Filed 1/30/20 Carter v. Williams CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

VICKY L. CARTER, Individually and as Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

RICHARD WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

B293063

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BP166682

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Maria E. Stratton, Judge. Affirmed.

Borden Law Office, Alex R. Borden and Stephanie Chao, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

Richard Williams appeals a trial court order determining that three pieces of real property in Whittier are assets of the Mildred J. Williams Revocable Living Trust dated January 24, 2014 (the 2014 Trust), and ordering the property transferred to the 2014 Trust. We affirm the trial court order.

BACKGROUND

Mildred J. Williams (Mildred) and her husband Joseph had six children, including Richard Williams and Vicky L. Carter. In 1995, the couple executed the Williams Family Trust of 1995 (the 1995 Trust), and in 2006, they executed the Joseph E. Williams and Mildred J. Williams Revocable Living Trust (the 2006 Revocable Trust). Title to the three properties at 12212, 12216, and 12220 Inez Street in Whittier (the Inez Street properties) was placed in the 2006 Revocable Trust by a grant deed Joseph and Mildred signed as joint tenants on February 25, 2011. No copies of the 1995 or 2006 trusts or evidence of the trust terms were presented to the court or otherwise admitted into evidence.

Joseph died on December 30, 2013. On January 24, 2014, Mildred signed the 2014 Trust (“Declaration of Trust”) as “Grantor and Trustee,” naming herself as trustee and Vicky as successor trustee. The 2014 Trust states that Mildred as grantor “has transferred and delivered to the trustee all her interest in the property described in Schedule A attached to this Declaration of Trust.” Schedule A lists the three Inez Street properties (along with five other houses on Inez Street and the furniture and household items inside one of the Inez Street properties). The 2014 Trust provides that upon Mildred’s death, Vicky “shall be given Mildred J. Williams’s interest in the trust property.” The 2014 Trust does not mention the 2006 Revocable Trust or the 1995 Trust.

Mildred died on June 7, 2015. On September 18, 2015, Vicky filed a “Petition to Establish Trust’s Claim to Ownership of Property, For Order Directing Its Transfer to Trust.” Vicky alleged Mildred intended to transfer the Inez Street properties into the name of the 2014 Trust. The other properties on the Schedule A list had been sold before Mildred’s death. Alternatively, Vicky alleged that Mildred intended that the 2014 Trust would amend and restate the 2006 Revocable Trust, and the failure to reference the 2006 Revocable Trust in the 2014 Trust document was an oversight. Mildred had believed that the 2014 Trust superseded the 2006 Revocable Trust, and the 2006 Revocable Trust had been destroyed, so Vicky could not obtain an original or a copy. Vicky requested an order that the Inez Street properties were owned by the 2014 Trust, citing Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943 (Heggstad).

On February 22, 2016, Richard, who would receive nothing under the 2014 Trust, filed a “Petition to Determine Validity of Purported Trust Based on Testamentary Incapacity, Duress and Undue Influence, Mistake of Fact, and Fraud, and Petition for Imposition of Constructive Trust.” Richard alleged that when Mildred signed the 2014 Trust, she was not mentally competent; Vicky controlled Mildred and overpowered her will; and Vicky falsely told Mildred that Richard did not care about her, resulting in the “unnatural dispositions of her property” in the 2014 Trust. Although “[t]he precise terms of the 1995 [ ] TRUST and 2006 REVOCABLE TRUST are unknown to Petitioner,” Richard alleged on information and belief that upon Mildred and Joseph’s deaths the remaining trust assets were to be distributed to all the children in equal shares. Richard requested that the court declare the 2014 Trust invalid and void, and that Vicky be ordered to reconvey the Inez Street properties to Mildred’s heirs, or to the beneficiaries of the 1995 Trust or the 2006 Revocable Trust.

In response to Richard’s petition, Vicky denied his allegations of incapacity, undue influence, and fraud. Vicky detailed Richard’s acrimonious relationship with his mother, his drug abuse, his criminal convictions, an angry letter he wrote to Mildred in April 2014, and his failed claim for a mechanic’s lien against all the properties on Inez Street (he lived in one of the residences), which he filed in April 2014 attempting to cloud title.

In a joint trial statement, Richard and Vicky agreed that on September 18, 2006, Mildred and Joseph executed the 2006 Revocable Trust; when Mildred executed the 2014 Trust, the Inez Street properties “were assets of the 2006 Revocable Trust”; and “[t]itle to these properties remain[s] in the 2006 Revocable Trust.”

Richard argued that his trust contest “also serves as objections to the Heggstad Petition. . . . As a consequence of the unavailability of the 2006 Revocable Trust instrument and the 1995 [ ] Trust instrument, a determination cannot be made concerning Mildred’s authority to fund the [2014 Trust] with property that was vested in the 2006 Revocable Trust or the 1995 [ ] Trust, and Vicky cannot meet her burden of proof in establishing same.” (Italics added.)

1. Tentative decision

After a four-day court trial, Judge Stratton prepared

an 11-page statement of decision granting Vicky’s petition and finding “the properties located at 12212, 12216, and 12220 Inez Street . . . [are] an asset of the 2014 Trust.” The court denied Richard’s petition, finding no evidence of lack of capacity, undue influence, mistake of fact, or fraud, to warrant invalidating the 2014 trust.

Judge Stratton described the testimony at trial. Mildred and Joseph both had health problems. They created a trust in 2006, and although the exact provisions are unknown, Vicky and Richard both believed it divided the trust assets equally among five of the children (the sixth was a “ward of the state”). Mildred went into the hospital in March 2013, and her prognosis was poor. While she was comatose, Vicky brought a binder to the hospital containing Mildred’s advance health care directive and the 2006 Revocable Trust. This was when Vicky and her brother David first saw the 2006 Revocable Trust documents, and learned the 2006 Trust named the two of them as successor trustees.

Upon discharge, Mildred was bedridden. Vicky quit her full-time job to care for her mother, and was added as an agent to Mildred and Joseph’s bank accounts. She took care of all the properties on Inez Street, collecting rents and making deposits. Richard, who lived in one of the Inez Street properties, took Joseph to his dialysis appointments.

Mildred and Joseph amended the 2006 Revocable Trust in June 2013, removing David as trustee and changing the distribution percentages. No copy of the 2013 amendment was in the record. After Joseph died in December 2013, Richard stopped assisting Mildred. Mildred told Vicky she wanted to amend the 2006 Revocable Trust. The result was the 2014 Trust, prepared by George Hernandez and executed on January 24, 2014. The 2014 Trust did not include copies of the 2006 Revocable Trust or the 2013 amendment. After Mildred signed the 2014 Trust, Hernandez told her to destroy the 2006 Revocable Trust and the 2013 amendment, and Mildred and Vicky burned them both.

Before the execution of the 2014 Trust, Mildred was trying to sell the unit on Inez Street where Richard lived, but in April 2014 he refused to leave and Mildred began eviction proceedings. He then recorded a mechanic’s lien on the property, told the buyer the property had major defects, and wrote a derogatory letter to his mother. Because the property was still in the name of the 2006 Revocable Trust, Mildred had to take steps to convince the title insurance company that she had the right to sell, and had problems cashing the check for the sale proceeds. Eventually Richard moved out, and escrow closed.

Mildred was hospitalized several times before she died in June 2015, but no evidence showed she suffered from lack of capacity or dementia.

Judge Stratton found Mildred’s brother Charles a “very credible” witness. Charles testified that Mildred told him she was angry with her children, and “ ‘Rick gets nothing,’ ” because he had a drug problem, tore up the house, and was always asking for gas money. She decided to give all her estate to Vicky “because Vicky gave all she had to give to Mildred.” She had changed her trust because of family circumstances. Charles read the letter Richard wrote, and “Mildred was sick about the letter.” Vicky was also a credible witness. She testified that Mildred had been upset no other family member would help Vicky with taking care of Mildred.

Judge Stratton explicitly made no finding about the terms of the 1995 Trust and the 2006 Revocable Trust, because neither party presented evidence of the terms of either trust. The 2014 Trust was very simply written, naming a trustee and successor trustees, and describing a distribution scheme. There was no evidence that Mildred lacked capacity when she signed it, and no evidence of mistake, fraud, or undue influence. “Finally, the court finds that the properties at 12212, 12216, and 12220 Inez Street are assets of the 2014 Trust. In the document and in Schedule A, Mildred stated her intention to include the property in the Trust. The facts satisfy the requirements of Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, and therefore Vicky’s petition is granted.”

2. Objections and final order

Richard objected that without evidence of the terms of the 2006 Revocable Trust, no facts or evidence established that Mildred was permitted to withdraw any property from the 2006 Revocable Trust or to create a new trust. Without this “essential component” the findings required by Heggstad were not established, as there was no evidence Mildred was the owner of the Inez Street properties and had the power to create a trust in the Inez Street properties, or to divest the 2006 Revocable Trust of title to the properties. Richard also objected that Vicky testified that some of the pages of the 2014 Trust as attached to her petition were not the original pages, but replacement pages created to resolve the problem of Mildred’s inability to cash a check after the sale of some of the real properties. Vicky responded that Richard did not file any objection to the Heggstad petition.

The trial court overruled Richard’s objections to the Heggstad petition. The 2014 Trust lists the Inez Street properties in Schedule A and states that Mildred, as grantor, transferred all her interest to the trustee. Other documentary evidence (the mechanic’s lien filed by Richard, the title insurance reports, and the three day notice to quit served on Richard) listed the owners of the property as Joseph and Mildred as trustees of the Williams Family Trust of 1995. The parties stipulated that the properties had been placed in the 2006 Revocable Trust, and no evidence showed that the 2006 Revocable Trust had been destroyed in bad faith. “The Court heard compelling evidence that Mildred intended to revoke her prior trusts when she created the 2014 Trust, which lists the Inez properties as trust assets. The court finds that the presumption of title in Evidence Code section 662 [has] been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that Mildred Williams was the beneficial owner of the properties and that the requirements of Estate of Heggstad [(1993)] 16 Cal.App.4th 94[3], have been satisfied.” The court adopted the tentative statement of decision as its final decision. In an order filed August 6, 2018, the court found the Inez Street properties were assets of the 2014 Trust and ordered them transferred to the Trust.

Richard filed a timely notice of appeal. Vicky did not file a respondent’s brief.

DISCUSSION

Richard argues we should apply de novo review to the legal question “whether certain real property has been properly transferred to a trust under undisputed facts.” He does not appeal the trial court’s conclusion there was no evidence to support his petition’s allegations of lack of capacity, mistake, fraud, or undue influence. On the evidence before it, the trial court correctly found that the Inez Street properties were properly transferred into the 2014 Trust.

Richard first argues the 2014 Trust is not a valid trust instrument, because it is not reasonably certain in its material terms. Richard points to Vicky’s testimony that some pages of the 2014 Trust as introduced in evidence were replacement pages created in April 2014, when Mildred needed to show the title company she had the right to sell the property where Richard lived. He argues that because no evidence showed the material terms on the replaced pages no longer in effect, the 2014 Trust was uncertain in its terms.

As the trial court stated, however, the 2014 Trust was simply written and reasonably certain in its material terms. “ ‘The declaration of trust, whether written or oral, must be reasonably certain in its material terms; and this requisite of certainty includes the subject-matter or property embraced within the trust, the beneficiaries or persons in whose behalf it is created, the nature and quantity of interests which they are to have, and the manner in which the trust is to be performed.’ ” (Lane v. Whitaker (1942) 50 Cal.App.2d 327, 331.) Richard’s contention that the 2014 Trust is invalid as uncertain because changes may have been made (of which he presented no evidence) does not render the straightforward trust too uncertain to enforce.

Richard’s second argument is that the 2014 Trust is invalid because the 2006 Revocable Trust—of whose terms no evidence was introduced—might have provided for an exclusive method of revocation under Probate Code section 15401, and if it did, Mildred may not have had the power to revoke the 2006 Trust. Again, Richard’s argument that there may have been restrictive terms in the prior trust is unsupported by any evidence, and cannot invalidate the 2014 Trust.

Richard’s third argument is that no undisputed facts establish that when Mildred executed the 2014 Trust, the 2006 Revocable Trust was revocable, Mildred owned the Inez Street Properties as the sole trustee of the 2006 Revocable Trust, and Mildred had the power to transfer the trust property. Under Probate Code section 15200, subdivision (a), a trust may be created by “[a] declaration by the owner of property that the owner holds the property as trustee.” In Heggstad, the court of appeal concluded “a written declaration of trust by the owner of real property, in which he names himself trustee, is sufficient to create a trust in that property, and that the law does not require a separate deed transferring the property to the trust.” (Heggstad, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 950.) Mildred, the owner of the Inez Street properties, executed a written declaration of trust naming herself trustee, and therefore no separate deed was required to transfer the property to the trust. (See Carne v. Worthington (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 548, 559; Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154, 169-170.) Richard argues that because there was no evidence of the terms of the 2006 Revocable Trust, nothing supports a finding that Mildred owned the property or had any interest to transfer to the trust. This ignores Richard’s agreement in the joint trial statement that when Mildred executed the 2014 Trust, the Inez Street properties “were assets of the 2006 Revocable Trust,” and “[t]itle to these properties remain[s] in the 2006 Revocable Trust.”

Richard also argues that the trial court erred in determining that the presumption of title in Evidence Code section 662 was overcome by clear and convincing evidence, because “no undisputed facts or evidence” established that when she executed the 2014 Trust, “Mildred owned the Inez Street properties as the sole trustee of the 2006 Trust.” Evidence Code section 662 provides: “The owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.” “Evidence Code section 662 has application, by its express terms, when there is no dispute as to where legal title resides but there is question as to where all or part of the beneficial title should rest.” (Murray v. Murray (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1067.) But as the trial court explained, the documentary evidence showed that Mildred and Joseph owned the Inez Street properties as trustees of the 1995 Trust; the parties stipulated that title had been placed in the 2006 Revocable Trust; no evidence of those trusts was presented; no evidence showed those trusts had been destroyed in bad faith; and the evidence was “compelling” that Mildred intended to revoke her prior trusts when she created the 2014 Trust. This was clear and convincing evidence that Mildred had full beneficial title to the Inez Street properties.

The trial court was not faced with a 2006 Revocable Trust that prevented the 2014 Trust from being a valid trust. Instead, the court was faced with a total lack of evidence about the 2006 Revocable Trust, beyond Richard’s and Vicky’s stipulations that it was a revocable trust created by Mildred and Joseph which held title to the Inez Street properties. An absence of evidence does not create disputed facts. Richard cannot prevail on appeal by arguing that because there was no evidence about the more specific terms of the 2006 Revocable Trust, the court erred in finding that the 2014 Trust was valid and in transferring the Inez Street properties into that trust.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. As respondent did not participate in the appeal, no costs are awarded to her.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

DHANIDINA, J.