Filed 1/31/20 Robinson v. Wiley CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THERESA WILLIAMS ROBINSON,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JACQUENETTE WILEY, as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

D075053

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2016-00032541- PR-TR-CTL)

APPEAL from an order following trial of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Julia Craig Kelety, Judge. Reversed; remanded with directions.

The Stone Law Group, Kenneth H. Stone and Phillip J. Szachowicz, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Theresa Williams Robinson filed a petition seeking to invalidate the Nathanial Williams Trust Estate dated June 2003 (Trust) and a February 26, 2007 amendment (2007 Amendment) to the Trust. The 2007 Amendment dictated that Robinson would not receive anything under the Trust. During the course of discovery, Robinson learned that there was an additional amendment to the Trust, dated May 21, 2010 (2010 Amendment). However, the 2010 Amendment did not mention Robinson, and Robinson did not amend her petition to challenge the validity of that amendment.

The matter proceeded to trial wherein Robinson argued the Trust, 2007 Amendment, and 2010 Amendment were all invalid based on forgery, lack of capacity of the trustor, and undue influence by the trustee Jacquenette Wiley. The superior court denied the petition in full. Nevertheless, it signed an order after trial that stated the Trust and 2007 Amendment were valid, but the 2010 Trust was invalid.

Wiley, as trustee of the Trust, appeals the portion of the order after trial declaring the 2010 Amendment invalid. Wiley maintains the challenged portion of the order went beyond the scope of the issues before the court at trial, and Williams lacked standing to contest the validity of the 2010 Amendment. In the alternative, Wiley contends the 2010 Amendment was valid. Robinson did not file any brief in this matter.

We agree with Wiley that Robinson lacked standing to challenge the 2010 Amendment. Once the court determined that the 2007 Amendment was valid, Robinson had no interest in the Trust estate. The 2010 Amendment did not pertain to her at all, but instead, removed two of her siblings as beneficiaries under the Trust. Accordingly, we reverse the order and remand this matter back to the superior court to strike its determination that the 2010 Amendment was invalid and then enter an amended order consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 12, 2003, Decedent Nathaniel Williams (Decedent) executed the Trust, naming his four children as beneficiaries: Wiley; Robinson; Nathaniel Williams, Jr. (Williams); and Sonia Williams Johnson (Johnson). Article II of the Trust set forth the following requirements that Decedent had to satisfy to amend the Trust:

“During the lifetime of the Trustor, this trust may be Altered, amended or revoked, in whole or in part, by written instrument signed by Trustor and filed with the Trustee, and upon any revocation, all such assets shall return to the Trustor free of trust.”

Following the execution of the Trust, Decedent became estranged from Robinson and Williams. Thus, Decedent executed the 2007 Amendment, removing Robinson and Williams as beneficiaries under the Trust. Between 2006 and 2010, the relationship among Decedent’s children deteriorated as both Robinson and Johnson believed that Wiley was attempting to isolate Decedent and ruin Decedent’s relationships with his other children. The rift between the siblings continued to grow to the point that Johnson’s son (Donovan) accused Wiley of attempting to kill Johnson. After Donovan communicated these accusations to Decedent, Decedent and Johnson’s relationship all but ended because Decedent disagreed with the accusations against Wiley.

Decedent subsequently executed the 2010 Amendment, removing Johnson as a beneficiary under the Trust. After the 2010 Amendment, Wiley was the sole beneficiary under the Trust.

Decedent passed away on January 20, 2013. On November 16, 2016, Robinson filed a petition seeking to invalidate the Trust and the 2007 Amendment. Robinson alleged that Wiley unduly influenced Decedent, Decedent lacked capacity to execute the Trust and the 2007 Amendment, and that Decedent’s signatures on those documents were forged. The petition made no reference to the 2010 Amendment.

On April 28, 2017, Wiley filed an opposition to the petition, denying any relief was warranted.

During the ensuing discovery, it became apparent that there were two amendments to the Trust: the 2007 Amendment and the 2010 Amendment. Nevertheless, Robinson did not seek to amend the petition to challenge the 2010 Amendment. However, in the joint trial readiness conference report (joint report), the parties listed the “[l]egal issues in dispute.” Among other issues listed, the joint report specifically referenced the 2010 Amendment as being in dispute: “Whether Decedent had the requisite capacity to execute the May 21, 2010 Amendment”; “Whether the May 21, 2010 Amendment was the product of undue influence”; and “Whether the May 21, 2010 Amendment was properly executed by Decedent.”

Despite listing a legal dispute as to the validity of the 2010 Amendment in the joint report, Robinson did not claim the 2010 Amendment was invalid in her trial brief, which was submitted almost two months after the joint report.

During trial on Robinson’s petition, Wiley, Robinson, and nine other witnesses testified regarding Decedent’s health, memory, mental fitness, relationship with his children, and the preparation of the various documents at the heart of the dispute. While testifying during her direct examination, Robinson mentioned that she became aware of the 2010 Amendment during discovery. After referencing the 2010 Amendment, Robinson’s trial counsel suggested they would “move on.” At that point, the court interjected, asking whether there was “a 2010 document before the court.” Robinson’s counsel responded, “There’s a document, but it’s like notaries—it’s a power of attorneys [sic] and things like that.” Wiley’s trial counsel then attempted to clarify the issue, “Your Honor, there is a 2010 amendment that is at issue in the case. It’s Exhibit 109, and it is notarized by a San Diego notary.”

Exhibit 109, the 2010 Amendment, was written in the style of a letter to “The Watkins Group, LLC” and dated May 21, 2010. The subject line referenced the “Nathaniel Williams Revocable Living Trust.” The document then reads:

“Amend to read as follows: [¶] The deletion of Sonia Louise Williams Johnson as a beneficiary to my estate, shall receive 0%. [¶] The deletion/removal of Nathaniel Williams, Jr, .[sic] now deceased. [¶] The addition of: . . . Innsdale Lane, San Diego, Ca. 92114 shall go to Jacquenette Williams Wiley shall [sic] receive 100% All assets shall be distributed to Jacquenette Williams Wiley. [¶] Schedule of Assets, remove California Coast, Mission Federal and 1993 Isuzu Rodeo.”

The document then appears to be signed by Decedent. Attached to the document is a California all-purpose acknowledgement signed by a notary. At trial, Robinson’s attorney asked Robinson several questions about the 2010 Amendment. Relevant here, Robinson testified that she believed Wiley had drafted the document and that the signature on the document did not appear to be Decedent’s. She also stated that she did not believe Decedent had the “capacity” to sign the 2010 Amendment.

During closing argument, Robinson’s attorney briefly discussed the 2010 Amendment:

“Regarding the alleged second amendment, 109, a few more years down the road, in 2010, May 21st, once again, the Court should find this invalid in that there’s problems with this document. Ms. Wiley indicated that she prepared it, she typed it. She says that [Decedent] signed it at his house on Innsdale. The notary said it was signed in his office in front of him. There’s additional problems with the notary as to how it was filled out. [¶] Clearly, [Decedent] did not have the capacity to sign Exhibit 109 and all three of the factors, once again, are there for [undue] influence”

After closing arguments, the court summed up its view of the evidence before making its ruling. In doing so, it discussed the 2010 Amendment:

“And I confess I don’t know quite what to make of Exhibit 109. I’m not completely sure that—whether that’s a direction to the attorney to do something, or whether that’s actually an amendment. Mr. Watkins [the Decedent’s attorney] had [a] very strange practice. And so for them to say ‘Well, if you want an amendment, you put it in writing and notarize it and send it to us, and we make it an amendment that you sign and notarize.’ It’s very, very strange, weird practice. I’m not really sure whether 108—or 109 is, in fact, a further amendment or whether it’s a letter of instruction to the attorney saying ‘I want you to, you know, make the following changes to my trust.’

“If it were the latter, then I think we would probably all agree that, even in writing, instructions to the attorney aren’t the same as a future amendment. The point is I don’t think it matters, really. At most, it shows that by 2010, so three years before death, he was still in mind that as to [Robinson], that she would not receive anything.”

In regard to Robinson’s challenge to the validity of the Trust and the 2007 Amendment, the court found that forgery was not proved. The court also stated that it did not find any “any evidence of lack of capacity.” Further, the court determined there was “no real evidence of [undue] influence.” The court therefore denied the petition “in full,” noting “it has not been proven that the trust is invalid or the amendment was invalid or Ms. Wiley should be removed and a new trustee appointed. The petition is denied, . . . .”

The court then asked Wiley’s counsel to prepare and submit a proposed judgment to Robinson’s counsel “for approval as to form and content.” Wiley’s attorney drafted a proposed judgment and sent it to Robinson’s counsel. The proposed judgment stated that Robinson would take nothing by way of her petition and judgment was entered in favor of Wiley. The proposed judgment also indicated that Wiley had been awarded costs. Wiley’s counsel and Robinson’s counsel could not reach agreement as to the content of the judgment. Thus, Wiley’s counsel submitted the proposed judgment to the court.

Robinson filed an objection to Wiley’s proposed judgment, arguing, among other things not germane to this appeal, that the court had found the 2010 Amendment invalid. Robinson also submitted a proposed order after trial. Wiley responded to the objection, noting Robinson’s petition only challenged the validity of the Trust and the 2007 Amendment.

Ultimately, the court signed Robinson’s proposed order after trial with a couple of changes. Relevant here, the order stated the following: “That the May 21, 2010 document is not a valid Amendment to the Trust.” The court signed the order on May 31, 2018 and served it June 1, 2018.

On June 15, 2018, Wiley filed a motion for a new trial to modify the order after trial. The hearing on the motion was held August 29, 2018. The court deemed the motion “denied by operation of law” because “the court’s power to rule on it expired on August 14, 2018.”

Wiley timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

The procedural posture of the instant matter is somewhat unorthodox. Robinson’s petition challenged the validity of the Trust and the 2007 Amendment. It did not mention the 2010 Amendment, apparently because Robinson was not aware of the existence of that amendment at the time the petition was filed. However, after learning of the 2010 Amendment during discovery, Robinson did not seek leave to amend her petition to challenge the validity of the 2010 Amendment. And she did not mention the 2010 Amendment in her trial brief.

However, in the joint report, the parties included in their list of “[l]egal issues in dispute:” “Whether Decedent had the requisite capacity to execute the May 21, 2010 Amendment”; “Whether the May 21, 2010 Amendment was the product of undue influence”; and “Whether the May 21, 2010 Amendment was properly executed by Decedent.” Further, during closing argument, Robinson’s attorney asked the court to find the 2010 Amendment invalid, claiming (1) there were “problems with th[e] document,” (2) Decedent did not have the capacity to sign it, and (3) “all three of the factors . . . are there for [undue] influence.”

The court found no evidence of forgery, lack of capacity, and undue influence. However, these findings appeared to be made in the context of the Trust and 2007 Amendment. That said, there is no indication in the trial transcript that the court found that Decedent lacked capacity to execute the 2010 Amendment or was unduly influenced to do so. Moreover, we can find nothing in the transcript that leads us to believe the court found the 2010 Amendment forged.

At most, the court appeared puzzled by the 2010 Amendment, noting it did not “know quite what to make of” it and not being “completely sure” “whether [it was] actually an amendment.” Yet, the court seemed to conclude that whether the 2010 Amendment was valid or if the document was merely instructions to the attorney to amend the Trust did not matter: “The point is I don’t think it matters, really.” Thus, the court did not explicitly find the 2010 Amendment valid or invalid in discussing its findings at the close of trial. Rather, the court implied that the validity of that amendment was unimportant in determining the issues in Robinson’s petition while observing that the document showed “that by 2010 . . . [Decedent] was still in mind that as to [Robinson], that she would not receive anything.”

The court denied Robinson’s petition “in full.” The court confirmed this finding in the order after trial, specifically delineating by handwritten notes on the order that stated “[t]he petition is denied.” The court also made clear in the order that it found that 2007 Amendment was valid, and that Robinson was no longer a beneficiary of the Trust due to the 2007 Amendment. Yet, in the order after trial, the court additionally found the 2010 Amendment was invalid. We see little basis in the record to support this conclusion. Nevertheless, we need not second guess the superior court or attempt to find a justification for this portion of the order. Wiley, for the first time on appeal, argues that Robinson lacked standing to challenge the 2010 Amendment. We agree.

” ‘ “Plaintiff’s lack of standing to sue on the claim is treated as a ‘jurisdictional’ defect and is not waived by defendant’s failure to raise it by demurrer or answer: ‘[C]ontentions based on a lack of standing involve jurisdictional challenges and may be raised at any time in the proceeding.’ ” [Citation.] “Lack of standing negates existence of a cause of action and is not waived by failure to object; it can even be raised for the first time on appeal.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Cummings v. Stanley (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 493, 501.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 367 requires that every action be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. A real party in interest has standing to bring suit. For probate proceedings, Probate Code section 48 defines “interested person” as follows:

“(a) Subject to subdivision (b), ‘interested person’ includes any of the following:

“(1) An heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding.

“(2) Any person having priority for appointment as personal representative.

“(3) A fiduciary representing an interested person.

“(b) The meaning of ‘interested person’ as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding.”

Standing under section 48 is “a fluid concept.” (Arman v. Bank of America (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 697, 702 (Arman).) “[S]ubdivision (a) provides a nonexclusive list of recognizable interests, providing the court with the authority to designate as an ‘interested person’ anyone having a property right in or claim against an estate which may be affected by the probate proceeding. On the other hand, section 48, subdivision (b) broadly permits the court to determine the sufficiency of a party’s interest for the purposes of each proceeding conducted.” (Estate of Maniscalco (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 520, 523-524 (Maniscalco); see Estate of Davis (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 663, 668 (Davis).)

The intent of the “interested party” requirement is to “prevent[] persons with no interest from delaying the settlement of estate affairs.” (Maniscalco, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 523.) Additionally, it “provide[s] the probate court with flexibility to control its proceedings to both further the best interests of the estate and to protect the rights of interested persons to those proceedings.” (Id. at p. 524; see Davis, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 668 [“section 48 gives the trial court . . . flexibility in controlling probate proceedings”].)

Here, Robinson was a beneficiary under the Trust. The 2007 Amendment removed Robinson as a beneficiary. She challenged the validity of the Trust and the 2007 Amendment. Clearly, Robinson was an “interested party” under section 48, subdivision (a)(1) because she was a named beneficiary of the Trust and then had her beneficiary status revoked by the 2007 Amendment. Therefore, she had standing to challenge the validity of both the Trust and the 2007 Amendment.

Nonetheless, Robinson’s standing to challenge the 2010 Amendment is more “fluid.” (See Arman, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.) Although she is not mentioned in the 2010 Amendment, that amendment would impact whomever had an interest in the Trust estate at the time it was executed. Put differently, if she was a beneficiary of the Trust at the time the 2010 Amendment was created, Robinson’s rights would be impacted by a court determining whether the 2010 Amendment was valid. If it was valid (and two other beneficiaries were removed from the Trust), Robinson would receive a larger share of the Trust estate. However, if she was not a beneficiary of the Trust at the time the 2010 Amendment was executed, her interests would not be impacted whatsoever by a determination of the validity of the 2010 Amendment.

Here, the court determined that the 2007 Amendment was valid, and that Robinson was no longer a beneficiary of the Trust. As such, she had no interest in the Trust estate after the 2007 Amendment was executed. Because the 2010 Amendment was executed some three years later, she had no property rights in or claim against the Trust estate at that time. As such, she was no longer an “interested person” under section 48, subdivision (a)(1) and lacked standing to sue as to the 2010 Amendment’s validity.

In short, once the court determined that Robinson had no interest in the Trust estate by way of the 2007 Amendment, she lacked standing to challenge the 2010 Amendment. Therefore, the court lacked the jurisdiction to declare the 2010 Amendment void in the course of the trial on Robinson’s petition. (See Hudis v. Crawford (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1586, 1592.) Consequently, the court erred in declaring the 2010 Amendment invalid.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed. This matter is remanded with directions for the superior court to strike any reference to the validity of the 2010 amendment in the order after trial dated May 31, 2016. The court may further amend the order to address possible confusion caused by removing any references to the 2010 Amendment. However, the court shall not include any language in the amended order regarding the validity of the 2010 Amendment whatsoever, except to note that the issue of the validity of that amendment was not determined in this matter.

Wiley is entitled to her costs on appeal.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

AARON, J.