TODD YANCEY VS. EDWIN BLUE

LINE: 4 19-CIV-02501 TODD YANCEY VS. EDWIN BLUE, ET AL.

TODD YANCEY EDWIN BLUE
PRO SE ANTHONY WEIBELL

MOTION TO STRIKE TENTATIVE RULING:

The Court grants Cross-defendant Yancey’s request for judicial notice of: Stipulation and Order from USDC Case 1:08-CV-00993; document from same case; dismissal of case; transcript from deposition of Edwin Blue, September 20, 2019. The motion is denied as to all challenged specific words (and derivatives), conclusions, and other matter other than entire paragraphs. “A motion to strike a portion of a pleading must quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph . . . .” (CRC Rule 3.1322(a).) The Notice of motion fails to identify any word, phrase, sentence, or other set of allegations that Cross-defendant moves to strike.

The motion is denied to the extent it is based on the sham pleading doctrine. The argument is that Edwin Blue’s deposition testimony is inconsistent with allegations in the complaint, which makes the cross-complaint a sham pleading. The argument fails. First, the motion does not identify what portions of the pleading are subject to the sham pleading doctrine. Second, the argument lacks merit. The Court grants Yancey’s request for judicial notice of the Deposition Transcript of Edwin Blue, taken September 20, 2019. However, “although the existence of statements contained in a deposition transcript filed as part of the court record can be judicially noticed, their truth is not subject to judicial notice.” (Garcia v. Sterling (1985)176 Cal. App. 3d 17, 22.) Since the Court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of Mr. Blue’s testimony, it cannot conclude that his testimony demonstrates that the challenged matter is false or otherwise lacks factual support. The motion to strike “conclusory allegations” is denied. The motion does not specify what conclusory allegations are being challenged.

The motion to strike false allegations (Mov. at 9), inflammatory allegations (Id.), and irrelevant or improper matter (Id. at 11) is denied. In addition to failure to comply with CRC Rule 3.1322(a), the motion argues that certain allegations are contradicted by the deposition testimony of Edwin Blue. The Court grants Yancey’s request for judicial notice of the Deposition Transcript of Edwin Blue, taken September 20, 2019. However, “although the existence of statements contained in a deposition transcript filed as part of the court record can be judicially noticed, their truth is not subject to judicial notice.” (Garcia v. Sterling (1985)176 Cal. App. 3d 17, 22.) Since the Court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of Mr. Blue’s testimony, it cannot conclude that his testimony demonstrates that the challenged matter is false or otherwise lacks factual support.

The motion to strike the prayer for attorney’s fees is denied. An award of attorney’s fees is permitted under Penal Code section 502, which is the basis of the sixth cause of action.

The motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is denied except that the motion to strike punitive damages in paragraph 120 for violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200 is granted. “[P]unitive damages, are not available under the UCL.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1148. For the other requests for punitive damages, the allegations set forth generally in paragraphs 17 through 29, if proven, could support a finding that Cross-defendant acted with fraud, oppression, or malice supporting a punitive damage claim. If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Cross-complainant IRA Services shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.

LINE: 5 19-CIV-02501 TODD YANCEY VS. EDWIN BLUE, ET AL.

TODD YANCEY EDWIN BLUE
PRO/PER ANTHONY WEIBELL

DEMURRER TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer to the 1st through 5th causes of action on statute of limitations grounds is overruled. The Demurrer argues that the claims are time-barred if they accrued before June 6, 2016, but does not cite any allegations to show that any cause of action accrued before that date.

The demurrer to all 10 causes of action on the ground of the sham pleading doctrine is overruled. The demurrer does not identify the allegedly sham allegations or the deposition testimony that contradicts them. Yancey’s Reply Brief identifies them for the first time, which is too late for lack of notice to IRA Services. Even if the court considered each of the statements from the Edwin Blue deposition, the does not explain how those statements dispose of any cause of action.

The Court rules on the individual causes of action as follows.

First Cause of action (conversion of property): Overruled. The contention that Yancey was not a director or employee of IRA at the time he created the intellectual property does not appear on the face of the cross-complaint.

Second cause of action (conversion of money): Sustained. The pleading does not allege a specifically identifiable sum of money that was allegedly converted. The allegations of “hundreds of thousands of dollars” (FACC para. 72) damages of “no less than $500,000” (Id. para. 75) are nonspecific. “Money cannot be the subject of conversion unless a specific identifiable sum is involved. (Citations).” Thomas, McGhee et al., Cal. Civ. Prac. Torts § 15:5 (2019).

Third cause of action (fraud): Overruled. The allegations are sufficiently specific. (FACC para. 23, 53, 79(c) & (d), 80-83.)

Fourth cause of action (constructive fraud by fiduciary): Overruled. The facts fully set forth the basis of the fiduciary relationship (board member, officer, agent with oversight of ICSP development (para. 13, 18, 22, 56) and the acts constituting breach (taking of IRA assets for Yancey’s own use (para. 17-23, 29, 42-46, 87.)

Fifth cause of action (breach of fiduciary duty: Overruled. The FACC sufficiently pleads existence of a fiduciary duty, breach, and damage proximately caused. The high-specificity for fraud is not required for pleading breach of fiduciary duty.

Sixth cause of action: Overruled. The basis of the demurrer is that the cross-complaint does not allege violations of Penal Code section 502 by various acts. (FACC para. 100.) The allegations are supported by specific allegations in paragraphs 17, 42, 44 through 47. The Court disregards Yancey’s Reply arguments (failure to allege damage) because that was not the ground for demurrer.

Seventh cause of action (interference with contract relations): Sustained. The pleading does not allege the existence of a contract between IRA and a third party. IRA cites paragraphs 15 and 104 (See Opp. 10:16), but those paragraphs do not allege the existence of any contract that is the subject of this claim. Eighth cause of action (interference with economic relations): Overruled. The Demurrer sets forth the elements of the tort, but does not argue what element or elements the cross-complaint fails to allege. (See Moving P&A at 19:2-11.) Ninth cause of action (Unfair Business Practices): Overruled. (a) The FACC alleges a statutory violation of Penal Code section 502. (b) A prayer for punitive damages or disgorgement of profits is not a ground for demurrer. (Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 384 (unavailable or improper remedy not ground for demurrer).) (c) The FACC alleges six acts of fraudulent misrepresentation and that the misrepresentations “are likely to deceive customers in the industry . . . .” (FACC para 117.)

Tenth cause of action (declaratory relief): Overruled. The moving papers do not identify any flaw in the FACC. (See Mov. P&A at 20.) The FACC alleges that the issue of ownership of property is in controversy: Yancey claims that he is the owner of property associated with the ISCP (FACC para. 37), which is contrary to the position taken by IRA. Thus, a justiciable controversy exists as to who is the rightful owner of the property.

Cross-complainant IRA Services is granted leave of court until March 11, 2020, to file and serve an amended cross-complaint that addresses the deficiencies of the second and seventh causes of action.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Cross-complainant IRA Services shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.

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