Filed 12/11/19 P. v. Gale CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROB RAY GALE,

Defendant and Appellant.

E072839

(Super.Ct.No. RIF1603289)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michael B. Donner, Judge. Affirmed.

Rob Ray Gale, in pro. per.; Tanya Dellaca, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Rob Ray Gale pled guilty to two counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, with a prior Penal Code section 273.5 conviction. (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1), counts 1 & 2.) He also admitted that he personally inflicted great bodily injury as to count 1 (§§ 12022.7, subd. (e) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), that he had one prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1) & 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)), and that he had served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). In exchange, a trial court dismissed two other counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse with a prior conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)) and various other allegations. At sentencing, the court dismissed the prior prison allegation, pursuant to the People’s request, and sentenced defendant to 15 years eight months in state prison.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal, in propria persona, based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea, claiming that he was “unfairly pressured into the trial stage,” denied the right to full discovery, and that the judge was evidently prejudice. He filed a request for a certificate of probable cause, which the court denied.

We affirm the judgment.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged by information with four counts of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, with a prior section 273.5 conviction. (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1), counts 1-4.) The information also alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.7, subd. (e) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), as to counts 1, 2, and 4, served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), had one prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), and had one prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), & 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)).

Defendant was represented by counsel, but petitioned the court to proceed in propria persona. After warning defendant of the seriousness of his case, the court relieved his counsel and granted the request. Defendant subsequently filed numerous handwritten motions, including a motion to dismiss one of his prison priors, which the court granted.

On November 9, 2018, defendant filed a Pitchess motion, requesting the records of internal sheriff’s department investigations into complaints of all officers involved in this case. He then filed a motion “to utilize Senate Bill 1421” to supplement his Pitchess motion, listing certain investigators and officers. The Riverside County Sheriff’s Department filed a letter stating no records existed that were responsive to defendant’s request. The court denied the Pitchess motion, finding it to be difficult to follow and vague and overbroad. The court noted that it contained “a lot of conclusory accusations” and a lack of facts.

On February 20, 2019, defendant requested appointed counsel. Counsel was appointed the same day.

On February 27, 2019, defendant entered a plea agreement and admitted that, on or about June 12, 2016 and June 22, 2016, he committed the crime of inflicting corporal injury upon a spouse, and that he had previously been convicted of section 273.5, subdivision (a). (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1), counts 1 & 2.) He also admitted that he personally inflicted great bodily injury as to count 1 (§§ 12022.7, subd. (e) & 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)), that he had one prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1) & 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)), and that he had served one prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

Defendant subsequently requested to participate in mental health diversion under section 1001.36. The court noted that it had discussed the issue with defense counsel off the record, that it had reviewed defendant’s criminal history, and that it went through the six criteria for diversion under section 1001.36. The court ultimately found that defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety in light of his violent criminal history. Therefore, it denied the request for diversion.

Pursuant to the People’s request, the court dismissed the prior prison allegation and then sentenced defendant to 15 years eight months in state prison. It also dismissed the remaining counts and allegations.

ANALYSIS

Defendant appealed and, upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and identifying the following potential arguable issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s Pitchess motion; and (2) whether the court erred in denying his request to participate in mental health diversion, pursuant to section 1001.36. Counsel has also requested this court to undertake a review of the entire record.

We offered the defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, which he has done. The supplemental brief stated that he disagreed with his appellate counsel’s decision to file a Wende brief, asserted that he was treated unfairly by the Riverside courts and sheriff, and claimed that he was “scared into” signing the plea agreement and “wish[ed he had] never signed” it. Defendant subsequently filed an amended supplemental brief, arguing that his request for mental health diversion under section 1001.36 was denied unfairly since he fit the criteria, and he asks this court to “review the entire case for bias/prejudice and abuse of discretion.”

Defendant’s first supplemental brief simply contains general assertions and allegations. The only potential claim he makes is that he was somehow coerced into entering the plea agreement. However, the record demonstrates that the court asked him if he personally initialed and signed the plea form and if he discussed the plea form with his attorney and understood everything on it. The court confirmed that he wanted to waive his rights and plead guilty, and it found that he knowingly, voluntarily, and freely entered the agreement.

As to defendant’s claim in his amended supplemental brief that the court erred in denying his request for mental health diversion, we disagree. The court stated it had a problem with the sixth factor in the criteria for eligibility under section 1001.36, which required it to be satisfied that defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(F).) The court reviewed defendant’s criminal history, presented by the People, which detailed numerous incidents of defendant grabbing, punching, threatening, and/or stabbing his former girlfriends. The incidents dated back to 2007 and occurred through 2016. The court described his criminal history as “a continuum of violence” toward women, and specifically pointed out an incident where defendant stabbed his former girlfriend in the face with a screwdriver, and threatened to kill her and burn her house down. We cannot say the court erred in concluding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(F).) Thus, it properly denied his request for mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)

Pursuant to the mandate of People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, we have conducted an independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

McKINSTER

Acting P. J.

We concur:

MILLER

J.

SLOUGH

J.