Filed 12/17/19 Marriage of Brann CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of TINA and WILLIAM BRANN. H045424

(San Benito County

Super. Ct. No. FL-14-00138)
TINA MARIE MALLOY,

Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM ANDREW BRANN,

Appellant.
In February 2014, Appellant William Brann (“William”) and Respondent Tina Marie Malloy (“Tina”) signed a quitclaim deed conveying their interest as a married couple in a real property on Promise Way in Hollister, California, to Tina, as a single person. Upon dissolution of the parties’ marriage, the trial court found William transmuted his interest in the property to Tina by signing the deed, and found no undue influence in the transfer. It thus awarded the property to Tina as her sole and separate property, granting her two years to remove William’s name from the mortgage associated with the property.

On appeal, William argues the trial court erred in finding a transmutation, as he claims the evidence at trial showed he did not knowingly and freely transmute the property. He argues the court further erred by allowing Tina to retain him on the mortgage for two years. We disagree with William’s contentions regarding the transmutation, and conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling. William forfeited his arguments pertaining to the mortgage by failing to cite to legal authority in support of his contention. We will affirm the judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
II.
A. The Trial Testimony
B.
The trial court set the matter for a bench trial beginning June 2017. Over the course of two days, it received the following evidence.

The parties married September 2, 1990, and separated February 1, 2014. They have three children, Spencer, Noah, and Cameron, all of whom were adults at the time of trial in 2017. Tina filed a petition for legal separation in April 2014; William responded seeking dissolution of the marriage.

During marriage, the parties owned a home on Promise Way in Hollister, California. William left the home permanently on the date of separation, February 1, 2014. At trial, the parties disagreed regarding the circumstances surrounding William’s departure from the home. William claimed he came to the house that day to get some of his belongings; he called the police ahead of time seeking a “civil assist” to do so, as he had an altercation with their son, Cameron, at some point before February 1, when Cameron discovered William wanted to dissolve his marriage with Tina. William alleged Tina had told him not to return to the home after finding out he wanted to divorce her.

Tina asserted William arrived at the house and discovered that a truck owned by the parties was not at the property; she testified William became “irate,” and called the police, who eventually told William to leave the property. Tina claimed William never wanted to return to the home after that. Tina contended that at that time William had keys to the home; she never took his keys, and never asked her sons to take his keys.

The parties agreed Tina gave William some of his personal property before he left the home on February 1. Although the police told her she did not have to give him any property, Tina claimed she gave William the items he needed for work and most of his personal belongings, such as clothes. William alleged Tina gave him “some toiletries, underwear and a couple clothes.” William did not take anything else out of the house when he left.

Several days after William left the home, the parties signed a quitclaim deed regarding the Promise Way residential property. They did so at a notary’s office; two of their sons went with them. The deed states, in relevant part, “William Andrew Brann and Tina Marie Brann, a married couple, for and in consideration of: One Dollar ($1.00) and/or other good and valuable consideration conveys, releases and quit claims [sic] to … [¶] Tina Marie Brann, a single person … [¶] [the Promise Way property.] [¶] Grantor does hereby convey, release and quitclaim all of the Grantor’s rights, title, and interest in and to the above described property and premises to the Grantee(s), and to the Grantee(s) [sic] heirs and assigns forever, so that neither Grantor(s) nor Grantor’s heirs, legal representatives or assigns shall have, claim or demand any right or title to the property, premises, or appurtenances, or any part thereof.” Both parties signed the deed before a notary.

Tina testified William wanted to transfer his interest in the home to her to avoid the consequences of the pending foreclosure of the home. On October 31, 2013, the holder of the parties’ second mortgage on the home recorded a notice of default and election to sell under deed of trust, notifying the parties that the home was in foreclosure. The notice indicated the parties failed to pay the installment due November 2, 2010, and all subsequent installments. As described below, both parties confirmed William knew of the notice of default signifying the foreclosure prior to signing the quitclaim deed on February 6, 2014.

Tina testified she received the notice of default in November 2013, and discussed it with William at least 10 times between then and the date of separation in February 2014. Although no mortgage payment had been made since October 2010, Tina indicated William stated he was not going to make the payments, because “[t]he house was upside down. It was a money pit. Wasn’t going to invest any more money in it. . . . We weren’t going to.” Concerned the house would be lost to foreclosure, Tina discussed having William transfer the house to her after separation, so she could attempt to save it. Tina prepared the quitclaim deed for the parties’ signatures and found a notary. William did not object when Tina asked him to sign the deed; rather, in Tina’s estimation, “[h]e was relieved to be done with the house.” Aside from wanting property that he left in the house, Tina testified William, “didn’t want anything else to do with the house,” noting, “we were upside-down and sideways on that house. … He didn’t want it.” In exchange for William’s signature on the quitclaim deed, Tina was taking the home knowing that it was “under water.” Tina believed the house was worth $325,000 in February 2014. It was subject to over $440,000 in encumbrances: $397,000 was owed on the first mortgage, $35,000 was owed on the second mortgage, and $10,000 was owed in attorney fees related to the foreclosure process.

At trial in 2017, William said he was “a little bit” aware of the notice of default recorded by the holder of the second mortgage on the home; the parties talked about it “a few times.” Specifically, he knew that the default process had started at the time he signed the quitclaim deed. Although at his deposition William testified that he had never seen the notice of default, at trial he confirmed that he had seen it and talked about it with Tina. When he learned about the notice of default, William stated he made efforts to bring the mortgage arrears current. He tried to get a second job at Lowe’s, “but that didn’t work.” He asked Tina to start working, but she wanted to stay in school; William told Tina “we have to come up with the money somehow.” William believed the property was worth “just under” $500,000 at the time of separation. However, he contended his decision to sign the quitclaim deed in February 2014 had nothing to do with the notice of default; the only reason he signed was to get his property from the house and reduce the “drama” with the family. Tina told him he could get his property if he signed the quitclaim deed.

Although William testified that he signed the quitclaim “voluntarily,” he also said he was “stressed” when he did so, as he was on medication for high blood pressure, anxiety, and depression, and “[j]ust wanted the drama to be over.” He claimed he did not intend to give away his interest in the home, “but … didn’t know what else to do.” William did not testify about the effects his medications had on him, and did not present evidence that the medications impaired his ability to comprehend or to make decisions at the time he signed the quitclaim deed.

At the same time William signed the quitclaim deed, William signed a document confirming his intent to give Tina one-half of an expected worker’s compensation settlement. At trial he alleged he signed both documents “under distress,” not only because of his medication, but because he was afraid of the parties’ youngest son, Cameron, as the result of events that took place just before the parties’ separation. William testified that Cameron was at home when William asked Tina for a divorce; Cameron became upset, leading to a verbal altercation between father and son. Tina and William then began to argue; Cameron told William to leave Tina alone, and then physically attacked William. Given this, William was “afraid of Cameron” at the time he signed the quitclaim deed. However, Cameron did not tell William to sign the deed. William also testified that on the date of separation, while he was waiting for the police to arrive for the “civil assist,” another of the parties’ children, Noah, came up to the window of William’s parked car and “laid into [him].”

The parties’ third son, Spencer, drove to the notary with William; William confirmed that Spencer did not verbally threaten him or physically touch him during the drive. William did not tell the notary he was signing the deed under protest; nor did he notify law enforcement to claim that he felt he had been threatened or otherwise forced to sign the deed. However, as Noah and Spencer were both present when William signed the quitclaim deed, William alleged he was “nervous. . . . I didn’t know what was going to happen.” William did not “want any more trouble”; he just wanted to retrieve his personal belongings and deal with everything else “later.” William claimed he did not receive any funds for signing the quitclaim deed.

Tina denied withholding William’s property until he signed the quitclaim deed. Tina conceded William and Cameron got into an altercation shortly before the date of separation. She believed William was intoxicated at the time; she alleged William confronted Cameron while he was in the parties’ truck in the driveway, and then physically assaulted her, causing Cameron to tackle William. Despite this altercation, Tina testified that she did not threaten William in any way, and did not see anyone else threaten him. She believed William began removing property from the home prior to the day he signed the quitclaim deed. Tina confirmed William did not express any concerns to the notary about signing the deed.

The parties’ son Spencer testified that he drove with William to the notary’s office. He denied pressuring William to sign the deed, or hearing anyone else make threats or coercive statements to William at the time of signing. William did not say anything to Spencer during the drive that suggested William did not want to sign the quitclaim deed. During the times Spencer was present at the home between the date of separation and the date the parties signed the quitclaim deed, he never heard anyone say William could not enter the home. Spencer believed William could have obtained his personal property without going to the notary. At the time William signed the quitclaim deed, there were no court orders preventing him from going into the house; nor did William seek any orders confirming his ability to enter the house.

Tina testified that after separation, and after the parties signed the quitclaim deed before the notary, she received notice of a trustee’s sale for the Promise Way property. She contacted the mortgage lenders to work out an arrangement to save the home from foreclosure, which required her to make modified payments on the mortgage. Tina also worked with a program to obtain a loan allowing her to bring the first mortgage current. William was not required to cosign to obtain the loan; he signed documents before a notary confirming he had no responsibility for the loan. Tina testified that she kept the loans current thereafter. William testified that he did go to a notary on a second occasion after signing the quitclaim deed to sign documents, although he did not know he was signing papers related to a loan; he believed he was signing documents to enroll in a program to help reduce the amount owed on the mortgage or related to the notice of default. William claimed he signed the documents because Tina “threatened to get [him] fired,” but did not provide any additional detail about his claim, except to say he told Tina and his coworkers that he was signing under protest. William did not tell the notary he was signing under protest. William did not call any of his coworkers to testify at the trial.

C. The Trial Court’s Ruling
D.
On October 3, 2017, the trial court orally announced its decision regarding certain reserved issues on the record. Relevant to this appeal, it found there was “an express transmutation [of the Promise Way home] by the [quitclaim] deed….” The court determined, “there was no undue influence or misrepresentation in the transfer of the [Promise Way] residence,” noting the parties were close to losing the home at a trustee sale. While William might have “subjectively felt pressured” to sign the quitclaim deed, the court determined “it was more a sign of relief rather than a sign of distress,” as the parties expected to lose the home. Tina “took the initiative to find the additional financing that was necessary to protect the home and went to the extra trouble of doing so, and at the time [sic] appears that the house not only was in immediate threat of foreclosure but could have been having a negative equitable value or interest. [¶] So I am finding that that particular transfer was legitimate, was enforceable, and I will be confirming the house to Ms. Brann as her sole and separate property.”

The trial court initially stated there did not have to be consideration for the transfer. However, it went on to reiterate that the parties determined the house was, at minimum, at risk of being lost in foreclosure, and “one or both parties had formed an opinion that the house had no equity in it or was negative equity,” an opinion with “some factual support based on estimates of values at the time.” The court concluded the parties agreed to deed the home to Tina, and she made the necessary efforts to save the home from foreclosure. If William believed Tina had done something improper or illegal, the court believed he had options available to him which he chose not to pursue.

With regard to the fact that William’s name remained on the mortgage after he signed the quitclaim deed, after hearing argument from both parties, the court determined it would allow Tina “two years to refinance the loan or sell the property and extinguish the loan, provided during that time period she keeps the loan in good standing….” The court reserved jurisdiction for either party to request either a shorter or longer period as the circumstances required.

The trial court issued a judgment on reserved issues on November 22, 2017. In the judgment, the court restated its findings that there was no undue influence in the transfer of the property to Tina, and that the quitclaim deed was an “effective transmutation of the property.” The court awarded the Promise Way property to Tina as her sole and separate property, effective February 7, 2014, and ordered Tina to remove William’s name from any loan encumbering the residence on or before October 1, 2019, reserving “jurisdiction to make further orders regarding the facilitation of the removal of [William’s] name from any encumbrance on the residence.” The clerk of court served notice of the entry of the judgment on the parties; William timely noticed his appeal of the judgment. The judgment is appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(1).

III. DISCUSSION
IV.
A. William’s Brief Does Not Comply With the California Rules of Court
B.
We commence by noting that William did not comply with rules governing the proper preparation of the Appellant’s Opening Brief. We recognize that William represented himself at the time he filed both his opening brief and his reply brief. A party representing him or herself on appeal “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) Like represented litigants, William was required to follow the appropriate appellate procedures. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)

California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) mandates that, in their briefs on appeal, parties, “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” “We have the discretion to disregard contentions unsupported by proper page cites to the record. [Citations.]” (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970.) This rule supports judicial economy. (See Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745 [“ ‘We are a busy court which “cannot be expected to search through a voluminous record to discover evidence on a point raised by [a party] when his brief makes no reference to the pages where the evidence on the point can be found in the record.” ’ [Citation.]”].) William did not cite to the record in discussing the factual contentions in his brief. While he should have done so, the record is not so voluminous that we feel it appropriate to exercise our discretion to disregard his brief.

Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requires each party to “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.” This court can treat as forfeited any issue that is not supported by identifiable legal argument or proper citation of authority. (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600, review den. (Nov. 29, 2017); Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655 (Keyes).) William did not set forth his legal argument under separate headings or subheadings; he included his entire argument under the subheading “Standard of Review.” However, the arguments set forth in William’s pleadings on appeal are sufficiently defined such that we can address the merits of his challenge to the trial court’s finding that there was a valid transmutation of the Promise Way property.

William did not cite any legal argument or legal authority in support of his contention that the trial court erred in allowing Tina two years to remove his name from the mortgage on the Promise Way property. As discussed in more detail, post, we find William forfeited his contentions of error regarding the mortgage issue.

C. The Trial Court did not Err in Finding a Valid Transmutation
D.
Under Family Code section 760, property acquired during marriage is presumed to be community property. There is no dispute on appeal that the parties purchased the Promise Way property during marriage, and thus the community property presumption applied to this asset. At trial, Tina argued that the quitclaim deed William signed in February 2014 validly transmuted the property from community property to her separate property.

Because spouses “occupy confidential relations with each other, when an interspousal transaction advantages one spouse over the other, a presumption of undue influence arises. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 287, citing predecessor of § 721, subd. (b) (Haines).) To overcome that burden, the advantaged spouse has to “prove the quitclaim deed ‘was freely and voluntarily made, and with a full knowledge of all the facts, and with a complete understanding of the effect of the transfer.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 296.) The trial court found here that there was no undue influence in the transaction transferring the Promise Way property from the community to Tina’s separate property. As framed by William, the issue on appeal is whether Tina met the burden to overcome the presumption of undue influence. However, Tina argues the presumption of undue influence does not apply here because she did not gain an unfair advantage in the transaction. For reasons explained below, we need not determine whether Tina gained an unfair advantage, as substantial evidence supports the finding that Tina met her burden to overcome the presumption of undue influence.

1. Standard of Review
2.
The question of whether or not the presumption of undue influence applies, and, if it does, whether it has been overcome, are questions for the trier of fact; we will not reverse the trial court’s decision on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Weil v. Weil (1951) 37 Cal.2d 770, 788 (Weil); In re Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 734, 737-738 (Burkle).) In determining whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, resolving all conflicts in its favor, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference. (In re Marriage of Brooks (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 576, 589 (Brooks).) Even if there is substantial contrary evidence, we must affirm the trial court’s ruling if the record reveals substantial evidence in support of the judgment. (Id. at pp. 589, 592.)

3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding That There Was No Undue Influence
4.
There are several principles governing interspousal transactions. First, “[a] transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected.” (§ 852, subd. (a).) The quitclaim deed here is a writing containing an express declaration joined in, consented to, or accepted by William (see Estate of Bibb (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 461, 468-469), and thus qualifies as the type of writing described in section 852, subdivision (a).

Next, as noted above, because spouses “occupy a confidential relationship with each other,” when they engage in transactions between themselves, they “are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships . . . .” (Burkle, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 729.) This obligation is described in the Family Code: “This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners….” (§ 721, subd. (b).) As a result of this duty of fair dealing, it has long been recognized that “whenever [spouses] enter into an agreement in which one party gains an advantage, the advantaged party bears the burden of demonstrating that the agreement was not obtained through undue influence . . . .” (In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, 27.)

William relies on Haines to argue that the presumption of undue influence applies here, as the Promise Way property was transferred to Tina’s separate estate by way of quitclaim deed in exchange for Tina’s payment of $1 to the community. In Haines, the wife signed a quitclaim deed transferring her entire interest in the family residence to the husband, in exchange for the husband’s signature on a loan for a car needed by the wife. “[W]here Judy transferred her interest in real property to Clarence for his cosignature on an automobile loan—clearly inadequate consideration for execution of the quitclaim deed—Clarence properly should have borne the burden of rebutting the presumption of undue influence . . . .” (Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 296.)

William is correct that courts have found that the presumption of undue influence must be applied when one spouse acquires an advantage over the other in a transaction between spouses. “Generally, a spouse obtains an advantage if that spouse’s position is improved, he or she obtains a favorable opportunity, or otherwise gains, benefits, or profits. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624, 629.) However, in Burkle, the appellate court further clarified the nature of the advantage that raises the presumption of undue influence. “It is settled that the predicate for applying a presumption of undue influence in an interspousal transaction is that one spouse has obtained an advantage over the other in the transaction. [Citations.] The presumption of undue influence is regularly applied in marital transactions in which one spouse has deeded property to the other . . . . In such cases, it is evident one spouse has obtained an advantage—the deeded property—from the other. In other more comprehensive marital transactions involving the division of community assets, the nature of the ‘advantage’ required to raise a presumption of undue influence has not been much discussed in the cases. However, the language of Family Code section 721 is clear, prohibiting either spouse from taking ‘any unfair advantage of the other.’ (Fam. Code, § 721, subd. (b).) Section 721, together with our analysis of the case authorities, leads us to conclude that the ‘advantage’ which raises a presumption of undue influence in a marital transaction involving a contractual exchange between spouses must necessarily be an unfair advantage.” (Burkle, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 730.)

The Burkle court further considered cases that applied “the presumption of undue influence when the marital transaction is one in which one spouse deeds his or her interest in community property to the other spouse, for no consideration or for clearly inadequate consideration. [Citation.] Cases such as Weil and Haines, involving property transfers without consideration, necessarily raise a presumption of undue influence, because one spouse obtains a benefit at the expense of the other, who receives nothing in return. The advantage obtained in these cases, too, may be reasonably characterized as a species of unfair advantage. [¶] In short, both Family Code section 721 and case precedents support the conclusion that in a contractual exchange between spouses, a presumption of undue influence arises only if one of the spouses has obtained an unfair advantage over the other.” (Burkle, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 731-732.) In addition, where the spouses obtain “mutually agreeable advantages,” the presumption of undue influence does not apply. (Id. at pp. 735-736.)

When the trial court ruled that the transfer of the Promise Way property by quitclaim deed from the community to Tina’s separate property was a lawful transmutation, the court found that there was no undue influence in the transfer. Although it discussed in some detail the circumstances that led the parties to sign the deed, the court made no explicit factual finding on the record that Tina did not obtain an unfair advantage, but as it explained its reasoning, the court clearly concluded that there was nothing unfair about the transaction. We observe that although the parties had the opportunity to obtain a statement of decision from the trial court, they waived that right by failing to pursue such a statement after the court issued its decision on the record. (See fn. 5, ante.) Under the doctrine of implied findings, which applies when the parties waive a statement of decision, “all intendments favor the ruling below [citation], and we must assume that the trial court made whatever findings are necessary to sustain the judgment. [Citation].” (Michael U. v. Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 792-793.) From its discussion of the property transfer, we could infer that the trial court determined the presumption of undue influence did not apply to the agreement the spouses made to sign the quitclaim deed because the transaction was fair to both spouses—this is Tina’s contention on appeal, that she did not obtain an unfair advantage in the transaction because the Promise Way property was valueless at the time of the transfer.

However, we need not reach the issue of whether any advantage Tina received in the transfer was unfair. Even if the presumption of undue influence applied, there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that Tina rebutted the presumption, i.e., that Tina showed by a preponderance of the evidence that William signed the quitclaim deed “ ‘freely and voluntarily . . . with a full knowledge of all the facts, and with a complete understanding of the effect of’ the transaction. [Citations.]” (Burkle, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at pp. 737-739.) In reaching this conclusion, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Tina, as the prevailing party. (Brooks, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 589.) Moreover, the trial court’s resolution of the disputed evidence necessarily required it to make credibility findings. The trial court is the “ ‘ “sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] . . . ‘We do not judge credibility on appeal. . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Oliverez (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 298, 319.)

Regarding the voluntariness of William’s execution of the quitclaim deed, the trial court ruled that while William may have “subjectively felt pressured” to sign, “it was more a sign of relief rather than a sign of distress,” as the parties expected to lose the home. The evidence at trial confirmed that William and Cameron did have a physical altercation a week or more before the parties signed the quitclaim deed. Tina’s testimony indicated William was the initial aggressor in that dispute, in which Cameron intervened when William physically assaulted Tina. William confirmed that Spencer did not threaten him while driving with him to the notary to sign the quitclaim deed. Cameron was not present when the parties signed the deed, nor did he tell William to sign the deed beforehand. Both Tina and Spencer denied exerting any pressure on William to sign the deed, and denied hearing anyone else make threats or coercive statements to William. Tina denied withholding William’s personal property until he signed the quitclaim deed. Spencer testified that William could have retrieved his personal property from the Promise Way residence without signing the quitclaim deed. There were no court orders precluding William from entering the home, nor did William seek orders confirming his ability to enter. While William testified that Cameron attacked him, that the parties’ third son, Noah, “laid in to him,” and that he signed the deed so he could retrieve his personal property, as stated above, we must accept the trial court’s credibility assessments and view the evidence in the light most favorable to Tina. We thus find that the trial court accepted Tina’s and Spencer’s testimony as more credible than William’s.

Rather than signing as a result of duress due to pressure from Tina and Cameron, the evidence shows William signed the quitclaim deed in order to avoid the potentially negative repercussions of the pending foreclosure of the Promise Way property. The trial court found, “. . . that the parties had by mutual agreement determined that the house was going to be lost to foreclosure or was in serious risk of being lost in foreclosure, that there was a dispute over the amount of equity in the home, but one or both parties had formed an opinion that the house had no equity in it or was negative equity. [¶] And there is [sic] facts—there is some factual support based on estimates of values at the time.” There is substantial evidence to support the finding that the property had no equity or a negative value at the time of the interspousal transfer. Tina testified that she and William discussed the foreclosure at least 10 times prior to the date of separation; William indicated he did not want to make any additional payments on the home, because it was “under water.” William did testify at trial as to his belief that the property had positive equity, as he valued the property at just under $500,000 in February 2014. Yet, Tina alleged the property was worth $325,000 in February 2014, with outstanding obligations of over $440,000, such that it would have had negative value. Although Tina later confirmed that she estimated a higher value for the home in the schedule of assets and debts she completed in May 2014, she provided explanation for the discrepancy; she did not research comparable sales on the home until after she signed the schedule of assets and debts. Again, as we are obliged view the evidence in the light most favorable to Tina, as the prevailing party, and resolve all conflicts in favor of the trial court’s ruling (Brooks, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 589), we must find that the trial court accepted Tina’s testimony as more credible than that of William, as evidenced by the court’s conclusion that the house was not only subject to the “immediate threat of foreclosure” but also potentially “[had] a negative equitable value or interest.”

There is also substantial evidence that William had full knowledge of all the facts and a complete understanding of the effect of signing the quitclaim deed. Although in his pleadings on appeal, William contends he was not aware of the foreclosure at the time he signed the quitclaim deed, his testimony at trial contradicts this claim. He clearly testified that he knew about the notice of default before signing the quitclaim deed. The evidence also demonstrates that William understood that Tina would take ownership of the home as her separate property, leaving her solely responsible to save the home from foreclosure. Both parties testified that Tina was able to save the home by applying for an additional loan or program, for which William was not liable. While William indicated his decision to sign the quitclaim deed had nothing to do with the foreclosure, he did not deny feeling relieved to be free of the burden of the house he considered to be a “money pit,” and the trial court found William in fact was relieved to be free from this obligation. Tina made all of the mortgage payments after the transfer. There was no evidence William had to make any additional payments on the home after he signed the quitclaim deed. William’s cooperation in Tina’s efforts to save the home, as well as the fact he did not make additional payments on the mortgage, evidence his full understanding that he transferred responsibility for the home to Tina by signing the quitclaim deed. Moreover, the trial court’s ruling suggests it found Tina’s testimony more credible than William’s in this regard.

To show he did not have full knowledge of all of the facts when he signed the quitclaim deed, William alleges for the first time in his reply brief that Tina sold the house after trial, “gain[ing] over $400,000 in net proceeds,” and did not disclose the sale to William or the court. This fact is not part of the evidence included in the record on appeal. With limited exceptions that do not apply in this case, on appeal we disregard arguments relying on facts outside the record and matters that occurred after rendition of the judgment being appealed. (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813 (Reserve Insurance Co.) [“It is an elementary rule of appellate procedure that, when reviewing the correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was entered.”].)

Even if we were to consider this evidence, William does not explain how this new information serves to invalidate the trial court’s implied finding that Tina rebutted the presumption of undue influence. The sale of the home after the trial court entered judgment in 2017 had no bearing on whether Tina exerted undue influence over William when he signed the deed in 2014. While the property may have increased in value between 2014 and 2017, this does not alter our conclusion that at the time the parties signed the quitclaim deed, William did so freely and knowingly with full knowledge of the facts and a complete understanding of the effect of the transaction. From the perspective of the spouses in 2014, the property might have as easily lost value during that time period. As often occurs, the spouses decided in 2014 what was reasonable under the circumstances, without the benefit of knowing the future.

We conclude under section 852, subdivision (a), that the quitclaim deed represents a valid transmutation of the Promise Way property from community property to Tina’s separate property, as it is a writing containing an express declaration joined in, consented to, or accepted by William. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s express ruling that there was no undue influence in the transaction, and implied finding that Tina rebutted the presumption of undue influence, proving by a preponderance of the evidence that William signed the quitclaim deed freely and knowingly, with full knowledge of the facts and a complete understanding of the effect of the transaction. We therefore will affirm the trial court’s judgment finding the property to be Tina’s separate property.

E. William Forfeited His Contention of Error Related to the Mortgage
F.
William argues the trial court erred by allowing Tina two years from the entry of judgment to remove his name from the mortgage associated with the Promise Way property. In his Appellant’s Opening Brief, as well as his Appellant’s Reply Brief, William did not cite legal authority in support of his contention, as required by rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). “[T]he trial court’s judgment is presumed to be correct, and the appellant has the burden to prove otherwise by presenting legal authority on each point made and factual analysis, supported by appropriate citations to the material facts in the record; otherwise, the argument may be deemed forfeited. [Citations.] [¶] . . . [The appellate court] is not obligated to perform that function on the appellant’s behalf. [Citation.]” (Keyes, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 655.) “[I]t is not [the appellate court’s] role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. Rather, an appellant is required to present a cognizable legal argument in support of reversal of the judgment.” (Okorie, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 599-600.)

Aside from stating his belief that the trial court erred in allowing Tina to keep his name on the mortgage, William did not, in his briefs, provide legal argument, or cite appropriate authority, in support of his contention. At oral argument, William’s newly-retained counsel did attempt to provide such argument and authority. We have discretion to reject new contentions raised for the first time at oral argument on the ground of their untimeliness, and elect to do so in the instant matter, as we explained to counsel at the time of argument. (Estate of McDaniel (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 458, 463.) William has failed to support his claim of error with respect to the trial court’s mortgage order, thereby forfeiting his claim. Accordingly, we decline to consider it.

V. DISPOSITION
VI.
The trial court’s November 2017 judgment on reserved issues is affirmed.

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Greenwood, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

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Grover, J.

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Danner, J.

Brann v. Brann

No. H045424