Filed 5/29/20 United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. Cal. Unemployment etc. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO AFT/CFT, AFL-CIO, NEA/CTA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD,

Defendant, Cross-defendant, and Appellant;

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Real Party in Interest and Respondent

A142858

(San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. CPF 12-512437)

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD,

Defendant and Appellant.

A143428

(San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. CPF 12-512437)
Appellant United Educators of San Francisco AFT/CFT, AFL-CIO, NEA/CTA (UESF) petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandate on behalf of certain substitute teachers and other public school employees employed by the San Francisco Unified School District (District). UESF contended that these members—all of whom had been provided reasonable assurance of continued employment in the fall of 2011—were improperly denied unemployment benefits during the summer of 2011. The petition was successfully opposed below by the District.

In a companion appeal, the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board challenged a separate ruling by the superior court invalidating a precedent benefit decision that would have permitted substitute teachers to receive unemployment benefits if they are “on-call” during a summer school session and do not work. We consider this matter anew following a remand from the California Supreme Court. (See United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 805 (United Educators).) For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Under section 1253.3 of the Unemployment Insurance Code (section 1253.3), public school employees are ineligible to collect unemployment benefits for “any week which begins during the period between two successive academic years or terms or, when an agreement provides instead for a similar period between two regular but not successive terms, during that period,” if the employee worked during “the first of the academic years or terms” and received “reasonable assurance” of work during “the second of the academic years or terms.” (Id., subd. (b), italics added.) At issue in these proceedings is whether the District’s summer school session qualifies as an “academic term” or instead reflects a period of ineligibility within the meaning of section 1253.3, subdivision (b).

Twenty-six employees of the District filed claims for unemployment benefits in 2011. The claimants worked for the District as on-call substitute teachers or as paraprofessional classified employees, such as instructional aides and custodians, during the 2010–2011 school year or during the 2010 summer session. By the summer of 2011, the claimants received a letter from the District providing “reasonable assurance” of employment during the 2011–2012 school year beginning that fall.

The parties stipulated that the District’s “regular” session of the 2010 2011 school year ended on May 27, 2011, and that “[t]he first day of instruction for the 2011–2012 school year was August 15, 2011.” The parties further agreed that the District operated a summer school session from June 9, 2011, to July 7, 2011 for elementary school students, and from June 9, 2011, to July 14, 2011 for middle and high school students. Some claimants worked during all or part of the May to August 2011 summer period. Other claimants were either on call or did not work at all.

All of the claimants filed claims for unemployment benefits for the period between May 27, 2011 and August 15, 2011. The Employment Development Department denied benefits to each named claimant. The claimants, represented by UESF, sought review by an administrative law judge, who reversed and held that each claimant was entitled to unemployment benefits covering all the weeks for which they had applied.

The District appealed the decision to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board or CUIAB). The Board held that certain claimants, including those who had worked during the 2010 summer session and had a reasonable expectation of working during the 2011 summer, were not barred by section 1253.3 from collecting unemployment insurance benefits during the weeks when the 2011 summer school was in session.

UESF subsequently petitioned the superior court for a writ of administrative mandamus against the Board as respondent and the District as real party in interest. UESF asserted that all 26 claimants were eligible for unemployment benefits during the entire period of May 27, 2011 to August 15, 2011 because the summer session was an “academic term” and none of the claimants had been given reasonable assurance of employment during the summer term. The District cross-complained against the Board and UESF, contending that the Board’s determination of benefits eligibility for the summer 2011 period was in error. While this matter was pending, the Board adopted its decision in Alicia K. Brady v. Ontario Montclair School District (Dec. 10, 2013) CUIAB, Precedent Benefit Dec., No. P-B-505 (Brady) as a precedent benefit decision. In Brady, the Board held that substitute teachers who are “qualified and eligible for work” during a school district’s summer school session are not on recess for purposes of section 1253.3 and are eligible for unemployment benefits. (Brady, at p. 11.)

The trial court below rejected Brady as contrary to the plain meaning of section 1253.3, denied UESF’s petition, and reversed and remanded the Board’s decisions with respect to all 26 claimants. UESF appealed from the denial of its petition, and the Board separately appealed from the trial court’s declaration of Brady’s invalidity.

We affirmed, concluding that summer school is not an “academic term” within the meaning of section 1253.3’s reference to “academic years or terms.” (United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1249.) Based on the text, history, and purpose of section 1253.3, we found that “summer sessions are not academic terms and instead fall between academic years or terms under section 1253.3.” (Id. at p. 1250.) We thus held that the 26 claimants were ineligible for benefits for the entire period of May 27, 2011 to August 15, 2011. In so holding, we agreed with the trial court that Brady cannot be reconciled with section 1253.3. (Id. at p. 1252–1253.) The case now returns to us on remand from the California Supreme Court.

DISCUSSION

In its review of this case, the Supreme Court held that “a summer session does not fall within the period of unemployment benefits ineligibility mandated by section 1253.3 if the summer session is a ‘regular’ term—that is, if the summer session, as a whole, resembles the other academic terms of the school year in terms of enrollment, staffing, budget, instructional program, or other objective characteristics.” (United Educators, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 820-821.)

Our high court reasoned that “[s]ection 1253.3(b)’s reference to ‘regular’ terms indicates that the Legislature contemplated the existence of ‘regular’ and non-‘regular’ terms, and it strongly suggests an intent to foreclose benefits during non-‘regular’ terms.” (United Educators, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 815.) Section 1253.3, however, does not define what constitutes a “regular” academic term. (Ibid; see United Educators, at pp. 813 814, 818 819 [an “academic term” may encompass a variety of instructional periods, including a traditional September to June school calendar, a quarter, semester, or trimester period, or a year-round school program].) Whether a summer period of educational instruction qualifies as a “regular” term within the meaning of section 1253.3—and therefore whether an employee may be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits under the statute—depends upon whether the instructional period resembles other academic terms on the basis of certain objective criteria.

Under the court’s opinion, “some summer sessions—such as those offered as optional or remedial programs to a subset of students on a part-time basis and requiring the participation of fewer staff than a regular semester or quarter—do not qualify as ‘academic terms.’ ” (Id. at p. 818.) In contrast, “other summer sessions—such as those in year-round schools or those that, as a whole, resemble other academic terms of the school year in terms of enrollment, staffing, budget, instructional program, or other objective criteria—would qualify as ‘academic terms’ during which unemployment benefits are payable.” (Ibid.)

UESF asserted before the Supreme Court that “[The District] [has] offered no evidence that the summer session was any different from the sessions that ended in May 2011 or began in August 2011.” The court disagreed, observing that “the record contains little evidence, one way or the other, on the objective characteristics of the summer sessions at issue . . . .” (United Educators, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 821.) It directed that “the parties, with the guidance of today’s opinion, may introduce such evidence on remand.” (Ibid.) As to the Board’s appeal, the Supreme Court disapproved Brady to the extent it is inconsistent with its opinion. (Id. at p. 820.)

No additional arguments have been presented for consideration on remand. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order denying UESF’s petition for writ of mandate and remand for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision.

DISPOSITION

The order denying UESF’s petition for writ of mandate is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. Costs are awarded to UESF.

_________________________

Sanchez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Banke, J.

A142858/A143428 United Educators, etc. v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, etc.