonable accommodation as to conduct is discussed in the analogous context of employment. In that context, the law is fairly clear as to what accommodations are necessary to address conduct stemming from conditions such as alcoholism:

“ ‘Reasonable accommodation’ does not include excusing a failure to control a controllable disability or giving an employee a ‘second chance’ to control the disability in the future. [Citation.] In [Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights (7th Cir. 1995) 65 F.3d 664], a probationary police officer had a diabetic reaction which resulted in disorientation and memory loss, which caused him to drive his squad car at high speed in residential areas outside his jurisdiction. He was terminated for this conduct. He sought a ‘second chance’ to properly monitor his diabetes as a reasonable accommodation. The Seventh Circuit concluded the ADA did not require the employer to give the employee a second chance to properly monitor his disease. [Citation.] The employee contended the error was not his, but his physician’s. The appellate court held that even if this were true, the employer ‘should not be required to pay for [the employee’s] physician’s mistakes.’ [Citation.] The appellate court held that ‘when an employee knows that he is afflicted with a disability, needs no accommodation from his employer, and fails to meet “the employer’s legitimate job expectations,” [citation], due to his failure to control a controllable disability, he cannot state a cause of action under the ADA.’ [Citation.]” (Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 239.) In any case, “an employer may terminate an employee for disability-caused misconduct involving threats or violence against coworkers.” (Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 143, 164.)

By analogy to the employment context, the question is what accommodation was requested by Rea, or could be offered to Rea by Parsons, that would constitute a reasonable accommodation to address Rea’s conduct. The evidence strongly suggests that no accommodation could reasonably mitigate Rea’s conduct. Parsons provides evidence of the incident involving Carole McHugh in June 2019. If Rea is actually unable to control his own conduct of the kind involved in that incident because of his disabilities, then accommodating Rea’s disabilities by allowing the conduct to continue unabated is to constantly put McHugh and all other tenants at risk of a recurrence of Rea’s highly improper conduct. Rea, McHugh, other tenants have a right to the quiet enjoyment of the premises. An accommodation that permits Rea to verbally and physically assault other tenants is not reasonable. It is not a reasonable accommodation that forces McHugh to live in fear of Rea and her safety.

Moreover, this is not a situation where Rea had a single episode that is unlikely to recur. The June 2019 incident, which is not factually disputed in the evidence here, occurred after the notice to quit had expired and after the UD Case was filed. Thus, even in the face of pending litigation to evict Rea from the Premises as a result of his conduct, Rea continued to endanger and to harass other tenants. Although there is evidence that Rea is now seeking rehabilitation, as noted above by analogy to the employment context, Parsons is not obligated to give Rea yet another chance and to place the other tenants at risk that Rea will relapse. On the evidence presented, the court finds the likelihood that Rea will prevail in the UD Case by asserting the failure of Parsons to reasonably accommodate his disabilities to be low.

(5) Balance of Equities

The balance of the equities does not favor granting the motion to stay the UD Case. Based upon the evidence presented in this motion, Rea’s conduct as it relates to verbally and physically assaulting other tenants is a serious matter in plain violation of the terms and conditions of the tenancy. No accommodation would be reasonable that permits Rea to continue that conduct to the risk and detriment of the Parsons property and its other tenants. The equities therefore strongly support resolving the UD Case on its merits promptly and not to delay resolution of the UD Case so that all aspects of Rea’s discrimination claims may be resolved at the same time. The court is mindful that, if the UD Case is resolved on its merits adversely to Rea, Rea would be dispossessed of the Premises and would need to move out. Because of Rea’s financial and physical condition, Rea may not be able to find other housing in Santa Barbara County. To the extent that Rea argues that this will put him on the streets, the court finds on the evidence presented that Rea has other options, even if those options are not to his liking, and so the balance of harms does not support granting the motion as viewed as a sliding scale with respect to the likelihood of prevailing on the merits.

Consequently, taking all of the evidence, argument, and the above analysis into consideration, the court finds that Rea has not met his burden for the relief sought and that the balance of the harms and equities does not favor granting the relief sought. Accordingly, Rea’s motion to stay this action will be denied.