Case Number: BC600599 Hearing Date: March 15, 2019 Dept: 3

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

TRESHUNDA JUDDINE, ETC.,

Plaintiff(s),

vs.

DOES 1-100, et al.,

Defendant(s).

Case No.: BC600599

[TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO RPDS, SET TWO; DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE OF MEDICAL RECORDS; IMPOSING SANCTIONS

Dept. 3

1:30 p.m.

March 15, 2019

Plaintiff, Treshunda Juddine, a minor by and through her GAL, Krishawnna Barker, filed this action against Defendants, Does 1-100 for damages arising out of alleged medical malpractice. Plaintiff has since named a variety of doe defendants, including Moving Defendant, Michael J. Dawson, MD. At this time, Dawson moves to (a) compel Plaintiff to respond to RPDs, set two, (b) compel Plaintiff to sign an authorization concerning her medical records, and (c) pay sanctions.

Defendant propounded RPDs, set two, on Plaintiff on 11/14/18. To date, despite an attempt to meet and confer, Plaintiff has not served responses. Defendant therefore seeks an order compelling her to respond to RPDs, set two, without objections. The motion to compel is granted. CCP §2031.290(a), (b). Plaintiff is ordered to serve verified responses to RPDs, set two, without objections, within ten days.

Defendant also seeks to compel Plaintiff to sign an authorization permitting release of her MediCal records to Defendant. Despite the lack of opposition to the motion, the motion is denied. Defendant presents no relevant authority in support of the motion to compel Plaintiff to sign an authorization. Defendant does not cite Miranda v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 913, 918-919, wherein the Court of Appeals considered this issue. In Miranda, the plaintiff made an underinsured motorist’s claim. The defendant commenced discovery, which revealed that the plaintiff had been treated for post-concussion symptoms with Kaiser in 2000. The defendant followed up with a subpoena to Kaiser, but Kaiser indicated it would only release the records with a signed authorization from the plaintiff. The plaintiff refused to sign an authorization. The defendant ultimately filed an action to commence discovery with the Superior Court. The defendant concurrently filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to sign an authorization for release of the records from Kaiser. The motion was unopposed, and the trial court granted the motion. The plaintiff continued to refuse to sign the authorization, and the trial court ultimately granted a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed, but the sole issue on the appeal was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss the case; the Court of Appeals did not rule on the propriety of the issuance of the order compelling the plaintiff to sign the authorizations.

Notably, to the extent the Court of Appeals did rule on the issue, it was highly skeptical of the method of discovery. In a footnote, it indicated, “The record does not reflect the reason the medical facilities requested plaintiff’s authorization. Perhaps defendant did not comply with the procedures to obtain “personal records” of a “consumer” as required by section 1985.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in which case the medical facilities had a sufficient basis to refuse compliance. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (k).) If section 1985.3 had been complied with, the record does not indicate why defendant did not simply move to compel compliance with the subpoena pursuant to section 1987.1, instead of pursuing an unwilling plaintiff for a signed authorization. These matters remain mysteries because of the scant record presented to the trial court.”

There is ample California appellate authority holding that the trial court does not have the power to create additional methods of discovery. See, for example, San Diego Unified Port Dist. V. Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1405 and the cases referenced therein. The motion to compel Plaintiff to sign an authorization is therefore denied.

Defendant also seeks sanctions in connection with the motion. Sanctions are appropriate per §2030.290(c) based on Plaintiff’s failure to respond to RPDs, set two. Defense Counsel bills at the rate of $200/hour. The Court awards one hour of attorney time to prepare the portion of the motion relating to compelling RPDs. Any sanctions for preparation of the remainder of the motion are not appropriate. No opposition was filed and therefore no reply was necessary. Counsel is located in Glendale, and therefore the Court awards two hours of attorney time to appear at the hearing. The Court awards a total of three hours at the requested rate of $200/hour, or $600 in attorneys’ fees. The Court also awards the requested $60 filing fee.

Sanctions are sought and imposed against and her attorney of record, jointly and severally. They are ordered to pay sanctions to Defendant, by and through his attorney of record, in the total amount of $660, within twenty days.

Defendant is ordered to give notice.